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TOWARDS A CLASS-BASED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
by
Ashley W. Doane, Jr.
University of Nev Hampshire, December, 1969
This work is an attempt to develop a theoretical model 
useful for explaining the historical evolution of ethnic and
national identities. Central to this framework are the
1
following assertions: (1) that ethnic and national identi­
ties are dynamic affiliations which undergo change through 
intergroup resource competition; (2) that given their 
material base, a complete theory of ethnicity and nation­
ality must consider these ties in relation to class; (3) 
that the evolution of group identities can ultimately only 
be understood in the context of global capitalist develop­
ment; and (4) that the uneven nature of capitalist develop­
ment (i.e., the core-periphery division) can be employed to 
explain intersocletal variations in the evolution of ethnic 
and national identities. Drawing upon these assumptions, we 
propose a global, historical and material approach to the 
study of intergroup relations and ethnic change.
In the analysis of intergroup relations in historically 
specific circumstances, our model employs the notion of eth- 
class (defined as social location in terms of both ethnicity 
and class) in order to explore the material interests which
x
underlie group action. We maintain that eth-class captures 
both the interrelationship between ethnicity and class and 
the reality that ethnic groups contain internal class divi­
sions. Thus, ethnic and national mobilization are analyzed 
as "alliances" of eth-class fractions; assimilation and 
ethnic merger reflect strategic decisions to alter group 
identity.
In addition to a conceptual discussion of ethnicity and 
nationality =ind a critical review of both classical and 
contemporary theories of ethnic change, this work contains 
two case studies in which our model is employed to explain 
the evolution of ethnic identities after 1800 in both the 
United States and South Africa. We find that the global, 
historical, and material approach presented in our framework 
facilitates analysis of the development of intergroup rela­




The purpose of this work Is to develop a theoretical 
model, that Is, an inventory of the elements necessary for 
understanding (Mills 1962, p. 36), useful for explaining the 
evolution of ethnic and national identities in the context 
of capitalist development in the post-1800 vorld-economy.x 
We will attempt to provide a framework in which to answer 
the question: What causes ethnic and national identities to
emerge, persist, change, or disappear? To use the argot of 
the social sciences, we are employing ethnicity and nation­
ality as dependent variables, seeking to explain variations 
in their form and nature across time and space. Such an 
approach stands in contrast to the main current of ethnic 
studies, which is to take ethnicity and nationality as 
givens (i.e., as independent variables) and instead focus 
upon their ability to explain other phenomena. As we will 
make clear below, we believe that a fuller understanding of 
ethnicity and nationality as social processes is necessary 
if we are to realize their full potential in explaining 
human behavior.
At the same time, however, we must emphasize both the 
exploratory and the theoretical nature of this work. Our 
objective is not to propose a "grand theory" of ethnicity 
and nationality— a task which we believe is beyond the
2current level o£ development of the field— but Instead to 
construct a framework containing those processes which in 
our opinion most strongly shape the evolution of ethnic and 
national Identities. Thus, this endeavor should be viewed 
as an attempt to specify parameters and establish a program 
for future study. The theoretical orientation of this 
undertaking will be manifest in our concentration upon 
broad, general trends in ethnic relations rather than the 
explanation of specific phenomena. Although case studies of 
two specific societies are provided, their inclusion is more 
for the purpose of exploring and illustrating our theoret­
ical framework than to stand as substantial analytical 
efforts in their own right.
Rationale
Our rationale for this undertaking has both theoretical 
and substantive roots. We believe that ethnicity and 
nationality are fundamental concepts in the attempt to 
understand and to explain human social behavior. They pro­
vide an important context for individual and group identity 
and action. How we define situations and act on the world 
around us is shaped by our ethnic and national affiliations. 
On a broader scale, ethnicity and nationality are a major 
source of local and global conflict. One need only peruse 
the daily newspaper for examples of struggle and violence 
rooted in ethnic and national cleavages. Of equal signifi­
cance is the role of ethnicity and nationality in serving as
a basis or socially constructed pretext for the unequal 
distribution of scarce or valued resources— i.e., for deter­
mining social stratification--thus affecting both indi­
vidual and group life chances and group interaction and 
conflict. Few societies exist without at least some degree 
of ethnically-based inequality, while the unequal distribu­
tion of wealth among nations is a major global issue (for­
merly First vs. Third World, now popularly phrased as the 
"North-South" conflict). Clearly, issues involving the 
forms and evolution of ethnicity and nationality may hold 
the key to understanding a diverse range of social issues.
On a substantive level, this work has its genesis in an 
earlier study (Doane unpublished) exploring issues of ethnic 
identity and stratification in the case of the Franco- 
Amerleans of New Hampshire. During the course of this 
research, we became convinced of the necessity of a histor­
ical and structural approach to the study of ethnicity. At 
that time, it seemed fruitless— and it still does— to 
attempt to explain the current status of Franco-Amerleans 
without reference to the past, which in turn was only under­
standable through the consideration of such factors as the 
industrialization of New England and the need for cheap 
labor in the textile industry; American immigration and the 
ebb and flow of natlvism and Americanization; and the oppor­
tunities for mobility produced by the expanding American 
economy. In the context of these issues, it was possible to
begin to explain both the assimilation and the persistence 
of Franco-Amerlean ethnicity.
At the same time, however, we became interested in the 
issue of variations in identity within an ethnic group. For 
some Franco-Amer leans "le fait ..rancais" remains a vital 
aspect of existence, while for others ethnic identification 
has been reduced to a descent category in the course of 
assimilation into the White American Hmega-group." In 
addition, we also became aware of historical and anecdotal 
evidence of class divisions within the group (e.g., a tradi­
tional working class, a petty bourgeois elite which provided 
both group leadership and a liaison with the larger society, 
and a professional and academic intelligentsia which emerged 
in the 1960s and 1970s), each with different implications 
for the persistence or disappearance of Franco-Amerlean 
ethnicity, which led us to question the interrelationship 
between ethnicity and class. A final puzzle was presented 
by the assertion of French-Canadian/Quebecois identity in 
Canada, a development which stood in sharp contrast to the 
experiences of Franco-Americans in the United States. This 
led us to question why an identity which flourished in one 
milieu disappeared or experienced a major transformation in 
another. Bach of these considerations is subsumed in the 
central question of this work: What causes ethnic and na­
tional identities to_emerge, persists.change. or disappear?
As ve began to search for answers to this question, ve 
became Increasingly dissatisfied with the corpus of existing 
works on ethnicity and nationality. Traditionally, social 
science has tended to treat ethnicity and nationality as 
undesirable preindustrial relics destined to fade away under 
the relentless homogenizing pressures of modernization. As 
a result, the primary contribution of the social sciences 
has been a plethora of excellent descriptive studies of the 
role and nature of ethnic identity for individual groups, 
with a much more limited literature on what ve view as the 
essential issue of intergroup relations and the evolution of 
ethnic and national identities. Moreover, the bulk of such 
work suffers from tendencies towards ahistorlcal, so-called 
"empirical11 research; that is, the use of data torn from 
their social contexts. In our opinion, studies of this 
nature do more to obfuscate than to clarify the nature of 
ethnicity and nationality.
A particularly harmful development in our view has been 
the tendency to generalize from case studies of individual 
groups to develop "universal" understandings of ethnicity 
and nationality. Given the prevalence of sociological 
"ethnocentrism"— the tendency of social scientists to ex­
plain general social phenomena on the basis of their under­
standing of their own society— and the intellectual hegemony 
of Western social science, the study of ethnicity and 
nationality has disproportionately reflected the experience
of Europe and the united states (c£. Amin's 1980, p. 4, 
discussion of "West-centered reductlonism"). This is mani­
fest in such practices as the emphasis on assimilation, the 
view of ethnicity as minority culture, and the use of race 
as a master concept. When non-western ethnicity as been 
taken into account, it has generally been via an "anthropo­
logical" emphasis on the "tribal" identities of preindus­
trial cultures. From our vantage point, a global theory of 
ethnicity requires a comparative approach derived from 
concrete group experiences in a diverse array of settings.
The development of our approach to the study of ethni­
city and nationality has been shaped by two major influ­
ences. First and foremost has been general Marxian poli­
tical economy. Marx's observation (1970, pp. 20-21) that as 
humans interact to produce their subsistence, they enter 
into social relations which in turn condition more general 
social and political processes underscores the primacy of 
class (i.e., material) interests in analyzing social behav­
ior.2 This does not mean— as is often mistakenly assumed by 
those working both inside and outside the Marxian framework- 
-that all actions are reducible to class (a position often 
referred to as "vulgar Marxism"). The relationship between 
the material and the ideal is a dialectical one: ideas such
as ethnicity and nationality may assume an Independent exis­
tence and may in turn affect relations of production— or, in 
Weberian terms, non-economic elements may have economic
consequences. Thus, Ideas emerge from human productive 
activities, vhich means that class (i.e., relations of 
production) must be taken into account as a key variable. 
Folloving this approach, our search for a theoretical frame­
work for ethnic and national relations will emphasize the 
material basis of ethnicity and nationality, assuming that 
the ultimate utility of group affiliations lies in the realm 
of Intergroup resource (i.e., productive and distributive) 
competition. Such an approach will necessarily focus upon 
the structural (as opposed to cultural, psychological, or 
even socio-biologlcal) roots of ethnic and national iden­
tities (cf. Yancey, Brikson and Juliani 1976, p. 392). In 
essence, our quest is for what Bonacich (1980, p. 12) has 
termed a "class" theory of ethnicity and nationality; that 
is, an explanation of the impact of class and the interplay 
of class and ethnic interests on the emergence, persistence, 
and evolution of group (i.e., ethnicity/ nationality and 
class) affiliations.
A second influence has been the super-macro or world- 
system perspective and its emphasis upon the world-system as 
a unit of analysis in the study of social behavior.* 
Wallerstein' s (1972, p. 222) insistence that national cases 
(and the study of ethnicity therein) cannot be understood 
apart from the world-system convinced us of the necessity of 
a global approach to the study of ethnicity and nationality. 
One cannot study the current ethnic conflict in South
Africa, for example, without taking into consideration the 
effects of European conquest and colonialism, the influence 
of foreign investment, and the evolution of the capitalist 
vorld-economy during the post-1945 age of decolonization and 
the Pax Americana. From a global or world-system perspec­
tive, Wallerstein's (1974a, 1974b) conceptualization of a 
core-periphery division of labor suggests that experiences 
of ethnicity and nationality may differ between the First 
World and the Third World; however, it simultaneously 
reminds us that these experiences are inexorably bound 
together— and therefore can only be understood in terms of 
each other. This encourages us to view the evolution of 
ethnicity and nationality in industrial and developing 
societies not as separate phenomena, but as different yet 
related outcomes of the process of global capitalist 
development.
Overview
As we stated at the outset, the objective of this work 
is to develop a theoretical framework with which we can 
begin to explain the evolution of ethnic and national Iden­
tities. Yet the process of theory-building is complex 
indeed. Before ve can present our model, ve must first set 
conceptual parameters and evaluate the contributions of 
previous efforts. In this overview, our purpose is to 
introduce the reader to the core of our theoretical argument 
in the hope that such exposure will enhance appreciation of
the necessary intermediate steps. This synopsis will neces­
sarily be truncated, as elaboration vill be forthcoming in 
the following chapters.
In approaching the study of ethnicity and nationality, 
ve maintain that these phenomena are not unique, but serve 
as one type of group affiliation, one means through which 
humans mobilize to produce and to compete for the means of 
material existence. As a basis for group formation, ethni­
city and nationality belong to the order of communal affili­
ations; that is, they are rooted in real or presumed common 
origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint 
destiny (cf. Weber 1946, pp. 171-79; 1968, pp. 385-98; 
Schermerhorn 1970, p. 12). At the same time, these communal 
affiliations take on social significance in the context of 
interoroup material relations— relations which emerge from 
the specific conditions of economic and political life.
This suggests that ethnic and national identities and the 
structure of intergroup relations emerge and change as a 
consequence of the exigencies of material existence. 
Accordingly, if we are to unlock the secret of how ethnic 
and national identities evolve, then we must develop some 
conception of how the social organization of human produc­
tive activities shapes the process of communal group 
formation.
One central argument of this work is that as group 
phenomena, ethnicity, and.nationality can ultimately only be
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understood in the context of the process of global capital­
ist development— the evolution of the capitalist vorld- 
economy. This is not to attribute mystical explanatory 
powers to capitalism, but to recognize that the dominant 
means through which humans produce their subsistence will 
have a significant effect upon other dimensions of social 
existence (cf. Marx 1970, pp. 20-21). We contend that the 
expansion of capitalism into a global system transformed the 
nature of group affiliations through such processes as colo­
nization, labor migration, proletarianization of independent 
producers, and the emergence of the modern state. Thus, the 
process of capitalist development constitutes the most 
general basis for explaining ethnicity and nationality, the 
current context in which communal affiliations are ex­
pressed. Our choice of the post-1800 world-economy as the 
focus for analysis permits us to concentrate upon an era in 
which capitalist production relations were unquestionably 
dominant in much of the world, while maintaining sufficient 
historical scope to enable us to analyze the evolution of 
group identities.'*
Although we maintain that global capitalist development 
constitutes the overarching context for the study of ethni­
city and nationality, further exploration should take place 
at lover levels of analysis— in particular, the nation­
state. Social behavior occurs across a range of inter­
related levels, from world-system to dyad; our task is to
move between levels and to specify Interrelationships. At 
the societal level, ve believe that one dynamic of capital­
ism— uneven development— has had a particularly profound 
influence upon the evolution of ethnicity and nationality. 
The core-periphery relationship (cf. Wallerstein 1974a, 
1974b) describes two vastly different yet intertvined tra­
jectories of national social and economic development; that 
is, the economically and politically dominant core vs. the 
underdeveloped and dependent periphery. In our view, this 
core-periphery division can be linked to different evolu­
tionary paths for ethnicity and nationality (e.g., "sym­
bolic1' ethnicity in the core vs. stronger ethnic ties and 
ethno-natlonallsm in the periphery). Accordingly, one major 
thrust of this work will be to generate hypotheses about the 
nature of ethnicity in the core and in the periphery. As we 
move to even lover levels of analysis, we recognize that 
these processes may also be observed within a nation-state, 
as uneven development— e.g., the domination of peripheral 
areas within a country by a more developed metropolis— which 
may again give rise to different forms of ethnicity (e.g., 
Wales, Quebec). In this work, however, the bulk of our 
analysis will be concentrated at the level of the nation­
state.
The third component of our theoretical framework is an 
emphasis upon the "eth-classw as a basic unit for the analy­
sis of group action. The term eth-class (borrowed— but with
a different usage— from Gordon 1964) captures the notion of 
social location in terms of what ve believe are the two most 
important social dimensions: ethnicity/nationality and
class.0 From our perspective, this concept incorporates tvo 
significant (and interrelated) social facts: (1) that ethnic 
groups themselves internally contain class divisions; and 
(2) that social classes may be segmented on the basis of 
"communal" affiliations such as ethnicity and nationality.0 
When groups mobilize for action, mobilization will occur 
along ethnic/national lines (e.g., Black working class and 
Black middle class) or class lines (e.g., Black, Hispanic, 
and White working classes) within the context created by the 
exigencies of capitalist accumulation. As these eth-class 
"alliances" struggle with other such entities, group identi­
ties and Intergroup relations are continually created and 
recreated. Consequently, another of our theoretical tasks 
will be to outline the types of eth-class "alliances" and to 
begin to specify conditions under which these different 
forms will actually emerge.
In sum, what ve are proposing is a class-based frame­
work for the study of ethnicity and nationality, a model 
which will be embedded in the dynamics of global capitalist 
development (e.g., capitalist accumulation— the search for 
markets and cheap labor, exploitation, proletarianization) 
and the consequences (e.g., core-periphery relations, 
tendencies towards crisis) of the uneven nature of this
development. While material activities serve in our view as 
the most general basis for social action, ve will place 
particular emphasis upon competition and conflict between 
eth-classes (and constellations of eth-classes) as a key 
explanatory factor in understanding the evolution of group 
identities. It is our hope that what emerges from our 
effort at theory-building will be a useful means for addres­
sing what ve have posed as a core question: What causes
ethnic identities to emerge, persist, change, or disappear? 
If ve are successful in this endeavor, we hope that this 
work will make a contribution to both the sociology of 
ethnic relations and the more general areas of stratifica­
tion and political economy.
Organization
Our attempt to develop a theoretical model useful for 
explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities 
will be organized around the following tasks: exploration
of conceptual issues; critical review of existing theories; 
development of a class-based theoretical framework; and 
application of the framework to two case studies. Each of 
these tasks is essential to the development of our theoreti­
cal position and will constitute one or more chapters in 
this work.
In Chapter II ve will explore conceptual issues related 
to our central notions of ethnicity and nationality. This 
task is made necessary by the conceptual confusion and broad
range of variation which currently exist In definitions of 
ethnicity and nationality (cf. Isajiv 1974; Burgess 1978; 
Connor 1972, 1978). Moreover, how ve conceptualize a vari­
able is closely linked to its theoretical usage (e.g., eth­
nic group qua culture group); therefore, a conceptual dis­
cussion is an essential first step in the construction of a 
theoretical framework. We will consider a variety of con­
ceptual Issues relevant to our study Including: the nature
of ethnicity; "race"; ethnicity as a variable; ethnicity and 
nationality; and nationality and ethno-nationallsm. One key 
(and somewhat novel) component of our conceptual base will 
be a distinction between ethnicity and nationality based 
upon level of inclusiveness: ethnicity will be defined as a
communal affiliation expressed within a society (i.e., a 
nation-state); nationality as a more Inclusive identity 
asserted on a global level. Secondly, ve will adopt a 
strategic perspective on ethnicity; that is, ve vill assert 
that ethnic and national identities are linked to the pur­
suit of material interests and are thus inexorably linked to 
issues of class, domination, and stratification.
The final preliminary step in the development of our 
theoretical model vill be a critical review, presented in 
Chapter III, of past and present theories of the evolution 
of ethnicity and nationality. Although classical social 
science seems to have unequivocally assumed that ethnic 
identities would vither away as a result of the homogenizing
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effects of Industrialization and modernization, many contem­
porary theorists have sought to evaluate ethnicity and 
nationality in the context of the changes wrought by indus­
trialization and modernization. We will classify and evalu­
ate five types of theories which attempt to explain the 
persistence of ethnicity in modern society: primordialism,
the plural society approach, modernization/competition 
theories, reactive ethnicity, and class theories. Our 
critique of these approaches will emphasize their over­
simplification of the relationship between ethnicity and 
class, as well as their lack of a macro-level dynamic which 
adequately explains the diversity of ethnic and national 
phenomena. Thus, ve set the stage for the introduction of 
our model, a class-based framework grounded in the dynamics 
of uneven global capitalist development.
In Chapter IV, ve vill present our framework for under­
standing the evolution of ethnic and national identities in 
the post-1800 world-economy. As outlined above, ve attempt 
to resolve the "dilemma" of the relationship between ethni­
city and class by focusing upon the eth-class as a basic 
unit for the analysis of group action. At the same time, ve 
assert that the formation of eth-class alliances (i.e., 
mobilization for action) can only be fully understood in the 
context of global capitalist development, including the 
uneven nature of this development reflected in the division 
between core and peripheral areas of the vorld-system.
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Drawing upon this base, ve will present a series of "working 
hypotheses" which address the evolution of ethnicity and 
nationality in both the core and the periphery. In addi­
tion, ve vill seek to specify factors which ve believe play 
an integral role in the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities in specific circumstances.
Chapters V and VI constitute the first application of 
our framework, where ve will seek to assess the analytical 
utility of our model by employing our working hypotheses to 
study the evolution of ethnic and national identities in two 
case studies: the United States and South Africa. Our goal
in each instance vill not be to produce an exhaustive case 
study— indeed, we will rely upon the secondary analysis of 
existing data— but rather to elaborate our abstract theore­
tical model by applying it to specific historical circum­
stances. Following the emphasis ve have placed upon the 
core-periphery distinction, we will devote one chapter to a 
core nation (the United States) and one to a peripheral 
society (South Africa).7 Our choice of the United States 
reflects both its location within the core and its role as a 
"data source" for many theories of ethnicity (e.g., assimi­
lation). Similarly, South Africa stands as perhaps the most 
acute (and most analyzed) example of ethnic conflict in the 
contemporary world. We are confident that the opportunity 
to reanalyze these cases while employing our framework will 
allow for a particularly rigorous test of its utility.
17
In Chapter v i i , the final chapter, ve will conclude our 
presentation and evaluate our theoretical framework In light 
of the data provided by our case studies. This should 
enable us to highlight both the strengths of our model and 
the areas requiring further elaboration. Given the explora­
tory or developmental nature of this undertaking, ve will 
devote particular attention to the task of specifying issues 
to be addressed by subsequent studies. Indeed, this work is 
as much a beginning as it is an end product. Perhaps the 
true measure of success vill be the degree to which ve 
establish a useful foundation for future research.
CHAPTER NOTES
CHAPTER I
1. Both of our central concepts— ethnicity and nationali­
ty— will be discussed at length in Chapter II. At this 
stage, the reader should be cognizant of the fact that 
ve are employing a somewhat unique conceptualization of 
nationality as a communal (i.e., ethnic-like) affilia­
tion linked to asserted claims of political and terri­
torial autonomy. Stated simply, nationality is ethni­
city on a more inclusive level.
2. The reference here is to Marx's famous statement in the 
preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy:
In the social production of their life, men enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable and 
independent of their vill, relations of production 
which correspond to a definite stage of develop­
ment of their material productive forces. The sum 
total of these relations of production constitutes 
the economic structure of society, the real foun­
dation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness. The mode of pro­
duction of material life conditions the social, 
political, and intellectual life process in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their con­
sciousness .
3. While key aspects of this work were inspired by the 
writings of Immanuel Wallerstein, ve would like to 
emphasize that this does not constitute an unqualified 
endorsement of world-system theory. On the one hand, 
ve believe that the world-system paradigm has made a 
significant contribution to sociology by reintroducing 
detailed historical analysis to the study of social 
change (reflected in the detailed historical analyses 
in Chapters V and VI of this work) and by encouraging 
us to consider the effect of global forces in the study 
of individual societies (a core component of our theo­
retical framework). On the other hand, we believe that 
much more needs to be done with respect to elaborating 
the dynamics of the vorld-economy. Moreover, ve would 
agree with those critics of Wallerstein (e.g, Brenner—
1977) who complain that world-system theory downplays
18
19
the role of internal class (not to mention ethnic) 
factors in shaping the evolutionary course of indi­
vidual societies. In this context, ve would consider 
the eth-class based analysis presented herein to be an 
implicit critique of the vorld-system approach. For an 
excellent summary and critical analysis of the vorld- 
system perspective, see Shannon (1989).
4. Clearly, communal identities existed prior to the 
emergence of the capitalist mode of production and 
vould be likely to exist in future social forms. Our 
analysis is limited to communal affiliations under 
capitalism. One complicating factor in such an 
analysis is the slow emergence of capitalism from 
feudalism (cf. Sweezy, Dobb, Takahashi, Hilton, Hill, 
Lefebvre, Procacci, Hobsbavn and Harrington 1978) and 
the length of time before capitalism penetrated the 
entire globe. This muddied the analytical waters by 
giving rise to intermediate, contradictory forms of 
communal affiliation containing components of precapi­
talist affiliations.
5. While Gordon (1964) should be credited with inventing 
the term eth-class, it should be noted that our usage 
vill differ dramatically from his (e.g., our use of 
Marxian class categories vs. Gordon's conception of 
class in status terms). Other writers (e.g., Leon 
1970; Geschwender 1978; Bonacich 1980; Barrera 1987) 
have also sought to integrate ethnicity and class as 
bases for social action.
6. Indeed, in the extreme circumstances of a "caste-like" 
society, ethnic groups, as overall units, may consti­
tute class divisions within a society. See Leon (1970) 
on the role of European Jews during feudalism and in 
the early stages of industrial capitalism.
7. We recognize that the choice of South Africa as an 
example of a peripheral society may be somewhat 
controversial. From the vantage point of the vorld- 
system perspective, South Africa vould be classified as 
semiperipheral; that is, as exhibiting a mixture of 
core and peripheral activities in the international 
division of labor (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Martin 
1986; Wallerstein 1979, p. 100; Milkman 1979). Inas­
much as (1) we view the semiperiphery-periphery 
distinction as representing gradations within the 
periphery (indeed, some— e.g., Chirot 1977— vould argue 
that all peripheral societies are now semiperipheral) 
and (2) South Africa was unarguably peripheral at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the South African 
case is suitable for the purposes of our study.
CHAPTER II
ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY AND CLASS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
In this chapter, ve propose to explore conceptual 
issues of ethnicity and nationality— and, more briefly, of 
social class-in order to provide a firm definitional foun­
dation for the theoretical discussion in the following 
chapters. As we do so, however, we acknowledge the limita­
tions of static, abstract definitions. Prom our vantage 
point, sociology is the study of social change; "social 
structure is process in slow motion" (as Robert E. Park used 
to say); and definitions are, in essence, metaphors for 
process. In other words, the theoretical concepts necessary 
to comprehend society evolve with society itself; that is, 
present-day "ethnicity" does not necessarily have the same 
sociological content as ethnic-like identities in ancient 
societies. Therefore, we remind the reader that our concep­
tual discussion is set in the specific context of the post- 
1800 vorld-economy--the analysis of other times is left to 
other works (see, for example, Armstrong 1982). Moreover, 
the definitions offered in this chapter represent but a 
first approximation of ongoing social processes; further 
elaboration vill occur when ve link ethnicity and national­
ity to class and to specific historical circumstances.
Our reservations regarding definitions notwithstanding, 
the discussion which is presented in this chapter is made
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necessary by conceptual problems which beset the field of 
ethnic studies and stand as an obstacle to analysis.
Indeed/ to pose a question such as: What do ve mean by
ethnicity and nationality? is equivalent to battling the 
many-headed Hydra. In surveying the field, we find a basic 
lack of consensus as to what is meant by ethnicity and 
nationality, a problem compounded by the presence of a host 
of related terms such as race, tribe, status group, culture 
group, and the like. Any review of social science litera­
ture will yield broad variations in definitions of ethnicity 
and nationality (cf. the excellent summaries provided by 
Isajiv 1974; Burgess 1978; Obidinski 1978; and Connor 1978), 
differences which often reflect the specific research con­
text or ideological environment of the author. Moreover, as 
Isajiv (1974) observes, definitions of ethnicity are often 
taken for granted and omitted entirely. We will address 
this issue in more detail as ve consider each individual 
concept.
A second and in our view equally grave problem is posed 
by the analytical separation of ethnicity and nationality, 
the artificial sundering of these fundamentally interrelated 
concepts. From a "sociology of knowledge" perspective, this 
unfortunate state of affairs reflects the compartmentaliza- 
tion of subject matter and units of analysis among the 
social sciences. In approaching ethnicity and nationality, 
sociologists have traditionally concentrated upon "race
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relations" and minority groups within a society, a focus 
which has been conducive to the study of ethnicity but not 
(except in the case of anti-colonialism) to the study of 
nationality--which requires a larger unit of analysis. 
Likewise, anthropologists have tended to engage in ethno­
graphic studies of individual groups, only more recently 
turning to the study of intergroup relations (R. Cohen 1978, 
pp. 380-83; Wolf 1982). On the other hand, political scien­
tists, with their emphasis on political institutions, have 
explored issues of nationality and "nation-building" but 
have devoted less attention to aspects of ethnicity. More­
over, as Connor (1978, p. 387) found after comparing refer­
ences from articles in the journals Ethnicity and Canadian 
Review of Studies in Nationalism, little cross-pollination 
has transpired. This academic "division of labor" has 
perpetuated the separation of ethnicity and nationality, 
leading to conceptual confusion of the two terms (e.g., 
treating them as synonyms) and limitations upon the develop­
ment of an integrated framework.
Our major conceptual position, to be elaborated in this 
chapter, is that ethnicity and nationality are analytically 
separate yet related affiliations, both belonging to the 
larger order of communal affiliations based upon real or 
flctive common ancestry and a shared sense of joint histori­
cal experience and destiny. The distinction we draw is that 
ethnicity (e.g., Franco-American, Walloon) is expressed
within a society or social system, while nationality (e.g., 
American, Belgian) represents a claim as a people to be a 
politically autonomous society (i.e., a nation-state). In 
other words, nationality is a more inclusive identity, a 
sense of citizenship in a nation-state which is expressed on 
a global level, while ethnicity is asserted within the con­
fines of the nation-state (we will deal with ethno-national- 
ism— the unattained claim of nationhood by an ethnic group—  
in the discussion of nationality). Indeed, ethnicity and 
nationality represent but part of a continuum of affilia­
tions ranging from kinship to pan-nationalism. Prom the 
perspective of the individual, these affiliations or poten­
tial affiliations exist as levels within levels (e.g., pan- 
national--national--ethnic--subethnic--kin), each identity 
employed in its particular social context (e.g., nationality 
in International relations; ethnicity within the nation­
state; sub-ethnicity within the ethnic group--cf. Keyes 
1976; van den Berghe 1971).
The other major component of the conceptual position 
which we will develop is a strategic characterization of 
ethnicity and nationality; that is, the position that ethnic 
and national identities are grounded in material interests—  
the production and distribution of valued resources— in the 
context of intergroup relations. As we noted in Chapter I, 
this is not to assert that ideas such as ethnicity and 
nationality cannot in turn influence material conditions,
but only to observe that they are ultimately grounded in 
material life. From the standpoint of individual group 
members, assertion of ethnic and national identities re­
flects Individual perception of interests, which in turn 
may be shaped by the group— and, as we will see shortly---by 
other groups. This linkage yet differentiation of indi­
vidual and group interests leads us to another major point, 
one which is often overlooked in the literature: ethnic and
national_groups are not monolithic entities,,. they can sub­
sume considerable differences of interest, especially with 
regard to class interests (cf. Thompson 1979). What this 
means is that ethnic and national identities and group 
actions are shaped (negotiated, imposed) on the basis of 
interests and power relations within group boundaries (e.g., 
longstanding political tensions within the Parti Quebecois). 
This point will be developed further in this and subsequent 
chapters.
The organization of this chapter will be along the 
lines of a topical discussion of the concepts of ethnicity, 
nationality, and class. In each case, our purpose is not to 
engage in an encyclopedic discussion, but rather to high­
light key issues and to elaborate our position. During our 
discussion of ethnicity we will also consider briefly a 
related concept--race--which we believe has been the source 
of much confusion in the study of ethnicity and nationality. 
We should also alert the reader to the fact that our consid-
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eration of class will necessarily be brief. Although class 
is inexorably intertwined with issues of ethnicity and 
nationality, and its conceptual ambiguity requires some 
clarification, a complete exposition of conceptual issues 
relevant to class would involve a separate work with a 
focus considerably different from that of this undertaking. 
Finally, at the conclusion of the chapter, a summary will 
emphasize this conceptual presentation to the material to 
follow.
Ethnicity
Although it is by no means a new term, ethnicity has 
only recently enjoyed widespread usage among social scien­
tists (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, pp. 1-4; R. Cohen 1978, pp. 
379-80). Moreover, as we noted at the beginning of the 
chapter, there is as of yet no consensus regarding a defini­
tion of ethnicity or its corporate manifestation, ethnic 
group (Isajiw 1974; Burgess 1978; Obidinski 1978).1 The 
reasons for this state of affairs serve as both an overview 
of the conceptual problems in the field of ethnic studies 
and a case study in the sociology of knowledge. As is 
evident in the development of ethnic studies, definitions 
reflect the "frame of reference” and the research objectives 
of the user, much to the detriment of any attempts to 
develop a lingua franca for scholarly discussion.
The ideological and geographical frame of reference of 
the researcher has had a particularly profound influence on
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how ethnicity has been conceptualized. Sociologists in the 
United States have for years viewed ethnicity as race, 
religion, or national origin (e.g., Gordon 1964) or as 
"minority culture" (e.g., Wirth 1938; Warner and Srole 1945, 
p. 28), thus reflecting the ideological emphasis of hege­
monic groups upon resolving social problems through the 
assimilation of ethnic minorities. From this perspective, 
the dominant Anglo-Americans were not viewed as an ethnic 
group, thereby creating what Banton (1983, p. 64) has des­
cribed as "minus-one" ethnicity; that is, a conceptual­
ization of ethnicity as an attribute of minorities. More 
recently, on the other hand, "primordial" definitions of 
ethnicity have been promoted by academic supporters of the 
recent ethnic "resurgence" in the United States (e.g., 
Greeley 1974; Novak 1973). Other examples further illus­
trate the sensitivity of definitions of ethnicity to the 
research context. The notion of ethnic group was often 
discarded by European social scientists in favor of nation, 
a reflection of European historical experiences with the 
national aspirations of ethnic groups (Isajiw 1974, pp. 113- 
14). Western scholars studying Africa have tended to use 
"tribe" to describe ethnic groups— in what we interpret as 
an ethnocentric, pejorative application (cf. R. Cohen 1978, 
p. 384) which serves to legitimate core domination (Connor 
1978, p. 392; van den Berghe 1983, p. 221). Definitions,
27
then, roust be evaluated with respect to their social setting 
and to the ideology of their promoters.
As is the case with geographical or ideological con­
text, academic environments have also shaped conceptualiza­
tions of ethnicity. Anthropologists have tended to empha­
size ethnic groups as culture groups (Barth 1969, p. 9; R. 
Cohen 1978, pp. 379-80), while sociologists outside of the 
field of ethnic studies have focused upon ethnicity as an 
explanation for other social processes. In this latter 
context, ethnicity is employed as a social category, an 
independent variable shaping such dependent variables as 
achievement orientation, mate selection, voting behavior, 
and occupational prestige (Obidinski 1978, p. 213; Yancey et 
al. 1976, p. 399). Unfortunately, such a methodological 
approach has resulted in ethnicity becoming "a matter of 
research design" (Obidinski 1978, p. 219), a function of the 
availability of data and the nature of operational defini­
tions employed by large scale survey operations such as the 
United States Bureau of the Census and the National Opinion 
Research Center.3 Such "abstracted empiricism," to use 
Mills* (1959) term, has made ethnicity a term employed by 
all and defined by few (cf. Isajiw 1974, p. Ill), a practice 
all too prevalent in current empirical works.
Rather than offer an abstract definition of what we 
view as a social process, our preference is to address the 
question: What_is important, sociologically speaking, about
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ethnicity? To begin with, ethnicity is an identity which 
reflects a group affiliation; thus, it is endowed with all 
the characteristics of social groups— e.g., collective 
representations shaping the behavior of members; existence 
in contrast to other groups; persistence through the ability 
to satisfy the needs and goals of members, particularly 
material needs and goals. Although similar in form to other 
types of social groups (e.g., occupational groups, subcul­
tures— cf. A. Cohen 1974b, pp. ix-x), ethnicity belongs to 
the order of communal identities; that is, it is grounded in 
presumed common origin and a sense of shared historical 
experience and joint destiny (Weber 1968, p. 389).3 This 
affiliation is not an "objective" social category, it 
requires some measure of collective solidarity on the part 
of group members (A. Smith 1981, p. 66). Ethnic groups 
differentiate themselves from other such entities on the 
basis of a configuration of socially defined (i.e., nego­
tiated, imposed) symbolic markers such as language, reli­
gion, customs, and physical characteristics (Schermerhorn 
1970, p. 12) which define the "boundary" (Barth 1969) of a 
group. In the contemporary world, ethnic identities exist 
in relation to other such identities within a sociopolitical 
system (i.e., a nation-state); that is, they are employed to 
make demands upon or resist incursions by other groups in 
what becomes a political struggle (cf. A. Cohen 1981, pp. 
317-18).* To summarize, we have tentatively described
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ethnicity as a social identity with four central character­
istics: presumed commonality, collective solidarity,
differentiation via symbolic markers, and expression through 
intergroup interaction within a social system. Yet this 
formulation only begins to capture the conceptual richness 
of ethnicity; thus, we must continue our exploration.
The Nature of Ethnicity
A central focus of conceptual discussions of ethnicity 
has involved attempts to describe the sociologically signi­
ficant qualities or the "nature” of ethnicity.® In our 
view, this debate is best organized around three subtopics: 
"primordial" ethnicity vs. ethnicity as a variable; ethni­
city as culture vs. ethnic boundaries; and "strategic" 
ethnicity.
"Primordial" ethnicity vs. ethnicity as a variable. To 
speak of ethnicity as "primordial" (e.g., Geertz 1963; 
Greeley 1974; Isaacs 1975) is to view it as an irreducible, 
basic group identity, one which is rooted in the "givens" of 
social existence.® Such an identity is ascriptive and 
involuntary; group solidarity is based in mysterious, 
emotional sentiments linked to historical experience. The 
attraction of a primordial view of ethnicity is its seeming 
ability to explain the emotional intensity of ethnicity, the 
"non-rational" emphasis upon symbols, and the adoption of 
ethnocentric attitudes (cf. Weber's— 1968, pp. 390-91—  
notion of "ethnic honor") towards other groups. Indeed, it
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is this "primordial" aspect of ethnic groups which has led 
many observers to view them as unique among social group­
ings .
Although primordiality may at times be a useful 
description of the apparent nature of ethnicity, its 
unidimensionality tends to obscure as much as it explains. 
Humans may exhibit a propensity for group membership and for 
basing groups on presumed descent; however, these groups may 
vary with regard to scope or permeability of their boun­
daries, change, or even disappear— phenomena which contra­
dict the notion of primordiality. In our view, primordial- 
ism is best viewed as an ideological claim of ethnic groups, 
a means of maintaining group solidarity. This point is 
tacitly recognized even by writers sympathetic to the 
primordialist position, as exemplified by Nagata's (1981, p. 
94) discussion of "primordialized" cultural traits and of 
primordiality as "a matter of usage." Ultimately, we 
believe that the affective intensity, the seemingly ascrip­
tive nature, and the symbolic demands of ethnicity are not 
primordial— they stem from human material activities 
(although ideas, once established, can assume a seemingly 
independent existence— hence, "primordiality").
In contrast to the primordialist conceptualization of 
ethnicity, many recent works have emphasized the variable 
nature of ethnicity. As Abner Cohen (1974b, p. xiv) has 
observed, "ethnicity is a matter of degree. There is
ethnicity and ethnicity." The notion of ethnicity as a 
variable subsumes a broad range of considerations. First, 
the assertion of ethnicity may exhibit considerable within- 
qroup variation in meaning and intensity (Obidinski 1978; 
Banks and Gay 1978, p. 245), even leading to the formation 
of sub-groups emphasizing different cultural markers (Barth 
1969; Lyman and Douglass 1973; Hannan 1979).7 Moreover, 
individual and group identities can be observed to vary 
across time and space (A. Cohen 1981) and in specific cir­
cumstances (Lyman and Douglass 1973, p. 358; Okamura 1981). 
For example, Italian-American affiliation may have held one 
subjective meaning for a Brooklyn laborer in the 1930s, as 
opposed to a Connecticut grocer during the same era, or a 
Portland, Maine, stockbroker in the 1980s. Finally, inter­
marriage between groups may produce "multiethnic" indi­
viduals who may choose to accentuate one identity (T. Smith 
1980) or create their own "ethnicity package" from the 
alternatives available to them (Lopata 1976, p. 117).
A second aspect of ethnicity as a variable pertains to 
our earlier observation that ethnic-like affiliations exist 
as levels within levels. Accordingly, each individual may 
have at his or her disposal several identities (e.g., 
American, White-American, Franco-American, Cajun), each of 
which may be activated in different circumstances (Light 
1981, pp. 70-71; Nielsen 1985). Perhaps the most signifi­
cant aspect of ethnicity as a variable, however, involves
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the ability of individuals and groups to change this seem­
ingly most basic of all identities. Individuals may "pass" 
from one identity to another, usually higher-status affili­
ation (De Vos 1975, pp. 26-29), while entire groups may 
assimilate into and be absorbed by more dominant groups (a 
phenomenon observed among White protestant immigrants to the 
United States). Indeed, new identities may emerge from new 
circumstances {e.g.. Creoles in Sierra Leone— A. Cohen 1981) 
or from the "pan-ethnic" fusion of smaller groups (e.g., 
American Indians, Asian Americans--Trottier 1981; Italian- 
Americans— Hannerz 1974; Slavic-Americans--Barton 1975; 
Jewish-Americans— Teller 1970; Arab-Americans— Abraham and 
Abraham 1983, Naff 1985).
Although the dimensions of ethnicity as a variable 
discussed above tend to refute the primordialist perspec­
tive, overemphasis of the mutability of ethnicity may be 
equally problematic. To reduce ethnicity to a purely 
"subjective belief" (as Weber— 1968, p. 389— is generally 
interpreted as having done; cf. Isajiw 1974, pp. 116-17; 
Burgess 1978, p. 269) is to remove its social and cultural 
anchors and to downplay the persistence of ethnicity. While 
they are not primordial, neither are ethnic identities 
donned and shed like a suit of clothes. This indicates for 
us the need to explore further, to uncover the reasons for 
both the persistence and the variability of ethnicity.
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Ethnicity as culture vs. ethnic "boundaries". The 
perspective of ethnicity as culture includes an emphasis 
upon ethnic groups as culture groups; that is, as bearers of 
a distinctive culture or symbolic system which is employed 
by group members to guide and interpret behavior (Naroll 
1964; Isajiw 1974; A. Cohen 1974b). This formulation has 
the attraction of seemingly capturing the unique essence of 
ethnicity, the often striking cultural differences between 
groups and the emphasis ethnic groups often place upon sym­
bolic issues. While ethnic groups, like many other social 
collectivities (e.g., occupational groups), share in common 
elements of culture, the notion of a direct correlation 
between ethnicity and culture has been criticized for promo­
ting an overly static conceptualization of ethnic group and 
for reducing ethnic groups to "trait inventories" (Barth 
1969, p. 12). Moreover, culture is not a unitary phenomenon 
(Lai 1983, p. 163); that is, it is subject to intragroup 
variation (Horowitz 1985, p. 69; A.P. Cohen 1985, pp. 15-19) 
and intergroup similarity through contact and diffusion.
The "cultural diversity" between ethnic groups is an arti­
fact of their past geographical separation (i.e., different 
material conditions and social contexts giving rise to 
different cultures), an isolation which is broken through 
intergroup interaction. We believe that the erroneous 
tendency to equate ethnicity with culture is due to over­
emphasizing the use of relatively persistent cultural sym­
bols (which gives ethnicity both its seeming primordiality 
and the appearance of being culture) as "markers" of group 
membership, thus overlooking the possibility of changing 
markers (e.g., the French language no longer being shared by 
all Franco-Americans) or the existence of markers which are 
shared by several groups (e.g., Catholicism as a common ele­
ment for many ethnic groups in the United States).8 Culture 
may be an important element of ethnic identity; however, 
ethnicity is not culture I
From the standpoint of intergroup relations, what is 
important about culture, more than its content per se, is 
the use of cultural elements as markers or boundaries which 
define and differentiate between groups. As noted in the 
seminal work of Barth (1969), an ethnic group is an organi­
zational type, a key feature of which is the maintenance of 
a boundary allowing classification into in-group and out­
group, "us" and "them." Inasmuch as culture is constantly 
created and re-created as a consequence of material activi­
ties and intergroup contact, the persistence of boundaries 
implies the conscious structuring of interaction so as to 
maintain intergroup differences (cf. Barth 1969, pp. 15-16). 
Accordingly, ve can view the seemingly "non-rational" (from 
an economic standpoint) emphasis of ethnic groups on cul­
tural symbols as attempts to maintain the organizational 
basis of the group and to assert collective solidarity 
(e.g., the attempts by ethnic groups in the United States to
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use bilingual education to preserve group distinctiveness). 
Ultimately, culture follows boundaries (Horowitz 1985, p.
69) 1
For our purposes, the above discussion leads to several 
important points. First, we see that ethnicity is only 
meaningful in the context of interaction with other groups. 
Without an "out-group" for contrast (i.e., boundary mainten­
ance), "in-group" identity becomes irrelevant. Secondly, 
the process of boundary formation and maintenance reflects 
the results of self and other ascription— the change and 
persistence of ethnicity occurs in the course of intergroup 
interaction. Thus, ethnicity becomes a negotiated identity 
(Lyman and Douglass 1973, p. 360) or, to the extent that 
power relations between groups are unequal (a fact with 
important historical significance), even an Imposed identity 
(cf. Banton's--1983, p. 31— discussion of "pariah groups"). 
It is in this context that "cultural markers" become signi­
ficant in limiting the variability of ethnicity, for unless 
key markers (e.g., language, physical traits) are part of 
one's make up or behavioral repertoire, ethnic boundaries 
become impermeable (i.e., unless one looks or acts the part- 
-and is perceived in such a manner by others--one cannot 
pass or assimilate; for example, a Franco-American with a 
"French" accent cannot present him or her self as an old 
stock Yankee). Consequently, to the extent that intergroup 
relations (and boundaries) are linked to elements of culture
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which are not easily manipulated, ethnicity appears to be 
primordial and ascriptive. What remains for us, then, is to 
investigate why processes of ethnic change and persistence—  
of boundary maintenance and manipulation— occur.
"Strategic" ethnicity. Thus far, we have emphasized 
the variable nature of ethnicity, suggesting that group 
boundaries and identities change as a consequence of inter­
group contact. As we have just observed, however, we are 
still faced with the question: Why do ethnic identities
vary? In response to this question, we can stress the 
importance of ethnicity as strategy; that is, the view that 
ethnic identities are linked to material interests— the 
production and appropriation of valued resources--expressed 
in an intergroup context (cf. Worsley 1984, pp. 248-50).
This position is a logical extension of our emphasis on the 
role of material factors in human social existence outlined 
in Chapter I; however, we should note that the notion of 
ethnicity as strategy has been given wide use by many non- 
Marxian scholars (e.g., A. Cohen 1974b; Bell 1975; Keyes 
1981; Light 1981) .
To consider ethnicity as strategy is to underscore the 
situational, voluntary nature of ethnicity, to assert that 
individuals and groups assert, mask, and alter ethnic iden­
tities in the pursuit of economic and political goals.* 
Individuals manipulate identities and seek to restrict the 
range of identities available to others (Lyman and Douglass
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1973); while groups mobilize along ethnic lines in order to 
demand greater inclusion into social institutions, to seek 
or maintain the exclusion of other groups, or to struggle 
for survival as a group. The implications of this are far- 
reaching: the notion of ethnicity as strategy suggests that
ethnic identities will ultimately not be retained across 
generations if they fail to provide material advantages 
(Barth 1969, p. 25; Glazer and Moynihan 1975, p. 9; Despres 
1975, p. 199). In other words, we can begin to explain eth­
nic persistence and change in terms of strategic utility in 
intergroup competition. As Keyes (1981, pp. 14-16) observes, 
individuals continually reassess social identities in light 
of past social action and changing social contexts; identi­
ties are shed, reformulated, or retained and the process 
begins anew.10
How do ethnic identities serve as strategies? On an 
individual level, the cultural markers which comprise group 
boundaries can be displayed or masked according to the per­
ceived exigencies of the situation. Surnames can be empha­
sized or altered, descent asserted or kept hidden, language 
employed or discarded. Individuals may also vary the level 
(e.g., nation, group, sub-group) at which they express their 
identity, choosing the identity which they believe will be 
most advantageous (Bell 1975, pp. 158-59; Light 1981, p.
73). Group mobilization and ethnic assertion can be em­
ployed to make political demands (e.g., "language rights,"
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increased representation), to create economic monopolies 
(Light 1972), or to establish an institutional infrastruc­
ture (Breton 1964) and informal social networks (Yancey et 
al. 1976, pp. 392-93). What is important in each instance 
is that ethnic boundaries are manipulated in order to obtain 
advantages in political and economic competition with other 
groups.
Despite the attractiveness of a strategic conceptuali­
zation of ethnicity, we must recognize that at this juncture 
the notion of ethnicity as strategy remains problematic. 
First, there are limits to the ability to manipulate ethnic 
boundaries due to the fact that ethnic identities must be 
negotiated (i.e., accepted by both outsiders and other mem­
bers of one's own group) and the cultural markers which 
comprise group boundaries are not necessarily easily adopted 
or shed (Horowitz 1985, p. 66). In instances of unequal 
power and the domination of one group by another, self­
definition may even become secondary (De Vos 1975, p. 30) or 
identities may even by forcibly altered (cf. Magubane's—  
1979, pp. 55-70— description of the deliberate transfor­
mation of native identities by the European colonizers in 
South Africa). Secondly, to consider ethnicity as an 
isolated strategy at one point in time reduces ethnic groups 
to interest groups and begs the larger issue of the emer­
gence and evolution of ethnic identities. The simple asser­
tion that identities persist or disappear in accordance with
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their strategic efficacy becomes teleological unless it is 
grounded in larger social dynamics. To consider ethnicity 
as personal strategy (e.g., Patterson 1975; Banton 1983) is 
unjustified reductionism which downplays group dynamics. 
Accordingly, while we find the notion of ethnicity as 
strategy to be useful, our fuller exposition must include 
issues of power and domination and attempt to explain the 
evolution of ethnic identities in the larger socio-histori- 
cal context of social and economic development.
Ethnicity and Race; A Conceptual Comment
In our consideration of conceptual issues of ethnicity, 
it is necessary to discuss briefly the related concept of 
race. We will argue that race is a confusing notion best 
omitted from the lexicon of the social sciences. From a 
scientific standpoint, race has little utility; it repre­
sents an arbitrary system of classification (e.g., Cauca­
soid, Mongoloid, Negroid) based on phenotypical differences. 
Underlying the notion of race was the fallacious belief that 
humans could be divided into separate species or subspecies 
based upon the assumed intergenerational transmission of 
complexes of traits--and that these differences could be 
employed to "explain” a vast array of human differences.11 
Current scientific theory, on the other hand, holds that all 
humans belong to the same species and share the same origi­
nal ancestry, exhibiting only minor variations due to iso­
lation and adaptation (Montagu 1974). Nevertheless, these
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pseudoscientific explanations have exerted a dispropor­
tionate— and, one might add, tragic--influence on human, 
affairs.
Sociologically speaking, we can describe race as a folk 
concept or social "myth” (Redfield 1958, p. 67; Montagu 
1974, p. 3) which is employed socially to distinguish 
between human groups (i.e., to mark ethnic boundaries) and 
to emphasize intergroup differences by inferring separate 
origins. The social and arbitrary nature of this categori­
zation is reflected in the varying treatments accorded per­
sons of "mixed" ancestry (e.g., Black/White persons as Black 
in the United States, as a separate group--Colored— in South 
Africa, and distributed along a continuum in Brazil— Harris 
1964), the legal definitions of racial membership (e.g., the 
Phipps case in Louisiana, Racial Classification Boards in 
South Africa), and the legislative alteration of the race of 
an individual (Henriques 1953, pp. 49-50).12 "Racial" cate­
gorization has its origins in interethnic contact between 
diverse groups (usually due to long distance migration) and 
a desire to "explain" intergroup physical, cultural, and 
technological differences. A seemingly inevitable corollary 
of this process was the deliberate creation of racist ideol­
ogies (i.e., of "superior" vs. "inferior" human types) to 
legitimate the brutality of conquest, colonization, and 
enslavement (Montagu 1974, p. 39). Indeed, as Hannah Arendt
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has observed (1973, pp. 183-84; cited in Montagu 1974, p.
31) :
It is highly probable that the thinking in terms 
of race would have disappeared in due time to­
gether with other irresponsible opinions of the 
nineteenth century, if the "scramble for Africa," 
and the new era of imperialism had not exposed 
Western humanity to new and shocking experiences. 
Imperialism would have necessitated the invention 
of racism as the "explanation" and excuse for its 
deeds even if no race-thinking had ever existed in 
the civilized world.
Thus, from a social scientific standpoint, race is properly 
studied as an ideology of domination, as the reification of 
relations of dispossession (Chang 1985).
In our view, what remains problematic is that despite 
its recognized scientific shortcomings, race is still widely 
used by social scientists (e.g., the large number of arti­
cles and monographs containing "race" in the title; the use 
of race to describe fields of study— ethnic and racial 
studies; race relations). Those who distinguish "racial" 
groups from ethnic groups assume that race engenders unique 
emotions and serves as a particularly visible and immutable 
marker of group identity, thereby producing qualitatively 
different intergroup relations. If we transcend the experi­
ences of former slaves in the Americas and the European 
colonization >of Africa, which seemingly provide the bulk of 
the data for the sociological study of "race relations," we 
find that neither of the above assumptions is valid. Dif­
ferences of color have not always been stigmatized, there 
exist instances of race-like divisions which do not rely
42
upon skin color (e.g., Tutsi vs. Hutu in Burundi), and the 
ability of individuals to "pass" as members of another race 
belies any unique reliability of race as an incontrovertible 
marker of group membership (Horowitz 1985, pp. 42-43; Banton 
1983, p. 27). Even the perspective that race is a "special 
case of ethnicity" (e.g., van den Berghe 1983, p. 222) where 
group boundaries are more rigid is flawed in that any dis­
tinction is not qualitative but at best a matter of degree. 
Skin color is simply one means of marking ethnic boundaries; 
"race" is a supporting ideology. Inasmuch as we believe 
that the notion of race has limited analytical utility and 
that its use perpetuates its pseudoscientific standing, we 
will henceforth subsume race under the aegis of ethnicity. 
Ethnicity as a Dependent Variable
Thus far, we have conceptualized ethnicity as a com­
munally based group identity which varies in conjunction 
with its strategic utility in intergroup material competi­
tion. We emphasized the point that ethnicity is a variable. 
that it persists, evolves, or disappears as a consequence of 
intergroup interaction. While explication of the causes of 
this variation will be pursued in following chapters, we 
believe that it is useful to expand our conceptual discus­
sion to include dimensions of ethnicity as a dependent 
variable; that is, how ethnicity and ethnic relations are 
outcomes of intergroup competition. In this respect, we 
will highlight conceptual aspects of two interrelated
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issues: changing individual and group identities and
changes in the structure of intergroup relations.
Changing identities: assimilation and dissimilation.
Within the field of ethnic relations, the analysis of the 
persistence or evolution of individual and group identities 
is generally phrased in terms of assimilation and dissimila­
tion (Yinger 1981). In a general sense, assimilation des­
cribes a process of boundary reduction, the whole or partial 
absorption of one group into another or the merger of two or 
more groups into a more inclusive identity. Traditional 
sociological perspectives on assimilation {e.g., Warner and 
Srole 1945; Park 1950), based upon the experience of Euro­
pean immigrants to the United States and the "Anglo- 
conformity" Ideology of the dominant group, viewed it as a 
unilinear process which would lead to the inevitable 
absorption of ethnic minorities into the dominant group and 
the subsequent loss of the distinctive cultural markers 
which defined the group and its boundary. More recently, 
however, with the proliferation of comparative studies and 
the so-called "resurgence" of ethnicity in the United 
States, sociologists have come to recognize that the ethnic 
experience in the United States constituted a unique histor­
ical moment and that assimilation is a multidimensional 
process which is neither inevitable nor irreversible.13 
Gordon (1964) has demonstrated that assimilation may occur 
at varying paces in different spheres of social life (e.g.,
cultural vs. structural assimilation). Others (e.g.,
Banton 1981; Yinger 1981) have observed that assimilation 
need not be total, that it may be reversible, and that it 
may involve changes in the Identities of both groups. 
Furthermore, assimilation may vary among members of a group, 
as different material and political interests produce 
different ethnic "strategies." What is clear is that 
assimilation as absorption is a complex phenomenon shaped by 
such factors as the time and nature of intergroup contact, 
differential levels of power, the generational progression 
of intermarriage, and the competing goals of different 
groups (Scherraerhorn 1970; Banton 1981).
In addition to the notion of absorption and "loss of 
identity," assimilation has also been used to describe a 
second process of boundary reduction, the temporary or 
permanent amalgamation or fusion of several groups into a 
larger, more inclusive identity (Horowitz 1985, p. 65; Sarna
1978). Here, intergroup competition has the effect of 
expanding the "scope of identity" (Light 1981, p. 73), as 
previously separate groups blend their boundaries by 
employing more inclusive criteria (cf. Coser— 1956— on 
conflict functioning to reduce intragroup conflict). For 
example, ethnic competition and out-group hostility in the 
United States encouraged Neapolitans, Sicilians, and other 
regional groups to view themselves as Italian-Americans 
(Hannerz 1974), much as it facilitated the formation of such
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"pan-ethnic" groups as Asian-Americans, Native Americans, 
and Hispanic Americans (Trottier 1981). Such unification 
often reflects an awareness of the strategic disadvantages 
of relatively small, fragmented groupings in an expanding 
socio-political arena. Indeed, some writers (e.g., Hannan 
1979; van den Berghe 1983) maintain that the organizational 
requirements of modern societies produce more inclusive 
ethnic groupings.
The other side of the coin of changing ethnic identi­
ties is dissimilation or differentiation. We can describe 
dissimilation as the maintenance or strengthening of ethnic 
boundaries or the creation of new, more exclusive boundaries 
(cf. Yinger 1981, p. 257). Ethnic groups can persist des­
pite strong assimilative pressures and increasing cultural 
convergence (e.g., Pranco-Americans in Northern New England- 
-Doane unpublished, pp. 46-79) and can even experience 
ethnic "revivals"— the increased assertion of group distinc- 
tiveness-under certain conditions (cf. Khleif's— 1978b—  
description of the post-1945 revival of Welsh identity; 
other examples would be Quebecois in Canada, Basques in 
Spain, and Sikhs in India). While the general trend may be 
towards more inclusive identities, groups may still be 
divided into more exclusive subgroups— Muslim solidarity 
created Pakistan, subsequent Bengali dissimilation in East 
Pakistan led to the secession of Bangladesh. Indeed, 
neither dissimilation nor assimilation are unilinear
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processes; groups may experience cycles of unification and 
differentiation (cf. Nagata's— 1981— enlightening descrip­
tion of the expansion and contraction of Malay ethnic 
boundaries).
The structure of intergroup relations: ethnic strati­
fication. The structure of intergroup relations describes 
issues of group access to economic resources and political 
power; that is, of systems of ethnic stratification. In our 
view, the structure of intergroup relations is a key inter­
vening variable in the evolution of ethnic identities. 
Individuals and groups reassess and reformulate identities 
and goals in light of group location in the ethnic structure 
of society. Group position conditions both available alter­
natives and the probability of success of given strategies. 
At the same time, group location is constantly changing as a 
result of the collective actions of group members, the re­
sponses of other groups, and changes in the larger social 
system (e.g., colonization, immigration, economic and demo­
graphic changes). Types of changes in group location in­
clude: increased egalitarianism, subordinate group ascen­
dancy, increased dominant group power, and rearrangement of 
the subordinate hierarchy (i.e., gains for one minority 
group relative to others). What we are describing is a 
dynamic process: group position shapes identities and
action which in turn affect group position; identities and
47
goals are reassessed in light of changes and the process 
continues.
Systems of ethnic stratification can be depicted in a 
variety of ways. Conceptually, such systems can be viewed 
as distributed along a continuum between two ideal types:
(1) a hierarchical, Mcaste-like" ordering of all groups 
(i.e., all members of group A rank above group B, which in 
turn ranks above group C, etc.); and (2) an unranked system 
in which all groups are proportionately distributed across 
all levels of society. Clearly, neither of these ideal 
typical forms reflect empirical reality. Instead, societies 
exist between these polar opposites; that is, they vary with 
regard to degree of inequality, and each group within the 
society exhibits its own "status pyramid" (Horowitz 1985, 
p. 24) or internal stratification.3''4 Moreover, we must 
emphasize the dynamic nature of such structures; systems of 
ethnic stratification are constantly changing--becoming more 
or less equal, or rearranging the relative position of 
groups (cf. Light 1981)--as a result of intergroup competi­
tion .
While we believe that the notion of the structure of 
intergroup relations constitutes an excellent conceptual 
basis for describing outcomes of ethnic interaction in 
specific historical circumstances, two additional comments 
are necessary. First, we reject the position, found fre­
quently in the literature (e.g., Horowitz 1985, pp. 22-
48
36), that societies can be classified categorically as 
either stratified or plural, ranked or unranked. Each 
society varies in terms of degree of ethnic stratification; 
however, as long as ethnicity is a factor in determining 
access to resources, a society is not unranked (cf. Vallee, 
Schwartz and Darknell 1957; Lenski and Lenski 1982, p. 330). 
To insist that the internal stratification of groups--the 
existence of an elite within each group (Horowitz 1985, p. 
25)--constitutes an unranked system is to remove ethnic 
stratification from consideration as a factor in human 
affairs. The internal stratification of groups does not 
preclude the existence of stratification between groups 
(e.g., the existence of some Black members of the capitalist 
class would not make the United States an ethnically "un- 
ranked" society). Indeed, as we shall see in subsequent 
chapters, a minority elite may often play a key role in the 
maintenance of systems of ethnic stratification.
A second observation pertaining to our position is that 
any attempt to depict a system of ethnic stratification is 
an extremely general characterization of very complex rela­
tionships. To describe ethnic stratification at the soci­
etal level is to smooth over regional variations (e.g., 
Croatians in Croatia vs. Croatians in other parts of Yugo­
slavia) which can be vital in determining social action. 
Moreover, social stratification is in itself a complex 
phenomenon. As we will note later in this chapter, social
49
class constitutes a matrix of relationships, it is not 
merely described by economic position or any other univari­
ate measure (Poulantzas 1975). Accordingly, the totality of 
the relationship between ethnicity and class (i.e., systems 
of ethnic stratification) transcends any simple character­
ization (cf. Marger 1985, pp. 42-43).
Nationality
As a focus of study, nationality poses perhaps even 
more of a dilemma than ethnicity. Indeed, it is easy to 
agree with Tilly (1975, p. 6), that nation is "one of the 
most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexi­
con." For some social scientists (e.g., De Vos 1975, p. 11; 
Newman 1973; Said and Simmons 1975), nationality is viewed 
as identical with ethnicity, as another means of describing 
the same phenomenon. In contrast, a second perspective 
defines nationality as simply a category— citizenship within 
a particular political state— with little or no social con­
tent. From this vantage point, Obidinski (1978, pp. 215- 
16), after properly criticizing the tendency of many social 
scientists to equate ethnicity with nationality, continues 
on to describe nationality as having attribute qualities--a 
formally designated "either-or" classification. Both per­
spectives effectively eliminate consideration of nationality 
as a key social process, with the result that it has been 
underutilized by sociologists.
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In our opinion, the conceptual ambiguity involving 
nationality is rooted in an academic division of labor which 
has tended to discourage sociologists from using the nation­
state as a unit of analysis (cf. Mills'— 1959— critique of 
sociology for a lack of societal vision) and has prevented 
proper specification of the link between ethnicity and 
nationality. Such a shortcoming is all the more puzzling 
inasmuch as the basic notion of nationality--an ethnic-like 
identity linked to political autonomy (i.e., state power)-- 
was presented by Weber (1946, pp. 1 7 1 - 7 9 ) . In any event, 
the limitations of contemporary approaches are clear. On 
one hand, if national and ethnic groupings are viewed as 
identical, then virtually all existing geo-political enti­
ties are not nations but multi-national states (Connor 1972, 
p. 320). The effect of this position would be to define the 
nation (or the ethnic group) out of existence. On the other 
hand, if nationality is equated with citizenship, then the 
richness of group identification is lost or diminished.
What is needed, therefore, is a new conceptualization of 
nationality, one which considers the underlying similarity 
of ethnicity and nationality while at the same time retain­
ing a distinction (and specifying the linkage) between the 
two identities.
In contrast to the above approaches, we propose a some­
what unique formulation of nationality as a group affilia­
tion, a communal identity linked to asserted political and
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territorial autonomy (i.e., to state power).1" A nation, 
then, becomes a politically autonomous social group sharing 
the same nationality (cf. Finer 1975, p. 88). Nationality 
is akin to ethnicity in that it, too, is grounded in pre­
sumed common origin and a sense of shared historical experi­
ence and joint destiny. Given the more inclusive nature of 
nationality, the putative aspect of common origins and 
experience comes to the fore. Indeed, one of the tasks of 
nation-building has been to create national "myths"--a 
history of the past capable of promoting solidarity in the 
present (Worsley 1984, pp. 273-75; Khleif 1985).17 Like 
ethnicity, nationality also relies upon cultural markers to 
define group boundaries and upon cultural symbols and 
rituals to promote group solidarity. As Gellner (1964, p. 
168) has observed, "nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where
they do not exist— but it does need some pre-existing 
differentiating marks to work on." In this most basic 
sense, nationality and ethnicity are similar.
Yet ethnicity and nationality are not the same. The 
difference is that nationality is linked to geo-political 
autonomy, to state power (yet, as Connor--1978, p. 379—  
reminds us, the nation— a social grouping— is not the same 
as the state-~a political relationship). While ethnicity is 
expressed within a socio-political system (i.e., a nation­
state), nationality constitutes a political claim vis-a-vis
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other such entities in an interstate system. This distinc­
tion is crucial, for as Abner Cohen (1974b, p. xi, emphasis 
added) observed in distinguishing between ethnicity and 
nationality:
The term ethnicity will be of little use if it is 
extended to denote cultural differences between 
isolated societies, autonomous regions, or inde­
pendent stocks of populations such as nations 
within their own national boundaries. The differ­
ences between the Chinese and the Indians, con­
sidered within their own respective countries, 
are national not ethnic differences.
Thus, we view nationality as an ethnic-like identity on a
more inclusive level, as a special form of ethnicity
attached to the state (cf. Worsley 1984, p. 247). It is
more than a formal category such as citizenship; it is an
internalized identity which, like ethnicity, is employed in
intergroup material Interaction.
Nationality; A Modern.Phenomenon
If we are to understand fully the significance of
nationality in the modern vorld-system, then we must realize
that it is a modern phenomenon, one which is linked to
global capitalist development and which fully emerged in the
post-1800 era (cf. Ehrenreich 1983, p. 9; Rejai and Enloe
1969, pp. 145-46; Worsley 1984, pp. 252-53). Unlike
previous loyalties (e.g., religion, estate, feudal lords,
even absolute monarchs), modern nationality is a political
identity (Weber 1946, p. 172) grounded in mass allegiance to
the idea of the nation— a people sharing a common heritage,
interests, and destiny— with the belief that ultimate
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sovereignty resides in the people as a whole (cf. the 
Declaration of Independence; the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen). In Western Europe, the rise of nations 
(and nationality) was concurrent with the emergence of capi­
talism and the capitalist state. If it was to prosper as a 
social system, capitalism required a political structure 
capable of social and economic integration (e.g., public 
education, common language, common standards), a potential 
which was made possible by urbanization and the Improvements 
in transportation and communication which were concomitants 
of capitalist development. The political "cement" (i.e., 
legitimation) for this process was provided by the ideology 
of nationalism demanding loyalty to a nation-state in which 
(according to the tenets of bourgeois liberalism) the people 
were sovereign— although some would be more sovereign than 
others. Such loyalty was not "natural" (Gellner 1964, p. 
149), but was often created through coercive homogenization 
or "nation-building"; that is, cultural conformity imposed 
on ethnic minorities (Khleif 1978b; Tilly 1975, p. 43). 
Nevertheless, nationalist ideology--the "right" of national 
self-determination— spread rapidly, fueled by the French 
Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and late nineteenth century 
European global domination.
In this context, the issue of how nationalism emerged 
in different historical circumstances becomes important. 
According to the "nation-building" school (e.g., Deutsch
1953; Deutsch and Foltz 1963), all nations would evolve 
along the same path as modernization led to increasing 
social and political mobilization and the development of 
supraethnic "national” identities. Yet even a cursory 
examination of twentieth century history is enough to assure 
us that this "nation-building" did not universally come to 
pass (cf. Connor 1972; Horowitz 1985, pp. 566-68). The 
failure of the nation-building school, like the failure of 
the developmentalist/modernization school in sociology, is 
grounded in mistaken generalization from the experience of 
Western societies. Nation-building may describe the slow 
evolution of nations (concurrent with capitalist develop­
ment) in core societies; however, it is much less applicable 
to the periphery in that the very existence of the core 
changes the international context (Tilly 1975, p. 81), not 
to mention the effects of colonialism and uneven development 
(Amin 1980). Nationality assumes different forms in 
different historical circumstances.
What begins to emerge is a picture of two very differ­
ent types of nationalism. In the developed nations of the 
core, we find that some sense of national identity generally 
preceded the emergence of a state structure, while in the 
periphery the existence of a politically independent state 
generally preceded any meaningful national integration and 
solidarity. Thus, following Rejai and Bnloe (1969, p. 140), 
on one hand we have "nation-states;" on the other hand,
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"state-nations."x* This distinction is crucial, for it 
foreshadows differences between nations in degree of 
national integration (and ethnic conflict) and it begins to 
explain the subsequent "fragility" of peripheral societies. 
Amin (1980, p. 20), in drawing a parallel distinction 
between more complete (core) and less complete (peripheral) 
societies, reminds us that this division is inexorably 
linked to the uneven development of the capitalist world- 
economy (i.e., to core-periphery relations). We will 
explore the fuller implications of this issue in subsequent 
chapters.
Nationality and Nations:__ Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity
A major source of confusion in the study of nationalism 
is the issue of homogeneity, the insistence by many writers 
(e.g., A. Smith 1981; Connor 1978; van den Berghe 1983) that 
"nations" must exhibit substantial ethnic and cultural homo­
geneity. Connor (1972, p. 320) correctly observes that few 
contemporary states can be described as ethnically homogene­
ous (i.e., one group accounting for more than 90% of the 
population— e.g., Germany, Japan); however, this fact often 
leads analysts to the position that "nation-state is a 
misnomer" (A. Smith 1981, p. 10), that existing states are 
multi-nations. We believe that this misses the point: a 
nation need not be a monolithic entity, it may subsume 
considerable ethnic variation.x* As we noted earlier, 
ethnicity and nationality exist as levels within levels (cf.
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Keyes'— 1976— notion of "nested segments") and are employed 
in relation to specific others. Ethnic identities are 
asserted in opposition to other ethnic identities within a 
nation-state; national identities are employed vis-a-vis 
other nations in an interstate system. Thus, a nation may 
contain considerable ethnic heterogeneity and conflict as 
long as it possesses some measure of similarity and soli­
darity in its dealings with other nations— a matter of 
within-group vs. between-group variance.30 Indeed, follow­
ing Khleif (1978a) and Park and Burgess (1921, p. 665), we 
believe that most nations in the contemporary world can be 
viewed as coalitions of competing ethnic groups whose 
balance is continually subject to change.
This internal heterogeneity of nations has an important 
implication. If a national identity is negotiated or im­
posed through intergroup interaction, then we must take into 
consideration issues of power and domination. Hegemonic 
ethnic groups (i.e., a Staatsvolk— Glazer and Moynihan 1975, 
p. 4) and classes control the means of cultural reproduction 
(e.g., schools, media) and may construct or shape the 
national identity in their own image and interest (e.g., the 
confluence of "American" national identity with the dominant 
Anglo-American ethnic identity). Nationality, then, may 
largely reflect the culture of dominant ethnic groups. 
Consequently, as Weber (1946, pp. 172-74) noted, individual 
and group attachments to a nation may vary, generally being
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strongest in more powerful groups and weaker (i.e., indif­
ferent or even opposed) in less powerful groups. Like eth­
nicity, nationality is a variable 1
To illustrate the heterogeneous nature of nationality, 
let us briefly consider a question which has prompted much 
debate: Is there an "American” national identity?23- Our
answer to this question is that there i_g. indeed an "Ameri­
can" national identity. "Americans" possess a shared sense 
of a common past (more recent arrivals seemingly adopt the 
past) and joint destiny; identify themselves as "Americans" 
(vis-a-vis Iranians, Soviets, or other nationalities); and 
employ cultural symbols and rituals to define the group 
boundary and maintain solidarity. For immigrants, part of 
the process of assimilation (which is neither irreversible 
nor inevitable) involves assuming an American national 
identity. For example, a Cambodian migrating to the United 
States would at first (in terms of orientation) be a Cam­
bodian residing in the United States; however, over time 
(the duration of which is determined by a variety of fac­
tors) we might expect adoption of "American" nationality, 
with Cambodian (or Asian-American) becoming an ethnic 
identity asserted in competition with other "American" 
ethnic groups.22 At the same time, "American" national 
identity exhibits considerable variation, due to both the 
continuous influx of immigrants and the reaction of other 
groups to the attempts of the dominant Anglo-Americans
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(joined, after I960, by some "White Ethnics") to define 
"American" national identity in their own image.**
Ethno-Nationalism: Ethnicity or Nationality?
While we believe that the distinction specified above 
resolves much of the conceptual confusion surrounding ethni­
city and nationality, it remains problematic in that there 
is no clear line of demarcation separating ethnicity and 
nationality. Individual ethnic groups within a nation-state 
can aspire to separate nationhood, an event which has hap­
pened so often as to appear commonplace in the post-1945 
era (e.g., Quebec, Basque Provinces, Wales, Brittany, 
Corsica, Biafra, Katanga, Eritrea, Sikhs in the Punjab, 
Tamils in Sri Lanka--to name a few). Although the existence 
of these would-be nations seemingly represents an anomaly in 
our conceptual schema, we believe that this phenomenon can 
be accounted for. Ethnicity and nationality are not rigid, 
mutually exclusive identities but dynamic affiliations 
capable of movement along a continuum of inclusiveness.24 
National identities are socially constructed and may 
experience moments of waxing and waning--cycles of national 
solidarity— in response to specific circumstances. Strictly 
speaking, these separatist movements are neither ethnic 
groups nor nations, but contradictory social groups which 
contain elements of both forms (and will probably eventually 
become one or the other). Consequently, although many 
observers use the word "nation" to describe these social
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groupings, we will reserve the word nation for politically 
autonomous entities (cf. Worsley 1984, p. 252) and denote as 
"ethno-nat ional11 those movements for national autonomy on 
the part of ethnic groupings within existing nation­
states .29
Also problematic is the treatment of ethno-national 
movements in the study of ethnicity and nationality. For 
some (e.g., Said and Simmons 1975; Connor 1972; A. Smith 
1981), ethno-nationalism represents the decline of nation­
states amid competing loyalties and the proliferation of 
nationalist movements. We believe that this overstates the 
situation; that ethno-nationalism is better understood as a 
response of ethnic groupings (some with memories of past 
autonomy or "failed" nationhood) to such phenomena as domi­
nation by other groups (perceived "second-class" status and 
feared loss of autonomy) and the increasing emphasis on 
national self-determination amidst the break-up of colonial 
empires. While some ethno-national movements may succeed in 
establishing separate nations (although Bangladesh is the 
only recent example) and others may persist or periodically 
resurface for generations, they must overcome substantial 
obstacles such as state resistance and lack of external 
support for altering the interstate system.2" Moreover, 
ethno-national groups may not possess unanimity of purpose; 
some may be willing to accept improved social, political, 
and economic position within existing states rather than
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undergo a protracted struggle for national liberation {e.g., 
the divisions among French-Canadians in Quebec). While 
ethno-nationalism will remain a significant social force for 
the foreseeable future, we suspect that many ethno-national 
movements will eventually become movements of ethnic asser­
tion within existing states, with national aspirations held 
in reserve in the event of "intolerable" conditions at some 
future time.
class
The final conceptual topic to be considered in this 
chapter is class. For our approach to the study of ethni­
city and nationality, class is an important concept inasmuch 
as it describes human relations in the production of mater­
ial life, a process which in turn conditions social exis­
tence. Analytically, the changing conditions of the produc­
tion of material life constitute the basic context in which 
social relations (e.g., ethnicity and nationality) occur. 
Moreover, we adopt the perspective that class struggle is a 
basic motor force of history; that is, that the tension be­
tween conflicting groups in the production of material life 
is a fundamental social change dynamic. Thus, any attempt 
to understand the evolution of ethnicity and nationality 
must be linked to issues of class.
While a detailed exposition of issues of class is 
beyond the scope of this endeavor, we believe that some 
consideration is necessary in light of the varying (and, in
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our view, often misleading) uses of class by mainstream 
social scientists. We refer here to the attempts to create 
social order by defining class out of existence; that is, 
removing class from the realm of social action by reducing 
it to an attribute of individuals (cf. Page 1969, p. 128). 
Prom this perspective, class becomes part of a seamless veb 
of social relations, but one (and declining in influence) of 
many possible bases for ad hoc group formation and social 
action (Bell 1975). As a result of this ideological posi­
tion and the "abstracted empiricism" (cf. Mills 1959) which 
is prevalent in American sociology, class is too often 
operationalized as occupation, income, prestige, or "life­
style" (none of which measure class I) and turned into a 
smoothly graded "status hierarchy" (e.g., Warner, Meeker and 
Ells 1949; Hollingshead and Redlich 1958; Blau and Duncan 
1967; Sewell, Haller and Portes 1969). Accordingly, much 
contemporary research which purports to treat social class 
instead measures non-class economic variables which may be 
loosely correlated with class (Wright, Costello, Hachen and 
Sprague 1982).
Although long neglected by mainstream social science, a 
useful basis for the study of class existed in the work of 
Marx. Unfortunately, the incomplete nature of Marx's formu­
lation (e.g., the unfinished Chapter 52--"Classes"--in 
Volume III of Capital--Marx 1981) and the existence of 
mechanistic applications of Marxian class categories have
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contributed to the persisting ambiguity in conceptualiza­
tions of class. More recently, many excellent attempts have 
been made to construct more refined definitions of class 
(e.g., Poulantzas 1973, 1975; Anderson 1974; Wright and 
Perrone 1977; Wright et al. 1982; Resnick and Wolff 1981); 
however, a complete conceptualization remains an elusive 
goal. It is not our purpose here to attempt such a task; 
Instead, we will briefly consider those issues most relevant 
to our subsequent analysis.
Our approach to class is essentially Marxian; that is, 
we emphasize relations of production and distribution as the 
definitional basis of class. Thus, a class can be distin­
guished in general on the basis of common economic position 
(i.e., in the production process) and interests.27 Yet a 
class is not an economic category, it exists only in rela­
tion to other classes. Like ethnicity, class stands as a 
potential basis for group formation and action, which in 
turn provides an orientation for individual behavior. 
Although any potential basis for group membership is prob­
lematic in that it may come into conflict with other affili­
ations (Nielsen 1985), we can attribute a certain primacy to 
class inasmuch as material interests are fundamental human 
interests. Nevertheless, class-based action requires a 
certain level of consciousness (Marx's Klasse an sich—  
Klasse fur sich distinction)— perhaps ranging along a 
continuum (cf. Giddens 1973, pp. 111-13)--thereby rendering
63
class action a variable, not a given.** Consequently, an 
important issue for class analysis involves the degree to 
which class shapes human behavior in historically specific 
circumstances.
A central concern of class analysis is the nature of 
specific class structures. Marx's general analysis of the 
capitalist mode of production employed a two-class model 
(bourgeoisie-proletariat); however, the analysis of histori­
cally specific social formations requires more complex 
schema (e.g., Anderson 1974; Wright et al. 1982) with more 
than two classes. Moreover, classes may contain internal 
divisions (cf. Poulantzas 1973 on fractions, strata, and 
social categories) which may function as effective social 
forces (e.g., intelligentsia, highly skilled labor, frac­
tions of the bourgeoisie) in specific circumstances. Thus, 
we must conceptualize class structures as dynamic relation­
ships which vary over time and from nation-state to nation­
state, as processes which reflect historical forces and 
material conditions. Each society has a unique class struc­
ture which must be analyzed as such.
Finally, the analysis of specific class structures must 
ultimately be conducted on a global level. This is not to 
assert that global classes exist--although they potentially 
could (Connell 1984, pp. 430-35). What we mean is that 
given the international nature of capitalist accumulation, 
and the linking of economies effected by core imperialism.
the analysis of historically specific class structures must 
include classes external to the national economic arena—  
e.g., U.S. capital in the Third World (Bonacich 1980, pp. 
17-21; Bonacich and Cheng 1984). In addition, external ties 
may in turn transform indigenous classes or fractions— e.g., 
the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie linked to foreign 
capital (Poulantzas 1973, p. 38). Thus, class relations 
within nation-states must be linked to global processes.
Chapter Summary
Our purpose in this chapter has been to present an 
outline of our conceptualization of ethnicity, nationality, 
and class in the modern world-system. This undertaking had 
its roots in what we perceived to be the shortcomings of 
approaches to the study of ethnic relations which focus 
upon individual groups and nation-states torn from their 
social context rather than intergroup relations, social 
change and global dynamics. In our view, such formulations 
contain several major flaws: they place an incorrect empha­
sis upon such notions as primordiality, culture, and race; 
they confuse ethnicity and nationality; and they constitute 
an incomplete basis for explaining the evolution of group 
identities. Consequently, we found it necessary to create 
our own conceptual base before we could embark upon our 
exercise in theory-building.
Towards the end of this chapter, we briefly considered 
conceptual issues pertaining to class. The importance of
class to our analysis lies in the fact that there exists a 
critical interface between ethnicity/nationality and class. 
Like class, ethnicity and nationality emerge as humans 
mobilize in opposition to other groups to produce and to 
compete for the resources necessary for existence. Indi­
viduals and groups possess potential affiliations with 
others in the same productive circumstances (class) and the 
same communal order (ethnic group or nation). Yet these 
potential ties represent different and possibly contradic­
tory social realities (e.g., ethnic groups and nations 
contain internal class divisions, while classes may be riven 
by communal ties). Accordingly, a key issue for any attempt 
to explain the evolution of ethnic and national identities, 
becomes explication of the relationship between the ethnic 
or national structure and the class structure of a social 
system.
As we frame this question, however, we must recognize 
that the relationship between ethnicity/nationality and 
class is neither static nor abstract. Ethnicity, nation­
ality, and class describe dynamic relationships (i.e., 
social processes) in historically specific circumstances. 
History describes the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities and class relations. As humans interact with one 
another, they alter conditions of the production of material 
life and, hence, change society. Thus, any class-based 
theory of ethnic and national identities must necessarily be
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a theory of social change: that is, of changes in social 
groupings effected by the changing patterns of relative 
power and access to resources. Moreover, if we are to 
analyze the evolution of ethnic and national identities, 
then we must consider them in the context of the current 
form of the production of material life--the capitalist mode 
of production. This process will begin in the following 
chapter, as we review the literature on the relationship 




Indeed, a review of recent literature in the field of 
ethnic studies finds researchers offering substitutions 
for the somewhat unwieldy "ethnic group" (e.g., ethne—  
De Vos 1975, p. 9; ethny— van den Berghe 1983, p. 222; 
ethnie--*A. Smith 1981, p. 66). The process of termino­
logical evolution may yet be unfinished.
For a discussion of methodological Issues and the 
conceptualization of ethnicity, see Doane (unpublished, 
pp. 88-103).
Weber's definition of ethnic group (1968, p. 389) 
merits quotation in its entirety:
We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups 
that entertain a subjective belief in their common 
descent because of similarities of physical type 
or of customs or both, or because of memories of 
colonization and migration; this belief must be 
important for the propagation of group formation; 
conversely, it does not matter whether or not an 
objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic 
membership (Gemelnsamkelt) differs from the 
kinship group precisely by being a presumed 
identity, not a group with concrete social action, 
like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership 
does not constitute a group; it only facilitates 
group formation of any kind, particularly in the 
political sphere. On the other hand, it is 
primarily the political community, no matter how 
artificially organized, that inspires the belief 
in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist 
even after the disintegration of the political 
community, unless drastic differences in the 
custom, physical type, or, above all, language 
exist among its members.
To assert that behavior occurs within a social system 
or society is somewhat problematic inasmuch as we agree 
with Wallerstein (1974b, pp. 347-48) that the only real 
(i.e., self-contained) social system in contemporary 
society is the world-system. Nevertheless, it is also 
true, at least from the perspective of social actors, 
that political boundaries tend to provide the context 




5. For summaries of this debate, see Isajiv (1974);
Burgess (1978); Yinger (1985).
6. The concept of primordiality is generally credited to 
Edward Shils (1957), although he did not directly apply 
it to ethnic groups.
7. For a discussion of methodological issues involving the 
variability of ethnicity, see Plax (1972); Obidinski 
(1978); T. Smith (1980); Darroch and Marston (1969).
For applications of measures to specific groups, see 
Segalman (1967); Simirenko (1964); Masuda, Matsumo and 
Merideth (1970); Sandberg (1974); Driedger (1975); and 
Montero (1981).
8. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it would 
seem that the confusion of ethnicity with culture is at 
least in part attributable to the historical tendency 
of sociologists and anthropologists to study indi­
vidual, culturally distinctive groups. To view ethni­
city as culture may seem appropriate when studying 
isolated peoples or newly arrived immigrant groups; 
however, it is clearly much less useful in understand­
ing modern societies or third-generation immigrants.
9. Our emphasis upon the political as well as the economic 
is intentional. Following Poulantzas (1975, pp. 64- 
66), we seek to avoid overly economistic conceptualiza­
tions of social relations and to recognize that 
political relations (i.e., relations of domination) are 
an integral aspect of material life.
10. At this point, it is appropriate to enter a caveat with 
regard to rationality as an explanation of human 
behavior. Individuals may pursue a course of action 
even if it has significant economic costs (Billig 
1976), while affective, "non-rational" motives 
undoubtedly shape human behavior (cf. Nielsen 1985, p. 
140ff.). Furthermore, perceptions of situations may 
vary and actions may have ’'unintended consequences." 
While resolution of this issue is beyond the confines 
of this endeavor, for our purposes it is sufficient to 
suggest that material rationality exerts a strong 
influence on human behavior.
11. For detailed accounts of the evolution of the concept 
of race, see Banton (1977); Montagu (1964; 1974); 
Gossett (1963).
12. In the Phipps case, a Louisiana woman in 1982 failed in 
her attempt to overturn a Louisiana law which defined 
as Black anyone with 1/32 "Negro blood."
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13. By "so-called resurgence of ethnicity," we are suggest­
ing that in many instances ethnic identity never dis­
appeared, that the "resurgence" of ethnicity was the 
rediscovery and glorification of diversity by a school 
of American social scientists (e.g., Glazer and 
Moynihan 1963; Novak 1973; Greeley 1974). See commen­
taries on this phenomenon by Steinberg (1981) and 
Yinger (1985, pp. 152-53).
14. Thus, as Chang (1985, p. 42) observes, ethnic strati­
fication becomes "a case of statistical correlation
rather than a categorical certainty."
15. Indeed, Weber's entire discussion (1946, pp. 171-79) of 
"nation" is in our opinion well worth reading inasmuch 
as it considers several key aspects of nationality:
the link to the state; the existence of internal 
heterogeneity; and varying degrees of national solidarity.
16. Nationality was used with this meaning both in the 
drafting of the U.S. Constitution and in its more 
recent interpretations (cf. Norton 1952).
17. This can even be applied to the subsequent incorpora­
tion of immigrant groups into a national identity. See
Steinberg (1981, p. 86) for a description of attempts 
by ethnic "insiders" to link newcomers to national 
experiences by intertwining the history of the group 
with that of the host nation.
18. Similar formulations have been suggested by other 
writers (e.g., Francis— 1976, p. 387— demotic vs. 
ethnic nations; A. Smith--1981, p. 18— territorial vs. 
ethnic nationalism); however, we prefer the political 
(as opposed to cultural) emphasis of Rejai and Enloe 
(1969).
19. For example, Dutch-speaking Flemings in Belgium think 
of themselves as Belgian— as opposed to Nederlandic or 
Dutch--in nationality. The existence of ethnic divi­
sions (e.g., Fleming vs. Walloon) in Belgium does not, 
in our view, make Belgian any less a national identity.
20. As many writers have noted (e.g., Weber, Simmel,
Coser), external conflict (in this case, war with 
another nation) can lead to increased internal 
solidarity (in this case, reduced ethnic conflict and 
increased national solidarity).
21. For example, Connor (1978, p. 381) maintains that 
Americans are not a nation, while Amin (1980, p. 129) 
asserts that they are.
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22. Thus, a national identity in one setting (e.g., Italian 
in Italy) can become an ethnic identity in another 
setting (e.g., the United States) and could even be 
reactivated upon return to the original context.
23. Many members of the dominant Anglo-American (i.e.,
WASP) group simply identify themselves as "American"
(cf. T. Smith 1980) .
24. This continuum of inclusiveness need not stop at state 
boundaries but can also encompass supranational iden­
tities (e.g., Pan-Slavism, Pan-Arabism). While the 
history of pan-nationalism to date is a history of 
failed attempts (see the excellent summary provided by 
Snyder— 1984), it is conceivable that changing struct­
ural conditions could facilitate some form of supra­
national political organization at some future time.
25. In this sense, then, we follow the French sociologist
Alain Touraine (1981) in asserting that sociologically
speaking there is no such thing as society as an
entity, only social movements 1
26. For a discussion of the factors shaping the outcome of 
separatist movements, see Horowitz (1985, pp. 265-81).
27. In this respect, we find ourselves generally in agree­
ment with Poulantzas (1973, p. 27, emphasis in the
original) who asserts that classes are "defined princi-
pallv but not exclusively by their place in the produc­
tion process;" that ideological and political factors 
are also significant.
28. The development of class consciousness within the core 
working class has not reached the revolutionary level 
anticipated by many Marxists (moreover, I would ques­
tion whether this or any process is a historical inevi­
tability— as opposed to a historical potentiality). 
Indeed, a higher degree of class consciousness seem­
ingly exists among the bourgeoisie. This can be attri­
buted to a variety of factors: the cultural and ideo­
logical reproduction of capitalism; the limitation of 
the relative deprivation or impoverishment of the core 
working classes due to their privileged position vis-a- 
vis other working classes in the world-economy; reform 
(vs. revolution) resulting from non-revolutionary class 
struggle (i.e., conflict not oriented towards overturn­
ing the system); and the at times confounding influence 
of ethnic and national ties (Ehrenreich 1983; Amin 
1980, pp. 28-30).
CHAPTER III
ETHNICITY/ NATIONALITY, AND CLASS: EXISTING THEORIES
At the conclusion of the preceding chapter, we posited 
a fundamental interrelationship— grounded in the production 
of material life— between ethnicity/nationality and class. 
This led us to assert that a complete understanding of 
ethnicity and nationality requires that they be considered 
with respect to class; that is, that a complete theory of 
ethnicity and nationality must be a class-based theory. In 
this chapter, we will review existing theories of the rela­
tionship between ethnicity/nationality and class. Such a 
review should serve as a useful preliminary to presentation 
of our own model, thus enabling us to highlight key issues 
as well as to benefit from the corpus of existing works on 
ethnicity, nationality, and class.
In our consideration of existing formulations, we 
adopt the position that all theories of ethnicity and 
nationality either explicitly or implicitly contain a theory 
of social change and assumptions regarding the relationship 
of ethnicity, nationality, and class. ffhat we mean by this 
is that every attempt to understand ethnic-like phenomena 
has sought to explain the emergence, persistence, or dis­
appearance of ethnicity and nationality in the context of 
the changes wrought by industrialization, modernization, 
urbanization, and bureaucratization.1 Moreover, each
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approach considers ethnicity/nationality in relation to 
class, whether as an epiphenomenon of class or as a com­
peting or even more basic source of group affiliation. 
Consequently, issues of social change and of class will 
serve as a focus for our evaluation of past and present 
theories of ethnicity and nationality.
Our review of theories of ethnicity and nationality 
will necessarily be critical, for in many respects the study 
of ethnicity and nationality constitutes one of the weak 
areas of social science. From classical theorists who 
viewed ethnicity as a remnant of primitive society to modern 
observers who have chronicled the ethnic "revival," social 
scientists have been unable to explain in a satisfactory 
manner why ethnic identities emerge, persist, change, or 
disappear. One cause of this problem has been a tendency to 
view social change as technological change or "moderniza­
tion” rather than as an integrated process grounded in the 
dynamics of global capitalist development. In addition, 
theorizing has been limited by the ethnocentrism of Western 
social science (i.e., a tendency to generalize from the 
experiences of Europe and the United States— cf. Amin 1980, 
p. 12); by ideology (the incompatibility of ethnicity with 
Western liberal thought); and by methodology (the division 
of labor in the social sciences; the sociological emphasis 
on community studies). These themes will be developed 
throughout the chapter.
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This chapter will be organized in a manner consonant 
with our purpose, which is a critical evaluation of attempts 
to explain the persistence of ethnic and national identities 
in contemporary society.2 Accordingly, we will not provide 
a detailed description of each perspective, but rather will 
attempt to highlight the contributions and shortcomings of 
each approach. We will begin with an overview of the 
development of theories of ethnicity and nationality, for 
many of the strengths and weaknesses of present approaches 
are grounded in past formulations. Following this, we will 
evaluate existing theories of ethnicity and nationality, 
which we have organized into the following rough typology: 
(1) primordial ism; (2) pluralism; (3) competition/moderniza­
tion; (4) reactive ethnicity; and (5) class theories.
Development of Theories of Ethnicity and Nationality
The tendency of social scientists to downplay ethnicity 
has deep roots which reach back into the nineteenth century. 
In general, mainstream classical sociologists (e.g., 
Durkheim, Toennies, Simmel, Weber) accorded little relevance 
to the role of communal identities in modern society. For 
these theorists, industrialization, modernization, and 
urbanization would lead to the weakening and eventual 
destruction of preindustrial forms of social organization 
and the emergence of rational social bonds--a transition 
captured in such dichotomies as mechanical vs. organic 
solidarity (Durkheim), Gemelnschaft vs. Gesellschaft
(Toennies), and status vs. contract (Maine). This transfor­
mation of society would be brought about by such processes 
as the increasingly differentiated and interconnected divi­
sion of labor (Durkheim), the emphasis on bureaucratic and 
market rationality (Weber), and the homogenizing influence 
of urbanism (Wirth 1938). Given the grounding of sociology 
in the conservative reaction to the perceived loss of order 
stemming from urbanization and modernization (cf. Zeitlin 
1968; Nlsbet 1978; Wolf 1982, pp. 7-13), the classical 
social theorists did not necessarily approve of these 
changes; instead, they sought to uncover new sources of 
social solidarity which would counteract the loss of tradi­
tional communal ties. As we shall see, the emphasis of 
mainstream classical sociology on order and new "rational" 
social ties was to have a profound influence on subsequent 
social thought— to the detriment of the study of ethnicity 
and nationality.
The legacy of the classical social theorists can be 
clearly seen among the functionalists who later came to 
dominate mainstream sociology. From the functionalist 
perspective, the search for order would be resolved by 
universalistic goals and values stemming from the functional 
prerequisites of modern society. Indeed, even inequality 
was viewed as contributing to the maintenance of society 
(e.g., Davis and Moore 1945). Thus, the outcome of moderni­
zation was a functionally integrated society possessing
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common goals and a common culture, a society where social 
position was based upon universalistic achieved criteria 
rather than particularistic ascribed statuses such as 
ethnicity {Parsons 1966, pp. 22-23; Benedict 1962; Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967; Smelser 1969).
By this juncture, the misgivings towards modern society 
of the classical theorists had disappeared and mainstream 
sociology became a glorification of modernity. Traditional 
society was no longer lamented but viewed as rigid and 
inflexible, while modern society was extolled as efficient 
and liberating of human potential. Consequently, ethnicity 
was viewed as an artifact of preindustrial society, dys­
functional in that it was incompatible with modernization 
and bureaucratization, and doomed to disappear as indi­
viduals made "rational" social decisions. Furthermore, 
with the emergence of the modernization/developmentalist 
perspective— that is, the (ethnocentric) assertion that all 
societies would evolve along the model of the "most ad­
vanced" Western societies (Rostow 1960)®— it was assumed 
that ethnicity would disappear even in peripheral nations 
once sufficient and inevitable levels of modernization had 
been attained. Later, the persistence of ethnicity even 
became an "explanation" of the "backwardness" of peripheral 
societies.
Closely paralleling the functionalist approach was the 
"nation-building" school in political science (e.g., Deutsch
1953; Deutsch and Foltz 1963; Almond and Coleman 1960; Jacob 
and Toscano 1964; Hoselitz 1960). This perspective expanded 
upon the effects of modernization to include the observation 
that social mobilization, facilitated by modern communica­
tion and transportation, led to political integration and 
the assimilation of ethnic groups into an interethnic 
"national11 identity. Such a process, it was assumed, had 
already occurred in the core nations, where democratic 
institutions and common interests had created new "national" 
loyalties. Furthermore, like the functlonalist/developmen- 
talist approach, adherents of the nation-building perspec­
tive also held that national integration would be a neces­
sary concomitant of modernization in less-developed nations 
(e.g., Coleman and Rosberg 1964). Thus, drawing upon its 
classical foundations, a dominant theme of mainstream social 
science was that industrialization and modernization inevi­
tably led to the disappearance of ethnicity in favor of more 
"rational" ties.
The effects of this theoretical monophony were reflec­
ted in early attempts to study the relationship between race 
and class. For Robert E. Park and others who studied "race 
relations" in the United States at the time of the "great 
migration" (1880-1924), emphasis was placed upon the issue 
of integrating immigrants and minorities into the common 
culture of the larger society. Following the classical 
social theorists. Park viewed modernization and European
expansion as resulting in the ''emancipation" of individuals, 
the formation of more inclusive groups, and the reduction of 
social distance through nev economic and political ties 
(Park 1974a, p. 205; 1974b, p. 149); however, he also main­
tained that modernization created "race relations" by 
increasing intergroup contact (Park 1974c, p. 116). This 
seeming anomaly was resolved in Park's (1974b, p. 150) 
famous "race relations cycle" of "contact, competition, 
accommodation, and assimilation," a cycle characterized as 
"progressive and irreversible."'* Thus, while a short term 
effect of modernization might be to increase intergroup 
conflict, inevitably such ties as ethnicity and race would 
be superseded by class conflict (Park 1974c, p. 116).
Following the lead of Park, sociologists in the United 
States during the middle decades of the twentieth century 
continued to emphasize the assimilation of minorities. 
Although subsequent writers suggested that assimilation 
might occur at varying rates for different groups (Warner 
and Srole 1945), at different levels in various dimensions 
of social life (Gordon 1964), or even into a "triple melting 
pot" along religious lines (Kennedy 1952; Herberg 1960), the 
underlying assumption of inevitable assimilation remained 
unchallenged. Even the "caste-like" position of Black- 
Americans was viewed as amenable to assimilation once 
"dysfunctional" White prejudice and discrimination were 
eliminated (Myrdal 1944; Dollard 1937; Gordon 1964, p. 114).
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This overemphasis upon assimilation led mainstream U.S. 
sociologists to view any relationship between ethnicity and 
class as a reflection of "entry status" in the United 
States, a temporary phenomenon awaiting the homogenizing 
influence of individual mobility and assimilation.
Even more than the influence of classical social 
theorists, the assimilationist bias of U.S. and European 
sociology reflected the prevailing ideological climate of 
dominant groups In Western society. During this period, 
social thought was dominated by what some (e.g., Greeley 
1974; Gordon 1975, p. 88; A. Smith 1981, pp. 2-3) have 
termed the "liberal expectancy"--the belief that the homo­
genizing influences of mass education, the media, and the 
marketplace would eliminate social cleavages and conflict 
based upon "irrational" communal ties. Indeed, the most 
optimistic thinkers envisioned that the culmination of this 
process would be the disappearance of nationalities in the 
face of social integration on a global level (cf. A. Smith 
1981, p. 3; Said and Simmons 1976, p. 9).* Thus, the 
decline of ethnicity was viewed as not only inevitable but 
also socially desirable, even, it was assumed, by minorities 
themselves. Their protestations of "value-free" science 
notwithstanding, most social scientists uncritically 
accepted assimilation not only as a prediction, but also as 
a prescription (cf. critiques by Metzger 1971; Greeley 1974) 
for social Integration (to be achieved through a reduction
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of prejudice and increased mass education). What was 
unsaid, however, was that the nature of this ideal" assimi­
lation was not the more inclusive identity postulated by 
theory (i.e., the melting pot), but rather the adoption of 
the culture and values of the dominant ethnic group (cf. 
Gordon— 1964--and Greeley--1974--on assimilation in the 
United States as "Anglo-conformity"). In essence, main­
stream sociological thought was a reflection of (and legiti­
mation for) dominant group ideology.®
A second development in the study of ethnicity and 
class by mainstream sociology in the United States involved 
the above-mentioned (cf. the discussion of class in Chapter 
II) extension of the emphasis on social integration and 
achieved status to the "individualization" of class and 
stratification (i.e., class as a description of individual 
position). As applied to ethnicity, this reduction of 
social processes to individual careers lowers ethnicity to a 
characteristic of individuals (i.e., a descent category 
affecting social status), thus totally removing it from the 
realm of action or from accounting for action. Given the 
all-too-prevalent practice of "abstracted empiricism" (Mills 
1959, pp. 50-75) by U.S. sociologists, this "individualiza­
tion" of ethnicity permeated the field, its influence re­
flected in such notions as the "culture of poverty" (Lewis 
1966; Banfield 1970), "status attainment" (Duncan and Duncan 
1968; Featherman 1971), and the "human capital" perspective
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(Becker 1971;, Sovell 1975; 1978; 1981). These reductionist 
approaches towards ethnic stratification subsume dominant 
ideological assumptions concerning the free market and the 
blessings of individual competitiveness, while ignoring such 
factors as the structural "reproduction" of inequality (cf. 
Bordieu 1977), power differentials, and group influences. 
Unfortunately, this tendency to view ethnicity and class as 
individual attributes remains influential, particularly in 
directing so-called "empirical" research on stratification.
The study of the relationship between ethnicity and 
class has fared little better outside the mainstream of 
sociological thought. Interestingly, the Marxian/conflict 
perspective, which usually stood in opposition to the clas­
sical theorists, contained a strikingly similar view of the 
fate of ethnicity in modern society. For Marx (1964, pp. 
68-69; 1973, p. 163), ethnic ties were only significant in 
precapitalist societies and would wither away under the 
force of capitalist production relations and the emergence 
of class-based conflict. Likewise, Lenin (1968, pp. 20-21, 
emphasis in the original) viewed nationalism as a phenomenon 
of early capitalism, doomed in the face of "capitalism's 
world historical tendency to break down national barriers, 
obliterate national distinctions, and to assimilate 
nations."7 Although remaining vestiges of nationalism 
(i.e., "false consciousness" from the Marxian perspective) 
could serve as an obstacle to working class solidarity (cf.
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Marx and Engels— 1972— on "the Irish Question"), they would 
be swept away during the class struggle in which the prole­
tariat would emerge victorious. To the extent that Marxian 
theory contained a sense of evolutionary inevitability, 
issues of ethnicity and nationality were generally de­
emphasized .
Where ethnicity and nationality did figure in Leninist 
thought, however, was with respect to political strategy.
In this case, the focus was upon the "national question"-- 
the issue of the socialist position on the right of self- 
determination of nations (e.g., the famous debate between 
Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg).- For our more limited theore­
tical purposes, what is most interesting about this issue 
was the inclusion of the notion of the different class 
bases of nationalism (Lenin 1968, p. 65; Luxemburg 1976, pp. 
136-38), the recognition that different classes may possess 
different "national" interests. Unfortunately (for our 
purposes), the development of this theoretical point was 
lost in the larger tactical issues.* Later, the nuances of 
this debate were overshadowed by such concerns as the 
national unification of post-revolutionary societies and the 
construction of grand alliances to capitalist nations.
The Crisis of Classical Theories
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, the 
major theoretical schools had reached a paradigmatic 
"crisis" (cf. Kuhn 1970) with respect to ethnicity and
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nationality. Within the most developed core societies, the 
proposition that ethnicity was no longer a relevant factor 
was belied by the persistence of supposedly assimilated 
groups, the emergence of ethno-national movements seeking 
political autonomy, and the intensification of existing 
"racial" cleavages (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; McRoberts and 
Postgate 1976; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). Similarly, 
the post-colonial nations which emerged in the periphery 
after 1945 found that ethnic divisions and conflict inhi­
bited attempts at "nation-building" (Connor 1972; Horowitz 
1985). From a Marxian perspective, the ideal of proletarian 
internationalism failed to overcome nationalist sentiments 
during world wars and in the foreign policies of socialist 
states (Davis 1978, pp. 17-22), while much anti-imperialist 
resistance emerged on a national basis (Ehrenreich 1983). 
Clearly, theories of modern society which fail to account 
for ethnicity and nationality as bases for social action 
have become rather obsolete.
From the vantage point of the present, it is evident 
that the classical assumption of progressive and uniform 
effects of modernization and the disappearance of ethnicity 
is empirically untenable. Indeed, most contemporary works 
begin with a critique of these earlier theories. On a 
global scale, the belief that all societies would follow the 
path of the most developed societies can be viewed as an 
unjustified generalization (a case of "West-centered reduc-
tionism"— Amin 1980, p. 12) which ignores the impact of 
developed core societies upon the evolution of less- 
developed peripheral societies.10 At the societal level, we 
have found that the increased contact (and increasing homo­
geneity via diffusion) is as likely to lead to increased 
conflict as it is to assimilation (Blumer 1965; Greeley 
1974; Khleif 1978b), thus undercutting the underlying 
assimilationist assumptions of most sociological studies.
As a consequence of the crisis of classical theory and its 
successors, much recent literature has been devoted to 
rethinking issues of ethnicity and nationality. What is 
emerging are formulations which explicitly seek to explain 
the persistence of ethnicity and nationality in modern 
society.
IbSPE i&S. <?£ Ethnicity and yatiPireUfcy; Recent Trends
The final step in our survey of existing perspectives 
on ethnicity and nationality is an assessment of the corpus 
of "new" theories of ethnicity and nationality; that is, 
formulations which have their genesis in the abovementioned 
"crisis" of classical theories. We believe that the great 
majority of these new perspectives are best viewed as 
attempts to revise or modify earlier theories in light of 
new realities— and can only be fully understood in this 
context. Indeed, these new formulations share as a common 
point of departure the rejection of the classical assumption 
that communal Identities would wither away in modern socie-
ties. Accordingly, each perspective seeks to address the 
same basic question: How can we account for the persistence
of ethnicity and nationality in modern society? In order to 
analyze the diverse attempts to answer this question, we 
have organized existing approaches into the following rough 
taxonomy: (1) primordial ism; (2) plural society theories;
(3) the modernization/competition perspective; (4) reactive 
ethnicity; and (5) class theories. This taxonomy is not 
intended to provide a definitive system of classification, 
but is instead employed as a heuristic device for the 
analysis and criticism of existing theories prior to the 
presentation of our own framework.
Primordialism
This perspective seeks to address the problems of 
classical and functionalist theories by changing the 
properties of ethnicity. For primordialists, the per­
sistence of ethnicity is due to the strength (i.e., the 
primordial nature) of communal ties which are grounded in 
precapitalist society but are able to resist the effects of 
modernization. As a primordial identity, ethnicity is a 
non-rational, affective, ascriptive tie rooted in the 
presumed "givens" of social existence (Geertz 1963)— such 
factors as descent, biological features, place of birth, 
name, language, and religion. Thus, ethnicity becomes a 
"basic group identity . . .  a ready-made set of endowments 
and identifications which every individual shares with
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others from the moment of birth by chance of the family into 
which he is born" (Isaacs 1975, p. 31). As a primordial 
bond which exists prior to action, ethnicity is, from the 
primordialist perspective, an immutable phenomenon which 
must be considered sui generis as a fundamental explanation 
for human behavior.
In its role as a corrective to traditional theory, 
primordialism assumes several different forms. For Edward 
Shils, who is credited with coining the term "primordial" 
(1957), such ties could assume a functional role in inte­
grating modern society; however, Shils assumed (1975, pp. 
45-45) that ethnic identities would diminish in favor of 
the more inclusive primordial tie of nationality.11 
Similarly, Geertz (1963) sought to account for the persist­
ence of ethnicity in post-colonial societies, thus leaving 
unchallenged the hypothesis that modernization resulted in 
the diminution of ethnic ties. On the other hand, more 
recent writers (e.g., Novak 1973; Greeley 1974; Isaacs 1974, 
1975; Keyes 1976), particularly those examining the persist­
ence of ethnicity in core nations, have extended the primor­
dialist position to encompass the existence of ethnicity as 
a significant tie in modern societies. In this latter 
approach, the traditional thesis regarding the effects of 
modernization upon ethnicity is explicitly rejected and 
ethnicity is considered as basic to social action— or, one
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might add, as a "permanent artifact" of preindustrial 
society.
As an explanation of ethnicity, primordialism has been 
widely criticized (e.g., Bonacich 1980; McKay 1982) for the 
unidimensional nature of its characterization of ethnicity 
as a primary motor for social action as well as for its de­
emphasis of structural factors. The attribution of primor- 
diality does little to explain variations in the existence 
and intensity of intergroup conflict or times when ethnicity 
is sublimated to other group ties. Moreover, the existence 
of intragroup conflict (e.g., Breton's— 1972— description of 
intergroup differences among Quebecois/French-Canadians in 
Canada) constitutes a phenomenon totally outside the bounds 
of the primordial1st perspective. Furthermore, an emphasis 
on primordiality is an emphasis on the psychological as 
opposed to the structural, thereby placing intergroup 
conflict in a "political and economic vacuum" (McKay 1982, 
p. 399).
Perhaps the most fundamental failing of primordialism, 
as noted in Chapter II, is that it provides a static and 
deterministic picture of ethnicity which ignores the varia­
bility of ethnic ties (e.g., assimilation vs. assertion; 
changing group boundaries). The "presumed givens" of pri­
mordialism are in fact variable (e.g., religion, language) 
or socially defined (e.g., biological features, descent, 
birthplace). This shortcoming has been recognized by some
primordialists (e.g., Geertz 1963, p. 109; Isaacs 1975, pp. 
33-34; Keyes 1981); however, if identities vary according to 
circumstance, then primordiality is reduced to a descrip­
tion— a metaphor for the emotional intensity of ethnic 
affiliation. This is captured by Nagata's (1981, pp. 92-94) 
observation that primordiality is a matter of usage, that 
traits undergo "primordialization" in opposition to specific 
groups in a particular context. Thus, primordialism consti­
tutes an ideoloaical claim, not a social fact.
The major contributions of the primordialist perspec­
tive are its critique of traditional approaches and its role 
in calling attention to the affective aspects of ethnicity. 
Ironically, the primordialist approach may be viewed as a 
form of propaganda for pluralism and dissimilation; that is, 
it has a tendency to overstate ethnic persistence and to 
extol the virtues of diversity in the same manner that 
traditional sociology emphasized and glorified assimila­
tion.13 It is as extreme— and as erroneous— a position as 
the view that ethnicity would disappear in modern societies. 
Ethnicity and nationality may be primordial to the extent 
that humans are social animals and tend to form groups on 
the basis of perceived similarities (whether cultural or 
territorial); however, prlmordiality is ultimately no more 
than a somewhat useful metaphor. More complex perspectives 
are necessary if we are to understand the variable and 
material nature of ethnic and national identities.
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Plural Society Theories
This heading is employed to describe two dramatically 
different— and, one could say, diametrically opposed—  
perspectives on ethnic phenomena in modern societies. While 
both perspectives emphasize the "plural" nature of society, 
analytic distinctions have been drawn between equilibrium 
and conflict pluralism (van den Berghe 1969, p. 72; Kuper 
1969a, pp. 8-16) and "pluralistic" vs. plural societies 
(Kuper and Smith 1969, pp. 3-4). The equilibrium or plural­
istic society approach is more compatible with mainstream 
social science; however, it does attempt to address the 
issue of ethnic persistence. On the other hand, the con­
flict or plural society perspective constitutes a more 
radical break with the assimilationist assumptions of 
classical sociology and, hence, a more serious attempt to 
come to grips with issues of ethnicity in modern society.
The "pluralistic society" approach to ethnicity is an 
offshoot of the pluralist model of power employed by many 
political scientists and sociologists. Grounded in de 
Tocquevillean political theory (cf. van den Berghe 1965, p. 
270; Burawoy 1974, p. 521), this perspective views modern 
society as an entity in which power is dispersed among 
interest groups based on multiple or overlapping ties, with 
competitive balance achieved via compromise or shifting 
coalitions (see, for example, Kornhauser 1960; Dahl 1961; 
Polsby 1980). Societal integration is achieved, in a manner
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similar to the functionalist perspective, by adherence to a 
shared set of common values and political principles. 
Although the traditional pluralistic society approach emu­
lated classical social theorists in postulating "rational" 
economic interests as the basis for interest group forma­
tion, it has more recently been extended to include ethni­
city— perhaps as a reawakened primordial tie— as a basis for 
political mobilization (Bell 1975; Glazer and Moynihan 
1975). In this scenario, social order is maintained through 
mutual toleration of ethnic differences (i.e., "cultural 
pluralism"), along with shared national identity and poli­
tical institutions.
From our vantage point, the "pluralistic society" 
approach towards ethnicity is not a theory, but a descrip­
tion. It requires an additional mechanism (e.g., primor- 
dialism or modernization) to account for the persistence of 
emergence of ethnic ties. Moreover, we believe that the 
notion of a pluralistic society is flawed even as a descrip­
tion. Like functionalism, the pluralist approach to power 
has been criticized (e.g., Parenti 1978, pp. 27-37; Esping- 
Andersen, Friedland and Wright 1976; Whitt 1982) for 
ignoring or obfuscating the realities of the distribution of 
power and for overemphasizing the degree of consensus in 
modern society. With respect to ethnicity, the pluralistic 
perspective constitutes an ideal-typical description of a 
culturally plural society (e.g., the "melting pot" as it was
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meant to be— cf. Zangwill 1906— in contrast to assimilation 
or "Anglo-conformity"), one which recognizes ethnic diver­
sity but retains an emphasis on social equilibrium--in 
essence an ideological statement/ not an empirical descrip­
tion. Although in some respects the pluralistic approach 
represents an advance over classical formulations/ it 
ultimately offers no solution to the problem of explaining 
ethnicity in modern society.
In contrast/ the plural society approach represents a 
more dramatic departure from the classical tradition. It is 
essentially a response to the failure of functionalism, 
grounded in the observation— first made by J . S. Purnivall 
(1948)— that there existed societies which were not inte­
grated by a consensus on common values, but were instead 
divided by sharp cleavages (e.g., ethnicity) and held 
together through coercion (Kuper and Smith 1969, p. 3). For 
Furnivall, a plural society was a "tropical” society under 
colonial domination, a diverse "medley" of peoples forced 
into a common political unit by a colonial power. The 
causal factor in this case is economic, for economic forces 
(i.e., colonial exploitation) both created and maintained 
social pluralism. In such a society, according to Furnivall 
(1948, p. 304, cited in Kuper 1969a, pp. 10-11),13 groups:
mix but do not combine. Bach group holds its own 
religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas 
and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the 
marketplace, in buying and selling. There is a plural 
society, with different sections of the community
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living side by side, but separately, within the same
political unit.
With respect to functionalism, this "plural society" consti­
tutes a pathological social form, with more or less func­
tionally integrated subsocieties bound together in an 
involuntary and unhappy relationship.
This formulation was later expanded by M. G. Smith 
(1965; 1969a; 1969b) to encompass societies outside of the 
colonial situation and bases for differentiation beyond 
ethnicity (cf. M. Smith 1969b, p. 436). In addition Smith 
viewed plural societies as emerging not from economic 
exploitation, as did Furnivall, but from cultural differ­
ences manifest in different institutional practices (e.g., 
kinship, religion).1-* This institutional separation was a 
necessary, but not sufficient basis for Smith's plural 
society; what was also required was the differential (i.e., 
unequal) incorporation of these distinct culture groups into 
a common political structure under the domination of a 
cultural minority (Kuper 1969a, p. 12). Other writers in 
this tradition (e.g., van den Berghe 1965, p. 270; Kuper 
1969a, pp. 15-19) embrace less rigid conceptualizations of 
"plural society" by introducing the notion of pluralism as 
a variable (i.e., societies exhibiting varying levels of 
pluralism) and by seeking to elaborate factors which affect 
this variation. Used in this sense, a plural society is a 
society containing substantial ethnic cleavage and conflict 
(Thompson 1983, p. 127).
In our view, the major contribution of the plural 
society approach is the recognition of the structural basis 
of ethnic persistence (and the reproduction of this basis), 
particularly Furnivall's recognition of the role of colo­
nialism in expanding ethnic conflict. On the other hand, 
the development of the notion of plural society has been 
rather limited. The insistence by Smith upon institutional 
separation reduces plural society to an ideal type or a 
description of an empirically rare extreme form of an 
ethnically divided society. Yet if Smith's assumptions are 
relaxed to Incorporate pluralism as a variable (e.g., van 
den Berghe, Kuper), then "plural society" becomes essen­
tially a descriptive term for an ethnically divided society. 
Moreover, given the multiethnic nature of modern societies, 
virtually every society would be a plural society in this 
broader sense, thus removing any descriptive or analytical 
utility (cf. R. Cohen 1978, pp. 398-99). Consequently, the 
plural society perspective is best viewed as a set of 
"sensitizing concepts” (van den Berghe 1973, p. 970), a 
framework for study which employs ethnicity as a basic 
explanatory variable, one which is analytically coequal with 
class (Thompson 1983, p. 128).
Even as a framework for research, however, we believe 
that the plural society approach contains several serious 
deficiencies. First, little attention is devoted to the 
nature of ethnicity; instead, it is viewed as extrinsic— but
not in a primordial sense--in that group cultural differ­
ences precede any particular social setting (cf. Banton 
1983, p. 93). As a consequence, intergroup commonalities 
are downplayed and intragroup variation is neglected. 
Secondly, other than Furnivall's emphasis upon colonial 
domination, the plural society perspective lacks a motor 
force for conflict and change, especially in that primacy is 
given to political domination and economic issues are seen 
as derivative (Greenberg 1980, p. 18). It is difficult to 
envision "differences in institutional practice" (M. Smith 
1969a, p. 27) as being the root cause of ethnic conflict in 
such "plural societies" as South Africa and Sri Lanka. In 
sum, while the plural society approach recognizes the short­
comings of classical sociology and properly views ethnicity 
as linked to social structure, it offers little beyond ex­
tended description as an explanation for ethnic phenomena. 
Modernization/Competition Approaches
This is less an organized paradigm than a convenient 
heading for a group of approaches which we believe share the 
same underlying assumptions.1® The crux of the moderniza­
tion/competition thesis addresses the "crisis" of classical 
theories of ethnicity by asserting--in direct contrast to 
earlier theories— that modernization results in increased 
ethnic conflict and, hence, the persistence or even resur­
gence of ethnic identities.1® Like the earlier classical 
and functionalist theories, the modernization/competition
model vievs modernization or industrialization as leading to 
urbanization, bureaucratization, and the ascension of 
"market" criteria. What is different about the moderniza­
tion/competition perspective, however, is the view that 
modernization, by bringing groups into closer contact with 
each other (e.g., via expanded markets and improvements in 
transportation and communication) and by destabilizing 
existing interrelationships (e.g., productive activities, 
demographic balances), creates competition between groups, 
competition which heightens ethnic solidarity and sharpens 
group boundaries (Barth 1969; Blumer 1965; Despres 1975; 
Deutsch 1966, pp. 125-26; Banton 1983; Nielsen 1985). 
Moreover, these effects of modernization are felt not only 
in peripheral societies undergoing rapid change, but also in 
the most modern societies (Khleif 1978b; Nielsen 1980; Olzak 
1982) .
Unlike the primordialist and plural society approaches 
which emphasize the persistence of cultural differences 
between groups, the modernization/competition perspective 
maintains that ethnic identities can flourish despite the 
reduction of intergroup cultural differences (Barth 1969, 
pp. 32-33). What is essential for the persistence of ethnic 
identities is resource competition between groups (Despres 
1975, p. 199; Barth 1969, p. 25; A. Cohen 1974a, 1974b), 
competition stemming from modernization. Given the seem­
ingly inevitable acculturation which results from intergroup
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contact, the continuation of ethnic boundaries implies the 
conscious structuring of interaction and rearranging of 
identities to maintain distinctions between groups (Barth 
1969, p. 16). Thus, ethnic identities may persist in a "we- 
they" sense, regardless of diminished cultural differences 
between groups, as long as there exists a conscious reason 
for doing so. Indeed, in instances of ethnic resurgence, 
the symbolic content may be revived or invented from the 
past in order to facilitate mobilization for competition 
(Gellner 1964; Khleif 1985).
In light of the postulated connection between moderni­
zation and ethnic persistence or resurgence, many of those 
who follow the modernization/competition approach have 
sought to elaborate mechanisms through which modernization 
increases ethnic mobilization and conflict. Examples of 
such mechanisms include the following:
Transformation of social structure. As modernization 
changes traditional economic activities (i.e., production, 
markets) and relations of domination, the process of estab­
lishing new arrangements may lead to increased intergroup 
competition and ethnic assertion (Despres 1975, p. 202; 
Khleif 1978b; Gellner 1964, p. 171). With the disintegra­
tion of empires and the post-1945 wave of decolonization, 
the ensuing power vacuums led to increased intergroup 
conflict (c£. Banton 1983, pp. 193-95; this is also a basic 
premise of the Hplural society" model). Furthermore, this
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wave of anti-colonialism and nationalism spread from the 
periphery to the core, triggering a rise in ethnonationalism 
among historically subjugated groups (i.e., the "Third 
World within the First World"--Khleif 1985; that is, groups 
such as the Welsh and the Quebecois who were previously 
assumed to have assimilated; see also A. Smith 1981, pp. 19- 
25). Ethnic mobilization within the core was also stimu­
lated by the relative gains of minorities vis-a-vis pre­
viously hegemonic groups (e.g., "White Ethnics" vs. WASPs in 
the United States--Burgess 1978, p. 277; Khleif 1978b) and 
by the emergence of an ethnic intelligentsia or middle class 
(i.e., cultural entrepreneurs) who saw further gains as tied 
to the assertion (as opposed to masking, which had been the 
previous route to mobility) of ethnic identity (Gellner 
1964, pp. 168-70; A. Smith 1981, pp. 108-33; Khleif 1984b; 
Doane unpublished, p. 73).
Migration. One significant phenomenon of the modern 
era has been large scale migration in response to changing 
labor markets (Hechter 1976; Castles and Kosack 1973; 
Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982; di Leonardo 1984). Although 
often underemphasized by earlier students of ethnic rela­
tions (cf. Burgess 1978, p. 279), one effect of migration 
has been to bring together--often within a short time span—  
previously separated groups under conditions of economic 
competition or domination of one group by another. More­
over, the process of International migration continues (al-
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though the identity of the participants may change), thus 
constantly changing (and often sharpening) the nature of 
ethnic relations within societies (e.g., the recent influx 
of Hispanics and Asians into the United States).
Changing role of the state. With modernization, the 
state has assumed an increasingly important role as an 
economic actor, both in terms of social capital expenditures 
(e.g., education, infrastructure) and the social need 
programs of the "welfare state" (cf. O'Connor 1973). In 
addition, the state serves as a source of valued resources 
(e.g., public sector employment and expenditure--Khleif 
1984b; Horowitz 1985, pp. 224-25) and an arbiter of 
political claims (e.g., civil rights, affirmative action). 
Indeed, if groups occupy separate territories within a 
nation-state, the geographical "patchiness" of the effects 
of political decisions may give virtually any state action 
an ethnic flavor (Nielsen 1985, p. 144). Consequently, 
ethnicity may be activated as a means of mobilizing to press 
group claims for inclusion or preference and for a share of 
social resources (Bell 1975; Khleif 1978b).
Mass society. Another outgrowth of modernization has 
been the expansion of the scope of markets, organizations, 
institutions, and media--the emergence of an increasingly 
interconnected "mass society." While the classical and 
functionalist perspectives held that these processes would 
lead to assimilation and more inclusive (e.g., national,
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global) identities, modernization/competition theorists 
emphasize ways in which mass society may facilitate ethnic 
mobilization. For example, increased intragroup homogeneity 
{i.e., the merging of subgroups) and improved communication 
may increase the effective size and scope of ethnic mobili­
zation, while expanded labor markets and the enhanced role 
of education increase the potential value of large scale 
organizations (Nielsen 1985; Burgess 1978, p. 279). At the 
same time, pressures for societal homogenization may spur 
ethnic assertion as a reaction to perceived external 
dominance (Khleif 1985; A. Smith 1981). Finally, a sense of 
alienation or rootlessness due to a loss of traditional ways 
may spark an ethnic resurgence as a "quest for community," a 
search for Gemeinschaft in the midst of Gesellschaft (Khleif 
1984b; 1985). In each instance the claimed effect of 
modernization is an increase in the assertion of ethnic 
ties.
Competition theories: a critical comment. In our
view, modernization/competition approaches constitute a 
significant improvement over classical theories of ethni­
city. They address the reality of the persistence of ethni­
city by locating it squarely in the dynamics of contemporary 
society. Moreover, competition serves as a plausible con­
text for ethnic persistence; even the "non-rational" affec­
tive elements of ethnicity can be explained in terms of 
perceived interests or group solidarity. At the same time,
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however, the modernization/competition perspective has some 
serious shortcomings. It does not easily explain intragroup 
differences in ethnic assertion or why some groups might 
assimilate while others persist. Furthermore, competition 
theory is circular to the extent that it claims that while 
competition is ethnically based, it is in turn essential for 
the maintenance of ethnic affiliations (e.g., Despres 1975, 
p. 199). Without an additional mechanism (e.g., prlmordial- 
ism, modernization following pre-existing cleavages), ethni­
city and competition would appear inexplicably as both cause 
and effect of each other.
Reactive Ethnicity
According to this approach, ethnically based action is 
actually a reaction to structural discrimination; that is, a 
’’cultural division of labor” where individuals are assigned 
to specific occupations on the basis of ethnic affiliation 
(Hechter 1974, p. 1154). Inasmuch as ethnic assertion is a 
reaction to migration or to the differential effects of 
modernization (i.e., unequal benefits) upon ethnic groups, 
the reactive ethnicity perspective could seemingly be viewed 
as a variant of the modernization/competition approach, 
except that it emphasizes senaration of groups as opposed to 
contact (Nielsen 1980; 1985). On the other hand, unless an 
additional mechanism, such as internal colonialism (Hechter 
1975), which creates and perpetuates ethnic divisions is 
specified, there is little to distinguish reactive ethnicity
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from the functionalist assertion that ethnic persistence is 
merely the result of the "accidental” coincidence of ethnic 
and functional cleavages and should disappear with complete 
modernization (Nielsen 1980, p. 78). Accordingly, the 
reactive ethnicity model per se is of rather limited utility 
in explaining ethnic phenomena.
Class Theories.11
Given that Marx provided no systematic writings on 
ethnicity and nationality and that the orthodox Marxian 
position has always maintained that ethnic ties would fade 
away in the face of capitalist relations of production, many 
attempts have been made to "revise” Marx in light of the 
obvious persistence and salience of ethnicity.1" While 
there is no integrated body of theory, we will divide 
existing formulations into the following rough taxonomy:
(1) ethnicity as class strategy; (2) ethnicity as class; and
(3) ethnicity as colonized nation.
Ethnicity as class strategy. In this variant of class 
theory, it is claimed that the capitalist class employs 
ethnicity (i.e., "precapitalist divisions") to create an 
underclass which can be paid artificially low wages (thus 
increasing the rate of surplus value— i.e., "superexploita- 
tion") and to create political divisions within the working 
class (Reich 1970, 1981; Baran and Sweezy 1966). Conse­
quently, ethnicity is not a meaningful social reality per 
ser but rather a deliberate creation (albeit based on pre­
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existing categories) of the bourgeoisie.1* An alternative—  
but in our opinion related— perspective is split or seg­
mented labor market theory (Bonacich 1972; 1979), a class 
theory which emphasizes ethnic competition within the 
working class, but which also retains a key role for 
capital.20 According to the split labor market perspective, 
ethnic conflict results from the efforts of relatively 
advantaged dominant group labor to defend its position (via 
discrimination, immigration restriction, etc.) in the face 
of attempts by capital to replace highly paid labor with 
"cheaper" (i.e., superexploited) labor from subordinate 
groups.21 In this schema, ethnicity is once again relegated 
to a secondary role--by "historical accident" it happens to 
be correlated with labor market status (Bonacich 1980, p. 
14). Indeed, if ethnic antagonism is a result of "acciden­
tal" cleavages, then there is little to separate split labor 
market theory from the reactive ethnicity approach.
Ethnicity as class. In this context, ethnicity is more 
than a capitalist device, ethnic groups are essentially 
"blurred collective representations of classes" (Wallerstein 
1972, p. 222). This formulation is most often applied when 
class and ethnic boundaries coincide, as in the case of 
"middleman minorities" (Bonacich 1973) or "caste-like" 
situations (South Africa, American Blacks in the Jim Crow 
era), to produce a "people-class" (Leon 1970) which contri­
butes to the persistence of ethnicity, yet is in essence a
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class. Prom the vorld-system perspective (Arrighi, Hopkins 
and Wallerstein 1983; Wallerstein 1972), class and "status" 
(i.e., ethnicity) are two manifestations of the same pheno­
menon of group formation, except that class takes logical 
precedence in that if underlying class differences disap­
pear, then the status-group conflicts would also eventually 
disappear (Wallerstein 1972, p. 221).
Ethnicity as "colonized nation". This perspective is 
closely linked to the debate on the "national question"--the 
self determination of nations as an intermediate revolution­
ary step--mentioned earlier in the chapter. For some stu­
dents of the world-economy (e.g., Cox 1959; Magubane 1979) 
racial/ethnic/national domination is an effect of the super­
exploitation manifest in Western colonialism and imperial­
ism. Likewise, Third World revolutionary theorists (e.g., 
Fanon, Cabral) emphasized the national basis of resistance 
to capitalist colonial rule.22 By extension (or by anal­
ogy)/ this analysis was applied to ethnic groups within 
nations so that ethnic stratification became colonialism and 
ethnic assertion became national liberation (cf. Blauner-- 
1972; and Omi and Winant--1986, pp. 38-47--on Black 
nationalism in the United States and the use of internal 
colonialism to facilitate ethnic mobilization).23 As a 
consequence, many analysts spoke of internal colonialism; 
that is, the political and cultural domination and economic 
exploitation of a geographically discrete ethnic enclave
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within the boundaries of the nation-state. The notion of 
internal colony has been employed to study South Africa 
(Wolpe 1972); Blacks and Hispanics in the United States 
(Blauner 1972; Barrera 1979); Quebec (McRoberts 1979); the 
Celtic Fringe of Great Britain (Hechter 1975; Khleif 1978b); 
Frisians in the Netherlands (Khleif 1985); and various South 
American nations (Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1970)--to name 
a few. In each case, internal colonialism was employed as a 
tool to facilitate the analysis of ethnic interaction in the 
appropriate historical, comparative, and structural 
contexts.
Class theories: a critical comment. Like the moderni­
zation/competition perspective, contemporary class theories 
represent a significant advance over classical and main­
stream approaches to the study of ethnicity. Class theories 
emphasize the importance of understanding the link between 
ethnicity and class and the role of class interests in moti­
vating "ethnic" behavior, while encouraging a perspective 
which is both macroscopic and comparative. Nevertheless, 
existing class approaches contain many limitations. While 
both the superexploitation and the split labor market 
approaches pinpoint key group interests, neither "bourgeois 
machinations" nor labor market competition provide a satis­
factory explanation of the complexity of ethnic identities 
and intergroup conflict. Similarly, the notion of ethnicity 
as latent class might be applicable in special cases where
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class and ethnic boundaries coincide; however, it has little 
utility in other situations where the proliferation of 
"people-classes" would dilute the explanatory value of 
"ethnicity as class."24 Internal colonialism, while perhaps 
a useful metaphor in sensitizing analysts to historical and 
structural forces, lacks an explanation of change, minimizes 
interconnections between sectors, and leads to an overem­
phasis on political domination, nationalism and in-group 
homogeneity (Burawoy 1974, pp. 523-27; Khleif 1985; Frank 
1969; Omi and Winant 1986, pp. 49-50). Carried to an 
extreme, internal colonialism mystifies social relationships 
by confounding ethnicity and nationality and by ignoring 
intragroup class divisions— it becomes a class theory from 
which class has been jettisoned.23 Ultimately, the class 
approaches seemingly provide little explanation for why 
ethnic identities persist or evolve; indeed, ethnicity is 
either viewed (by the superexploitation, split labor market, 
and ethnicity as class approaches) as epiphenomenal to class 
(with the ultimate goal being the attenuation of ethnic 
affiliations in the name of class unity) or (by internal 
colonialism) as a replacement for class. Thus, we believe 
that current class theories of ethnicity grossly oversim­
plify the reality of intergroup relations.
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have conducted a critical review of 
existing theories of ethnic change in an attempt to assess
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their utility for our own endeavor. From the outset, we 
characterized theories of ethnic change as one of the 
"failures” of social science, a state of affairs which w<-; 
traced back to pre-1960 social theories which posited the 
diminution of ethnic ties in modern industrial society. As 
we described above, however, the basis of these theories 
(i.e., the decline of ethnicity) was contradicted by the 
persistence of ethnicity, a phenomenon which became particu­
larly evident during the post-1945 era. In response to this 
"crisis” of classical theory, the modern (i.e., post-1960) 
study of ethnicity has been dominated by the emergence of 
new theories which attempt to explain the continuing signi­
ficance of ethnicity in contemporary society. Given this 
progression of theories of ethnicity, our central task in 
this chapter was to evaluate five current perspectives on 
ethnicity and nationality— (1) primordialism, (2) plural 
society theories, (3) modernization/competition approaches,
(4) reactive ethnicity, and (5) class theories--in terms of 
how they addressed our basic question: What causes ethnic
and national identities to emerge, persist, change, or 
disappear?
Despite the contributions of these contemporary para­
digms in addressing the persistence of ethnicity, our con­
clusion was that they contained several significant limita­
tions. All of the perspectives analyzed above treat ethni­
city as unidimensional, thereby failing to explain the
phenomenon of vithin-group variation discussed in Chapter
II. Moreover, several approaches--e.g ., primordial ism, 
plural society theory, reactive ethnicity, and internal 
colonialism— lack any dynamic for social conflict or change. 
As a result, they are reduced to little more than descrip- 
tions of ethnically divided societies. Even those perspec­
tives which we viewed as most promising--competition and 
class theories— remain flawed. The competition perspective 
seemingly lacks any grounding in larger structural and 
historical dynamics, thereby leaving it susceptible to 
reduction to an individual phenomenon. Class theories, 
meanwhile, suffer from a failure to take ethnicity serious­
ly, a belief that in the final analysis ethnicity remains an 
epiphenomenon of class. Consequently, we feel the need to 
look elsewhere for a theory of ethnic change.
In our view, what is needed is a perspective which can 
accomplish the following tasks. First, ethnicity must be 
taken seriously as an explanatory concept in its own right, 
rather than viewed as a given or as an epiphenomenon. 
Secondly, any perspective on ethnicity and nationality must 
be able to address the issues of within-group variation; 
that is, it must provide a theory of assimilation as well as 
persistence, and it should be able to account for different 
actions by members of the same ethnic group. Thirdly, it is 
necessary to develop a more explicit link between ethnicity 
and class; to explain the interrelationship between these
two affiliations, rather than to declare one as conceptual 
terra firma having analytical precedence. Finally, any 
theory of ethnicity and nationality must have a macro- 
structural dynamic; that is, it must be grounded in global 
processes capable of explaining both the evolution and the 
broad variation of ethnic and national phenomena. It is to 
the development of a framework for such a theory that we 
will turn in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER NOTES
CHAPTER III
1. We view these phenomena as integrated components of the 
larger process of global capitalist development.
2. The reader may observe that relatively little mention 
is made of nationality in this chapter. This reflects 
the reality--described in Chapter II— that nationality 
has for the most part been overlooked by students of 
race and ethnic relations. The few exceptions to this 
(the nation-building school, the national liberation 
variant of Marxian thought) will be addressed briefly 
below.
3. For summaries and critiques of this perspective, see 
Barringer, Blanksten and Mack (1965); Moore (1960); 
Parsons (1964); Eisenstadt (1970); Bendix (1967); 
Weinberg (1969); and A. Smith (1973).
4. For Park (1974d, p. 354), even slavery was a case of 
temporary accommodation prior to assimilation. On the 
other hand, Park's race relations cycle was not as 
unilinear as has often been portrayed, as he observed 
(1974b, p. 150) that various social processes (e.g., 
racial barriers, immigration restriction) could slacken 
or even temporarily halt the process of assimilation.
5. Interestingly, this viewpoint was presaged by Park 
(1974c, p. 116) who observed that:
Looking at race relations in the long historical 
perspective, this modern world which seems des­
tined to bring presently all the diverse and 
distant peoples of the earth together within the 
limits of a common culture and a common social 
order, strikes one as something not merely unique 
but millennial! Nevertheless, this new civiliza­
tion is the product of essentially the same his­
torical processes as those which proceeded it.
The same forces which brought about the diversity 
of races will inevitably bring about, in the long 
run, a diversity of peoples in the modern world 
corresponding to that which we have seen in the 
old. It is likely, however, that these diversi­
ties will be based in the future less on inheri­
tance and race and rather more on culture and 
occupation. That means that race conflicts in 
the modern world, which is already or presently
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will be a single great society, will be more and 
more in the future confused with, and eventually 
superseded by, the conflicts of classes.
6. For an excellent discussion of this point and a 
critique of the mainstream ethnicity paradigm, see Omi 
and Winant (1986, pp. 15-24).
7. Lenin did adopt the position that nationalism could be 
a progressive force to the extent that it enabled 
"backwards" nations to resist core imperialism (i.e., 
"reactionary" nationalism) and commence the process of 
capitalist development necessary for the emergence of 
class struggle (cf. Davis 1978, p. 73).
8. For original positions in this debate, see Lenin (1968) 
and Luxemburg (1976). An interesting summary is 
provided by Davis (1978).
9. For a brief discussion of this point, see Bonacich 
(1980, p. 16).
10. The literature on dependency theory (e.g., Frank 1967; 
1969) served as a first major critique of the moderni­
zation/developmental ist perspective. For critical 
evaluations of dependency theory, see Palma (1978); 
Brenner (1977 ) .
11. While Hechter (1974, p. 1153) places Shils squarely 
within the traditional functionalist camp, I believe 
that Shils* efforts constitute an attempt to "update" 
functionalism to explain the persistence of ethnicity. 
His writings on the "crisis of national integration" 
(Shils 1975, pp. 50-63) exhibit an awareness of the 
persistence and resurgence of ethnicity.
12. See the critiques of primordialism by Patterson (1975); 
Steinberg (1981); and Yinger (1985).
13. Furnivall's observation was anticipated by Robert E. 
Park (1974d, pp. 353-54) who wrote in 1928 that:
Under such circumstances peoples of different 
racial stocks may live side by side in a relation 
of symbiosis, each playing a role in a common 
economy, but not interbreeding to any great 
extent; each maintaining, like the gypsy or the 
pariah peoples of India, a more or less complete 
tribal organization or society of their own.
14. Thus, for Smith, the United States would not be a 
plural society.
110
15. In a most general sense, intergroup resource competi­
tion could be viewed as underlying most theories of 
ethnicity (cf. Nielsen 1985, p. 134ff.).
16. Indeed, some theorists (e.g., Bell 1975) go so far as
to maintain that ethnicity, with its affective inten­
sity, now supersedes class as a basis for organization.
17. While some authors would include the discrimination
theories of Becker (1971) or the human capital theories 
of Sowell £1975; 1978; 1981) under the aegis of class
theories, we hold that Becker provides a theory of dis­
crimination, not of ethnicity, while the work of Sowell 
is too reductionistic to merit serious consideration.
18. Indeed, Marx is seemingly contradictory on this issue. 
On one hand, in The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels 
(1964, pp. 5-8) describe the dissolution of nations 
amidst the revolutionization of production and the 
expansion of the world market. On the other hand, 
their analysis in Ireland and the Irish Question (Marx 
and Engels 1972) shows an inclination to take ethnicity 
into account as a factor in class struggle.
19. Superexploitation theories have also been applied on a 
global level; for example, the assertion that racist 
ideologies emerge as a result of (and as legitimation 
for) core imperialism and colonial domination (cf. Cox 
1959).
20. Bonacich (1980, p. 14) would disagree with our linking 
the superexploitation and split labor market ap­
proaches; however, we believe that the superexploita­
tion and split labor market theories describe the 
responses of two different eth-classes (dominant group 
capital, dominant group working class) to the same 
circumstances. We will develop this argument in 
subsequent chapters. For an insightful critique of 
labor market segmentation approaches, see Hodson and 
Kaufman (1982).
21. For those working within this paradigm, a major issue
of contention is the role of dominant-group industrial 
workers: whether they are manipulated "victims" who
suffer due to working class fragmentation or willing 
participants who benefit from the exploitation of the 
ethnic underclass (cf. Lenin's "labor aristocracy").
22. For a discussion of Fanon and Cabral on this issue, see 
David (1978, pp. 212-228). This "anti-imperialist" 
model was often linked to a two-stage theory of revolu­
tion in which national liberation is viewed as a
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necessary preliminary to proletarian revolution (Davies 
1973, p. 41; Southall 1983, p. 12).
23. For example, Blauner (1972, p. viii) explicitly grounds 
his analysis in the social movements of oppressed 
groups.
24. For example, in the United States, with its myriad of 
ethnic groups, potential "people-classes" could number 
in the dozens— an unwieldy basis for a "class" system.
25. As a guiding metaphor, internal colonialism overlooks 
one essential fact; that is, that "a colony can become 
independent, while an internal colony is integrated 
into a larger society" (Burawoy 1974, p. 523). In a 
particularly trenchant critique of internal coloni­
alism, Southall (1983, pp. 10-17) notes that the 
colonial analogy has been used by the South African 
state to support "separate development" and the 
"independence" of Black homelands. Similarly, in an 
analysis of the U.S. case, Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 
48-51) note that the nationalist analogy and demands 




In this chapter, ve will present our theoretical model 
for understanding ethnicity and nationality in the post-1800 
vorld-economy. As we noted in Chapter I, a model can be 
defined as a list of interrelated elements— and some state­
ments of relations among them--useful in understanding a 
given phenomenon. In actuality, we intend to proceed 
beyond this, introducing notions or "working hypotheses" 
which we believe are helpful to the development of a global 
theory of ethnicity and nationality. Nevertheless, our use 
of the word model is intentional, for it underscores the 
preliminary nature of this work; that is, the fact that we 
view this undertaking as an initial attempt to indicate a 
new direction in response to what we have described as the 
shortcomings of existing works. In this context, our goal 
is to establish a general theoretical framework for the 
study of ethnicity and nationality, one which stresses both 
the importance of analyzing the relationship between ethni­
city and class and the necessity of grounding theories in 
global dynamics. If we are successful in this effort, we 
will, we hope, have established a "base camp" for future 
explorations.
The presentation of our model will begin with a brief 
consideration of our basic sociological assumptions regard-
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ing the nature of groups and the issue of levels of analy­
sis. We believe that exposition of our position on these 
issues will provide the reader with a broader context within 
which our framework can be more easily understood. Follow­
ing this, we will embark upon a discussion of the relation­
ship between ethnicity and class, introducing the "eth- 
class" as a key analytical concept. In the third section of 
the chapter, we will explore the significance of the process 
of global capitalist development and the uneven nature of 
that development (especially the core-periphery distinction) 
for the evolution of ethnic and national identities. From 
this general discussion, we will then turn to a series of 
"working hypotheses"; that is, notions regarding the differ­
ential evolution of ethnic relations in core and periphery 
which will guide our subsequent analysis. In addition, we 
will also "flesh out" our framework (and facilitate our 
subsequent case studies) by listing aspects of nation-states 
(e.g., nature of the political system) which we believe 
exert a particular influence upon the nature of ethnic rela­
tions and national identities in historically specific 
circumstances. Finally, at the conclusion of the chapter, 
we will provide a brief summary of our model.
Underlying Assumptions:__ Social Groups and Society
Underlying our approach to issues of ethnicity and 
nationality are some fundamental assumptions concerning the 
nature of social groups and society. We believe that humans
create social groups and, hence, society as they interact in 
order to pursue goals and produce the necessities of mater­
ial existence. Affiliation with such groups is a basic 
source of human identity (i.e., the "reference group"), 
while group participation shapes how humans perceive and act 
upon the world around them. Human social groupings are not 
static entities but ongoing processes; moreover, they only 
assume significance in relation to other groups (i.e., 
"ingroups" vs. "outgroups"— Sumner 1906). In this inter­
group setting, group membership operates through processes 
of inclusion and exclusion (i.e., maintenance of a boundary 
via some diacritical characteristic) and the group itself 
persists through its utility to at least some of the actors 
involved. Groups compete with each other for valued re­
sources as they seek to improve their relative position or 
to maintain the status quo.
Ethnicity and nationality are not unique phenomena, 
they represent one type of possible group affiliation which 
may or may not be asserted (Nielsen 1985). In other words, 
ethnicity and nationality may be potent, even central bases 
for group formation, yet they nevertheless remain a basis 
for group formation along with class, occupation, religion, 
sex, and other potential affiliations. Such a formulation 
is somewhat at variance with the prevailing tendency to 
ascribe "special status" to ethnicity and nationality; 
however, we believe that it is necessary to remove the
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mystifying veil of "uniqueness” in order to ask the proper 
questions concerning the nature of ethnicity and national­
ity. As organizational forms, ethnicity and nationality are 
communal affiliations grounded in real or putative common 
origin and a sense of shared historical experience and joint 
destiny (nationality is distinguished from ethnicity by its 
link to political and territorial autonomy; i.e., to a 
nation-state).1 Yet we also hold that ethnicity and nation­
ality are more than communal ties. As a basis for social 
groupings, ethnicity and nationality are ideological/cul­
tural constructs stemming from the conditions of mater ial 
life. While other services to members (e.g., psychological) 
may become significant, the ultimate relevance (and, hence, 
survival) of groups is linked to their mater ial utility; 
that is, their role vis-a-vis challenging or maintaining the 
system of ethnic stratification. In other words, ethnicity 
and nationality are communal identities with a material 
base. Thus, during intergroup resource competition, ethnic 
and national identities continually evolve; that is, the 
assertion, masking, or change of identities occurs--whether 
voluntarily, via negotiation, or through ascription--in 
response to the changing exigencies of intergroup competi­
tion and conflict. A key question then, is: What effects
do different types of intergroup interaction have on ethnic 
and national identities?3
In the study of the role of ethnicity and nationality 
in human affairs, one important consideration is that of 
level of analysis; that is, determination of the level at 
which the evolution of ethnic and national identities is 
most fruitfully explained. This is a difficult question, 
inasmuch as society is best viewed as a series of concentric 
contexts (Khleif 1985) and ethnicity and nationality are 
asserted in a variety of milieus ranging from super-macro 
(global) and macro (nation-state) to meso (institutional) 
and micro (local or household). As we stated in Chapter I, 
we begin from the premise that the ultimate level of analy­
sis for the study of ethnicity and nationality is the 
world-svstem: however, we will tend to emphasize the nation­
state as a focal unit for analysis. Our rationale for this 
is simple: in the contemporary world-system, the nation­
state is the primary arena for intergroup competition, while 
the state itself plays a key role in shaping ethnic rela­
tions and national identities. In other words, the nation­
state, while a "subunit of the world-system" (Khleif 1985), 
becomes the practical context for the analysis of ethnic and 
national phenomena. At the same time, we will retain our 
global emphasis by anchoring our analysis in processes of 
the world-system, thereby employing these processes as key 
contextual variables in the study of ethnicity and national­
ity. Furthermore, we will seek to remain sensitive to what 
we might term "lower-level" processes occurring within the
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nation-state; for example, the impact of uneven regional 
development on intergroup relations. Given the model- 
building nature of this work, our efforts will necessarily 
be preliminary; however, one component of a complete theory 
of ethnicity would be the ability to articulate intergroup 
interaction at the global, national, regional, and local 
levels.
Eth-Class; A Tool for Understanding Group Action
In the macro-level analysis of human affairs, eth­
nicity/nationality and class, both of which are rooted in 
material relations, are perhaps the most salient bases of 
group affiliation. As we observed in Chapter II, individ­
uals possess potential affiliations with other individuals 
in the same productive circumstances (class) and the same 
communal order (ethnic group or nation). Most contemporary 
perspectives on ethnicity have attempted to specify the 
nature of the relationship between ethnicity and class, the 
conditions under which intergroup relations emphasize 
communal ties as opposed to class distinctions (cf. Mast 
1974; Levis 1974). For some theorists (e.g., primordialists 
and plural society theorists), ethnicity and class have been 
viewed as competitive. mutually exclusive affiliations, with 
one asserted at the expense of the other. In contrast, 
other perspectives (e.g., competition, reactive ethnicity, 
and class theories) have depicted ethnicity and class as 
largely coincidental; that is, as drawing upon the same
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membership, with one affiliation considered an epiphenomenon 
of the other, more basic tie. Thus, to accord analytical 
primacy to either ethnicity or class is to take, either 
explicitly or implicitly, a theoretical position in the 
above debate.
From our perspective, the competitive-coincidental 
dichotomy is a misleading oversimplification. Ethnicity and 
class are neither competing nor coincidental forms of group 
affiliation; such conceptualizations are Ideal types rather 
than empirical realities.3 Each individual has both an 
ethnic and a class position; each class/ethnic group con­
tains ethnic/class differences. Thus, ve will assert that 
ethnicity and class are interrelated (via their common 
grounding in material practice) in a manner much more 
complex than is suggested by the ideal types of competition 
and coincidence. In other words, we cannot study ethnicity 
and class independently of one another, but as integrated 
affiliations (cf. Marger 1978, p. 21). What is needed, 
therefore, is an analytical device which will enable us to 
explore the intricacies of the interrelationship between 
ethnicity and class.
Accordingly, we believe that a basic unit of analysis 
for group action is the "eth-class" (adapted from Gordon 
1964, p. 51); that is, social location in terms of both 
ethnicity and class (e.g., British capitalist class, 
Italian-American working class. Black middle class). In
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our view, the major advantage of the notion of eth-class is 
that it allows us to analyze both class interests within 
ethnic groups and ethnic divisions within classes--the 
different material bases for action for different eth-class 
segments. At the same time, it is essential to emphasize 
that we are employing eth-class in a sense which is dramat­
ically different from that of Gordon--or Abram Leon's (1970) 
similar notion of "people class".'* For us, eth-class Is an 
analytical tool, more valuable as an objective category than 
as a concrete basis for action or the subjective identity 
which ipso facto accompanies such a category.® Indeed, it 
is rare that an individual or group would develop an "eth- 
class consciousness" along the lines of class or ethnic 
consciousness.0 For example, working class Blacks are more 
likely to view themselves (and to mobilize for action) as 
Black or working class rather than as Black working class.
If we assert that eth-class is primarily an objective 
category, how do we make the transition from eth-class to 
group action along ethnic or class lines? In general, we 
accept the proposition that individuals and groups act to 
pursue material interests and to ensure survival (cf. 
Patterson 1975). Each eth-class segment has unique material 
interests which reflect a blend of ethnic and class inter­
ests.7 Depending upon whether interests are defined in 
class or ethnic terms (see Thompson— 1983, pp. 129-30— on 
class vs. ethnic economic interests), mobilization for group
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action (and the assertion of identity) can occur along 
either ethnic/national or class lines, involving ad hoc 
combinations or "alliances'1 of eth-classes (e.g., the 
alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and working 
classes). Furthermore, the differing constellations of 
ethnic and class interests may impel various eth-classes to 
adopt different strategies, even though the ultimate action 
may be cloaked in similar ethnic or class terms with regard 
to other groups (cf. See--1986— on different material 
interests of Protestant capitalist and working classes in 
Northern Ireland, yet the similarity of their ethnic asser­
tion vs. Catholics). In modern society, the general goal of 
eth-class alliances is to advance interests by seeking to 
attain or to influence state power (i.e., to realize greater 
inclusion or exclusion of subordinate groups); that is, 
mobilization will occur within a national context (cf. Marx 
and Engels 1964, p. 22).®
On a general level, a rough typology of potential eth- 
class alliances might be as follows:
1. Ethnic mobilization. This would involve group 
mobilization along ethnic lines, a cross-class alliance 
(elite, working class, etc.) of the eth-class units of a 
particular ethnic group. Such an alliance could occur in 
the face of real or perceived oppression or ethnic-based 
challenges to the status quo. To some extent, it may also 
reflect the ability of the ethnic elite to manipulate the
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symbolic content of group identity (or, from a Marxian 
standpoint, "false consciousness" on the part of the ethnic 
working class). One concomitant of ethnic mobilization is 
increased assertion (i.e., strengthening) of ethnic 
identity.
2. National mobilization. This is ethnic mobilization 
at the level of the nation-state; that is, a "cross-class, 
cross-ethnic" alliance. Like its ethnic counterpart, 
national mobilization may reflect real or perceived material 
and political interests and/or manipulation by hegemonic 
eth-classes (i.e., the bourgeoisie of the dominant ethnic 
group). One outcome of national mobilization may be the at 
least temporary muting of ethnic identities (i.e., assimila­
tion); however, attempts by dominant ethnic groups to cast 
national identity in their image may trigger ethnic mobili­
zation on the part of subordinate groups (e.g., the Civil 
Rights Movement by Black Americans during the 1960s and the 
ethnic resurgence among White Ethnics as responses to the 
hegemony of WASPs in shaping "American" national identity).
3. Ethnic merger. A third type of mobilization 
entails the super imposition of eth-class matrices upon one 
another, either via the absorption of one group by another, 
or through the merger of two or more groups into a new "pan­
ethnic" group.* Mergers would generally occur as groups 
band together (or are forced together) to assert interests
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vis-a-vis other entities. In this case, the outcome is the 
change of one or more ethnic identities.
4. Class mobilization. This is a "cross-ethnic” 
alliance— the unifying of eth-classes and the assertion of 
interests along class lines. For our purposes, the key 
outcome here is a diminution (although not necessarily 
irreversible) of ethnic ties.
At this abstract level, we have little more to add to 
our conceptual discussion of eth-class. The eth-class 
alliances we have described above should be viewed as 
temporary arrangements, as social movements which seek to 
alter the institutional and ideological contexts of group 
relations, including the redefinition of ethnic understand­
ings (cf. Omi and Winant— 1986--on racial formation). More­
over, these alliances are not necessarily mutually exclu­
sive, more than one may occur simultaneously within a 
society (the United States is a prime example of this).
With respect to the conditions under which eth-class alli­
ances emerge (i.e., whv mobilization occurs along class vs. 
ethnic lines, or vice-versa, or along both lines), much 
remains unaddressed at this juncture. In addition, we have 
yet to assess the impact of such factors as the number and 
relative size of eth-class units and the duration of eth- 
class alliances. These issues will be developed when ve 
analyze intergroup relations in historically specific 
circumstances.
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Structural Context; Capitalist Development
Our attempt to address issues of ethnicity and
nationality begins with our central thesis:
The evolution of ethnic and national identities 
(i.e.. the formation of eth-class alliances) can 
only be understood in the context of the process 
of global capitalist development.
This is not to assert that capitalist development per se 
"explains” the evolution of ethnic and national identities, 
but that capitalist development constitutes the structural 
context, the most general basis for explanation. In our 
opinion, current theories of ethnicity and nationality 
(which we criticized in Chapter III) either lack a basic 
motor force or employ processes (e.g., modernization, 
industrialization) which we believe are corollaries of 
capitalist development. Thus, if ethnicity and nationality 
are to be better comprehended, then they must be deliber­
ately linked to the dynamics of global capitalist develop­
ment .
Why are we emphasizing capitalist development as the 
most general explanation for the evolution of ethnicity and 
nationality? As we noted earlier, the dominant means 
through which humans produce their subsistence (in the post- 
1800 world, this is the capitalist mode of production) will 
have significant effect upon social existence (cf. Marx 
1970, pp. 20-21). In the case of capitalism, this influence 
has been particularly pervasive. Over the past half­
millennium, capitalism has revolutionized the production of
material life, which in turn has transformed social life 
through such processes as proletarianization; the domination 
of market relations; the emergence of mass institutions, 
mass society, and even mass communication on a world scale; 
and the production and dissemination of new technologies and 
ideologies. Unlike other social formations (e.g., precapi­
talist empires), capitalism transformed entire societies, 
destroying previous systems of production (either deliber­
ately or by dint of superior productivity) and increasing 
the sway of market relations. Furthermore, the ceaseless 
process of capitalist expansion (i.e., accumulation--cf.
Marx 1906) and the advances in technology (e.g., transporta­
tion, arms) facilitated the internationalization of capital­
ism to the extent that by the end of the nineteenth century, 
the effects of capitalism had occurred, in varying forms, on 
a global level.
For the purposes of this analysis, the most important 
effect of capitalist development was its effect upon the 
nature of the human penchant for communally-based group 
formation. The revolutionization of relations of produc­
tion and the development of a generalized system of domina­
tion via the market and civil society led to the intensifi­
cation and extension of socio-economic systems, the erosion 
of traditional social bonds, and the creation of new forms 
of group affiliation. What is important to understand is 
that the impact of the emergence of capitalism was not a
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simple matter of the disappearance of "non-rational" commu­
nal identities in the face of the logic of market criteria. 
Instead, it involved a complex interaction between the 
dynamics of capitalist development and the human propensity 
for group formation. In other words, what transpired was 
the transformation of communal identities: pre-existing
"ethnic" affiliations (relatively autonomous Gemeinschaft- 
like social relations, with a Durkheimian "collective con­
science") became means of domination and exploitation; of 
competition; and of mobilization and mutual aid--in each 
case reflecting material and political claims vis-a-vis 
other groups. Thus, the symbolic and cultural content of 
ethnicity became a means for group mobilization and boundary 
maintenance in the course of intergroup competition in a 
social system shaped by capitalist production, market rela­
tions, and the capitalist state.
Yet perhaps the greatest impact of capitalist develop­
ment on communal identities involved its effects on the 
global level. The internationalization of capitalism--the 
expansion of the Western European economy into a world- 
economy (cf. Wallerstein 1974a; 1974b; 1980)— brought 
together previously separate groups through such processes 
as colonization and voluntary and involuntary labor 
migration.3-0 This intergroup contact occurred between 
continents and across oceans, a quantitative change in the 
number of meetings between people on a scale thereto unseen
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(Stavrianos 1982, p. 140). Even more significant, however, 
was the qualitative change in the nature of intergroup 
relations brought about by the exigencies of capitalist 
accumulation on a global scale. Historical examples abound: 
see Hughes (1971, pp. 73-86) on the mixing of Protestant and 
Catholic Germans in the Ruhr valley; Koebner (1961) on the 
deliberate importation of Indians into Uganda and other 
African possessions by the British; Williams (1944) on the 
African slave trade; and Magubane (1979, pp. 55-70) on the 
forcible alteration of native culture by the British in 
South Africa. Furthermore, with the ascendance of the 
modern capitalist state, interstate competition, core 
imperialism, and anti-colonial resistance, national identi­
ties emerged, thereby adding yet another level of complexity 
to intergroup relations.11 Clearly, capitalist development 
has radically altered both the context and the nature of 
communally based group formation.
Inasmuch as we have asserted that capitalist develop­
ment constitutes the main context for the evolution of 
ethnic and national identities, it is essential that we 
specify those processes inherent in capitalist development 
which shape this evolution. The main dynamic propelling 
capitalist development (i.e., expansion, intensification of 
productive activities) is accumulation— the expanded repro­
duction of capital. As Marx (1906) observed, accumulation 
is motivated not by acquisitiveness, but by survival— the
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need to increase size or productivity in order to withstand 
competition from other capitalist entities. Yet the process 
of capitalist accumulation is not smooth, it is rife with 
contradictions (e.g., falling rate of profit; underconsump­
tion; profit squeeze; state expenditure) which become mani­
fest during periods of crisis--the disruption of accumula­
tion (cf. Wright 1977; Shaikh 1978; Alcaly 1978). Thus, we 
can understand the seemingly ceaseless quest for markets, 
resources, investment opportunities, and cheap labor power—  
the internationalization of capital and the formation of the 
global economy— as the virtually inevitable outcome of the 
basic motor force of capitalism.
Uneven Development and Ethnic/National Identities
For our purposes, what is particularly important about
capitalist development is the nature of its expansion into a
world-system. In this context, our next key proposition is:
A major factor in the evolution of ethnic and 
national identities has been the uneven nature of 
capitalist development as characterized by the 
core-peripherv division.
Uneven development (i.e., periods of relative advantage for
different regions) is endemic to capitalism (Frank 1967, p.
9); that is, it is grounded in the competitive, privatized
nature of commodity production. This is not to assert that
uneven development is unique to capitalism; indeed, the
technological advances linked to capitalism enabled Western
Europe to "leapfrog" past more developed Middle Eastern and
Oriental societies and to create a European-dominated world-
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economy {Stavrianos 1982, p. 35; Wolf 1982). Nevertheless, 
uneven capitalist development is a qualitatively different 
phenomenon due to the internationalization of capitalism and 
the degree to which capitalist production relations altered 
the nature of social life. Moreover, to speak of uneven 
capitalist development is not to describe inequality between 
isolated empires, but between societies integrated into a 
world-economy. As a consequence, the experiences of peoples 
in developed and less-developed areas are inexorably inter­
twined .
How is uneven development linked to the evolution of 
ethnic and national identities? Historically, uneven 
development--and the domination of less-developed countries 
by more powerful ones— has followed existing social cleav­
ages, particularly geographic and cultural boundaries 
(Wallerstein 1974b, pp. 86-87), both within nation-states 
and at the societal level. Thus, ethnic and national 
identities became relations of domination and exploitation-- 
and of resistance. Through social and ideological reproduc­
tion (cf. Bordieu 1977), these ethnic and national divisions 
became an aspect of material life; indeed, intergroup 
differences were often reified as an "explanation" for 
inequality (Chang 1985; Genovese 1968, p. 32). As we will 
argue below, these different material experiences produced 
different trajectories of ethnic and national relations. In 
essence, then, one could assert that ethnicity and national-
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ity in the current world-system are a reflection of the 
interaction of uneven development and previous socio­
cultural cleavages.12
The notions of core and periphery (cf. Amin 1974, 1980; 
Wallerstein 1974b) are useful for describing two fundamen­
tally different paths of capitalist development--and the 
resulting differential evolution of ethnic and national 
identities.12 Core describes those nation-states (e.g., 
United States, Western Europe, Japan) characterized by a 
high level of economic development, a complex and diversi­
fied economy, and a relatively high level of national inte­
gration in terms of political and social institutions. In 
contradistinction, periphery describes areas (e.g., Latin 
America, Africa, Asia) which exhibit relatively low levels 
of economic development and diversification (i.e., con­
centration on relatively few products) and relatively low 
levels of national integration. Yet core-periphery is more 
than a description, it is a relationship in which one pre­
supposes the other. Core-periphery relations are those of 
economic and political domination and subjugation, relations 
which are reproduced through such mechanisms as coloniza­
tion, dependent development, capital repatriation, and 
unequal exchange. What we are confronting are two different 
paths of capitalist development: the core, where the pro­
cess of capitalist development was relatively slow and 
autonomous and fueled by the exploitation of the resources
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and labor power of the periphery; and the periphery, whose 
process of capitalist development was introduced by the core 
and subsequently distorted to conform to the needs of the 
core (e.g., the destruction of the Indian textile industry 
by the British concurrent with the construction of an 
infrastructure to facilitate the export of raw materials-- 
Stavrianos 1982, p. 277). What remains to be explored is 
how this core-periphery division was manifest in the 
evolution of ethnicity and nationality.
Communal Identities and Post-1800 Capitalist Development 
At this juncture, we have discussed in general terms 
the revolutionary impact of capitalism on pre-existing 
social relations and the expansive forces propelling the 
internationalization of capitalist production relations. In 
addition, we have observed uneven nature of the process of 
capitalist development which in turn resulted in an integra­
ted world-economy structured for the benefit of the powerful 
core nations. As we enter the post-1800 era, we find this 
uneven internationalization proceeding apace, as the capi­
talist world-economy expands rapidly from its European base. 
By the nineteenth century, the age of "plunder" (i.e., the 
overseas exploration, slaving, and looting--Marx's "primi­
tive accumulation"— which served as a source of capital for 
European expansion) and mercantilism had largely passed, and 
the industrializing core powers were embarking upon an era 
of colonization of the periphery (i.e., Asia, Africa, the
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Caribbean) which met the need for new markets, sources of 
raw materials, and outlets for investment. Driven by the 
need to overcome domestic obstacles (i.e., contradictions) 
to continued capitalist accumulation and by interstate 
competition among colonial powers,14 core imperialism 
resulted in a world-economy which by 1900 was virtually 
completely dominated by Western Europe and the United 
States.1* Again, what must be emphasized is both the scope 
of nineteenth century European expansion and the unprece­
dented nature of its effects--i.e ., the transformation of 
peripheral social structures to serve the needs of core 
capitalist accumulation.
One noteworthy aspect of the expansion of the capital­
ist world-economy was that it was neither a uniform nor a 
unitary process. Instead, core imperialism (i.e., core- 
per iphery relations) and global capitalist accumulation 
involved the articulation of a variety of subprocesses, each 
with different implications for intergroup contact and the 
evolution of ethnic and national identities. For our 
purposes, we will consider briefly two issues most closely 
linked to intergroup relations: colonization and labor
migration.
Colonization. Political and economic domination of the 
periphery by the core took several forms, each with--as we 
will discuss later in the chapter--different effects on 
ethnic and national identities.
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1. Settler colonies. These were societies (e.g., 
United States, Canada, Palestine-Israel, New Zealand, and 
Australia) created by core conquest and the replacement of 
the indigenous population (often eliminated via genocide) 
through large scale migration from Europe. This served 
several purposes for the core: a safety valve for excess or 
unwanted population (thereby reducing domestic conflict); a 
locus for investment; a new market for core commodities; and 
a source of raw materials and agricultural goods. Varia­
tions on this pattern include societies where settlers 
constituted a small but dominant minority (e.g., South 
Africa) or a smaller majority partially amalgamated with 
native peoples (e.g., Latin America). Given cultural and 
institutional similarity to the colonial power, settler 
colonies tended to achieve political independence at an 
earlier stage. Following independence, indigenous peoples 
were often subject to domination by settler groups.
2. Traditional colonies. These were peripheral 
societies conquered by the core and governed directly by a 
colonial administration for the economic and strategic 
benefit of the core. Overall migration from the core was on 
a much smaller scale, consisting of administrators and 
support personnel, military, representatives of core capi­
tal, and independent entrepreneurs and adventurers. From 
the vantage point of the colonized nation, the impacts of 
colonization included: distorted or inhibited development
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{i.e., economic development consonant with the needs of the 
core--e.g., export of selected raw materials or agricultural 
products); partial proletarianization (i.e./ creation of a 
wage labor force through disruption of traditional activi­
ties, enclosure, taxation, etc.— yet with wages often below 
subsistence levels); and inhibition of the development of 
indigenous economic and political institutions. The bulk 
of these "traditional colonies" only became independent in 
the post-1945 era, most remain on the periphery of the 
worId-economy.
3. Autonomous but dominated societies. These were 
semiperipheral or peripheral societies which escaped con­
quest and colonization (often due to intra-core rivalries), 
yet were economically (and occasionally politically) domi­
nated by the core (e.g., China, Ottoman Empire, Eastern 
Europe, post-independence Latin America). One result of 
this core economic domination was underdevelopment (i.e., 
distorted capitalist development); however, these effects 
were mitigated somewhat by political autonomy. To some 
extent, there exist parallels between these societies and 
the post-colonial experience of the traditional colonies 
(i.e., political independence but economic domination by 
core-based transnational corporations).
Labor migration. Core colonization and the evolution 
of the world-economy also provided the context for mass 
movements of peoples from one area of the globe to an­
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other.1® As mentioned above, settler colonies provided an 
outlet for economically displaced persons, adventurers, and 
political and religious refugees from both the colonial 
power and other core nations (e.g., German and Scandinavian 
immigrants to the United States). Within "traditional 
colonies," migration from the core was more limited; how­
ever, the labor force was often supplemented by the impor­
tation of workers from other colonies (e.g., Indians and 
Asians as contract laborers within the British empire).
The plantation economies of the Southern United States, the 
Caribbean, and South America were buttressed by the involun­
tary importation of African labor--i.e., the slave trade.
A subsequent but analytically related phenomenon 
involved "reverse" migration from the periphery to the core. 
Incomplete proletarianization in the periphery and semi­
periphery disrupted traditional economic pursuits (e.g., 
agriculture); however, development (distorted by core 
domination) was not sufficient to absorb this surplus 
population. Given the lower historical levels of wages in 
peripheral societies and the need of core capital for cheap 
labor, a frequent result was mass migration from the peri­
phery to the core, thus creating a new setting for inter­
group relations.1-7 Whatever the direction of movement, 
each of these processes is grounded in core capitalist 
expansion, each can be linked to different experiences of
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intergroup relations and both class-based and ethnically- 
based identities.
Capitalist Development; A Summary
Thus far, we have presented a brief outline of those 
aspects of capitalist development which we deem most rele­
vant to understanding the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities. We have emphasized the need to view the global 
evolution of capitalism as a constellation of Integrated 
processes— capitalist accumulation, uneven development, and 
core-periphery relations. Indeed, one problematic aspect of 
many works is the artificial sundering of such fundamentally 
interrelated processes. For example, colonization, depen­
dent development, and labor migration are not isolated 
events, but threads in a larger historical tapestry. In the 
post-1800 world-economy, what transpired was the expansion 
of Western European capitalism, an event which effected an 
unprecedented transformation of social relations on a 
worldwide scale.
With respect to ethnicity and nationality, our argument 
is that the emergency and evolution of capitalism has trans­
formed the nature of communal relations. Given the uneven 
nature of global capitalist development and the broad and 
diverse contacts between peoples, ethnicity and nationality 
became an aspect of material relations, a tool for domina­
tion, competition, and resistance.x* In other words, we 
have intimated that the specific nature of intergroup
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contact, along with position in the world-economy/ shaped 
the nature of subsequent intergroup relations; that is, the 
evolution of ethnic and national identities. Accordingly, 
in the next section we will seek to link specific outcomes 
to the world-system processes described above.
Working Hypotheses
Although we have asserted that the evolution of ethnic 
and national identities has been shaped by the dynamics of 
global capitalist development, our discussion to this point 
has been rather general. Consequently, in this section we 
will present a series of "working hypotheses" in which we 
will attempt to link different historical experiences of 
ethnicity and nationality to processes of the world-system. 
The term "working hypotheses" has been selected intention­
ally so as to underscore the exploratory nature of this 
work. By working hypotheses we do not mean specific, 
empirically testable propositions, but rather more general 
statements which represent a first attempt to describe 
relationships between our key concepts. In other words, 
these working hypotheses will serve as guideposts for the 
application of our framework to specific cases. Further 
development of our framework will of course necessitate 
elaboration of these notions.
As will soon become evident, a major basis for organi­
zation of these hypotheses is the core-periphery division. 
Within the context of global capitalist development in the
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post-1800 world-economy, the radically different experiences 
of core and periphery led to different historical patterns 
of ethnic and national relations. We are in essence de­
scribing two different types of ethnicity and nationality 
(core and peripheral) which are linked together by the 
dynamics of the capitalist world-system. This is not to 
assert that the core-periphery distinction explains all 
variations in ethnic and national identities, but rather 
that it constitutes a first cut with our analytical scalpel. 
Indeed, these hypotheses are grounded in the conceptual 
issues raised in Chapter II, as well as the subprocesses of 
the world-system (e.g., types of colonization, labor migra­
tion) described above. Additional detail will be provided 
at the end of the section, when we discuss the evolution of 
ethnicity and nationality in historically specific circum­
stances .
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Core 
Nationality.
1. In the core, the emergence of nations was roughly 
concurrent with capitalist development and the forma­
tion of the modern state— an entity which would facili­
tate (as opposed to control) market relations and 
maintain the basis of bourgeois domination. This 
process of national emergence included the evolution of 
nationalism (the ideological assertion of national
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self-determination, mass sovereignty, and loyalty to 
the nation-state) and nationality.
2. Given their relatively slower and more autonomous 
process of nation-building, core societies tend to be 
more complete (Amin 1980, p. 20); that is, they exhibit 
higher levels of national integration and national 
affiliation (Horowitz 1985; Tilly 1975).
3. The process of nation-building facilitated core 
capitalist development by homogenizing and unifying 
societies, by providing mass support for imperialism, 
and by reducing class conflict (by providing an alter­
native— national mobilization--to mobilization along 
class lines). Capitalist development in turn facili­
tated nation-building by increasing the role of the 
state, by allowing subordinate eth-classes to enjoy 
some of the benefits of colonial exploitation via 
increased standards of living, and by stimulating 
nationalism through rivalries with other core nations 
(cf. Ehrenreich 1983).
A. National identities do not emerge de novo, but 
rather through intergroup interaction (i.e., national 
mobilization or nation-building). Thus, national 
identities are negotiated and/or imposed; they reflect 
relations of power between eth-classes. The homogeni­
zation inherent in national mobilization often means 
the creation of a national identity in the image of the
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dominant ethnic group, with consequent variation in 
intensity of affiliation among subordinate groups 
(e.g., the attempt to base "American1* identity on 
Anglo-American ethnicity--and the responses this 
engendered from other groups).
5. At the same time, uneven development within core 
nations (or annexation of a contiguous area, followed 
by uneven development), the ideology of the right of 
self determination of peoples, and the attempt (often 
through coercion) to create homogeneous national iden­
tities gave rise to ethno-national movements on the 
part of subordinate but not assimilated peoples within 
the core (e.g., peripheral areas within core nations 
such as Wales, Quebec, and Corsica). Thus, core 
nationalism contains a contradictory element in terms 
of facilitating capitalist development.
Ethnicity.
1. In general, ethnicity in core societies has under­
gone a transformation from a Gemeinschaft-like culture 
group to a Gesellschaft-like interest group (cf. 
Steinberg 1981, pp. 52-57). Modernization and prole­
tarianization did not lead to the disappearance of 
ethnicity, neither did increased cultural similarity 
necessarily result in assimilation (both of which had 
been assumed by pre-1960 sociologists). Instead, 
ethnic groups have increasingly become symbolic organi­
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zational types, the role of vhich is to assert material 
and political claims (cf. Gans— 1979— on "symbolic 
ethnicity").
2. Within this overall pattern, one subtrend involves 
"submerged nations"; that is, historically autonomous 
regions within the core which were annexed or conquered 
by more powerful groups, but not totally assimilated 
into the larger nation-state (e.g., Wales, Corsica, 
Quebec, Native Americans). In these cases, ethnic 
identity has persisted— although considerable accul­
turation may have occurred--due to uneven economic 
development and economic and cultural domination (i.e., 
what some would term "internal colonialism") and may 
even give rise to ethno-national movements seeking 
autonomy.
3. A second subtrend has occurred within "settler 
societies" (i.e., Canada, the United States, Australia, 
New Zealand, and pre-1967 Palestine-Israel) where the 
indigenous population was virtually eliminated and 
replaced by European migrant groups. In these cases, 
successive waves of voluntary migrants (i.e., labor 
migration from periphery to core; the involuntary 
importation of labor to the core —  i.e., African slaves 
to the United States--is a special case and will be 
treated later) underwent either full assimilation and 
absorption into the dominant group or partial assimila-
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tion and evolution into a "symbolic" identity. This 
trend was the result of the effects of class and 
national mobilization; the economic, political, and 
cultural hegemony of the dominant settler group and a 
period of internal settlement and economic expansion 
(i.e., movement into the core) which facilitated (and 
relied upon) the absorption of large numbers of 
immigrants.
4. A new phase of intergroup contact and ethnic rela­
tions has resulted from the (largely) post-1945 labor 
migration from the periphery to the core. In these 
cases (e.g., "guestworkers" in Western Europe; Common­
wealth immigrants in Great Britain; Hispanics and 
Asians in the United States), assimilation may be more 
problematic due to changing conditions of accumulation 
(e.g., emergence of the service economy and labor 
market segmentation).
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Periphery
1. With regard to nationality in the periphery, a key 
factor appears to be the specific nature of contact 
with the core (e.g., colonialism vs. relative autonomy 
under the suzerainty of a core power). Indeed, the 
very nature of peripheral capitalist development (and 
subsequent ethnic and national relations) is different 
if for no other reason than the existence of the core 
(e.g., dependent development; increased ethnic contact-
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-due to infrastructural development--prior to any 
significant national mobilization). In general, socie­
ties experiencing higher levels of core penetration 
(i.e., depth, duration) tend to be less ,,complete,, 
nation-states with lower levels of integration and 
national mobilization.
2. The effect of core colonial domination of the 
periphery upon the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities was shaped by such forces as:
a. the nature and level of development of pre­
colonial society (cf. Rex 1981).
b. the identity of the colonial power and the 
time and duration of colonial occupation (for 
example, the earlier independence of Latin America 
due to its colonization by weaker powers such as 
Spain and Portugal).
c. specific colonial policies (e.g., importation 
of foreign laborers, reliance upon specific groups 
for soldiers or state officials--cf. Horowitz 
1985; political boundaries which reflected the 
interests of the colonial power rather than the 
ethnic divisions of subjugated peoples).
d. the exigencies of capitalist accumulation 
(e.g., labor requirements of specific enterprises, 
specific forms of labor control--plantations, wage 
labor, etc.).
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e. the structuring of post-colonial society 
(e.g., the deliberate institutionalization of 
ethnic interests in Lebanon and Malaysia; the 
existence of colonial "settlers" in Latin America 
and South Africa).
3. Nationalism in the periphery emerged largely as a 
response to core domination and in part to the dissemi­
nation of the core ideology of "national self-determi­
nation." Thus, nationalism is a contradiction of 
capitalism: on the one hand, it facilitated (via the 
rise of powerful states based upon the nationality of 
the majority) core domination of the world-economy; on 
the other hand, it has served as a means of resisting 
and ultimately limiting core hegemony (via "anticolo­
nial" nationalism).
4. In peripheral areas which experienced core domina­
tion, attempts at nation-building often followed the 
establishment of a politically autonomous state (cf. 
Rejai and Enloe's— 1969— notion of "state-nation"). 
Thus, the cultural and institutional basis for national 
integration tends to be more fragile, with nationality 
based upon resistance to core imperialism. To the 
extent that nation-building occurs, national identities 
are created through intergroup interaction (and con­
flict) in a manner similar to the core.
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5. Peripheral ethnic identities tend to be stronger 
and more salient, almost in inverse proportion to the 
strength of national identity (e.g., Guyanese primary 
identification vith the ethnic group— Creole or East 
Indian--as opposed to the nation). In contrast with 
the core, ethnic identities tend to have a stronger 
Gemeinschaft-like component and to be less "symbolic". 
Given lower levels of national integration, interethnic 
conflict is often "national" in character as groups 
strive for self-determination (e.g., current conflicts 
between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; between 
Sikhs and Hindus in India).
Ethnicity and Nationality in Specific Circumstances
Although the above working hypotheses provide a general 
framework for explaining the evolution of ethnic and 
national identities, they cannot account for all variation. 
While we have suggested that the core-periphery distinction 
reflects two different trajectories of ethnic and national 
relations, each of which contains considerable similarity of 
experience, each category nevertheless subsumes considerable 
differentiation. Clearly, the evolution of ethnic and 
national identities in the United States has been different 
from that of Great Britain; the experience of South Africa 
is different from that of India or of Peru. From our per­
spective, explanation of such differences can only come from 
an analysis of the historically specific circumstances sur-
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rounding each case or constellation of interrelationships. 
Accordingly, the development of our theoretical framework 
must include a consideration of those aspects of social 
systems which we believe are important in understanding the 
evolution of ethnic and national identities at the level of 
the nation-state. In our examination of particular cases, 
we will emphasize the following factors: the nature of the
eth-class system; the nature of the political system; and 
the nature of the intergroup "arena.”
The nature of the eth-class system. Each society has a 
unique eth-class system; that is, ethnic composition, class 
structure, and the distribution of ethnic groups across the 
class structure (i.e., eth-classes). In the analysis of 
concrete situations, a key consideration involves the 
material and political interests of eth-class units and the 
strategies selected to advance these interests (e.g., 
inclusion vs. autonomy; exclusion vs. incorporation; class 
vs. ethnic mobilization).3-* Two factors seem crucial here. 
First, the number and relative size of groups and classes 
(and eth-class units) affects strategic perceptions and 
possibilities (e.g., polarized relations in Northern Ireland 
vs. the multiethnic nature of the United States; the small 
proportion of Native Americans in the United States vs. the 
proportion of indigenous Blacks in South Africa). The 
second factor is the existence of certain eth-class units 
(e.g., minority intelligentsia, elites, and working class)
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which have historically assumed a key role in ethnic mobili­
zation (cf. See--1986--on the role of the French-Canadian 
clergy in supporting English-Canadian rule in nineteenth 
century Quebec). For our purposes, the crux of the matter 
is whether or not interests are perceived and articulated in 
ethnic terms.
With respect to the evolution of eth-class structure, 
it is essential to examine the reproduction of such systems. 
Inasmuch as the institutional superstructure of a society 
tends to reflect existing relations of power and domination, 
these relations tend to be reproduced intergenerationally 
through differential access to key resources (e.g., educa­
tion, networks). In this context, such factors as degree of 
economic mobility, permeability of ethnic boundaries, and 
the degree of mobility possible while maintaining minority 
group affiliation influence the selection of assimilative 
vs. assertive strategies. Rigid boundaries, for example, 
would increase the likelihood and intensity of intergroup 
conflict. Thus, strategic options (e.g., the formation of 
eth-class alliances and the manipulation of group ties) are 
constrained by structural realities.
The nature of the political system. Given our asser­
tion that eth-class alliances occur within a national con­
text, that is, within a nation-state, then a theory of the 
state is essential to understanding intergroup relations 
(cf. Khleif 1985). To speak of the state in modern capital­
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ist society is to speak of concentrated social and economic 
power (e.g., military and police powers, state expenditures) 
in an institution which affects virtually every sphere of 
social life. Without undue elaboration, our view of the 
stat* is as a temporary accommodation which represents 
relations of power between social groups. State actions 
reflect the interests of dominant classes and groups, 
constrained (to varying degrees) by the oppositional power 
of subordinate groups.20 Moreover, the state is not a 
monolithic entity but consists of subinstitutions which 
reflect different constellations of interests.
In essence, the state is both an actor in and an object 
of ethnic and class struggle. On one hand, socially defined 
ethnic meanings are embedded in political processes, while 
state decisions have varying impacts on different eth-class 
segments. On the other hand, group claims are political 
claims made towards the state; group mobilization is a 
social movement aimed at altering the political balance of 
power. Thus, in an ethnically divided society the state is 
shaped by current ethnic ideologies; however, these ideolo­
gies may change in response to challenges to the established 
order (cf. Omi and Winant-1986— on the response of the U.S. 
state to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s 
and to the "White backlash" of the 1970s and 1980s). In 
short, the "balance" between groups, as both mediated by and 
reflected in the state, is constantly changing.
148
Accordingly, the nature of the political system is a 
key factor in intergroup relations. The relative power of 
groups and the perceived legitimacy of the dominant group 
will shape both demands on the state (e.g., relatively 
absolute power might inhibit subordinate group mobilization 
by lowering the perceived chances of success) and state 
responses.21 Similarly, the balance between group claims 
and the claims of others (e.g.. White supremacy vs. Black 
equality in South Africa) will condition both the incidence 
and the intensity of group conflict.22 Finally, the nature 
of the formal political structure itself is important, for 
if ethnic cleavages are institutionalized in the formal 
state structure— e.g., ethnic political parties, proportion­
al representation, ethnic "niches”, legitimacy of ethnic 
based claims--then group identities will remain a salient 
basis for action (cf. Marger’s--1985, pp. 81-81--notion of 
corporate pluralism).
The nature of the interaroup arena. If we are to 
attempt to explain the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities in historically specific circumstances, then it 
is useful to take inventory of factors which vary from 
milieu to milieu and which affect intergroup interaction. 
Historically, aspects of the physical environment have 
shaped material activities and group relations. For 
example, location along trade routes or the existence of 
valued resources were reflected in patterns of exploration,
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colonization, and subsequent social relations (e.g., the 
discovery of gold in South Africa). Likewise, environmental 
changes which have a significant impact upon productive 
activities may dramatically alter the nature of intergroup 
relations (e.g., the Irish potato famine and subsequent 
Irish emigration to the United States). Even a factor such 
as close proximity of immigrant groups to the "homeland” may 
effect the evolution of group identity (cf. Barkan--1977— on 
the "commuter migration" of Mexicans and French-Canadians to 
the United States).
Of equal or greater importance for the evolution of 
ethnic and national identities is the social context in 
which intergroup interaction occurs. What we are referring 
to here is the specific social structural setting in which 
groups meet, as well as the particular qualities of groups 
involved. Such factors as demography (e.g., the changes in 
the relative sizes of ethnic groups in Lebanon— Khleif 
1984a); economy (e.g., the ability of expanding American 
industry to absorb relatively unskilled immigrant labor at 
the beginning of the twentieth century); economic cycles 
(Weber 19S8, p. 938; Cross 1978, p. 40; Khleif 1984b);23 
group structure (e.g., the institutional supports which 
contributed to the persistence of French-Canadian identity 
in Quebec— Breton 1964): and external actors (e.g., the 
impact of India on the Tami1-Sinhalese conflict in Sri 
Lanka) all influence the nature and outcome of intergroup
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conflict. In each case, it is essential to examine partic­
ular historical circumstances in order to discern which 
factors have shaped the trajectory of intergroup relations.
Our purpose in discussing aspects of the physical and 
social environment which affect intergroup relations is not 
to provide an exhaustive listing, but rather to make an 
important theoretical point: that specific intergroup
relations must be explained in the context of a specific 
social and spatial environment--that the evolution of ethnic 
and national identities takes place in a specific "inter­
group arena" (Doane unpublished, p. 17). This is not to 
suggest that the study of ethnicity requires idiographic 
explanations; indeed, our framework remains grounded in 
processes of the world-system, for many of the variables 
which operate at the level of the nation-state are shaped by 
global forces. Instead, we maintain that global processes 
are mediated by the forms which they assume in particular 
circumstances and by the nature and actions of specific 
social entities. In other words, if we want to understand 
the evolution of ethnic and national identities in, for 
example, the United States, then it is necessary to study 
the specific course of capitalist development and the 
nature of the particular groups involved in the American 
intergroup arena— whether forcibly imported in chains or 
peacefully recruited by steamship companies. Thus, to 
paraphrase Marx (1978, p. 595), ethnic groups and national­
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ities may make their own history; however, they do not make 
it as they please, but under specific historical circum­
stances conditioned by the dynamics of global capitalist 
accumulation.2"4 Yet the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities is a dynamic, recursive process, for the outcomes 
of intergroup "struggle" will in turn shape the nature of 
the "intergroup arenas" of the future.
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented our theoretical 
model for the study of the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities, our framework for answering the question: What
causes ethnic and national identities to emerge, persist, 
change, or disappear? As we asserted at the outset, this 
model is preliminarv in nature; it is an attempt to recast 
the study of ethnicity and nationality in the macrosociolog- 
ical context of global capitalist development. Rather than 
the last word on the subject, we view what we have just 
presented as a preamble. Necessary elaboration must come 
through the rigors of the process of theory construction, 
and by employing data from case studies and from comparative 
research.
To summarize briefly, our model rests upon the 
following core assumptions:
1. Ethnicity and nationality are one basis for group 
affiliation, Ideologies of community which may be
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asserted in intergroup resource competition. Thus, 
ethnicity and nationality have a material basis.
2. Ethnicity/nationality and class are intertwined 
inasmuch as every individual potentially possesses both 
affiliations and every ethnic group/nation or class 
contains divisions based upon the other affiliation. 
Rather than to attempt to separate these two identi­
ties, both of which are grounded in material life, we 
suggested that the eth-class— social location in terms 
of both ethnicity and class— provides an objective 
basis for understanding the material interests under­
lying group mobilization. Depending upon how material 
interests are perceived, group formation may be along 
either class or ethnic lines, resulting in ad hoc 
alliances of eth-classes and the assertion or masking 
of ethnic and national identities.
3. The ultimate context for explaining the evolution 
of ethnic and national identities is the process of 
global capitalist development. We suggested that 
capitalism has brought about the transformation of 
social life, increased the level of interaction between 
diverse peoples, and effected the metamorphosis of pre­
capitalist communal identities into group affiliations 
imbued with material content which serve as a basis for 
domination, competition, and resistance. Furthermore, 
the expansionist dynamic of capitalist accumulation and
the need to overcome contradictions inherent in the 
process of accumulation led to the internationalization 
of capitalism and the transformation of social identi­
ties on a global scale.
4. The uneven development of the capitalist world- 
economy is an important factor in explaining the evolu­
tion of ethnic and national identities. Manifest in 
the core-periphery relationship of domination and 
exploitation, uneven development emerged and was repro­
duced on a global scale. Inasmuch as uneven capitalist 
development tended to follow existing geographical and 
socio-cultural cleavages, these divisions became 
aspects of material life. Thus, different levels of
capitalist development are reflected in different his­
torical patterns of ethnic and national relations. 
Building upon these central notions, we then sought to 
anchor our framework in the dynamics of the post-1800 world- 
economy--the era of industrial capitalism and an increasing­
ly integrated world-system. In particular, we focused upon
two processes, colonization and labor migration, which we
deemed most salient to the evolution of ethnic and national 
identities. At this juncture, we introduced our ttworking 
hypotheses"— a series of rough propositions describing the 
different historical paths of ethnicity and nationality in 
core and peripheral societies. These notions will serve as 
organizing assumptions for the study of specific social
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settings. As a further elaboration of our framework, we 
recognized that other aspects of social systems (i.e., for 
our purposes, nation-states) also affect the evolution of 
ethnic and national identities and must be taken into 
consideration in explaining variations in ethnic experience 
between similar societies (e.g., core-core). Consequently, 
we attempted to provide an initial inventory of those 
aspects of nation-states which we believe are most likely 
to affect the course of intergroup interaction and group 
identit ies.
In sum, what we have presented in this chapter is a 
first outline of what we perceive to be the key factors in 
explaining the evolution of ethnic and national identities. 
We have sought to redirect the study of ethnicity and 
nationality along lines which we believe will yield more 
fruitful results. At the same time, we recognize that our 
framework requires considerable elaboration and development. 
As a first step in this process, we will attempt in the next 
two chapters to employ our framework to explore the nature 
of ethnicity and nationality in two case studies: the
United States and South Africa.
CHAPTER NOTES
CHAPTER IV
1. Although ve have maintained that ethnicity and 
nationality are group phenomena, ve recognize the 
problem of the link between group affiliations and 
individual behavior, the level at which sociological 
abstractions become human experience. This issue--the 
so-called macro-micro problem (Collins 1981; Blalock 
and Wilken 1979; Hechter 1983)— involves specifying the 
relationship between individual action and social 
determination. While the nature of this linkage 
remains unclear, we embrace the Durkheimlan notion that 
the social whole is more than the sum of its parts 
(i.e., the actions of individual actors); that society 
and social groups have a reality sui generis; that the 
group itself provides a context (i.e., shared rules and 
understandings) for individual rationality and action 
(Khleif 1985). Indeed, following Berger (1963) we 
posit that the relationship between individuals and 
society is interactive, perhaps dialectical in nature; 
that is, individual actions shape society, which in 
turn conditions Individual behavior. With respect to 
the study of ethnicity and nationality, this implies 
that while individual actions are shaped by group 
membership, the combined (in a manner more complex than 
mere addition) impact of individual experiences and 
actions in turn changes the nature of group membership 
(e.g., if enough individuals see no utility in group 
membership and act accordingly, then the group may 
disappear). Although our investigation will focus upon 
group relations at the macro level, we recognize that a 
complete theory must include linkage to micro level 
phenomena (e.g., linkage via informal social networks 
which may affect opportunities for education, employ­
ment, etc. ) .
2. For a more detailed exposition of our conceptual 
position, see Chapter II.
3. See our earlier discussion of ethnic stratification in 
Chapter I I .
4. Gordon (1964) uses eth-class in the tradition of main­
stream U.S. sociology; that is, as a combination of 
two individual attributes. In contrast, Leon (1970) 
employs "people-class" to describe the fusion of ethni­
city and class among American Jews. Our formulation 
differs from both: we use "eth-class" as a configura-
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tion of both relations of production (class) and 
communal/political groupings in the context of the 
nation-state. The concept of eth-class enables us to 
look within both ethnic groups and classes and to take
into account the division of one by the other.
5. I am indebted to Professor Richard England for
directing ray attention to this issue.
6. For an exception to this, see our description in 
Chapter VI of the actions of the South African white 
working class during the Rand Revolt of 1922. See also 
Cruse (1967; 1968) on abortive attempts by the Black 
working class in the United States to mobilize them­
selves during the Depression.
7. For purposes of this analysis, there is little to be
gained by attempting to assign analytical primacy to
ethnicity (e.g., primordiality) or class (e.g., ethni­
city as an epiphenomenon of class). The "ethnic" and 
"class" material interests of an eth-class segment are 
fused together, although they are expressed politically 
in ethnic or class terms. Indeed, even if we assign 
analytical primacy to class (via its grounding in the
economic base of society) as opposed to ethnicity (an
ideology located in the social superstructure), their 
interrelationship confounds the causal chain in the 
analysis of historically specific circumstances (i.e., 
the superstructure— ethnic relations— in turn influ­
ences the base— class). If class has any determining 
influence over ethnicity, it is across longer time 
spans (e.g., the impact of the transition from feudal 
to capitalist class relations on ethnic and national 
identities). For a discussion of this issue as it 
pertains to ethnic relations, see Burawoy (1974).
8. This is not to overlook the possibility of class or 
pan-national mobilization on a level broader than that 
of the nation-state (e.g., Trilateral Commission,
Second International, Pan-Arabism, "the West"); 
however, such processes are not, in our judgement, a 
major determinant of ethnic/national identities at the 
current historical moment. With the increasing inter­
connectedness of the global economy, it is likely that 
such identities will become more salient in the future.
9. See our discussion of this point in Chapter II.
10. Such contact effected a decrease in the cultural 
differences between groups (via diffusion), while often 
increasing the social distance between groups (due to 
economic and political competition).
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11. For example, in the Near East, such factors as (1) the 
incursion of the British into Egypt in the 1880s to 
control, among other things, its cotton production and 
the Suez Canal; (2) the incursion of both the British 
and the French in the post-WWI era into the countries 
of the Fertile Crescent in order to control the oil 
resources of the region; and (3) the U.S. presence in 
the region as successor to British hegemony in the 
post-WWII era all contributed to the downplaying of the 
"Millet System," the decline of the religious community 
as the mainspring of identity, and the evolution of a 
new community based on language and culture. In other 
words, "Christian" and Muslim" as distinct identities 
were fused into something new— "Arab" nationalism—  
especially during the 1880-1960 era. More recently, 
the destabilization of Lebanon in the 1970s was a 
reversal of the usual sort of nationalism, a boost to 
"confessional" divisions and the Balkanization of the 
Arab countries into religious Bantustans. Here ethni­
city, class, nationality, and pan-nationality become 
ingredients in an imperial and sub-imperial "melting 
pot" (Khleif unpublished; Rodinson 1973a, 1973b; Locke 
and Stewart 1985; Semyonov and Lewis-Epstein 1987).
12. This is not to imply, in the manner of the functional­
ist perspective, that ethnicity and nationality are 
historical artifacts reflecting different levels of 
development. On the contrary, we view ethnicity and 
nationality as key aspects— both process and outcome—  
of uneven capitalist development.
13. While world-system theory (e.g., Wallerstein 1974a; 
1974b) also describes a semiperioherv (i.e., an 
intermediate position wherein a state has core-like 
relations with the periphery and peripheral relations 
with the core), we view the semiperiphery-periphery 
distinction as one of gradations within the periphery. 
For us, the key distinction is the one between core and 
per iphery.
14. This is not to suggest that all colonization was 
directly economic in nature; for example, colonization 
was also an attempt to establish spheres of influence 
in opposition to other core nations (see Chirot 1977, 
pp. 49-54; Sweezy 1942, pp. 302-03).
15. As Magdoff (1978, p. 29) observes, effective European 
control (including former colonies in the Americas) 
increased from thirty-five to sixty-seven percent of 
the land surface of the earth during the period 1800- 
1878 .
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16. For an excellent discussion of international labor 
migration, see Bonacich and Cheng (1984).
17. Perhaps the first instance of this "reverse migration" 
involved Irish workers in England (Bonacich and Cheng 
1984, p. 29); other examples include Irish, Southern 
and Eastern European, Hispanic, and Asian migration to 
the United States; "guestvorkers" in Western Europe; 
and Commonwealth migrants to Great Britain.
18. For an example of this point, see our discussion of 
race in Chapter II.
19. Thus, we are describing objective interests,'subjective 
perceptions, and concrete actions.
20. In brief, our view of the state is neither pluralist 
nor elitist/instrumentalist. While we believe that 
state power is in general wielded by the dominant 
segments of a society (e.g., in modern capitalist 
society, this would be the capitalist class of the 
dominant ethnic group) for their own benefit, we 
recognize that the power of subordinate segments (e.g., 
working class, ethnic minorities) acts as a constraint 
on dominant group hegemony. Thus, state power and 
actions are shaped by class/ethnic struggle, which, in 
modern society, is increasingly directed towards the 
state. For an in-depth exploration of this point, see 
Esping-Andersen et al.— 1977; Whitt--1979.
21. See Omi and Winant (1986, pp. 72-82) on variations in 
subordinate group strategies (i.e., war of maneuver vs. 
war of position) and state responses (e.g., repression 
vs. absorption or insulation) in relation to differing 
levels of power.
22. See Schermerhorn's (1970, p. 78) notion of "reciprocal 
goal definition."
23. Interestingly, these writers disagree on the nature of 
the effects of economic cycles. Weber (1968, p. 938) 
and Cross (1978, p. 40) posit that ethnic identity will 
become more salient during periods of slow economic 
growth, while Khleif (1984b) describes the reawakening 
of Welsh nationalism in the midst of the post-1945 
expansion of the world-economy. This suggests for us 
both the importance of social structural effects and 
the need to examine these effects in relation to a 
specific context.
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24. Cf. Marx (1978, p. 595):
Men make their own history, but they do not make 
it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under cir­
cumstances directly found, given and transmitted 
by the past.
CHAPTER V
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE CORE: THE UNITED STATES
In this chapter we will employ our theoretical frame­
work to analyze the course of intergroup relations in the 
United States. Our purposes in doing so are twofold.
First, we believe that the framework outlined in the pre­
ceding chapter will enable us to attain a fuller, more 
comprehensive understanding of American ethnic history.
Such an endeavor should be the ultimate objective of any 
attempt at theory development. Secondlyr we hope that 
application of our hitherto abstract framework to a concrete 
historical case will provide us with an opportunity to 
"flesh out" our model in the face of the demands of actual 
usage. Thus, this chapter represents both case study and 
laboratory, as we seek to demonstrate the utility of our 
framework while at the same time subjecting it to test and 
elaboration or modification.
Our selection of the United States as our core nation 
case study reflects a variety of considerations. As we 
noted in Chapter I, the United States has served as "data" 
for many theories of ethnicity, theories which we criti­
cized in Chapter III. Moreover, these data have been 
subjected to diverse if not diametrically opposing interpre­
tations, from the view of the United States as an open 
society or "nation of nations" (Glazer 1967) to its
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characterization as a country marked by fundamental racial 
inequality (Takaki 1987a). Accordingly, we find it particu­
larly challenging to "reanalyze” this case using our own 
theoretical model. In addition, American ethnic history 
contains a wide variety of interethnic experience, both in 
terms of type of interaction (e.g., colonization, migration, 
involuntary migration and slavery) and number of groups 
involved, thereby providing us with the greatest possible 
breadth of material for analysis. If our model can address 
the diversity of the American case, then it should be able 
to contend with the analytical problems posed by ethnic 
relations in other perhaps less complex core nations.
In our examination of American ethnic history, our 
objective is not to produce a history per s e . but rather to 
undertake a theoretical interpretation of the development of 
ethnic relations in the United States. Consequently, we 
will employ our model for the secondary analysis of existing 
sociohistorical studies, providing a distillation and 
interpretation of these "data." Given the scope of this 
undertaking, our analysis will necessarily be painted with 
broad strokes on a macro (in this case, national) level, 
emphasizing major themes and dynamics rather than specific 
groups, facts, or figures. In keeping with the focus of 
the model outlined in the previous chapter, we will anchor 
our discussion in the following assumptions:
1. The development of ethnic relations in the United 
States was ultimately shaped by the nature of American 
capitalist development (set, of course, in the context 
of global capitalist development), particularly the 
exigencies of capitalist accumulation and the uneven 
nature of development. This is especially true of the 
post-1840 era.
2. The major factor shaping the evolution of ethnic 
identities was not culture, ideology, or values, but 
rather the strategic demands of intergroup resource 
competition. Thus, the emergence, metamorphosis, per­
sistence, or disappearance of ethnic identities in the 
United States is best interpreted as an outcome of eth- 
class alliances and struggles. For example, we would 
attribute the initial persistence of Irish-American 
identity to eth-class struggle (in which various Irish- 
Amer ican eth-classes banded together) vs. the dominant 
Anglo-American group. The more recent attenuation of 
Irish-American ethnicity could be interpreted as the 
result of an alliance (of the type which we termed 
"ethnic merger" in Chapter IV) with Anglos and other 
"old stock" groups to defend their position in the face 
of challenges from newer arrivals. These eth-class 
alliances and struggles led to the creation of speci­
fic ethnic systems (i.e., a system of stratification 
and a related set of understandings governing the rela-
163
tions between specific groups)--a temporary "balance of 
imbalance"--which in turn provided a context for subse­
quent struggles (as well as those forces which tended 
to reproduce the system) and the further evolution of 
ethnic identities.
Additionally, as we develop our analysis of the American 
case, we will also seek to highlight those variable aspects 
of societies (i.e., nature of the eth-class system; nature 
of the political system; nature of the intergroup "arena") 
which appear significant to an explanation of the evolution 
of ethnic and national identities.
Our examination of the course of intergroup relations 
in the United States will be divided into four historical 
segments: the colonial era (prior to 1800); the nineteenth
century (1800-1890); the early twentieth century (1900- 
1945); and the modern era (1945-present). We believe that 
this format will best enable us to take into account the 
evolving nature of both the American economy and American 
ethnic relations, as these historical divisions roughly 
correspond to major economic epochs (colonial; expansion and 
early industrialization; industrialization and movement into 
the core; and the modern era), as well as eras of intergroup 
relations (settlement, old immigration, new immigration, 
modern). For each chronological period, we will attempt to 
link the dynamics of capitalist development (e.g., accumula­
tion, uneven development) to specific forms of contact (e.g.
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conquest, migration) and the appearance of particular 
groups. We believe that an understanding of these initial 
patterns of migration and intergroup contact is essential, 
for the events of each era shaped the context for subsequent 
intergroup interaction. Following this initial discussion, 
we will then retrace our steps, this time focusing upon 
relations between groups. In keeping with the model pro­
posed in the previous chapter, we will seek to interpret 
the American ethnic experience in the context of eth-class 
struggles, with particular attention devoted to the assimi­
lation, persistence, or evolution of ethnic identities. At 
the conclusion of our chronological discussion, we will 
briefly examine the role of an important actor in eth-class 
struggles— the state. Because the role of the state has 
expanded exponentially (especially after 1945), we elected 
to present consideration of the impact of the state upon 
intergroup relations as a separate discussion, as opposed to 
incorporating it into the historical narrative. Finally, in 
the chapter summary, we will review our key findings and 
draw some preliminary conclusions.
The Colonial Era: 1609-1800
Capitalist Development and Interaroup Contact
The origins of the American ethnic experience are 
grounded in the emergence and expansion of a capitalist 
world-economy centered in Western Europe (Wallerstein 1974a, 
1974b, 1980). Beginning in the fifteenth century, Western
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European nations began a process of conquest, plunder, 
mercantilism, and colonization which brought about dramatic 
social change on a global scale. Driven by the expansionary 
nature of capitalist accumulation and fueled by competition 
between core powers, the quest for raw materials, markets, 
and cheap labor resulted in a world which by 1900 was 
virtually completely under the sway of Western capitalism. 
This expansion was physical as well as political and eco­
nomic, as the impact of capitalist agriculture (e.g., 
enclosure, increased rents, decreased prices), increased 
manufacture and trade, and a population boom led to the 
displacement (i.e., proletarianization) of vast sectors of 
the European peasantry. Acting in concert with one another, 
the expansion of market relations and the creation of a 
European "surplus population" (relative to resources) 
resulted in an historically unprecedented movement of 
peoples and transformation of societies.
Within these larger global processes, the fate of the 
area which was to become the United States was determined by 
several factors related to English colonization. First, the 
victorious colonists were English, a fact which would leave 
an indelible imprint on the future shape of the United 
States. The eventual emergence of British hegemony within 
the capitalist world-system led to the absorption or removal 
of competing (e.g., Dutch, French, Spanish) European claims 
to North America and ensured Anglo-American dominance. Of
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equal significance were the absence of instant wealth (un­
like South America) and the particular economic needs of 
Great Britain. These forces combined to create an English 
colonial policy which emphasized self-sustaining settlements 
which would provide markets, raw materials, and an outlet 
for Britain's "surplus" population--a sharp contrast to the 
French and Spanish policies of plunder and limited settle­
ment. Finally, the indigenous Native American population 
was not economically exploitable (Archdeacon 1983, p. 4), a 
situation which when combined with their military vulner­
ability would lead to displacement via conquest. Thus, the 
American colonies emerged as a quintessential race suprema­
cist "settler society," a colonial outpost in which the 
indigenous peoples were outnumbered, decimated, and replaced 
by European peoples (cf. Stavrianos1--1982, p. 319--notion 
of "Europeanization").
As a British colony, the future United States developed 
a dualistic nature which in turn would shape the course of 
subsequent intergroup contact. On one hand, the Northern 
colonies (New England and the mid-Atlantic states) were of 
relatively limited economic value to Britain and experienced 
a relatively low degree of economic and political control by 
the colonial power (Frank 1979). As a result, the North 
became a region of small farmers and independent artisans, 
"refugees" from the process of British capitalist develop­
ment who hoped to return to an essentially precapitalist
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mode of production (Bonacich 1984, pp. 81-82). Alongside 
these "independent" classes emerged an increasingly prosper­
ous merchant class (fostered, at least initially, by British 
colonial trade policies and economic power) and the begin­
nings of an urban working class (Dowd 1974, p. 203; Zinn 
1980, pp. 47-51).1 In addition, liberal British immigration 
policies--stimulated by needs for labor, settlement, and 
defense and the desire, after 1661, to limit British emigra­
tion-encouraged the migration of non-English peoples such 
as Scotch-Irish, Germans, and (in smaller numbers) French 
Huguenots to the American colonies (Nevins and Commager 
1966, pp. 30-32; Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 1-2). 
Thus, the Northern colonies became an outlet for the excess 
population of not only England, but also the prospective 
core nations of Western Europe--the beginning of a pattern 
of immigration which would persist throughout the nineteenth 
century and become a dominant theme in American history
The South, on the other hand, possessed greater agri­
cultural potential and rapidly evolved into a predominantly 
plantation society producing tobacco (and, later, cotton) 
for the world market. Success of this economy was based 
upon the availability of cheap labor; however, the con­
straints upon wages exerted by relatively low world market 
prices for such commodities as cotton and the existence of 
competing opportunities (i.e., "independent" agriculture) 
inhibited the emergence of a wage-labor workforce (Bonacich
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1984, p. 80). Initially, this gap was filled by indentured 
servants, but this source proved unstable in the face of 
competing opportunities (e.g., farming) and post-1660 
English restraints on immigration (Dinnerstein, Nichols and 
Reimers 1979, pp. 12-15). Given the seeming unsuitability 
of the Native American population as a labor force (Marger
1985, p. 136), Southern plantation owners turned to the 
importation of African slaves as a source of cheap and 
controllable labor, a step which would have dramatic impli­
cations for the course of subsequent ethnic relations in the 
United States (Quarles 1969, pp. 34-35; Williams 1944). 
Establishment of a system of plantation slavery left the 
South with a radically different economic base (the conse­
quences of which will be discussed below) while discouraging 
European immigration by limiting opportunities for indepen­
dent small farming or wage labor employment (Nevins and 
Commager 1966, p. 239).=
Such was the colonial pattern at the time of the 
American revolution and the establishment of the United 
States as a sovereign nation. At this juncture, the United 
States already exhibited several components of its subse­
quent ethnic structure. Nearly two centuries of British 
colonialism had left an Anglo imprint upon American culture 
and institutions; however, Anglo-Americans existed alongside 
other European groups, as well as Blacks and Native Ameri­
cans.3 At the conclusion of the eighteenth century, the
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United States stood as a relatively veak peripheral society 
engaged in a process of nation-building amidst a debate 
(North vs. South, English vs. non-English) over its eventual 
shape. Nevertheless, the United States also stood at the 
threshold of a series of processes which would result in the 
total transformation of American society.
Interqroup Interaction and Ethnic Identities
Although the period prior to 1800 is beyond the stated 
purview of this work, it was during this time that a founda­
tion was established for subsequent ethnic and class inter­
action. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to examine 
briefly the central ethnic/class issues of this era. In 
this analysis, one key consideration is the fact that the 
United States was established as an English colony, which 
meant that its political economy, ethnic composition, and 
class structure were shaped by the exigencies of English 
economic and political interests. The importance of this 
English influence cannot be overstated: the bulk of the
initial colonizers were English, the colonies adopted 
English institutions and culture, and subsequent events 
(e.g., immigration, slavery, revolution) were results of 
English colonial policy.
With respect to ethnic relations, the first intergroup 
conflicts can best be described as national in nature, as 
the English vied with the French, Dutch, Spanish, and Native 
Americans for control of the New World.*• These interactions
would set the stage for future ethnic interaction. For 
example/ when England absorbed Dutch New Netherland in the 
1660s (a national conflict), the residents of New Netherland 
were required to accept English law and language and to 
swear allegiance to the British Crown (Archdeacon 1983, p. 
12), thus establishing the basis for Analo-conformitv--the 
expectation that non-English settlers would conform to 
English practices. Perhaps the most significant "national" 
conflict, however, was between English colonizers and Native 
Americans. From the beginning, this was a case of resource 
competition between peoples, as existing Native American 
settlements were incompatible with English colonial expan­
sionism.® Facilitating this process of conquest and dispos­
session was a "national" ideology in which Native Americans 
were characterized as heathen savages with no legitimate 
claim to land (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 7-13).6 Given the 
perceived limited economic utility of Native Americans 
(e.g., as trading partners or as a labor force) to White 
settlers and the emergence of increasing conflict over 
land, massacres and dispossession became standard practice. 
Any resistance on the part of Native Americans only led to 
harsh retaliation and the creation of new stereotypes (e.g., 
"treacherous Indians," the "Indian threat") to justify 
further conquest. While coastal Native American peoples 
soon succumbed— in a genocidal reduction of population--to 
warfare, disease, and economic displacement and marginaliza-
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tion, this experience established a pattern of ethnic or 
national interaction which would be repeated for two cen­
turies (cf. Zinn 1980, pp. 12-16). It is, in concert with 
anti-Black sentiments, at the core of White racism.
Initially, ethnic conflict (i.e., conflict between 
groups within a society) in the English colonies was limited 
by the homogeneity of the first settlers. This changed, 
however, with the post-1660 decline of English emigration 
and the adoption of liberal policies with regard to immi­
gration from other European nations."7 According to histor­
ical accounts (e.g., Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 2-6; 
Archdeacon 1983, p. 20), early non-English immigrants such 
as the Scotch-Irish and Germans did experience some ethnic 
hostility as a result of ethnocentrism and a fear of "for­
eign” domination on the part of the English settlers. 
Nevertheless, the level of intergroup conflict was low, 
reflecting the fact that English hegemony within the colo­
nies was never seriously challenged and, more importantly, 
the existence of a preindustrial, precapitalist class system 
which was not conducive to interethnic conflict. What we 
mean by this is that the system did not foster resource 
competition--labor was regulated via indenture or slavery 
rather than a competitive market, while land (for indepen­
dent agriculture) was plentiful. Furthermore, the relative 
isolation of communities (as opposed to the integration of 
industrial society) enabled groups to avoid conflict and to
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maintain a distinctive identity and customs. Indeed, the 
most virulent intergroup conflicts among European immigrants 
during the colonial era involved religious differences 
(Protestants vs. Catholics, Quakers, and other Protestant 
sects), reflecting the historical intolerance which had 
characterized the European experience of many groups (cf. 
Archdeacon 1983, pp. 20-21).
At the same time, assimilation did occur among non- 
English groups, reflecting the operation of the contradic­
tory forces of assimilation and pluralism which characterize 
much of American ethnic history. The aforementioned low 
level of resource competition, the economic utility of 
acculturation to English customs, and dominant group pres­
sures to conform were certainly key factors in the "blend­
ing" of groups. In addition, the lack of institutional 
support for non-English culture made it more difficult to 
retain group identities (cf. Dinnerstein et al.— 1979, pp. 
66-67--on religion, language and the decline of Dutch and 
German identity; Dinnerstein and Reimers--1982, pp. 7-8--on 
the lack of trained Presbyterian clergy and the diminution 
of Scotch-Irish ethnicity). Also significant were charac­
teristics of the intergroup arena--the proliferation of 
groups, the small size of individual groups, and the 
geographical mobility encouraged by colonial expansion-- 
each of which served to inhibit the persistence of ethnic 
communities. What is important for our purposes is the
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existence of a complex interplay of forces promoting both 
ethnic persistence and change.
Given the preindustrial class structure and the proli­
feration of the independent class (i.e., small-scale far­
mers, many with limited market ties; artisans engaged in 
petty production) in the pre-1800 United States, class 
conflict was relatively absent (as opposed to industrial 
capitalist society) and eth-class divisions were therefore 
of lesser importance (i.e., the relative isolation of inde­
pendent farmers tended to inhibit group mobilization--the 
Shay's and Whiskey Rebellions standing as notable excep­
tions). Nevertheless, increased contact, competition, and 
unrest, particularly among workers, servants, and a lumpen- 
proletariat in urban areas, resulted in a growing concern 
(on the part of the elite) with the lower class "threat" and 
a tendency to equate "poor" with "foreign" (Zinn 1980, pp. 
50-53; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 28)--the beginning of a 
tendency to blur together notions of ethnicity and class 
(Takaki 1987b, p. 105). In response, immigrant groups 
established self-help societies, thus employing ethnicity as 
a strategy for economic survival and advancement. Also 
evident during this period was the relationship between 
class position and ease of assimilation For example, upper 
middle class French aristocrats and planters who fled to the 
United States during the French Revolution or as a result of 
Caribbean slave revolts found that their higher status
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enabled them to blend in much more quickly with the dominant 
Anglo-American group {Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 9). 
These various patterns would become increasingly evident in 
ethnic relations in the post-1800 United States.
A final piece in the early American eth-class mosaic 
was the introduction of Blacks into the colonies. As we 
noted earlier, the political economy of the South (planta­
tion agriculture, scarce labor) provided the context for the 
emergence of slavery. While initially Southern labor needs 
were met by indentured servants, the tendency of such 
laborers to enter into farming or the labor market upon 
expiration of their term of service left the South with a 
perpetual shortage of agricultural labor. By the late 
seventeenth century, social unrest (e.g., Bacon's Rebellion) 
and the fear of a landless lower class of former indentured 
servants created an opening which was filled by the coinci­
dental English entry into the African slave trade (Breen 
1987; Zinn 1980, pp. 37-47). Interestingly, the first 
Blacks in the colonies were term servants; however, the 
economic benefits to plantation owners and the social 
stability stemming from lifetime servitude (one concern of 
the planter elite was that Black free labor would ally 
itself with the White lower class) facilitated the spread of 
the institution of slavery (Quarles 1969, pp. 35-36). The 
restriction of manumission (for economic reasons) and the 
absence of a large Black free class in turn gave rise to
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caste-like distinctions between Blacks and Whites and the 
emergence of a social order held together by racist ideology 
(Fredrickson 1981, p. 87).8
A key event in the course of intergroup relations was 
the American Revolution. On the most general level, the 
American Revolution can be viewed as a case of national 
mobilization--a cross-class, cross-ethnic alliance between 
most segments of the merchant, planter, independent and 
working classes (cemented by appeals to an ideology of indi­
vidual rights and freedom) which emerged in response to 
English colonial practices (e.g., taxation, trade restric­
tion, limitation of settlement— c f . Nevins and Commager 
1966, pp. 66-80),8 The success of the American Revolution 
changed the nature of the United States as an ethnic arena. 
Perhaps the major outcome was the shedding of "English" 
affiliation and the emergence of an "American" national 
identity (cf. the discussions by Boorstein— 1965, pp. 325- 
90— and Nevins and Commager--1966, pp. 168-81). At the same 
time, while the revolution removed the basis of English- 
American group dominance, the hegemonic Anglo-American elite 
was successful in casting national identity in its own image 
(i.e., American=Anglo-American) and in retaining Anglo-based 
institutions.10 This determination was reflected in such 
early legislation as the Naturalization Act, the constitu­
tional restrictions on foreigners holding office, and the 
Alien and Sedition Acts. Thus, while the new bourgeois
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national ideology promoted individual sovereignty and 
allegiance to the nation as a set of ideals, both indi­
viduals and the nation were expected to assume a certain 
form--one which assured the dominant position of the Anglo- 
American elite (Zinn 1980, pp. 88-101). 11
The process of national mobilization which began in the 
late eighteenth century had a significant effect upon non- 
Anglo ethnic groups. First, national mobilization entailed 
a muting of ethnic identity and the adoption, at some level, 
of the Anglo-defined "American" national identity. More­
over, the economic and political institutionalization of 
Anglo dominance ensured the absence of some of the institu­
tional supports (e.g., a somewhat separate legal system— as 
was permitted to French-Canadians in Quebec) which would 
facilitate the persistence of minority ethnic identity.13 
These forces, along with dominant group pressures for Anglo- 
conformity (at least for Whites), provided a strong impetus 
towards assimilation for non-Anglo European immigrants. On 
the other hand, Anglo hegemony (i.e., the effort to define 
American identity in Anglo terms) often triggered a counter­
vailing ethnic mobilization as immigrants sought to improve 
their economic position and preserve their traditional way 
of life (cf. Dinnerstein et al.--1979, p. 23— on German 
resistance to Anglo attempts to establish free schools to 
"Americanize" German students). Throughout American his­
tory, these two contradictory forces--assimilation and
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resistance-were influential in shaping the course of inter­
group relations.
Expansion and Industrialization; 1800-1890 
Uneven Development and Ethnic Contact
The nineteenth century was a period of rapid change for 
the United States. As the processes of capitalist develop­
ment and nation-building continued, the United States began 
its emergence as a world economic and political power, 
moving from the periphery to the core of the world-system. 
This era brought with it the upheaval of industrialization 
and the proletarianization of independent producers, the 
Civil War and the destruction of the slavery-based planta­
tion economy, and massive immigration and population in­
crease. During the century from 1790 to 1890, the popula­
tion of the United States increased from 3.9 million to 62.9 
million, including more than fifteen million new immigrants 
and their descendants (Archdeacon 1983, p. 27). The United 
States also expanded territorially, as the conguest and 
annexation of North America continued inexorably across the 
continent from the original states on the Atlantic seaboard 
to the Pacific coast. Each of these processes had a signi­
ficant impact upon the development of the American ethnic 
structure and the subsequent course of ethnic relations in 
the United States. In this discussion, we will seek to link 
these macro level components of capitalist development to 
specific patterns of migration and intergroup contact.
As we examine the emerging ethnic structure of the 
United States in the nineteenth century, we find that a 
central causal mechanism for such structure is the uneven 
nature of American capitalist development. One legacy of 
the colonial era was the dual nature of the new nation, the 
different and contradictory political economies of the North 
and South, the conflict between which would dominate the 
first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. Initially, the 
South was the more advanced area due to the slave-generated 
wealth of its plantation economy; however, this economic 
base contained tendencies which led to stagnation. The 
absence of a large independent sector (small farmers, arti­
sans) and the non-wage nature of coerced slave labor limited 
the development of a local market and discouraged non-export 
production beyond plantation needs and luxury items . In 
addition, the nature of the slave labor system inhibited 
specialization, diversification, and mechanization and kept 
productivity at low levels (Boorstein 1965, pp. 171-79; 
Genovese 1966).1:1 Thus, pressure for expansion was not as 
much qualitative (intensification of the forces of produc­
tion) as it was quantitative (expansion of the slave labor 
force and of agricultural land) and investment opportunities 
were limited.
In contrast, the North benefitted from forces which 
would, over several decades, allow it to "leapfrog” past the 
South and dominate American society. The dispersed nature
of the economic base of the North facilitated the slow 
development of an indigenous market, while the high relative 
cost and general scarcity of labor encouraged technological 
innovation and the emergence of manufacturing. A second 
source of advantage for the North was its greater participa­
tion in international trade, which enabled the accumulation 
of wealth (capital) through mercantilism and transportation 
(Frank 1979, p. 61). In addition, the North derived several 
advantages from its economic ties with the South: it pro­
fited from its role as intermediary in the export of South­
ern raw materials; it was able to use cheap Southern cotton 
to develop its textile manufacturing capacity; and it domi­
nated Southern markets with lower priced (but more profit­
able) goods (Genovese 1966, pp. 158-65; Bonacich 1984, p. 
91). Nevertheless, the pace of development was relatively 
slow even in the North as the United States remained depen­
dent upon European (especially British) investment, imports, 
and markets. Eventually, however, the ultimate effect of 
these processes— the Southern tendency towards stagnation 
and the economic dynamism of the North--was the ascendancy 
of the North and North-South political conflict (centered 
upon such issues as tariffs, slavery, and the nature of 
territorial expansion), the denouement of which was Northern 
victory in the Civil War and the dismantling of the Southern 
slave economy.
With respect to ethnic contact and intergroup rela­
tions, the dual nature of the United States was reflected in 
two dramatically different historical patterns. The nature 
of the Southern plantation economy continued, with the 
exception of a few port cities, to discourage large scale 
European immigration (Nevins and Commager 1966, p. 239).1,4 
Consequently, the ethnic structure of the South was domina­
ted by the Black-White division with its caste-like social 
relations embedded in the slave labor base of the plantation 
economy. As the institution of slavery came under increas­
ing attack in the nineteenth century, racist ideology 
emerged as a moral justification for this system of domina­
tion (Marger 1985, pp. 137-38). In the North, on the other 
hand, immigration from Europe was the significant factor in 
shaping ethnic relations. Although the pace of immigration 
was slow prior to 1820 and modest prior to 1840--due to the 
slow economic and territorial expansion of the United States 
and to the difficulties of the transatlantic passage--the 
United States (primarily the North) attracted a steady flow 
of newcomers, the bulk of whom were from Great Britain, 
Germany, and Ireland, but whose ranks also included smaller 
numbers of immigrants from other areas of Europe and from 
French Canada. As the United States became more industrial­
ized and began to expand territorially, the pace of this 
immigration began to increase--from 143,000 in 1821-30 to
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600,000 in 1831-40 to 1.7 million in 1841-50 {Dinnerstein 
and Reimers 1982, p. 156).
Both the scope and the nature of European immigration 
to the United States were intimately connected to economic 
processes. On the "push" side, European capitalist develop­
ment resulted in the displacement of small farmers and arti­
sans in numbers far beyond the absorptive capacity of the 
expanding industrial labor market. For some, the United 
States offered an opportunity (although it would prove tem­
porary) to attempt to escape the sway of capitalist produc­
tion relations by re-establishing themselves in agriculture 
or crafts, while for others the labor needs of American 
industry provided employment opportunities superior to those 
at home. Interestingly, the source of immigrants often 
shifted within sending nations, as the processes of capi­
talist development and proletarianization touched more peri­
pheral areas within the core (Archdeacon 1983, p. 49).1S 
On the "pull" side, the economic nature of European immigra­
tion was reflected in the sensitivity of migration to eco­
nomic cycles in the United States--increased immigration 
during periods of prosperity and lower levels during reces­
sions (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 11-13). In addi­
tion, migration patterns tended to follow existing trade 
routes and economic opportunities, thereby creating concen­
trations of immigrants and of specific groups in particular 
areas (e.g., Irish in Boston and New York, Germans in the
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Midwest).1" As the industrialization of the United States 
continued, immigration was encouraged by the recruiting 
activities of employers and the promotional activities of 
states and shipping companies (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 34-37). 
Once established, immigration generated its own momentum and 
created its own patterns as kin networks and ethnic agencies 
aided the flow of newcomers.
In addition to the uneven development and dualistic 
ethnic patterns of the North and South, a third component 
was added to the picture by the westward territorial expan­
sion of the United States. From our perspective, the his­
tory of the American West is best viewed in terms of "core- 
periphery" relations— the Northern states (first in compe­
tition with the South, then on a hegemonic basis after the 
Civil War) dominated the West in the same manner and for 
the same reasons that European core nations colonized much 
of the rest of the world.17 Whether territory was acquired 
by purchase, treaty, or conquest, United States westward 
expansion served two purposes: (1) to provide raw materials,
markets, and new outlets for investment; and (2) to serve as 
a haven for members of the independent class who were dis­
placed by capitalist development and who sought such oppor­
tunities as homesteading or mining— the latter driven by the 
Gold Rush of 1849 (Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 201-21; 
Barrera 1979;; Bonacich 1984, pp. 95-96). Thus, the West 
emerged as a peripheral area within the United States in
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which major economic activities--ranching, railroads, agri­
culture, and mining--were dominated by external (Northern) 
capital.
Given the different nature of development in the United 
States West, it is not surprising that it exhibited its own 
pattern of ethnic contact and interaction. Territorial 
expansion and colonization involved the conquest and dispos­
session of Native Americans through war, treaty, and the 
destruction of the economic base of Native American socie­
ties. By the time their last resistance was crushed in 
1890, Native Americans would experience a genocidal decrease 
in numbers and would find themselves confined to a marginal 
existence on reservations in the most desolate areas of the 
West (Brown 1971; Zinn 1980, pp. 124-46).18 These processes 
of genocide and peripheralization (i.e., relegation to such 
fringe activities as subsistence farming--cf. Barrera 1979, 
pp.56-57) can thus be viewed as an outcome of capitalist 
development and expansionism, Native-American resistance and 
increased White racism, and the perceived disutility (due to 
their resistance to settler incursions) of Native Americans 
as a source of labor. This experience was to a degree 
paralleled by that of Mexican-Americans. The southwestward 
expansion of the United States in 1848 resulted in the 
absorption of some 75,000 Mexicans who became American 
citizens (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 89). Despite 
guarantees of property rights, Mexican-Americans were slowly
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but steadily dispossessed by a combination of Anglo pur­
chase, taxation, legal and political decisions, and vio­
lence and intimidation (Barrera 1979, pp. 24-31). While 
the lack of Mexican-American military resistance enabled 
them to avoid the extreme fate which befell Native Ameri­
cans, the end product of United States annexation of the 
Southwest was relegation of Mexican-Americans to subsistence 
farming or to serve as a source of cheap labor in mining and 
agriculture. As would become evident over the following 
decades, these events had a determining effect upon the 
subsequent experiences of Native and Mexican-Americans.
Immigration also played an important role in shaping 
the ethnic structure of the Western United States. While 
the initial "settlers" may have been "Americans" from the 
Eastern states, they were soon joined by many other groups. 
The slow pace of development, the danger posed by Native 
American resistance, the greater distance from Eastern sea­
ports, and competition from superexploited labor combined 
to make the West less attractive to European immigrants; 
however, small numbers of many groups did migrate to iso­
lated settlements (e.g., Germans, Scandinavians— Dinnerstein 
et al. 1979, p. 90). At the same time, the Pacific seaports 
of the West facilitated immigration from China, which after 
1850 became a significant source of cheap labor for rail­
roads, mining, and agriculture. While Chinese immigration 
was numerically less significant than that of other groups
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during the mid-nineteenth century (e.g., Germans, Irish, 
Scandinavians) and was largely confined to a peripheral 
region within the United States, it assumes an important 
historical role as a harbinger of a new phase of immigra- 
tion--the movement of peoples from periphery to core (e.g., 
the United States by 1900) as the scope of global capitalist 
development expanded--which would become the dominant pat­
tern by the end of the century.
1865-1890. The Civil War serves as a useful checkpoint 
in the discussion of American capitalist development and 
intergroup contact. The conclusion of the war cemented the 
ascendancy of the emerging industrial capitalist order in 
the North over the plantation economy of the South and 
effected the dismantling of the slave labor system.3-9 
Nevertheless, the South was slow to change. The pace of 
Southern economic development and industrialization contin­
ued to lag behind the North, while the imposition of the 
"Jim Crow" laws in the post-Reconstruction era kept Blacks 
in the position of superexploited labor. In general, 
however, the post-Civil War era saw the continuation and 
intensification of processes of capitalist development which 
were already underway. Immigration kept pace with industri­
alization and territorial expansion: the flow of immigrants
resumed after the Civil War and increased markedly after 
1880 (cf. Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 156-59). Like­
wise, conquest and settlement of the West proceeded such
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that by 1890, little room remained for territorial expan­
sion— at least on the North American continent itself (as 
opposed to the 1898-1900 expansion which resulted in a U.S. 
"empire of islands"--Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and Samoa).
The post Civil War era also saw the rapid transforma­
tion of capitalist development in the United States and, 
hence, a period of rapid social change. Although the seeds 
of industrial development has already been planted, the 
confluence of cheap labor, technological innovation, abun­
dant natural resources, and investment capital contributed 
to the rise of the United States as a major industrial 
power. Concomitant with this process was the emergence of 
monopoly capitalism--the rise of corporations, the concen­
tration of economic power, and the increased organic compo­
sition of capital (Bonacich 1984, pp. 98-99; Commager and 
Nevins 1966, pp. 291-310). One outcome of these processes 
was the transformation of American society: the proletari­
anization of the population (i.e., an increasing proportion 
of wage laborers and a declining proportion of agricultural 
workers), the increased sway of market relations, and in­
creased class struggle and the rise of the union movement 
(Zinn 1980, pp. 247-75). These changes in turn provided 
further impetus for the expansion of the American economy, 
creating a need for cheap labor which could only be satis­
fied through further immigration. This demand for labor
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would combine with processes of the world-system (e.g., 
uneven development) to trigger a new phase in American 
ethnic relations.
Interqroup Relations and Ethnic Identity
With respect to intergroup relations, a key factor
during the nineteenth century was the changing nature of the 
eth-class arena, a process which was shaped by the course of 
global capitalist development. Processes such as industri­
alization, urbanization, proletarianization, mass immigra­
tion, and territorial expansion dramatically altered both
the ethnic and class structures of the United States and the
context in which intergroup interaction occurred. Also 
significant was the continued uneven development of the 
United States, a process which in effect created three 
separate intergroup arenas: North, South, and West. Within
this rapidly changing setting, our task is to explore the 
implications of intergroup relations for the evolution of 
group identities. For reasons which will soon become 
obvious--namely, the dramatic differences in their experi­
ences during the nineteenth century--we will consider issues 
involving European immigrants separate from those of non- 
White ethnic groups.
European immigrants: assimilation and persistence.
During the first part of the nineteenth century, several 
factors operated to reduce conflict between Anglo-Americans 
and European immigrants and to facilitate the slow assimila­
tion of the latter. The slow rate of immigration prior to 
1820 reduced both the physical and cultural reinforcement of 
non-Anglo ethnic groups as well as any perceived threat 
which they posed to Anglo hegemony (Archdeacon 1983, p. 61). 
More significantly, the preindustrial (albeit slowly 
changing) social structure of the United States with its 
large independent agricultural class provided a context 
which, in concert with opportunities afforded by territorial 
expansion, served to limit class conflict and, hence, the 
salience of group identity. At the same time, the low level 
of urbanization and the absence of the high level of inter­
connectedness characteristic of later mass society also 
contributed to reduce potential conflict by allowing groups 
to exist (and identities to persist) in relative isolation. 
With continued dominant group pressure for conformity, the 
result was assimilation, particularly among immigrants from 
England, thus creating an ideological model of assimilation 
which would be applied to subsequent immigrant groups. At 
this juncture, what we are describing is still largely a 
precapitalist, preindustrial type of ethnicity; that is, one 
in which ethnicity is a wav of life as opposed to a competi­
tive strategy. This would soon change, however, as the 
push/pull factors described earlier led to a rapid increase 
in immigration, particularly the post-1840 influx of Germans 
and Irish. With the alteration of the class structure 
(i.e., the expansion of the urban proletariat) as a result
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of industrialization in the North, the stage was set for 
increased intergroup interaction and the emergence of 
"modern" ethnic identities.
In the context of rapid immigration and increased 
intergroup contact, a key factor in determining subsequent 
interaction was the relative position of newcomers within 
the working class (cf. Poulantzas--1973, p. 38— on class 
"fractions"). Furthermore, given that skilled immigrants 
were often initially forced to occupy unskilled positions, 
we must take into consideration not only current occupa­
tional position, but also the potential for occupational or 
even class mobility.20 To the extent that social groups 
were homogeneous in terms of class, lifestyle, and culture, 
differences between them and the dominant group were often 
defined in ethnic terms--that is, ethnicity served as 
"shorthand" for describing ethnic and class differences— a 
practice fostered by dominant group association of immi­
grants with urban blight, poverty, and other social prob­
lems. This was particularly noticeable in the case of 
Irish Catholics, whose colonial experience under British 
rule in Ireland and urban location channeled them towards 
work as unskilled labor or in domestic service.21 In 
addition, Irish immigrants encountered particularly virulent 
dominant group resistance which was grounded both in reli­
gious differences (the historical Anglo fear of Catholicism) 
and, later, in political conflict (i.e., the real or per­
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ceived political threat posed by the urban concentration of 
the Irish). This in turn fostered ethnic mobilization on 
the part of the Irish as the best means for realizing group 
material Interests. It also meant survival— albeit in 
changed form due to the power of Anglo-American institu- 
tions--of Irish ethnic identity.
Standing in contrast to the Irish was the experience of 
German-Americans. Unlike the Irish, German immigrants 
tended to locate in the rural agricultural areas of the 
Midwestern United States, thereby avoiding the intensified 
ethnic/class conflict of the Eastern urban network. More 
importantly, German-Americans exhibited both a higher over­
all class position and more class diversity than the Irish, 
which enabled them to avoid ethnic labeling based upon class 
position, but which also provided less basis for ethnic 
mobilization. Our point here is that despite some cultural 
persistence, intragroup class divisions opened the door to 
the influence of assimilative forces.22 This assimilation 
was neither unitary nor irreversible as dominant group 
resistance could trigger ethnic mobilization (e.g., the 
reaction of German Catholics to legislative attacks on 
German language parochial schools--Archdeacon 1983, p. 109); 
however, the general trend was towards assimilation.
Also relevant to our analysis is the generally nativist 
reaction of the dominant Anglo group (now including assimi­
lated non-Anglos). While undoubtedly ethnocentric reactions
to cultural and religious (especially Catholic) differences 
were a contributing factor, we believe that the key issues 
were political and economic. As we observed during our 
discussion of the colonial era, fear of political domination 
by non-Anglos gave rise to fear of foreigners and insistence 
on Anglo-conformity. This dynamic persisted during the 
nineteenth century, as acceptance of European immigrants was 
tied to acculturation to American (i.e., Anglo-American) 
ways (Dlnnerstein et al. 1979, p. 111). Increased urbaniza­
tion and economic competition also fostered nativism, as 
reflected in the Know-Nothing movement of the 1840s and 
1850s. This mobiliztion also underscored the divergent 
class interests within the dominant group: workers, arti­
sans, and the independent class— those who felt the brunt of 
foreign competition or economic dislocation--provided the 
basis for the movement, while capitalists (industrialists, 
railroad magnates)--who benefited from the influx of cheap 
labor— tended to support immigration (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 
81-82; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 117-118). Indeed, the 
Know-Nothing phenomenon is nicely explained by split labor 
market theory (Bonacich 1972) with its emphasis on labor 
competition--in this case, the real or threatened displace­
ment of "native" labor by "new arrivals"--leading to antag­
onism and exclusion.
Closely linked to processes of ethnic mobilization or 
assimilation were the strategic decisions of individual
group members, decisions which were made in a group context, 
but which transformed both individuals and groups. More­
over, individual and group action took place within a 
general institutional framework which emphasized (and trans­
mitted) dominant group culture while devaluing the cultural 
practices of non-Anglos. As we suggested in earlier chap­
ters, strategic decision making was a complex undertaking in 
that non-material (e.g., historical, cultural, political) 
factors could affect the process; however, such decisions 
were strongly conditioned by economic forces. For the few 
wealthy newcomers (or those who attained wealth) assimila­
tion seemed the best strategy (e.g., as in the case of 
French aristocrats or planters), for there was little to be 
gained by retaining a non-Anglo ethnic identity, while the 
assimilative route offered increased status and opportunity. 
In contrast, strategic options for the middle class were 
less clear-cut: one path involved using class position to
assimilate and thereby enjoy (as permitted) the advantages 
of dominant group membership; however, a countervailing and 
often easier alternative was to retain ethnic identity and 
pursue material goals by attaining status and wealth through 
exploiting communal ties (e.g., professionals, merchants 
working within the enclave) or by serving as a broker or 
emissary between the group and the larger society. The 
final segment, the working classes, had the most limited 
strategic options. Opportunities for mobility were circum­
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scribed by both ethnicity and class (essentially a "double- 
barrelled” process of social reproduction). With few excep­
tions, the optimum working class strategy was to group 
together and use ethnic ties for adjustment and survival 
(e.g., informational networks, mutual aid).
As suggested in Chapter IV, a significant factor deter­
mining the persistence or disappearance of group identity is 
the nature of the intergroup arena. In examining the mid­
nineteenth century United States as an arena, key variables 
affecting ethnic identity are urban vs. rural, enclave vs. 
isolated, and nature of minority status (large vs. small, 
only vs. one among many groups). These factors shaped 
individual and group strategies both directly--e.g ., the 
feasibility of ethnic institutions (more possible in en­
claves)— and indirectly--e.g ., increased competition in 
urban areas triggering ethnic mobilization; increased 
nativism directed towards the only significant minority in a 
particular area. The interaction between these factors 
could often be complex. For example, while the settlement 
of Scandinavians in isolated rural communities made it 
possible for them to retain their ethnic identities without 
significant conflict, this same lack of conflict also 
inhibited ethnic mobilization and facilitated eventual 
assimilation. In another case, the urban location and 
dominant minority status of Franco-Americans in the mill 
towns of northern New England provided both demographic
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support for ethnic institutions and a basis for ethnic 
mobilization (because of the triggering of dominant group 
hostility). As a final example, the Irish of Minneapolis- 
St. Paul, who constituted a relatively small proportion of 
the population and who were outnumbered by Germans and 
Scandinavians, found it best to pursue a more assimilative 
strategy (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 102-03).
What appears to be unique about the U.S. eth-class 
system is the interplay between ethnicity and class. As 
Frederickson (1981, p. 200), among others, has observed, 
ethnic divisions impeded class consciousness among American 
lower classes. At the same time, the number of ethnic 
groups (and the relative weakness of any one) and the exis­
tence of class and other (e.g., demographic) differences 
within groups tended in many cases to discourage ethnic 
mobilization. Indeed, due to labor market competition and 
to Anglo policies of divide and rule, minorities were often 
as likely to compete with other minorities (e.g., Irish vs. 
Northern Blacks for service jobs, Irish vs. German Catholics 
or French-Canadians for control of the Catholic church in 
the United States) as with the dominant group, thus them­
selves diffusing the focus of conflict. Accordingly, while 
nineteenth-century European immigrant groups were able to 
preserve some aspects of ethnic distinctiveness, cross­
cutting influences and Anglo institutional hegemony encour-
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aged acculturation and, in some cases, eventual absorption 
into a dominant "White American" group.
Non-White groups: superexploitation and exclusion. As
ve consider nineteenth century intergroup interaction in the 
United States, it is essential to realize that the pattern 
described above--immigration, varying degrees of conflict, 
mobilization, persistence, or assimilation--is only part of 
the picture. In sharp contrast to this process was the 
experience of non-White immigrants (e.g., Chinese-Americans) 
and those groups involuntarily incorporated into U.S. 
society through conquest or forced immigration (e.g.,
Native, Black, and Mexican-Americans). What is different 
about non-White groups is not merely their means of "entry" 
into American society, but the nature of their subsequent 
experience. In each case, these groups were not fully 
integrated (i.e., proletarianized) into the economic 
mainstream--whether as wage labor or as independent 
agriculturalists— but were restricted to the margins of the 
economy as "superexploited" eth-classes whose labor power 
was appropriated via ethnically-based slavery, debt peonage, 
or labor market segmentation (cf. current practices in South 
Africa and in Israel).23 Thus, the interface between 
ethnicity and class for superexploited groups was dramati­
cally different from that of European immigrants--indeed, 
ethnicity and class were virtually isomorphic in a caste­
like manner where "race" served as the basis for the
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organization of social relationships (cf. Omi and Winant's—  
1986, pp. 66-67— notion of "racial formation"). This in 
turn led to a different pattern for the evolution of ethnic 
identity, one in which subordinate group identities were 
maintained by "racial" exclusion on the part of the dominant 
group.
For Native Americans, interaction with Whites followed 
the pattern established during the colonial era of conquest 
and removal in the face of settler expansionism. As we 
noted before, this was a "national" conflict (the United 
States viewed Native Americans as separate nations to be 
dealt with via treaty or warfare--Schaefer 1988, p. 177); 
one in which Native American resistance was weakened by 
"ethnic" divisions. From the White perspective, whether 
capitalist or settler, the ultimate objective--displacement 
of Native Americans— was clear. What was less clear, how­
ever, was the means by which this was to be accomplished.
In terms of policy objectives, White attitudes varied from 
the paternalism or assimilationism of Jefferson--who foresaw 
eventual acculturation and assimilation--to the implacable 
racism and advocacy of violent removal epitomized by Jackson 
and western settlers (Fredrickson 1981, p. 44; Takaki 
1987c). These differing views were manifest in a variety of 
policies ranging from the incorporation (proletarianization) 
of Native Americans via mission schools (cf. Archdeacon 
1983, pp. 67-68) and the development of individual property
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rights (often followed by systematic defrauding by Whites-- 
cf. Takaki 1987c, p. 64) to denial of citizenship and open 
aggression (Fredrickson 1981, p. 45; Dinnerstein et al.
1979, pp. 227-28). Given strong Native American resistance 
(and continued expansionary pressures), these various poli­
cies coalesced in military subjugation and removal which 
progressed inexorably from the Indian Removal Act (from east 
of the Mississippi River) in 1830 to total conquest and 
marginalization on reservations by 1890 (Zinn 1980, pp. 124- 
46). After conquest and creation of the reservation system. 
Native Americans remained largely outside of the American 
class structure (or, if one prefers, a lumpenproletariat). 
struggling in isolation to eke out a marginal existence.
A second superexploited minority, Mexican-Americans, 
were absorbed through the conquest of the territory which 
would become the Southwestern United States. Despite being 
granted American citizenship, Mexican-Americans were driven 
off the land via a variety of devices (laws, taxes, govern­
ment grants to railroads, institutional practices, non­
recognition of land tenure— cf. Barrera 1979) each of which 
favored Anglo corporations and settlers in what could be 
described as a form of "primitive accumulation" in which 
individual producers were separated from the means of 
production (cf. Marx 1906, pp. 784-87). Dispossessed 
Mexican-Americans were then available to serve as a source 
of "superexploited" labor for mines, railroads, and large
agriculture. At the same time, their status as low wage 
superexploited labor earned Mexican-Americans the enmity of 
Anglo workers (who resented perceived economic competition 
and downward pressure on wages) and small farmers (who had 
to compete with large farms using superexploited labor), 
both of whom sought to exclude Mexicans from the labor 
market (Barrera 1979, pp. 50-55). Given the weakness of 
Anglo workers, this situation does not in our judgement fit 
the split labor market interpretation of a caste system 
created by the working class of the dominant group (cf. 
Bonacich 1972); however, economic competition undoubtedly 
fostered Anglo racism and attempts at exclusion. These 
social arrangements tended to reproduce themselves from 
generation to generation, as Mexican-American mobility was 
inhibited by both their superexploited status (and ensuing 
economic disadvantage) and the effects of institutionalized 
Anglo racism
An experience somewhat similar to Mexican-Americans was 
that of Chinese immigrants. The preponderance of Chinese- 
Americans entered as indentured servants or as contract 
labor on the railroads (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 193)-- 
and experienced ethnically-based restrictive circumstances 
closer to the superexploited end of the continuum. Like 
Mexican-Americans, Chinese-Americans served as a low wage 
pool for the benefit of Anglo capital, while incurring the 
wrath of the White working class (Barrera 1979, p. 52).
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Similarly, anti-Chinese antagonism can be attributed to 
competition (e.g., downward pressure on wages, the use of 
Chinese-Americans as strikebreakers) and to the spreading 
ideology of racial inferiority of non-Whites. The eventual 
legal exclusion of Chinese immigrants after 1882 reflected a 
range of eth-class concerns. Clearly, the White working 
class agitated for exclusion; however, passage of restric­
tive legislation was as much a strategy of capital in the 
course of eth-class struggle--discarding a weapon (Chinese- 
American labor) which was serving as an organizing issue for 
the labor movement (Takaki 1987b, pp. 107-08). For our 
purposes, the essential point is that outcomes of intergroup 
interaction--conflict, exclusion, denigration--reflect con­
stellations of eth-class interests.
For the other superexploited minority, Black-Ameri- 
cans, the nineteenth century was a tumultuous one as they 
were caught up in the class/regional conflict between the 
North and the South. The expansion of cotton production 
cemented the role of slavery in the Southern political 
economy and increased the isolation of Black-Americans from 
the American mainstream (Quarles 1969, p. 63). Within the 
confines of slavery, forced acculturation, and social 
isolation, Black-Americans forged a new ethnic identity 
which reflected both their historical heritage and their 
economic status (Boorstein 1965, pp. 190-99; Dinnerstein et 
al. 1979, pp. 57-59; Schaefer 1988, pp. 218-19). Following
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the termination of the slave trade in 1808, heightened 
Northern criticism of the institution of slavery, and an 
ever-growing Southern fear of slave revolts, Black-Americans 
suffered increased restrictions (e.g., slave codes) as 
plantation owners sought to secure their position in the 
social order (Zinn 1980, pp. 168-76; Archdeacon 1983, p.
66). The effects of this expanding racist ideology--a 
philosophical justification for the institution of slavery-- 
were also felt in the form of increased restrictions upon 
free Blacks, who were viewed by Southern Whites as a threat 
to the maintenance of the slave system (Quarles 1969, pp. 
86-88).
The situation of the Northern Black-American population 
also deteriorated during this time. Confronted by a smaller 
(and therefore less threatening) population which did not 
play a significant economic role, Northern Whites exhibited 
what Fredrickson (1981, p. 151) has termed an "aversive" 
racial order--one which sought to exclude Black-Americans, 
which encouraged their "repatriation" to Africa, and which 
envisioned the eventual extinction of Blacks through an 
inability to compete on an equal basis with Whites. Thus, 
Northern Black-Americans experienced legal attempts to 
prohibit their entry and to restrict their civil rights 
(Archdeacon 1983, p. 66). With respect to the labor 
market, most Northern Blacks served as superexploited labor 
in a manner similar to Mexican and Chinese-Americans in the
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Western United States; that is, they were excluded from 
desirable jobs and labor unions and limited to the most 
unskilled positions--from which they were in turn often 
displaced by immigrants (Quarles 1969, pp. 92-93).** In 
this context, the Northern attack on slavery was not 
grounded in an ideological belief in equality, but instead 
in economic (class) competition between North and South, as 
the North was fearful that any westward expansion of slavery 
would both limit capitalist development and undermine the 
position of free White labor (Fredrickson 1981, p. 156; Zinn 
1980, p. 182).25
The triumph of the North in the Civil War shattered the 
slave-based Southern social order. Post-war "Reconstruc­
tion" saw the extension of some civil rights to Black- 
Americans; however, racism, the lack of land reform, and the 
class disadvantages instilled by slavery (e.g., lack of 
education and vocational skills) limited their economic 
opportunities. While the first decade after the Civil War 
contained considerable class struggle over the shape of the 
new post-slavery social order, the White rural elite 
(essentially the former plantation class) was able to re­
establish first its economic power and then--after the Hayes 
deal and the collapse of Reconstruction--its political 
hegemony (Bloom 1987, p. 33; Zinn 1980, pp. 198-200).20 
Even then, the planter class feared the potential threat 
posed by free Blacks in alliance with working class Whites
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(particularly given the popularity of the populist movement 
among lower class Whites--Dinnerstein et a l . 1979, pp. 91- 
92) and sought to preserve its control over Black agricul­
tural labor. Consequently, following the collapse of the 
populist movement, the Southern elite engineered the disen­
franchisement of Black-Americans and instituted the "Jim 
Crow" system of legal segregation. For Black-Americans, 
this meant subjugation in a system of superexploited labor 
(e.g., debt peonage and exclusion) which was maintained 
through both legal and extralegal coercion.
What emerges from this picture is the notion that the 
hegemony of the Southern White rural elite and emergence of 
the post-bellum racial order were not inevitable, but rather 
that they evolved via eth-class struggle in an arena shaped 
by the legacy of slavery and the existence of a polarized 
ethnic structure (i.e., containing two major groups, as 
opposed to the North). The "Jim Crow" system was the result 
of White ethnic mobilization, as the rural elite employed 
racial ideology to build a cross-class alliance--one which 
enabled them to retain power. As Bloom (1987, p. 18) 
observes, "racism did not overwhelm class; racism became an 
organizing principle for social strata fearful of class- 
based political action." In our view, this outcome is not 
compatible with the split labor market interpretation of a 
caste system (i.e., the exclusion of minority labor from 
high-paying jobs and the emergence of racially-based wage
differentials) created by a labor "aristocracy" (as would be 
maintained by Bonacich--1972), inasmuch as the Southern 
White working class did not have the power (although they 
might have had the interest) to force such changes.2"7 While 
the White working class may have benefitted from reduced 
economic competition (as well as the psychological benefits 
of higher social status), the major beneficiary was the 
rural planter class which both assured a supply of cheap 
labor and eliminated any potential cross-ethnic working 
class alliance. Thus, the interests of the White elite were 
cast as "ethnic" interests in order to mobilize all Whites 
and to maintain the subjugation of Blacks. Our intention in 
making this statement is not to depict ethnicity as an 
epiphenomenon of class--certainly racist ideology had become 
a social fact and was well institutionalized in the South-- 
but instead to assert that without the underlying class 
interests, the Southern racial order would not have emerged.
Also relevant to this analysis is the link between the 
Southern racial order and the national eth-class structure. 
As long as its political hegemony was unchallenged, the 
North was unwilling to employ costly control measures (e.g., 
using the full power of the federal government to push the 
South) to protect Blacks (Fredrickson 1981, p. 183). Inas­
much as Northern capital did not need Black labor (European 
immigrants provided an alternative source of cheap labor for 
industrial expansion— Bonacich 1984, pp. 112-13), it was
thus more interested in maintaining social harmony and 
continuing the flow of profit from the Southern "periphery” 
to Northern industrial and financial interests than in 
improving the welfare of Black-Americans {Bloom 1987, p.
25; Zinn 1980, pp. 201-03; Quarles 1969, p. 141).28 As a 
beneficiary, the North had no interest in overturning the 
Southern racial order. In addition, the social climate in 
the North was evolving in ways which made it more sympa­
thetic to Southern practices--e.g ., the late-nineteenth 
century spread of Social Darwinism, the increased racism 
directed towards new immigrants, the use of racism to 
rationalize imperialism, and the view that segregation was a 
necessary "apprenticeship” before Black-Americans could 
attain full citizenship (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 188-91). 
Closely linked to this was the increased class conflict 
(i.e., strikes, unions, populism) of the late nineteenth 
century, which in turn fostered increased capitalist class 
consciousness (including viewing the Southern elite as 
allies in the struggle against the working class) and a 
general retreat from ideologies of equality (Zinn 1980, pp. 
235-46; Fredrickson 1981, p. 189). In this context, it 
could be argued that Northern capital feared the fusion of 
the newly-formed Black-American underclass with the bur­
geoning union movement and was therefore quite willing to 
accept the Southern racial order (Steinberg 1981). Thus, 
the post-Reconstruction rapprochement between Northern
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capital and the Southern agricultural elite can be viewed as 
both class (capitalist) and national (White American) mobi­
lization which occurred at the expense of Black-Americans.
In this manner, the Southern racial order was integrated 
into the national social system--a "peripheral" and coercive 
form of labor control linked to core (Northern) capital 
through commercial and financial ties.
Summary: 1800-90. Before continuing with our analysis
of the evolution of intergroup relations in the United 
States, let us briefly summarize the trends of the years 
between 1800 and 1890. This was an era of rapid social 
change: immigration and territorial expansion had increased
the size and population of the United States; capitalist 
development, industrialization, and proletarianization had 
altered the nature of production; and the Civil War and the 
emergence of monopoly capitalism had restructured the poli­
tical economy. These developments in turn transformed the 
nature of intergroup relations, an outcome which we sought 
to describe in terms of two processes. In the first of 
these--the European immigrant experience— increased inter­
group contact and competition in the context of industriali­
zation led to a complex set of outcomes. On the one hand, 
competition and conflict (as "natives" sought to defend 
their position against immigrants) encouraged ethnic mobili­
zation and the persistence of group identity as a strategy 
for survival in unfamiliar settings. On the other hand,
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several factors— the link between acculturation and social 
mobility, overall economic expansion, and the relative 
permeability of boundaries (among White groups)--produced 
strong pressures towards assimilation, albeit at different 
rates for different eth-classes. Meanwhile, the second 
trend— the non-White experience— resulted in a different set 
of outcomes. These groups were relegated to a subordinate, 
"superexploited11 social and economic position which was 
reinforced by rigid, almost caste-like "racial" boundaries 
imposed by the dominant group (including newly-arrived 
European immigrants). While specific group experiences 
differed— Native Americans were decimated and marginalized 
on reservations; Black-Americans suffered under slavery 
prior to 1865 and from the Jim Crow system of segregation 
thereafter; and Mexican-Americans were faced with debt 
peonage and extreme labor market segmentation--the result of 
this overlapping of ethnicity and class (in the context of 
dominant group exclusion) was to concretize group boundaries 
and thereby effectively preclude any assimilation. The 
effects of these patterns would continue into the next 
century.
Core Status and Monopoly Capitalism: 1890-1945
The first half of the twentieth century saw the contin­
uing evolution of the process of U.S. capitalist develop­
ment. Industrialization and proletarianization proceeded 
apace, as evidenced by rapid economic expansion and the
reshaping of the class structure. On a global level, this 
era also marked the movement of the United States into the 
core of the capitalist world-economy, a dramatic change from 
the weak, newly emergent nation which existed at the begin­
ning of the nineteenth century. Closely linked to this 
transformation was the emergence of the United States as an 
imperialist power, a development attributable to the expan­
sionary nature of capitalism (e.g., the guest for new 
markets, sources of raw materials, and outlets for invest­
ment) and its inherent tendencies towards crisis (i.e., 
disruptions of accumulation, such as the depressions of the 
1870s and 1890s).2* For the United States, imperialist 
activities included the Asia trade and the Open Door policy, 
the Spanish-American War and territorial acquisitions in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, and the political and economic 
domination of Latin America.30 In addition to serving as a 
sign of the increased power and influence of the United 
States, many of these ventures would later provide sources 
of immigrants to the United States (e.g., Puerto Rico, 
Central America), particularly during the post-1945 era.
With respect to intergroup relations, the years between 
1890 and 1945 stand as a period of transition between the 
patterns of the nineteenth century (immigration and compe­
tition, domination and superexploitation) and those of the 
modern era (migration from periphery to core, ethnic asser­
tion vs. the state). The already complex ethnic structure
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which was the legacy of the nineteenth century would become 
even more varied, which in turn would lead to a sharp up­
surge in intergroup conflict as new groups sought to estab­
lish a niche in American society. Underneath the surface, 
increasing class differentiation would intersect ethnic 
boundaries (leading to a proliferation of eth-classes) and 
trigger intergroup processes ranging from assimilation to 
mobilization, although in many cases these effects would not 
be evident until the post-1945 era. Yet here we are begin­
ning to anticipate events. The story of intergroup rela­
tions in the first half of the twentieth century begins 
with variations on a traditional theme: immigration.
Ethnic Contact
For the first half of this era--i.e., from 1890 until 
1924--immigration continued to serve as a source of cheap 
labor for rapid economic growth. After 1880, the number of 
immigrants per decade roughly doubled from two and one-half 
million to five million (with the exception of only 3.7 
million during the depression-ridden 1890s), reaching a peak 
of 8.8 million in the first decade of the twentieth century 
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 158). While the "old 
immigrants"--English, Irish, Germans, and Scandinavians-- 
continued to come, they were surpassed in both numbers and 
impact by a flood (often referred to as the "Great Migra­
tion") of "new" immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe- 
-primarily Italians, Jews, and Slavs, but also including
smaller numbers of Greeks, Finns, Magyars, Lithuanians, and 
many other groups (Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 333-35).31 
In contrast with the original American settlement pattern 
which persisted through the nineteenth century, this migra­
tion reflected a new pattern--movement from the periphery 
(or the semiperiphery) to the core.32 Underlying this 
phenomenon was the increasingly global impact of capitalist 
development, as new areas experienced the same upheavals 
(e.g., rapid population growth, decline of small agricul­
ture, political conflict— the collapse of the Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires) which had previously 
stimulated emigration from Western Europe. Indeed, this 
"new" immigration is best viewed as part of a worldwide 
pattern (migrants also moved to other "settler" societies-- 
e.g., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) in which the United 
States was the primary destination (Archdeacon 1983, p.
113). For our purposes, what is most significant about this 
"new" immigration was that by introducing many new groups 
into American society, it effected a dramatic change in the 
ethnic composition of the United States.33
As was the case in the nineteenth century, immigrant 
and labor patterns were shaped by the uneven development of 
the United States. Bonacich (1984, p. 108) observes that 
the United States at the turn of the century contained 
aspects of both peripheral formations and advanced capital 
(e.g., exporting both raw materials and manufactured goods;
investing overseas while remaining an outlet for European 
capital). In the Northeast--the advanced capitalist "core” 
of the United States— immigration followed the "modern" 
pattern of peripheral (Southern and Eastern European) 
peasantry becoming a core urban industrial proletar iat. 3“*
The United States "periphery", on the other hand, exhibited 
different patterns: core-periphery migration in the West
(i.e., "settlers" emigrating from the Northeast in search of 
opportunities--e.g ., agriculture, mining--to join the inde­
pendent class) and limited migration to the more established 
agrarian society of the South. Both areas were dominated by 
"core" (Northeastern United States) capital and possessed an 
economy based on superexploited labor (Black-Americans in 
the South, Mexican-Americans in the West), hence, both were 
less attractive to immigrants. This core-periphery metaphor 
has its limits, as some immigrants did settle in the "peri­
phery" (especially the West, with its opportunities for 
economic independence); however, it provides a useful basis 
for understanding the different immigration and ethnic labor 
patterns of the early twentieth century.
This "new" immigration, however, would persist for only 
a few decades. While (despite their larger absolute num­
bers) smaller relative to the existing resident population, 
the new immigrants had a significant social impact, probably 
due to the increased economic and cultural distance between 
the United States and the sending societies. One effect of
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this increased "social distance" was an upsurge in nativism, 
ethnic conflict, racism, and pressure for immigration 
restriction.3a By the 1920s, American nativist sentiment 
was sufficiently strong to bring about legislation which 
strictly limited immigration from Southern and Eastern 
Europe and continued the exclusion of Asians (which began in 
1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act and was extended by the 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907 which limited Japanese immi­
gration ). 37 The roots of this exclusionary process were 
many and varied, including racism, general xenophobia, and 
political and economic competition; however, we would empha­
size the economic factors, particularly the declining need 
for unskilled labor (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 152) and the 
absorption of new immigrants into domestic workers' move­
ments (Bonacich 1984, p. 116). What is significant about 
the immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s is that 
it was deliberately (in a racist manner) designed to reverse 
the trend of the previous thirty years by restoring Northern 
and Western Europeans to the pre-eminent position among 
immigrant groups. Moreover, the restrictive system of 
national quotas, in concert with the Depression and World 
War II, served to limit drastically all immigration to the 
United States (e.g., from 4.1 million in the 1920s to 
500,000 in the 1930s--Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 158).
Yet the story of ethnic contact in the first half of 
the twentieth century does not end with immigration restric­
tion, the Depression, and the decline of European immigra­
tion. Mexicans were not affected by the 1924 Johnson-Reed 
Act (neither were French-Canadians, for that matter) and 
began to migrate in greater numbers, filling the labor void 
created by restrictions on Asian and European immigration. 
Emigration from Mexico was encouraged by rapid population 
growth and the displacement of the peasantry (the latter 
due in part to the effects of United States investment), 
while continued development of agriculture, mining, and 
railroads in the American Southwest created a demand for 
cheap labor to the extent that companies actively recruited 
in Mexico (Barrera 1979, pp. 69-71).38 Moreover, the 
proximity of Mexico (via improved railroad links) and the 
seasonal nature of agricultural work created a pattern of 
temporary or "commuter" migration (cf. Barkan 1977) which 
was compatible with both Mexican economic patterns and the 
needs of American capital (Archdeacon 1983, p. 129).
Indeed, the economy of the United States Southwest was so 
dependent upon Mexican labor that agricultural and mining 
interests successfully resisted any attempts to restrict 
Mexican immigration.3*
Also significant during this era was the internal 
migration of American Blacks from the "peripheral" Southern 
United States to the urban areas of the North. Like other 
immigrants during this period, Black-Americans forsook an 
economically less developed area for the wage labor market
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and expanding economy (particularly during wartime) of the 
Northern "core." Giving further impetus to the Black- 
American exodus from the South was the decline of cotton 
production and the mechanization of agriculture (the same 
disruption of small producers which propelled so many 
Europeans across the Atlantic), as well as the onerous 
nature of the Southern system of racial segregation 
(Archdeacon 1983, pp. 130-32). From the perspective of 
Northern capital, Southern Blacks provided a ready source of 
cheap labor after the restriction of European immigration 
and during the labor shortages of the First and Second World 
Wars. Although the migration of Blacks from South to North 
was not in itself international in scope, it continued the 
restructuring of the ethnic composition of the North and 
expanded Black-White intergroup contact beyond the confines 
of the South.
Thus, the half-century preceding World War II saw the 
continued evolution of United States capitalist development 
and the American ethnic structure. With respect to the 
former, this era witnessed the emergence of the United 
States as a full fledged core power, which in the context of 
the early twentieth century entailed industrial monopoly 
capitalism (i.e., increased rationalization of production, 
the expansion of market relations, the concentration of 
capital, the formation of trusts and cartels, and the 
systematic recurrence of economic crises) and imperialist
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activities. Ethnic contact was shaped by the demands of 
economic expansion which encouraged continued labor migra­
tion. Indeed, European immigration reached its zenith 
during the first half of this period. This pattern of labor 
migration was Qualitatively different: it dramatically
broadened the ethnic structure of the United States by 
introducing a diverse array of new groups which were non- 
Protestant and non-Western European. Even when the flow of 
immigrants from overseas was curtailed by the immigration 
restriction legislation of 1924, the migrations of Mexican 
and Black Americans continued the reshaping of the American 
ethnic mosaic. By the onset of the Second World War, the 
ethnic composition of the United States had begun to assume 
many of the characteristics of its present configuration— a 
mixture of Native Americans, the descendants of the British 
"original settlers" and of the "old immigrants" from 
Northern and Western Europe, the "new immigrants" from 
Southern and Eastern Europe, Asians, the "superexploited" 
Mexicans and Blacks, and an assortment of "micro-groups" 
from virtually every corner of the globe (indeed, U.S. 
ethnic groups are estimated to number more than 200). 
Eth-Class Struggles and .Group Identity
European immigrants. As we have just described, the 
addition of the new immigrants greatly increased the diver­
sity of the American eth-class structure. For the old 
immigrants and newcomers from Northern and Western Europe,
the arrival of groups from Southern and Eastern Europe 
triggered a process of "ethnic succession" (cf. Light 1981); 
that is, the displacement of earlier immigrants from the 
bottom of the (White) ethnic hierarchy. This occurred in 
several different ways. First, the new immigrants tended to 
deflect the nativist sentiments of Anglo-Americans (except 
perhaps towards Irish-Americans) from older immigrant 
groups, thereby enabling the latter (now seen as less 
objectionable) to move into a "middle" position in the 
ethnic structure--a benefit realized even by newcomers from 
these groups (e.g., Protestant immigrants from Germany, 
Scandinavia, etc.). In addition, intergroup competition 
with "new" immigrants often induced older immigrant groups 
to accentuate their "American" (i.e., Anglo) affiliation as 
a strategy to exclude newcomers or otherwise gain competi­
tive advantages (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 151-52). On the other 
hand, old immigrants occasionally found it easier to develop 
ties with newcomers, which in turn allowed them to improve 
their status by serving as "brokers" (e.g., increased Irish 
political power through incorporating Southern and Eastern 
Europeans into the Democratic Party and urban political 
"machines"— Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 176-77; Archdeacon 
1983, p. 157). This movement into the middle of the White 
ethnic structure, coupled with economic mobility (and subse­
quent intragroup class variation and divergent eth-class 
interests) in the midst of the expanding American economy,
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continued the assimilation of the old, pre-1880 immigrant 
groups.
For immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, the 
situation was markedly different from that of earlier ethnic 
groups. First, their migration was from periphery (or semi­
periphery) to core, as opposed to the core-periphery (or 
semiperiphery) pattern of the old immigrants. This meant 
that rather than entering American society with occupational 
and literacy skills that could be directly utilized (as was 
the case with the old immigrants, whose skills were roughly 
equal to that of the resident population), the new immi­
grants tended to be relatively disadvantaged (cf. Nevins and 
Commager 1966, p. 297; Archdeacon 1983, p. 152). Secondly, 
post-1890 new immigrants encountered a different class 
structure, one which was increasingly industrial as opposed 
to independent agriculture and petty commodity production, 
and one in which the modal labor form was urban and semi or 
unskilled as opposed to agricultural. As a result, new 
immigrants assumed a relatively low class position upon 
entry into an intergroup arena marked by increasing inter­
action, competition, and differentiation.
Another characteristic of the American intergroup arena 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
an upsurge in eth-class struggles. This was the era of 
union assertion, socialist movements, and the mobilization 
of anti-capitalist small producers (e.g., the Grange, rural
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populism), all class-based forms of group organization (cf. 
Zinn 1980, pp. 237-46, 314-49; Nevins and Commager 1966, pp. 
369-75). Given the increasingly complex ethnic structure of 
the United States, ethnicity both cut across and was inter­
sected bv class divisions, a factor which tended to limit 
the utility of both affiliations. Moreover, new immigrants 
were simultaneously interacting and competing with Anglos, 
old immigrants, and other new immigrants, which meant that 
intergroup conflict was not bipolar but multi-headed and 
more diffuse in nature (and, therefore, less salient).
Thus, the new immigrants were confronted by contradictory 
forces which encouraged both accentuating and attenuating 
ethnic identity.
In this context, new immigrants faced a wide range of 
strategic alternatives with respect to ethnic identity. For 
the many sojourners who viewed their stay in the United 
States as temporary (see note 33 above), there was little 
incentive for acculturation. Urban location and clustering 
in enclaves facilitated the emergence of ethnic institutions 
and informal networks, thereby increasing the value of group 
affiliation as a means of survival for both sojourners and 
permanent immigrants. For some group members, enclave 
survival entailed partial withdrawal from the larger society 
or specialization in an economic "niche" (i.e., occupational 
concentration or ethnic enterprise) as an ethnic-based 
strategy for improving class position.40 Competition with
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other groups often encouraged ethnic mobilization, manifest 
in new immigrant affiliation with the Democratic Party and 
with urban political machines (Handlin 1951, pp. 209-24; 
Archdeacon, 1983, pp. 189-92). Given the initial economic 
homogeneity of the new immigrant groups, the broad use of 
ethnic strategies resulted in the initial persistence of 
group identities.
Another factor in the equation was the reaction of the 
dominant classes and ethnic group to the new immigrants. 
Monopoly capital (which was predominantly Anglo) was seem­
ingly the greatest beneficiary of continued immigration, as 
the continued influx of cheap labor both increased profits 
(by reducing labor costs) and undercut working class soli­
darity. On the other hand, the Anglo/old immigrant working 
class tended to be antagonistic, fearing competition via 
lower wages and the deskilling of jobs and resenting the use 
of newcomers as strikebreakers. Similarly, the class of 
independent producers, still fighting a losing battle 
against capitalist development and proletarianization, 
viewed new immigrants with suspicion as tools of monopoly 
capital (Bonacich 1984, pp. 121-22).•*1 Fanning the flames 
of economically rooted intergroup conflict was existing 
racial ideology (e.g., Social Darwinism, the eugenics 
movement) employed to explain the social problems stemming 
from industrialization and the economic and cultural gap 
between residents and new immigrants from the periphery
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(Handlin 1951, pp. 279-80). This was manifest in works 
describing Southern and Eastern Europeans as racially 
inferior (e.g., Grant 1916) and by a Congressional Commis­
sion report (i.e., the Dillingham Commission) which 
described them as an "undesirable addition" to American 
society (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 163-64; Gossett 1963; Nevins 
and Commager 1966, p. 336). Thus, material conflict was 
exacerbated by existing ideology, which in turn had emerged 
from earlier intergroup resource competition.
As a result of these divergent interests and attitudes, 
there was considerable variation in dominant group strate­
gies towards new immigrants. Pressures for exclusion began 
in the nineteenth century; however, initial efforts met with 
only limited success (e.g., exclusion of contract laborers 
and Chinese) as restrictive legislation was vetoed by 
Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson (Higham 1955). Once 
immigrants had entered the United States, dominant group 
strategies for maintaining supremacy included exploitation, 
discrimination, and intimidation (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, 
pp. 145-56). One alternative strategy involved attempts to 
"Americanize" (i.e., Anglicize) immigrants, as manifest in 
social work (e.g., settlement houses), the workplace, and—  
most significantly--the public schools (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 
184-85)‘42 This movement gained momentum with the onset of 
World War I and charges of divided loyalty among "hyphe­
nated Americans" (charges promulgated by no less than
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President Wilson himself); however, the limited success of 
Americanization increased pressures for exclusion.43 Given 
the lessened opposition of the capitalist class to immigra­
tion restriction--due to the declining need for unskilled 
labor, the absorption of new immigrants into the union 
movement, and the perceived link between newcomers and 
radicalism (Bonacich 1984, p. 115; Archdeacon 1983, p. 152)- 
-Anglo cross-class ethnic mobilization (under the guise of 
Americanism) gave rise to the restrictive immigration 
legislation of 1924.44 Nevertheless, differing eth-class 
interests were visible in the lobbying for immigration 
restriction legislation--the National Association of Manu­
facturers opposed quotas, while the American Federation of 
Labor strongly supported them (Handlin 1951, pp. 289-90; 
Archdeacon 1983, p. 174).
The 1924 restriction (in the case of new immigrants, 
the virtual cutoff) of immigration changed the strategic 
context for intergroup interaction. While the enclave or 
ethnic niche strategy which had provided an initial foothold 
remained feasible for some, the absence of the physical and 
cultural reinforcement previously provided by sojourners and 
new arrivals limited the effectiveness of ethnic mobiliza­
tion and encouraged acculturation.4* One strategy--which 
became increasingly appealing given the intolerance of the 
dominant group for cultural diversity, the large number of 
groups in the American ethnic structure, and the existence
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of conflict between ethnic minor ities--was ethnic merger: 
that is, the enhancement of group strength by blurring eth­
nic identities from the country of origin and creating a new 
supra-ethnic identity based on previous national identity 
(e.g., Italian-Americans— Hannerz 1974; Slavic-Americans-- 
Barton 1975). Given declining dominant group hostility (new 
immigrants were perceived as less of a threat after immigra­
tion restriction), access to rights of citizenship (the 1790 
Naturalization Act extended citizenship status to all "free 
Whites"--Bonacich 1984, p. 116), and continued Anglo insti­
tutional hegemony, assimilation became an increasingly 
viable individual strategy.40 At the same time, the indi­
vidual psychological "costs" of assimilation--separation 
from community and family (cf. Child 1943; Handlin 1951)-- 
made it a process more likely to occur over generations. 
Thus, while acculturation and decreased intergroup conflict 
paved the way for assimilation, ethnic identity persisted 
for the new immigrants.
Non-White Groups. The problems and conflicts experi­
enced by the "new immigrants" paled by comparison with those 
superexploited groups not of European origin. Black, Asian, 
Native, and Mexican-Americans were forced to confront both 
the extreme racism of American society in the early twen­
tieth century and the disadvantage of location at the bottom 
of the class structure. With the exception of Native Ameri­
cans, who for the most part were kept on the margins of the
economy, these groups served, with varying degrees of 
severity, as superexploited labor generally located (with 
the exception of Northern Blacks) in the peripheral regions 
(i.e., the South and the West) of the United States. Inas­
much as colonial labor systems are grounded in the maint­
enance of rigid ethnic boundaries, non-White groups were not 
permitted to assimilate; that is, intergroup boundaries and 
status differentials were strictly enforced by the dominant 
Anglo-American group. This did not preclude the emergence 
of intragroup class divisions, for while the bulk of non- 
White group members remained in the superexploited segment 
of the working class, the limited permeability of the 
American "caste” system allowed for some mobility and the 
emergence of a small middle class (e.g., professionals or 
small business owners serving the minority community). Yet 
ethnicity remained a determining factor, for although the 
minority "middle" class enjoyed a higher economic position, 
it shared the pariah social and political status of its 
fellow group members.
For non-White groups, exclusion did not inhibit accul­
turation (i.e., the adoption of aspects of Anglo-American 
culture), it merely assured— given the rarity of "passing" 
as a dominant group member and the impossibility of class- 
based strategies--the persistence of ethnic stratification 
and group identity. In essence, minority ethnic identity in 
the early twentieth century evolved as an adaptation to
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White domination (e.g. Black accommodation to Southern White 
racism/paternalism--Bloom 1987, pp. 122-28) within para­
meters set by the dominant group. From the other side of 
the fence, dominant group exclusionary practices reflected 
the eth-class interests of both the elite (e.g., Southern 
and Western agricultural interests), who benefitted from the 
superexploitation and general labor control inherent in 
colonial labor systems, and the White working class, who 
sought to exclude competition. These economic interests 
were buttressed by the now-entrenched racial ideology of 
White superiority.
Within the general context of superexploited labor, the 
experiences of different groups varied. Black-Americans in 
the post-Reconstruction South experienced relegation to 
agricultural debt peonage (i.e., sharecropping) or to the 
lowest ranks of the working class.47 This caste-like social 
status was maintained by the "Jim Crow" system of legal 
segregation (which was given national sanction by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the Plessy v. Ferguson decision), by 
informal exclusion, and by extralegal coercion such as 
lynching (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 268-74). What emerged was a 
social order in which Blacks were economically, politically, 
and psychologically dominated by Whites, a social order in 
which the White rural elite were the prime beneficiaries.11 
Although "caste-like", this social system was not as rigid 
as slavery, as evidenced by the emergence of a small
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enclave-based Black middle class and of a range of ethnic 
institutions (e.g., churches).4* Although the Southern 
economy was rocked by crises (e.g., the boll weevil 
infestation and the decline of cotton agriculture), the 
emigration of Blacks to the North provided a safety valve 
which allowed the racial order to persist.
Black-Americans in the Northern "core" of the United 
States experienced a different form of superexploitation 
during the early twentieth century. While some Blacks had 
always lived in the North, their numbers were swelled by the 
immigration of Southern Blacks during World War I and after 
the restriction of European immigration (Quarles 1969, pp. 
193-95). In some respects, Black northward migration can be 
viewed as a case of "ethnic succession" in that they re­
placed the "new immigrants" at the bottom of the class 
structure; however, the position of Black-Americans was 
qualitatively different from that of Southern and Eastern 
Europeans due to racial exclusion--which seemingly increased 
in response to the influx of Southern Blacks (Lieberson 
1980, p. 375).*° At the same time, the Northern racial 
order was different from that of the South: there was less 
state-sanctioned segregation; Blacks were more integrated 
into the mainstream urban industrial sector; the system of 
ethnic stratification was relatively more permeable; and the 
local political economy did not depend on racial segregation 
(Bloom 1987, p. 187). Nevertheless, the position of Black-
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Americans was superexploited in that they constituted a 
separate segment of the working class (different wages, 
ethnic occupational stratification, exclusion from unions) 
amidst an "aversive" (cf. Frederickson 1981, p. 151) racial 
order characterized by segregation in employment, housing, 
and education (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 171-72; Bloom 
1987, p. 188; Blauner 1987, pp. 149-60). In response, 
Northern Blacks developed their own social and cultural 
networks and institutions, utilizing group ties as a means 
of survival.
Given our assertion that no one dominant eth-class 
segment benefitted from the exclusion of Blacks to the same 
degree as in the South, it becomes necessary to examine the 
basis of the Northern racial order. In essence, we are 
asking the question: Why were Northern Blacks treated 
differently from European immigrants? According to neo­
classical economic thought (e.g., Friedman 1962, p. 108), 
status discrimination is economically irrational in the 
context of advanced capitalism; however, it has not been 
market forces which have reduced discrimination.01 Given 
the power of the capitalist class, it is also not feasible 
to accept the split labor market suggestion that a White 
working class fearful of competition was unilaterally able 
to establish a restrictive racial order. We would argue 
that racial discrimination is not incompatible with indus­
trial capitalism, and that the capitalist mode of production
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can adapt itself to pre-existing ideologies. This suggests 
that there is little incentive for capital to change a 
racial order due to both the influence of racial ideologies 
and the economic advantages of discrimination (e.g., profits 
from superexploitation, increased labor control through 
working class divisions— cf. Reich 1981). Indeed, if a 
racial ideology is widespread, individual actors cannot 
afford not to discriminate (e.g., the economic loss, or 
perceived danger thereof, experienced by the first employer 
to hire racial minorities as professionals, managers, sales 
staff, etc. ) .
In the Western United States, Mexican-Americans exper­
ienced yet another superexploited labor pattern. As a 
consequence of agricultural expansion, World War I labor 
shortages, and the restriction of European immigration, the 
existing Mexican-American population was augmented by an 
influx of immigrants from Mexico.32 Within the political 
economy of the Southwest, Mexican-Americans served as cheap 
labor (with varying degrees of superexploitation) in several 
economic niches: extreme superexploitation via debt peonage
or wage discrimination in agriculture; wage discrimination 
in mining or as railroad labor; and occupational stratifica­
tion in the industrial labor force (Barrera 1979, pp. 78- 
90). Despite increasing White ethnic antagonism stemming 
from economic competition (e.g., White labor, White farmers 
competing with employers of Mexican-American labor), the
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economic role of Mexican-American labor was central to the 
extent that Southwestern capitalist interests prevented the 
inclusion of Mexicans in the immigration restriction legis­
lation of the 1920s (Dinnerstein et a l . 1979, p. 217;
Barrera 1979, pp. 73-74.).83 Nevertheless, the tenuous 
economic position of Mexican-Americans was reflected in 
their reserve role (which was enhanced by the proximity of 
Mexico)--Mexican-Americans were deported during the Depres­
sion or were replaced by White labor (Barrera 1979, pp. 105- 
07). 8"® Although some internal differentiation existed 
within the Mexican-American community (e.g., an enclave- 
based middle class), their ethnically-based marginality--and 
the later emergence of the contract-labor bracero program-- 
stood as a barrier to mobility.
A somewhat similar experience was encountered by Asian- 
American immigrants (i.e., Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos) in 
the Western states. Each group was welcomed by employers as 
a source of cheap labor, yet experienced hostility, discri­
mination (e.g., housing, jobs, citizenship rights), and 
eventual exclusion as a result of the interaction of eco­
nomic competition and racist ideology.88 After Chinese 
immigration was prohibited in 1882, Chinese-Americans 
retreated into enclaves, using group solidarity as protec­
tion against White hostility. Both the Japanese, who 
followed the Chinese, and the Filipinos, who succeeded the 
Japanese, experienced similar receptions (Japanese immigra­
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tion was first limited by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907, 
then explicitly halted in 1924; Filipino immigration was 
halted by the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924). Japanese- 
Americans prospered in agriculture and in small businesses 
(e.g., Japanese-Americans operated one-half of the truck 
farms in California by 1940); however, this success further 
fanned the flames of White racial antagonism. This hostil­
ity came to a head with the internment of Japanese-Americans 
in the Western United States during World War II, which, 
although rationalized as a military necessity in the context 
of national conflict with Japan, was grounded in racist 
ideology and economic competition.ss For example, White 
farmers supported internment as a means of removing Japanese 
competitors, while Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, although 
closer to the war zone, were not interned due to the 
centrality of their position in the local economy (Schaefer 
1988, p. 393).
The final non-White group, Native Americans, were 
placed in a unique social and economic position. Following 
the end of the White-Native American national conflict in 
1890, surviving Native-Americans were placed on reservations 
and remained largely on the outside of the White capitalist 
economy (indeed, the economic marginality of reservation 
land reduced most residents to economic dependence on the 
federal government). At this juncture, the White objective 
for Native Americans entailed socio-cultural incorporation
into the larger society and proletarianization into the 
labor force. This was attempted via two vehicles. The 
first, the Dawes Act of 1887, established individual private 
property rights (vs. communal landholding) within reserva­
tions, with the expectation that Native Americans would fail 
at farming and be forced to sell their land enter the labor 
market, and assimilate into "American" society (Zinn 1980, 
p. 514; Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 228; Schaefer 1988, pp. 
180-81).97 In addition, many Native American youth under­
went removal and forced acculturation through the notorious 
boarding schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 228-29). Neither of these 
methods completely achieved its goal (due in no small part 
to Native American resistance); however, Native American 
culture was weakened as a result of this economic and 
cultural onslaught. One side effect of the White attack on 
Native American culture was the beginning of Native American 
ethnic merger— the creation of a pan-ethnic "American 
Indian" identity (Trottier 1981)--although sub-ethnic 
identities continued to persist. Although White tactics 
changed to a more paternalistic approach (Native Americans 
were given citizenship and some political rights in the 
1920s and 1930s), Native Americans remained an economically 
marginal and politically subjugated ethnic group controlled 
by Whites through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Schaefer 
1988, pp. 181-82).
Summary: 1890-1945. As we suggested at start of this
section, this period was a time of transition between the 
nineteenth century and the modern (i.e., post-1945) era.
The "Great Migration" of the new immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe was the culmination of the immigration 
which defined U.S. society as a settler society; however, 
intergroup conflict (and the perceived threat to Anglo 
hegemony) led to stringent restrictions on immigration. 
Nevertheless, ethnic relations did not end with the exclu­
sionary legislation of 1924. As was the case with their 
predecessors, new immigrant identities both persisted. in 
response to intergroup conflict and the demands of a new 
environment (including merger into pan-ethnic identities), 
and slowly diminished. in response to increasing intragroup 
differentiation and the link between acculturation, assimi­
lation, and mobility. In contrast, the position of the 
superexploited non-White groups remained relatively static: 
Black-Americans were subject to Jim Crow and other forms of 
segregation; Native-Americans remained marginalized on 
isolated reservations; and the position of Mexican-Americans 
was undermined by deportations and contract labor. Never­
theless, chinks were beginning to appear in the "caste-like" 
status of these groups in the form of limited mobility 
(especially during the World Wars) which, by altering the 
eth-class composition of superexploited groups, would
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provide a base for subsequent mobilization. These trends 
would become dominant themes in the post-1945 era.
The Modern Era: 1945-Present
The conclusion of World War II marked the beginning of 
a new stage of global capitalist development. This included 
the establishment of the United States as the hegemonic core 
power; that is, as the political and economic center of the 
world-system. On a global level, key processes included 
nationalist movements and decolonization in the periphery, 
the emergence of U.S.-Soviet conflict as a central issue in 
international politics, and the proliferation of trans­
national corporations (TNCs) as a vehicle for global capi­
talist accumulation (Borrego 1981; Hymer 1978).38 Within 
the United States, the nature of capitalist development 
became increasingly post-industrial. marked by an expansion 
of education and the service and information sectors of the 
economy and a decline of traditional industrial manufac­
turing. Each of these processes in turn contributed to 
reshaping patterns of American immigration and intergroup 
contact.
In contrast to the first half of the twentieth century, 
which we have cast as a transitional period, the post-1945 
era (especially post-1960) constituted a dramatic departure 
from previous patterns of ethnic relations. Intergroup 
interaction during this period can be described in the 
context of several subtrends: (1) the post-1965 removal of
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immigration quotas and the subsequent influx of immigrants 
from the periphery (the cause of which was often linked to 
U.S. imperial ventures)— a development with particular for 
"ethnic merger" and the emergence of Hispanic-American and 
Asian-American pan-ethnic identities; (2) the increasing 
assimilation of White Ethnics (despite the much-ballyhooed 
"resurgence" of the 1970s) and the corresponding challenge 
to Anglo hegemony--the result of which is movement towards 
the creation of a "White American" (i.e., a partnership of 
Anglo-Americans, old immigrants, and White Ethnics) pan­
ethnic identity; and (3) the mobilization of Black-Americans 
(and, to a lesser degree, Native Americans and Hispanics) to 
challenge their subordinate status--and the subsequent White 
"countermobilization" of the late 1970s and 1980s. At the 
same time, the increasing interpenetration of ethnicity and 
class would further compound the complexity of intergroup 
interaction. What is clear, however, is that ethnic 
relations have continued to play a significant role in U.S. 
society. In the following pages, we will explore the 
evolution of both group identities and intergroup inter­
action during the modern era.
Intergroup Contact
In the years after 1945, the rate of immigration and 
labor migration began to increase, reflecting both the post­
war prosperity and the new global position of the United 
States. One trend was the continuation of patterns which
were established prior to and during the Second World War: 
Blacks continued to leave the South for the urban areas of 
the North, while Mexicans migrated across the border in 
greater numbers--as "braceros11 (contract laborers), as 
traditional immigrants, and as undocumented or "illegal" 
immigrants.9* Another source of immigrants was Europeans 
uprooted by World War II. Although the quota system estab­
lished in 1924 remained in effect until 1965, legislative 
action (e.g., Displaced Persons Act, War Brides Act) per­
mitted increased immigration following the war (Dinnerstein 
and Reimers 1982, pp. 72-73).00 In addition, beginning in 
the 1950s, the United States also accepted refugees from 
"communist" nations whose policies it opposed (e.g., 
Hungary, Cuba), an extension of "Cold War" politics in the 
context of U.S.-Soviet conflict A final source of immi­
grants during the 1950s and 1960s was Puerto Rico, an 
American colony whose citizens possessed United States 
citizenship and were thus not subject to immigration 
restriction laws. Driven by economic underdevelopment and 
rapid population growth and attracted by the need for cheap 
labor, Puerto Rican immigration fit the periphery to core 
migration pattern which had emerged in the late nineteenth 
century but which had been largely curtailed by the immi­
gration restriction legislation of the 1920s. This pattern 
would be re-established during the 1960s and 1970s.
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American immigration reached a watershed of sorts with 
the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 
1965. This legislation, which went into effect in 1968, 
reflected several policy objectives. First, it abolished 
the system of national quotas, a system which appeared 
increasingly illegitimate in the context of the Pax 
Amer icana. decolonization, and U.S.-Soviet political 
conflict (Archdeacon 1983, p. 207). Secondly, it for the 
first time placed limits on migration from other Western 
Hemisphere nations by establishing a hemispheric quota 
(120,000) within the yearly global quota.61 This portion of 
the legislation was clearly in the tradition of earlier 
immigration restriction in that it addressed a perceived new 
threat (i.e., the unrestricted influx of Latin Americans) by 
placing a limit on the number of newcomers (Dinnerstein and 
Reimers 1982, p. 75). Finally, the 1965 act established a 
new system of preferences, this time based upon family ties 
(i.e., close relatives of United States citizens) and job 
skills.
The impact of this law upon immigration patterns was 
dramatic and far reaching. Almost immediately, the number 
of immigrants increased by one-third, while within ten years 
the volume had doubled to more than 600,000 per year (Massey 
1981, p. 58).63 Of even greater significance was the shift 
in the origins of these "new" immigrants. While 77% of 
immigrants between 1921 and 1960 were from Europe and North
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America, 83% of immigrants between 1981 and 1985 were from 
Asia (e.g., Vietnam, Philippines, Korea, Taiwan) and Latin 
America (Schaefer 1988, p. 128). At the same time, geo­
graphical proximity and changes in the American economy 
(i.e., the decline of traditional manufacturing centers, the 
rise of the service sector, and the economic expansion of 
the "Sun Belt" during the 1970s) effected a shift in the 
destination of immigrants from the Northeast to the South­
west and Florida, with Los Angeles now supplanting New York 
as the most popular point of entry. Thus, the ethnic compo­
sition of the United States appears to be undergoing yet 
another transformation.
Yet the explanation for this shift transcends the 
change in immigration laws. During the half-century the 
United States had closed its doors the world-system had 
undergone a profound transformation. The ongoing process of 
global capitalist development (i.e., the expansion of the 
area under the sway of capitalist relations and the evolu­
tion of an increasingly integrated world-economy bound 
together by financial, transportation, communication, and 
corporate networks) had altered the nature of the periphery, 
which now included Latin America, Africa and much of Asia 
(cf. Chirot 1977, pp. 179-81). Continued capitalist pene­
tration of the periphery had resulted in partial proletari­
anization (including a decline in the viability of small 
agriculture) and rapid population growth, while the changing
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nature of core-periphery relations (i.e., post-1945 decolo­
nization and the emergence of neocolonialism--Hunt and 
Sherman 1986, p. 609) fostered continued underdevelopment 
and political instability. The result was an ever-widening 
gap between core and periphery (i.e., the "North-South” 
division) and an intensification of the "push" factors 
encouraging emigration from the periphery. At the same 
time, there was less economic incentive for Europeans to 
emigrate after 1965, with the exception of some movement 
from the poorer, semiperipheral nations (e.g., Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece). Within these shifting patterns of global 
migration, the identity of specific countries sending immi­
grants to the United States seemingly reflects past and 
current patterns of military involvement (Korea, Southeast 
Asia), colonization (Philippines), and political and 
economic domination (Latin America).
On the other side of the equation, however, the "pull" 
factors encouraging immigration to the core had also under­
gone changes. First, transnational corporations found it 
increasingly feasible to relocate production to the peri­
phery in order to take advantage of lower labor costs 
(Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1977, pp. 83-85; Barnet and 
Muller 1974). Secondly, as a "post-industrial" society, the 
United States (and other core nations) have different needs 
for unskilled labor. What is available are often low paying 
jobs in the service sector (with little prospect for upward
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mobility) or temporary work corresponding to agricultural 
needs or economic fluctuations (hence, the proliferation of 
guestworkers or migrant agricultural workers). One addi­
tional consequence of the changes in the United States 
labor market has been an increase in the occupational 
heterogeneity of immigrants, reflected in the influx of 
professional and technical workers (e.g., doctors, engi­
neers, scientists) from the periphery who are attracted to 
the core by the higher wages available to skilled labor 
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, pp. 82-84; Archdeacon 1983, 
p. 212; Fortney 1972). Encouraged by the preferences for 
skilled workers in the 1965 Immigration Act, this "brain 
drain"— the transfer of skilled labor from periphery to 
core, to the detriment of the former— has been augmented by 
the disproportionate representation of highly educated 
workers among refugees from Cuba and Southeast Asia (Massey 
1981, pp. 59-60).
One outcome of this imbalance between push and pull 
factors, as well as the limitation on immigration from 
Western Hemisphere nations, was an increase in undocumented 
or "illegal" immigration, a phenomenon which became the most 
controversial immigration issue of the 1970s and 1980s.
While the exact number of undocumented immigrants during 
this period could not be determined, the estimated annual 
influx was between 200,000 and 1,000,000, and the estimated 
resident "undocumented" population was between three and six
million (see Schaefex 1988, pp. 130-31; Massey 1981, p. 61; 
Morgenthau, Borger, Greenberg, Shannon, Michael and Pedersen 
1984, p. 19).*3 The primary source of undocumented immi­
grants is Mexico; however, significant numbers have come 
from other Latin American nations and citizens of nearly one 
hundred countries have been apprehended by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (Schaefer 1988, p. 131). While 
the "push” factors encouraging migration are the same as for 
legal immigrants, undocumented labor serves as an exploit­
able "reserve army" working for the lowest wages in the 
least desirable jobs (i.e., as a form of "superexploited" 
labor. *■* During the 1980s, undocumented labor became in­
creasingly controversial for a variety of reasons, including 
fear of labor competition, concern regarding the economic 
impact of undocumented immigrants, and an ethnocentric fear 
of the "Hispanicization" of the Southwestern U.S.os Follow­
ing several failed attempts, the United States Congress 
responded to pressures for exclusion (pressures remarkably 
similar to those of the 1920s) by enacting the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, a measure which sought to 
limit undocumented immigration through sanctions against 
employers, while at the same time extending amnesty and 
eventual citizenship to undocumented immigrants who entered 
the United States before 1982 (Pear 1986).*® Despite this 
attempt to limit immigration, the persistence of the "push" 
factors encouraging undocumented immigration— high Mexican
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unemployment and economic stagnation, rapid population 
growth, and the strength of the dollar relative to the peso- 
-suggests that recent patterns will continue into the 
foreseeable future."7
Eth-Class Interaction and Group Identity
The rapid changes in post-war American society had a 
profound impact on the nature of the " intergroup arena"; 
that is, the context in which intergroup interaction 
occurred. Ethnic relations in the post-1945 United States 
were shaped by several forces: the post-war expansion of the 
United States and world economies (what some would describe 
as the "A-phase" of Kondratieff cycle); the emergence of 
"post-industrial society", with its emphasis upon education 
and the service and information sector; the increased inter­
national role of the United States in the context of the Pax 
Americana; and by the expanding role of the state in social 
and economic life. These forces were bound together by 
increasingly interconnected national and global mass commu­
nication networks (cf. Richmond1S--1969, pp. 278-80--notion 
of Verbindunosnetzschaft) which both expanded the scope of 
intergroup interaction and the potential for ethnic mobili­
zation (e.g., the nationwide impact--via television--of the 
Civil Rights Movement) and increased acculturation by bom­
barding ethnic enclaves with the dominant culture."® For 
our purposes, what is important is to recognize that these 
changes altered both the eth-class structure (by changing
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both the class structure and the means by which this struc­
ture was reproduced— e.g., increased emphasis upon educa­
tion, credentials, etc.) and the nature of intergroup inter­
action (e.g., the emergence of mass movements). Our task, 
therefore, is to trace the influence of these processes upon 
the evolution of specific group identities.
Ethnic mobilization; Black-Americans. Perhaps the 
most significant development in ethnic relations in the 
post-1945 era was the ethnic mobilization of Black Ameri­
cans. This social movement--the "Civil Rights Movement"-- 
involved several important dynamics. First, Blacks chal­
lenged and overthrew the existing racial order (i.e., the 
norms, laws, and assumptions governing intergroup rela­
tions), particularly in the South, and as a group sought to 
improve their position in the American eth-class structure. 
Secondly, as a corollary to this movement, Black-Americans 
redefined their ethnic identity (Bloom 1987, pp. 6-7)-- 
including the perceptions of other groups. This entailed a 
process of psychological decolonization (cf. Fanon's— 1963-- 
discussion of similar processes in nationalist movements in 
the periphery); that is, the shedding of White-imposed defi­
nitions and the promotion of a Black-American consciousness 
(Carmichael and Hamilton 1967, pp. 34-39 ).■• Finally, 
Black-American ethnic mobilization altered the social role 
of ethnicity in the United States by establishing the
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legitimacy of group-based political mobilization (Omi and 
Winant 1986).
The roots of this Black-American ethnic mobilization 
are best analyzed in terms of both ethnicity and class 
(i.e., eth-class). At the most fundamental level, ethnic 
mobilization was a response to the historical ethnic encap­
sulation of Blacks (maintained via racial ideology), which 
for the roost part restricted them to a superexploited frac­
tion of the working or lower classes, or to an ethnically 
separate segment of the middle class. Yet this subordinate 
status is not sufficient as an explanation for ethnic mobi­
lization. What must also be taken into consideration are a 
series of structural changes: the slight but significant
changes in the position of Blacks (e.g., cf. Quarles— 1969, 
pp. 227-28--on opportunities for mobility provided by World 
War II, the 1949 desegregation of the U.S. military, and the 
emergence of a small Black middle class); the declining 
basis of the Southern racial order (e.g., decreased role of 
agriculture, the industrial development of the South and a 
lessening of its "peripheral" status with regard to the rest 
of the nation); and the declining stake of Northern capital 
in the Southern racial order (due to such developments as 
the encapsulation of class struggle through the legitimation 
of unions, and the international stigma of segregation in 
the context of decolonization, U.S.-Soviet conflict, and the 
Pax Americana). These subtle but significant changes in the
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intergroup arena created an opening for Black-American 
ethnic mobilization.
The Civil Rights Movement originated as a limited Black 
challenge to the Southern system of segregation which was 
nevertheless a challenge to the basis of the class hegemony 
of the White rural elite (Bloom 1987). Resistance by the 
elite took the form of an ethnic countermobilization, one 
which invoked the ideology of White supremacy--via appeals 
to "states' rights" and "preserving our Southern heritage"-- 
in an attempt to gain the alliance of other White eth- 
classes. The ferocity of White resistance (as well as such 
early successes as the Brown decision and the Montgomery bus 
boycott) in turn facilitated the formation of an eth-class 
alliance between the Black middle and lower classes and 
resulted in the emergence of a mass social movement (Zinn 
1980, pp. 441-46).70 As part of the movement strategy, 
Blacks sought to enlist (or force) the involvement of the 
federal government as an ally in overthrowing the Southern 
racial order, an objective which was feasible in light of 
the increased political influence of Blacks (especially on 
the Democratic Party in the North) and the declining stake 
of Northern capital in supporting a Southern rural elite 
which had become an economic and political anachronism.
Also targeted by the movement was the emerging Southern 
business class, which did not benefit from segregation as 
did the rural elite (although they also had no stake in
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challenging the racial order), but which was vulnerable to 
Black economic pressure (e.g., boycotts, disruption of the 
"business climate") and could thus be induced to negotiate 
(Bloom 1987, pp. 115-17). Ultimately, after a prolonged 
struggle, the Civil Rights Movement was successful in over­
throwing legal segregation and transforming the Southern 
racial order.-71
As Black-American ethnic mobilization evolved, it 
underwent a change in its class basis. Initially, the Civil 
Rights Movement was led by the "new" Black middle class 
(primarily lawyers, writers, and ministers) and took the 
form of legal challenges, limited protest, and a focus on 
"rights." As the base of the movement expanded amidst mass 
action, the increased involvement of the lower classes gave 
rise to class based demands. While the Black middle class 
stood to benefit the most from the removal of barriers to 
equal access (a demand which could be couched and realized 
in ethnic terms), fulfillment of lower class demands would 
involve more fundamental social and economic changes.^2 
This was particularly evident when the focus of Black 
mobilization shifted to the North and its de facto system of 
segregation (cf. Quarles 1969, pp. 255-59). In this con­
text, the economic (class-based) demands of Blacks consti­
tuted a direct challenge to the basic interests of the 
American capitalist system (as opposed to the Southern 
campaign, which merely challenged the peripheral rural
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elite). These demands shattered the civil rights "coali­
tion" by triggering the defection of middle class Whites and 
Blacks (neither of whom had any class interest in economic 
restructuring) and, when pressed in the form of increased 
militancy and ghetto revolts, brought on government co­
optation and repression (Zinn 1980, pp. 449-50; Omi and 
Winant 1986, p. 89).
For Black Americans, the ethnic mobilization of the 
1950s and 1960s did bring important social, economic, and 
political gains--the shedding of their superexploited 
position; however, Blacks remain far behind Whites in the 
late 1980s on virtually every measure of social or economic 
well-being. Given the continuing relationship between 
ethnicity and class (i.e., Blacks are overrepresented at the 
lower levels of the working class and among the underclass 
while they remain conspicuously absent from the upper 
classes), there remains a strong material basis for the 
persistence of group identity. Furthermore, continued 
exclusion (e.g., residential segregation) and ethnic antag­
onism by Whites provides additional impetus for group soli­
darity even in the face of intragroup class divisions. Con­
sequently, we anticipate that Black-White interaction and 
conflict will remain a focal issue in American society for 
the foreseeable future.
With respect to ethnic relations in the United States, 
the social impact of the Civil Rights Movement far transcen­
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ded its significance for Black-Americans. The success of 
Black ethnic mobilization altered the social meaning of 
American ethnicity by conferring increased legitimacy upon 
group demands (i.e., the "right" of non-dominant groups to 
make demands as a group) and by installing the federal 
government as "arbiter" of such demands. In addition, the 
movement changed the nature of intergroup relations by 
establishing a socio-cultural framework in which segrega­
tion, prejudice, and discrimination are unacceptable (Omi 
and Winant 1986, p. 141).173 Finally, now that the legiti­
macy of group demands had been established, Black-American 
mobilization was followed by similar movements on the part 
of other ethnic minorities: Hispanic-Americans (e.g., La 
Raza Unida). Native Americans (e.g., the American Indian 
Movement, land claims— cf. Zinn 1980, pp. 513-26), and, to a 
lesser degree, the "new" immigrants (e.g., the Italian- 
American Civil Rights League). These movements can be 
viewed as actual or attempted eth-class alliances (e.g., 
cross-class ethnic mobilization) pursued as a means of 
attaining material or political objectives. For the groups 
involved, the process of mobilization with its emphasis upon 
ethnic ties, group pride, and past or present grievances had 
the effect of increasing the salience of ethnic identity.
Assimilation vs. persistence: White Ethnics. For the
non-Protestant and non-Western European "new" immigrants, 
now referred to as "White Ethnics," the post-1945 era was
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one of both significant assimilation and surprising persis­
tence. Indeed, this contradiction is captured by the label 
"White Ethnic"--which on one hand implies the persistence of 
group identity by distinguishing White Ethnics from "non- 
ethnics" (i.e., Anglo-Americans and assimilated old immi­
grants), while on the other hand suggests (through the 
omission of specific group labels) at least partial assimi­
lation along the lines of the "triple melting pot" (Protes­
tant, Catholic, Jew) model popularized during the 1950s."74 
Many forces encouraged acculturation and assimilation. The 
restriction of immigration in the 1920s reduced the per­
ceived "threat" which the new immigrants posed to the domi­
nant Anglo-Americans and led to a decline in ethnic antag­
onism (e.g., no longer were new immigrants referred to as 
"racially different"). New immigrants were also subject to 
the assimilative forces which had affected the "old" 
immigrants: Anglo dominance of institutions; the increasing
number of ethnic groups (which tended to diffuse intergroup 
conflict); and the process of ethnic succession (Blacks 
replaced the new immigrants in much the same manner that the 
new immigrants replaced the old immigrants). A third set of 
factors were more historically unique: the national 
mobilization which occurred during World War II and the 
increasing influence of mass society, both of which promoted 
absorption into the larger Anglo-dominated society. The 
most important factor, however, was mobility, the oppor­
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tunity for which was increased by the union movement (which 
improved the economic position of the working class) and by 
structural changes and expansion in the United States 
economy (which facilitated the economic advancement of the 
new immigrants without displacing other groups--Hechter, 
1979, p. 124).7* One significant milestone in this process 
was the 1960 election of the first Catholic president, John 
F. Kennedy--an event which legitimized the inclusion of 
White Ethnics into the federal government and academic 
"means of administration." Mobility in turn led to 
increased intra-group class divisions (subjecting the 
upwardly mobile to the homogenizing tendencies of the middle 
class) which functioned to reduce ethnic solidarity. 
Opportunities for mobility made it more likely that 
individual group members would choose an "assimilative" 
strategy (i.e., increase opportunities by blending into the 
dominant group) as opposed to an "ethnic" strategy (i.e., 
advance interests within the context of the enclave).
At the same time, the new immigrant groups exhibited 
considerable persistence with respect to ethnic identity.7® 
The assimilative strategy, which worked so well for the 
middle class, was often eschewed by the working class, for 
whom ethnic ties and networks remained more salient (Glazer 
and Moynihan 1963; Gans 1962). Thus, ethnic identity was 
increasingly linked to class position--"White Ethnic" was 
often equated with upper working class and with ties to the
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Democratic Party. A significant event for White Ethnics 
was the "ethnic revival" of the late 1960s and the 1970s-- 
the assertion of identities thought to have been assimilated 
into the Anglo-American group, or at least into the triple 
melting pot (Novak 1973; Greeley 1974; Glazer and Moynihan 
1975). Occurring in the context of the post-Civil Rights 
Movement "legitimation" of ethnic politics, this "revival" 
was rooted in ethnic competition. The working class White 
Ethnics felt threatened by the demands of the groups below 
them (i.e., Blacks); that is, they believed that their 
neighborhoods and schools would be integrated, that their 
jobs and opportunities for advancement would be taken away 
(Vecoli 1978, p. 142; Novak 1973, p. 15). While their 
resistance was often racial (anti-Black) in form--reflecting 
both the virulence and the resilience of racist ideology in 
the United States--the White Ethnic "backlash" is probably 
best understood in class terms as a defense of their inter­
mediate position in the class structure (Steinberg 1981, pp. 
218-19J.77 This "revival" was further fueled by resentment 
towards (i.e., competition with) Anglo-Americans which 
stemmed from both memories of past injuries and a sense of 
exclusion from the upper echelon of American society (cf. 
Lieberson and Carter 1979; Vecoli 1978; Schrag 1970). The 
White Ethnic attempt at ethnic mobilization did exhibit some 
cross-class tendencies— e.g., attracting segments of the 
ethnic intelligentsia and upper middle class (i.e., cultural
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entrepreneurs) who stood to benefit from the upgrading of 
group status (cf. Doane unpublished, p. 73); however, its 
main effect seemed to be to slow temporarily the process of 
assimilation. ‘7S
By the 1980s the new immigrants/White Ethnics seem 
largely to have "made it" in American society in terms of 
achieving overall parity with the dominant Anglo group with 
respect to key economic indicators. On the other hand, they 
remain underrepresented among the economic and political 
elite--although significant inroads appear to be being made 
as the U.S. "power elite" is moving towards becoming an 
Ang?.o-White Ethnic partnership (Alba and Moore 1982; 
Lieberson and Carter 1979). Continued blurring of the 
relationship between ethnicity and class among Anglo- 
Americans and White Ethnics would be a strong force towards 
the assimilation of the latter. Given the likely absence of 
significant reinforcement or intergroup conflict, we expect 
that White Ethnic identities will become increasingly 
symbolic--that is, an affiliation with little salience for 
behavior (Gans 1979; Alba 1985). '7* Moreover, the combina­
tion of an increasing influx of non-White immigrants and 
continuing challenges from more disadvantaged groups will 
facilitate ethnic merger and the emergence of a "White 
American" supra-ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the 
"vestiges" of new immigrant identity remain sufficiently
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strong that the completion of any such merger will perhaps 
require at least another generation.®0
Immigration and ethnic merger: Hispanic and Asian-
Americans. For Hispanic and Asian-American groups, the 
post-1945 era brought a dramatic change in group composi­
tion and the meaning of ethnic identity. The key dynamic 
here is immigration, as the dominant pattern of the modern 
era (especially following the 1965 Immigration Act) has been 
the influx of immigrants from Latin America and Asia (Massey 
1981; Sassen-Koob 1983). Consequently, both groups contain 
a higher proportion of first generation residents who would 
tend to have a lower "entry level" status and stronger cul­
tural ties to their country of origin (both of which would 
be more likely to trigger dominant group ethnocentrism). A 
second theme is the expanding locus of immigration and the 
resulting ethnic diversity. Mexican-Americans, the original 
Spanish-speaking group, have been joined since 1945 by 
Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and smaller numbers of immigrants 
from virtually every Caribbean and Central and South Ameri­
can nation. Likewise, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino- 
Americans have been joined since 1965 by Koreans, Viet­
namese, Cambodians, and smaller numbers of migrants from 
other Asian countries. In addition, newcomers have exhi­
bited a range of class (or potential class) positions-- 
e.g., the high relative class positions of middle-class 
"refugees" from Cuba and Vietnam (Massey 1981; Portes and
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Stepick 1985, p. 494)— which in turn has resulted in in­
creased intragroup economic heterogeneity. This diversity 
(and the small relative size of individual groups) has 
seemingly served to hinder ethnic mobilization.
As opposed to ethnic mobilization, what can be ob­
served are the early phases of ethnic merger--the combining 
of two or more groups into a "pan-ethnic" group. This is 
manifest in the increasing use of "Hispanic-American” or 
"Asian-American" in place of individual national identities 
such as Mexican or Cambodian--although these lower-level 
ethnic identities still persist.ox While these mergers for 
the most part reflect an awareness of common interests, they 
are also a product (much in the same manner that new immi­
grant "national" identities were created by the American 
experience--cf. Glazer 1954, p. 167) of being classified and 
treated similarly by dominant groups and by the state (Enloe 
1981, pp. 133-34). Interestingly, these new pan-ethnic 
identities are not "national" in foundation but regional 
(Asian-American) or regional/linguistic (Hispanic-American), 
a factor which would seemingly offer less in the way of an 
historical or cultural basis for ethnic merger. Neverthe­
less, given the broad base necessary for effective ethnic 
mobilization in the contemporary United States (for example, 
Native American mobilization is inhibited by smallness of 
numbers) there is a strong incentive for these mergers to 
continue. This is particularly true in the case of His-
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panics, who by the twenty-first century could surpass Blacks 
as the largest American ethnic minority (Bouvier and Davis 
1982) .
Given the newness of most Hispanic and Asian groups, it 
is difficult to analyze intergroup contact and the evolution 
of identity. To some extent, the pattern of the past 
appears to be being repeated--entry at the bottom of the 
eth-class structure, competition and antagonism on the part 
of resident ethnic groups (e.g., conflict between Vietnamese 
and White fisherfolk in Texas; violent attacks on Asian- 
Americans), and attempts at exclusion (e.g., interdiction of 
Haitian refugees, imprisonment of Marielitos, the anti- 
Hispanic tenor of the 1986 Immigration Act). Not surpris­
ingly, these newest immigrants have responded by mobilizing 
along ethnic lines; that is, by using group identity for 
self-defense and survival in the face of dominant group 
resistance (Portes 1984). What is different for the most 
recent immigrants, as opposed to earlier groups, is the 
abovementioned change in the nature of the intergroup arena 
as a result of the Civil Rights Movement. From the perspec­
tive of new arrivals, the most important of these differ­
ences would appear to be the existence of some protection 
from extreme racism (e.g., the response of authorities to 
violent attacks on minorities). While this represents a 
change in the context of intergroup relations, the long term 
effects remain unknown.
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For Asian and Hispanic groups with a longer tenure in 
the United States, it is possible to trace a more developed 
pattern of intergroup relations and evolution of ethnic 
identity. Mexican-Americans experienced a slow diminution 
of their superexploited status; however, group mobility was 
inhibited by new and commuter (given the proximity of 
Mexico) immigration. At the same time, Mexican-Americans 
exhibited increased internal differentiation reflected in 
the emergence of an enclave-based middle class (Barrera 
1979, pg. 92). Nevertheless, a substantial superexploited 
sector remained, first through the temporary labor of the 
"bracero" program which was terminated in 1964 (Craig 1971), 
and later through the exploitation of undocumented workers 
(Barrera 1979). Conflicts regarding the status of braceros 
and undocumented immigrants followed the traditional eth- 
class pattern: agricultural capital, who benefitted from
the exploitation of "superexploited" Mexican labor, 
institutionalized and tried to protect the process; White 
labor, fearing wage competition, sought to exclude Mexicans 
and displayed increased ethnic antagonism (especially in the 
context of the Reagan-Meese attack on minorities); and 
Mexican-Americans in general suffered from the equating of 
"illegal immigrant" with "Mexican" (Craig 1971).02 Conse­
quently, Mexican-American ethnic mobilization occurred in 
response to economic and political issues— e.g., civil 
rights for undocumented workers, opposition to the tactics
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of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and 
opposition to the inclusion of employer sanctions (for 
hiring "illegal aliens") in the 1986 Immigration Act for 
fear of increased discrimination against Hispanics. Given 
the likely persistence of Mexican immigration (and of White 
resistance), the basis for group identity will continue; 
however, strategic considerations should encourage the 
continuation of the process of ethnic merger into a 
Hispanic-American pan-ethnic group (in which Mexican- 
Americans will play a significant role).
The experience of the oldest Asian-American groups, 
Japanese-Americans and Chinese Americans, has been shaped by 
a complex array of factors.03 Both groups had already faced 
virulent racism (although less than that faced by Blacks-- 
cf. Lieberson 1980, p. 366; Frederickson 1981, pp. 116-17 on 
White hierarchies of racial preference) and complete exclu­
sion after the 1920s, and the Japanese further endured 
internment during World War II. Ironically, the cut-off of 
immigration in 1924 may have had a "positive" effect over 
time on the status of Japanese and Chinese-Americans. 
Termination of immigration had several effects: it
undoubtedly reduced intergroup competition and the per­
ceived threat felt by the dominant group (and probably eased 
subsequent intergroup conflict, although prejudice and dis­
crimination persisted); it enhanced acculturation (by elimi­
nating reinforcement); and it transformed Japanese and
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Chinese-Americans into less visible micro-groups (by keeping 
group numbers small). Since the 1920s, Japanese and 
Chinese-Americans have followed separate paths (Schaefer 
1988, pp. 399-400). Chinese-Americans have tended to follow 
an enclave-based strategy which, reinforced by post-1965 
immigration, resulted in a slower rate of acculturation and 
assimilation. In contrast, the Japanese-American group has 
been more dispersed (due in part to the destruction of 
communities during the World War II internment), which, in 
turn, has led to higher rates of both assimilation and 
economic mobility (Petersen 1971; Montero 1981; Woodrum 
1981)."'* What this comparison suggests to us is that for 
micro-groups, ethnicity and economic position are shaped by 
the effects of both demography and eth-class.
Heaemonv and competition: Anglo-Americans. Our
assessment of the evolution of ethnic identities in the 
United States is not complete without some consideration of 
Anglo-Americans and those (e.g., "old" immigrants) who have 
assimilated into this group. This is a topic which is often 
overlooked in the literature on American ethnic relations 
(e.g., the assumption that Anglos are not ethnic— cf.
Banton1S--1983, pp. 64-66--critique of "minus-one" ethni­
city), perhaps reflecting a less specific sense of identity 
which gives the appearance of non-existence.83 We contend 
that to mistake low visibility for non-existence is a grave 
analytical error, that Anglo-American (WASP) ethnicity has
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played a key role in intergroup relations in the United 
states. There exist several explanations for the "invisi­
bility" of WASP ethnicity: dominant group status (cf.
Banton--1983, pp. 165-66--on majority vs. minority ethni­
city); intragroup class divisions (which have existed from 
the beginning); and the institutionalization of group cul­
ture on a societal level leading to a "taken for granted- 
ness" in which the ethnicity of the majority is the societal 
standard.as The bottom line is access to power and the 
resultant blurring of the lines between ethnic and national 
identity--the appropriation of "American" as the functional 
equivalent of "Anglo" (Enloe, 1981, p. 130; T. Smith 1980). 
Accordingly, prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants 
and ethnic minorities is most fruitfully interpreted as 
ethnic-based action bv Anglo-Americans (i.e., boundary 
maintenance) as a means of establishing and maintaining the 
dominant position of the group.0-7 Indeed, the basis of 
Anglo-American hegemony has been the ability to impose 
definitions and set parameters for intergroup action, while 
masking (i.e. institutionalizing) this process amidst larger 
dynamics of cultural reproduction (e.g., via an educational 
system which transmits an "Anglicized" version of U.S. 
ethnic history and guidelines for acceptable group action).
For Anglo-Americans, ethnic competition and antagonism 
towards minorities has been an ongoing process as the group 
has sought to fortify its position (even though it has never
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been seriously challenged). This conflict has been exacer­
bated by the persistence of racial ideology, which contri­
butes to increased intergroup t e n s i o n . I n  the 1970s and 
1980s, a variety of factors have contributed to increased 
intergroup competition: the economic downturn (the so-called 
Kondratieff "B-phase"); the "fiscal crisis of the state"
(cf. O'Connor 1973); resistance to the demands of minorities 
(i.e., a "backlash" towards the Civil Rights Movement); and 
cracks in WASP hegemony (Schrag 1970; Novak 1973).0!* This 
sense of disquiet has been exacerbated by the decline of 
U.S. global hegemony and increased challenges to American 
interests, which in turn have spawned increased national 
chauvinism (e.g., national or racial conflicts, at times 
government-sanctioned, vs. Arabs, Iranians, Japanese) and 
self awareness (remembering that "American" has to a large 
degree been appropriated by Anglos and, more recently, by 
White Ethnics). While Anglo-American and White Ethnic 
defense of position has often taken the form of overt 
racism (e.g., extremist groups, violent attacks on minori­
ties, racial conflict in colleges and universities), the 
declining legitimacy of racism in the post-Civil Rights era 
has encouraged the emergence of new forms of racial resis­
tance couched in non-ethnic terms or (ironically) in the 
language of equality. Recent examples of these new forms 
include: attacks on bilingualism and promotion of English as 
an "official" language; the assertion of the existence of
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equal opportunity and denial of the obstacles facing Blacks 
and other minorities (cf. Kluegel and Smith 1982); the 
Reagan-Meese doctrine (supported by such academics as Nathan 
Glazer--1975) with its attack on affirmative action "quotas" 
and emphasis upon fighting individual (vs. group) discrimi­
nation; and attacks on the "welfare state" (i.e., an attack 
on the state as an advocate for minorities--Omi and Winant
1986). If current trends (e.g., assimilation of White 
Ethnics; ethnic merger and polarization; the "shrinking 
middle class"; the fiscal and legitimation crises of the 
state) continue, we can expect continued intergroup compe­
tition and conflict in the 1990s and beyond.
American eth-class structure in the 1980s. As the eth- 
class structure of the United States has evolved over time, 
one noticeable change is its increasing complexity with 
respect to number of ethnic groups, classes, and fractions. 
This can be attributed to both continuing immigration (and 
the continually shifting sources of immigration) and the 
ongoing process of capitalist development. What is impor­
tant for our purposes is that there is no simple correspon­
dence between ethnicity and class in the contemporary United 
States, that ethnic groups contain class divisions and vice- 
versa (at times in the past, various ethnic groups exhibited 
a high degree of class homogeneity due to entry status or 
superexploitation). As a consequence, it becomes necessary 
to compare the eth-class "pyramids" of different groups;
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that is, the proportional distribution of group members 
across the various classes. Different shaped "pyramids"-- 
e.g., concentration of group members in the working class-- 
provide an underlying basis for ethnic mobilization as 
groups seek to improve or to maintain their position. More­
over, ethnic segmentation within classes (e.g., concentra­
tion in entry level positions, "ghettoization" in personnel 
or public relations--Schaefer 1988, pp. 265-66) may also 
contribute to the persistence of intergroup differences.
The current eth-class structure of the United States 
contains a diverse array of group pyramids. Ethnic minori­
ties— e.g., Hispanics, Blacks, Native Americans— are dispro­
portionately concentrated in the working class and in the 
underclass (Wilson 1987) and conspicuously absent from the 
elite. In contrast, WASPs (and assimilates) while existent 
in all classes, have a disproportionate grip on elite mem­
bership. Yet other groups--e.g ., White Ethnics, Japanese- 
Americans— occupy a mostly intermediate position, without 
publicly noticeable overrepresentation at either end of the 
class structure. While this does not ensure that mobiliza­
tion will occur along ethnic lines (including ethnic mer­
ger), the fact that current intergroup disparities are a 
result of past ethnic-based action (e.g., exclusion, discri­
mination) suggests that attempts to remedy the situation 
will most probably also be ethnically based.
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One key factor which will affect the potential for 
future ethnic mobilization is the nature of reproduction of 
the eth-class system. Here, we can envision two scenarios, 
each with different implications for ethnic mobilization and 
the persistence of group identities. To the extent that the 
economic system becomes open, with increasingly equal oppor­
tunities for mobility, we would expect an expansion of 
intragroup class divisions and a corresponding decline in 
the role of ethnicity as a major social force. In such a 
case, ethnic identity would become increasingly symbolic for 
individuals {Gans 1979) and social movements would be more 
likely to be class-based. Even so, without virtually com­
plete intergroup equality (which is probably an "ideal 
typical" eth-class system), ethnicity would remain on some 
level as a potential basis for mobilization. Thus, the more 
likely outcome here would entail the diminution but not 
elimination of group identities.
Our second scenario is based upon a relative lack of 
mobility and a high level of social reproduction. According 
to Moore (1981), recent changes in the structure of the 
American economy (e.g., declining need for skilled labor and 
an increase in unskilled service jobs; the increasing impor­
tance of education) will provide fewer opportunities for 
mobility for those groups currently at the bottom of the 
eth-class structure than were available for European immi­
grants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If
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this is so, then social (class) reproduction will in large 
part be ethnic reproduction as intergroup disparities are 
transmitted from generation to generation. Moreover, if 
economic stagnation results in a hardening of class lines, 
ethnic boundaries will harden as well, particularly as 
mobility becomes a "zero-sum" proposition which can only be 
achieved at the expense of others. As a consequence, ethnic 
conflict and mobilization would most likely increase, par­
ticularly if the current trend towards ethnic merger results 
in the creation of a few, easily polarized, pan-ethnic 
groups--and ethnicity would remain an influential force in 
American society for years to come.
Eth-Class Struggles and the State 
In the above discussion, we have emphasized two central 
themes: the relationship between capitalist development and
intergroup contact, and the role of eth-class struggles in 
shaping the evolution of group identities. At this junc­
ture, one element remains to be added to our discussion, 
that being a brief consideration of the role of the U.S. 
state with respect to eth-class struggles and ethnic iden­
tity. This is an important issue, for as we stated in 
Chapter IV, intergroup relations occur within a national 
context; eth-class struggles are political struggles. Our 
purpose here is not to present a theory of the state (see 
our brief discussion in Chapter IV), but rather to draw upon 
our analysis of intergroup relations in the United States to
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develop some general propositions regarding the role of the 
state in ethnic relations. In our view, such a task is 
essential, for while much has been written with respect to 
the role of the state in class struggle, there is little in 
the way of an ''ethnic" theory of the state.
What can we infer about the role of the state in inter­
group relations? Our first observation is that the state is 
playing an ever-expanding role in ethnic affairs {i.e., the 
state is a major actor in intergroup interaction). This 
phenomenon is concomitant with the general expansion of the 
U.S. state amidst the process of capitalist development
(i.e., the emergence of monopoly capitalism and state
monopoly capitalism). The growth of state functions has 
included an expansion of both direct involvement in ethnic 
relations (e.g., the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, immigration legislation, civil 
rights legislation, affirmative action) and in actions of 
the state which have a measurable effect on the intergroup 
arena (e.g., growth of the welfare state; the GI Bill and 
expanded educational opportunities; the interstate highway 
system and "White flight" to the suburbs). In general, the 
growth of the capitalist state was closely linked to nation­
alism and the rise of national identities (cf. Ehrenreich 
1983). This was especially true in the case of the United 
States, as the emergence of an "American" national identity 
and national culture was tied to the growth of the state and
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the expansionist ideology of "manifest destiny" (Nevins and 
Commager 1966, pp. 168-81; Boorstein 1965, pp. 325-90; 
Archdeacon 1983, p. 64; Dangerfield 1965).
Second, state actions tend to reflect relations of 
Dover between ethnic groups (i.e., eth-class alliances).
The state is neither the "executive committee" of the 
dominant group, nor a neutral arbiter of intergroup affairs. 
Nevertheless, its policies generally serve to advance the 
interests of the dominant Anglo and White Ethnic partner­
ship, thereby reflecting its disproportionate control of 
resources and of the staffing of state offices. The state 
was historically the vehicle through which Anglo-Americans 
(i.e., the political alliance of the various Anglo-American 
eth-classes) were able to conquer and dispossess Native and 
Mexican Americans; it played a key role in the subjugation 
of Blacks. In the same vein, the ability of Anglo-Americans 
to define "American" nationality in their own image and to 
use state power, especially in the post-1865 era, to insti­
tutionalize a particular set of cultural understandings 
established a basis for continued group hegemony.
Third, state actions reflect the interests of elite 
classes within the dominant ethnic group. As we review the 
course of ethnic relations in the United States, we find 
that the general course of state policy has served to bene­
fit the dominant eth-class, basically the Anglo-American 
(WASP) elite/capitalist class. Indeed, one of the earliest
tasks of the American state was to establish rules for 
inclusion on the basis of ethnicity (e.g., the Naturaliza­
tion Lav of 1790) as a means of preserving the position of 
the Anglo elite (Omi and Winant 1986, p. 75). Likewise, 
major events where state policies were focused upon inter­
group relations--the conquest of Native and Mexican-Ameri- 
cans, the termination of slavery, the long duration of 
unrestricted immigration, and even the end of Reconstruction 
(which we described earlier as a mutually beneficial treaty 
with the Southern rural elite)--can be interpreted in the 
context of facilitating capitalist accumulation and solidi­
fying the eth-class hegemony of the Anglo-American elite. 
Parenthetically, we can observe that this proposition is 
also true at the regional level, as Southern state actions 
served to maintain the power of the White rural elite (Bloom
1987) and federal and state policy in the Southwest effec­
tively maintained a supply of superexploited Mexican labor 
for White agricultural, mining, and railroad interests 
(Barrera 1979, pp. 168-72).»°
Fourth, the power of the dominant eth-class is not 
absolute but can be constrained by mobilization of ethnic 
minorities or the dominant group working class.ax These 
countervailing forces reflect the ability of subordinate 
groups or classes to mobilize and to force the hegemonic 
eth-class to make concessions in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of their position within the state system. Such
265
legitimizing actions seem particularly necessary in the 
context of bourgeois democratic ideologies of citizenship 
rights. At the same time, concessions are particularly 
likely to occur when they inflict no significant damage to 
the interests of the hegemonic eth-class. For example. 
Oriental exclusion and immigration restriction were conces­
sions to the White working class {thus maintaining the White 
ethnic alliance) which did not threaten the dominance of 
capital. Likewise, state acquiescence to the demands of the 
Civil Rights Movement increased its political legitimacy at 
minimal cost to capital (on the other hand, when Northern 
Blacks instituted a challenge to the basis of the economic 
order, it was quickly rejected).
Finally, the modern state is a major target of eth- 
class struggle. This particularly true in light of the 
expanding role of the state (e.g., the welfare state) and 
the post-Civil Rights casting of the state as arbiter of 
group demands. Consequently, groups mobilize to make 
demands on the state, which in turn may respond by absorb­
ing {i.e., co-opting), insulating {i.e., confining to a 
limited area), or even rejecting group demands, depending 
upon the strategic contingencies of the situation (Omi and 
Winant 1976, p. 81). Ultimately, however, the relationship 
between the state and the ethnic system is dialectical in 
nature; that is, while state action shapes ethnic relations 
(see our first point in this discussion), the state itself--
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and the ethnic understandings which it embodies— may also be 
transformed by intergroup conflict (e.g., as in the case of 
the Civil Rights Movement or some aspects of foreign 
policy). Thus, the state is both subject and object in eth- 
class struggle (cf. Esping-Andersen et al. 1976, p. 191).
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have attempted to employ our 
theoretical framework to interpret the general course of 
ethnic relations in the United States. Our analysis 
stressed two main issues: (1) capitalist development and
ethnic contact, and (2) eth-class struggle and the evolution 
of group identities. For each historical era, we first 
examined the role of capitalist development in shaping 
initial contact between groups; that is, how the evolution 
of the capitalist world-economy, uneven development, and the 
ceaseless search for cheap labor and new markets acted to 
create specific constellations of ethnic groups which in 
turn set the stage for subsequent intergroup interaction.
In the case of the United States, we have argued that the 
initial economic dualism (i.e., North vs. South) of the 
United States led to separate patterns of economic develop­
ment and ethnic contact (which was later augmented by a 
third "Western” pattern). As the United States experienced 
continued capitalist development, dynamics such as expan­
sion, industrialization, and proletarianization created the 
context for massive immigration and an increasingly complex
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ethnic structure. Later, the changing political economy of 
the United States (i.e., the dynamics of monopoly capital­
ism) led it to embark upon an era of immigration restriction 
which in turn encouraged internal migration and immigration 
from neighboring countries. Continued development has 
resulted in further changes in immigration patterns and the 
emergence of new issues (e.g., undocumented immigration).
At the same time, we noted that the role of American 
capitalist development in shaping interethnic contact was 
but one theme in a larger symphony. The United States is 
(and has been) part of a world-svstem; its development has 
been shaped by global trends (e.g., world markets, economic 
cycles, and the uneven development of the world-economy).
In its creation, the United States was a product of European 
capitalist expansion and English colonialism--its initial 
colonizers were for the most part drawn from those displaced 
by the capitalist development of Western Europe. Processes 
of global capitalist development also determined the sources 
of immigration to the United States, as changes in the 
identity of sending nations corresponded to the progression 
of capitalist penetration (i.e., first the core, then peri­
pheral regions within the core, and then the periphery of 
the world-system). As the position of the United States 
within the world-economy underwent a metamorphosis (i.e., 
from periphery to core), so too did the nature of immigra­
tion. More recent immigration patterns (e.g., Latin Ameri­
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cans, Asians) reflect bonds forged through U.S. colonialism, 
economic imperialism, or military intervention. Clearly, 
the ethnic history of the United States cannot be understood 
apart from the evolution of the vorld-system itself.
The second issue which we explored was concerned with 
what happened following initial intergroup contact; that is, 
how ethnic identities evolved in the course of intergroup 
resource competition. In this context, we examined proces­
ses of ethnic change--acculturation, assimilation, merger, 
and mobilization--in each case linking the evolution of 
identity to material interests and to relations of domina­
tion and subordination. We concluded that American ethnic 
history is best understood and explained not on the basis of 
ideology (e.g., melting pot, racism, ethnic identity or 
peoplehood), or as a series of contacts between culturally 
different groups leading to eventual assimilation (e.g., 
Park's "race relations cycle"), but as an ongoing process of 
intergroup interaction (e.g., conflict, domination, accommo­
dation) between eth-classes■ *a As we stated in Chapter IV, 
eth-classes--groups sharing ethnic and class affiliations-- 
form ad hoc alliances along either ethnic/national or class 
lines in order to advance material interests.*3 In the 
course of this struggle, ethnic identities take on a stra­
tegic role; that is, they are asserted, masked, or altered 
in accordance with the perceived exigencies of the situa­
tion. We believe that the notion of eth-class enables us to
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capture the complexity of ethnic change--and to account for 
economic differences and divergent interests within groups.
What we have attempted to postulate is a dynamic pro- 
cess of intergroup interaction and the evolution of group 
identities, one which involves complex matrices of eth-class 
interests. For example, the post-Reconstruction Southern 
racial order can be interpreted as an alliance between the 
White rural elite and working classes (with the tacit con­
sent of the Northern capitalist class) which employed the 
ideology of White supremacy in order to maintain dominance 
over Blacks. Ethnic mobilization (e.g., immigrant political 
machines, the Civil Rights Movement) involved cross-class 
alliances within groups in which ethnic identity was asser­
ted in order to advance material interests. In contrast, 
national mobilization (e.g., cross-class, cross-ethnic 
alliances) or class-based strategies (e.g., capitalist 
search for cheap labor, working class attempts at exclusion) 
involved transcending some ethnic ties while accentuating 
others. Although we have barely scratched the surface in 
exploring the implications of various strategies for the 
evolution of ethnic identities, we find eth-class to be a 
useful analytical tool for explaining the persistence, 
change, or disappearance of ethnic identities.
In addition to these two core issues, we also empha­
sized the effect of the interaroup arena on the evolution of 
identities. As we asserted in Chapter IV, the intergroup
acena constitutes the context in which interaction occurs, 
the background against which strategies are formed and 
identities evolve. In the case of the United States, one 
key factor was the demography of the intergroup arena (e.g., 
the number, relative size, and dispersion of groups), which 
had a significant impact on strategic options and relations 
between groups. For example, the multiplicity of groups in 
the U.S. arena (as opposed to polar situations such as 
Flemish vs. Walloons in Belgium or Tamils vs. Sinhalese in 
Sri Lanka) has tended to diffuse ethnic conflict. A second 
factor was the changing nature of the intergroup arena as a 
consequence of capitalist development and ongoing eth-class 
struggle--a factor we sought to highlight in our chrono­
logical discussion of American ethnic history. Clearly, 
ethnic relations in the preindustrial colonial era were 
qualitatively different from those of the industrial era 
which in turn differ from those of state monopoly capitalism 
and verbindungnetzschaft. Changing ethnic and class struc­
tures (i.e., the relation of groups to the economy), new 
conditions of capitalist accumulation, and the expanding 
role of the state all altered the context in which inter­
group interaction occurred. Thus, individual and group 
strategies are bounded by material and historical forces in 
an intergroup arena which is constantly recreated and 
modified.
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With respect to specific groups, we can begin to 
address the question: What causes ethnic identities to
emerge, persist, change, or disappear? Although the experi­
ence of each group is unique, it is possible to identify 
some general patterns--the underlying structure of ethnic 
relations. In the American case, we can describe two basic 
paths--immigration and superexploitation--each of which in 
turn contains innumerable variations on a general theme. As 
we briefly summarize these two trends, we will highlight 
those factors which we deem essential to understanding the 
evolution of ethnic identities.
The first pattern, the immigrant pattern, characterizes 
the experience of European immigrants (both original set­
tlers and later migrants) and is seemingly also applicable 
to the experience of post-1945 immigrants (with the excep­
tion of undocumented immigrants). Initially, the experience 
of these groups could be described by the first half of 
Park's (1950, p. 150) "race relations cycle"--contact and 
conflict-- a phenomenon which reflects both a seemingly 
universal initial ethnocentrism and the effects of subse­
quent intergroup resource competition (cf. Barth and Noel 
1972). An important early factor appears to be entry status 
(i.e., existing or potential occupational and class posi­
tion) and compatibility with the then-current American class 
structure. For example, the higher relative position of the 
old immigrants and their general compatibility with the
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then-preindustrial class structure of the United States 
facilitated their absorption into the dominant Anglo- 
American group. On the other hand, groups with a lower 
relative entry position (e.g., Irish and French-Canadians 
among the old immigrants) tended to retain ethnic affilia­
tions for a longer period of time.
For most immigrant groups, there was little initial 
intragroup class differentiation. This "fusion" of ethni­
city and class (i.e., no eth-class variation as most new­
comers ranked near the bottom of the working class) meant 
that group identity was generally expressed in ethnic terms 
(especially given the presence of other immigrant groups), 
thereby increasing the salience of group identity. In this 
context, ethnicity became a strategy--groups clustered 
together in enclaves for mutual assistance, developed ethnic 
"niches" within the economy, or sought to exclude competi­
tors— for improving group position within the eth-class 
system. At the same time, the "stuff" of ethnic identity 
underwent a transformation at the hands of the acculturative 
forces in American society (Anglo institutional dominance, 
the number and dispersion of groups, the relative perme­
ability of boundaries). Thus, while identities persisted, 
they also evolved (e.g., loss of language, adoption of 
Anglo-American customs).
From our vantage point, the most important factor 
shaping the evolution of ethnic identities was the existence
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of intragroup class differentiation: that is, the emergence 
of eth-classes within group boundaries. This occurred for 
both old and (albeit with more difficulty) new immigrants as 
an outcome of economic expansion, ethnic succession, and 
subsequent opportunities for mobility. The significance of 
intragroup differentiation was twofold. First, class divi­
sions led to a divergence of interests within groups and 
increased the difficulty of ethnic mobilization (unless the 
entire group came under attack from another group).
Secondly, middle class (or higher) status appears to facili­
tate acceptance by and assimilation into the dominant group 
(seemingly the most rational strategy for members of a 
minority middle class) when intergroup boundaries are not 
rigid. Consequently, the emergence of intragroup class 
divisions is necessary if assimilation is to occur.
Nevertheless, assimilation is a more complex process 
than was envisioned by Park and other early American soci­
ologists. In the American case, assimilation was not uni­
form (traditional ethnic identities persisted longer for the 
working class and in enclaves), it was not unidirectional 
(e.g., the ethnic "resurgence" of the 1960s and 1970s), and 
it was not complete (e.g., the persistence of "symbolic 
ethnicity" among post-1880 "new" immigrants). Taking a 
broader perspective, we would assert that assimilation is 
not necessarily the rule when peoples meet— as was assumed 
by a generation of American sociologists--but that European
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immigration to the United States was a special case condi­
tioned by a unique set of historical circumstances particu­
lar to core settler societies. These circumstances— i.e., 
economic expansion and waves of immigration, which permitted 
upward mobility; the multiplicity of groups, which averted 
more focused bipolar conflict--facilitated the assimilation 
of many groups on a scale unlikely to be repeated.
One variation of the immigrant path was the experience 
of the dominant Anglo-American group. As we noted earlier, 
the low visibility of the "ethnic" identity of this group 
can be attributed to dominant group status, the institution­
alization of Anglo-American culture, Anglo appropriation of 
"American" national identity, and access to state power. 
Cloaked under the guise of state action, Anglo-American 
ethnic action had a significant impact on other groups. 
Anglo-Americans were to a large degree able to shape the 
definition of group identities and to set the parameters of 
the American intergroup arena: they could foster ethnic
persistence by their ability to set and enforce boundaries; 
they could encourage acculturation and assimilation by 
controlling the processes of cultural reproduction and 
national mobilization; and they could even reshape the 
intergroup arena by excluding other groups. At the same 
time, Anglo power was by no means absolute— it was frag­
mented by class divisions within the group (e.g., the often- 
differing interests of the Anglo elite and working classes)
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and limited by the countervailing power of ethnic minorities 
{which often forced accommodation of non-Anglo interests). 
Indeed, much of American ethnic history can be described as 
a dialectical struggle between majority domination and 
minority resistance, a struggle increasingly characterized 
(given the expanding role of the state) by political 
challenges to Anglo hegemony.
The second pattern, the superexploited pattern, 
describes the experiences of non-Whites--Native, Black, 
Mexican, and (to a lesser extent) Chinese-Americans. For 
these groups, the common denominator of their experience was 
segmentation: that is, restriction to a separate class frac­
tion on the basis of ethnicity--e.g ., a lower segment of the 
working class, a separate and lower segment of the middle 
classes. As we observed earlier, a key element in maintain­
ing this segmentation was the existence of a "racial order"- 
-a set of beliefs of minority inferiority supporting caste­
like rigid boundaries between groups. Accordingly, the 
ethnic identities of "superexploited" groups persisted, even 
in the face of considerable acculturation.
An important consideration with respect to the super­
exploited pattern is its variabi1itv; that is, the existence 
of differences in degree of segmentation and domination. 
Clearly, the experience of Black-Americans differed from 
that of Mexican-Americans, while the situations of both 
groups varied over time (cf. Barrera--1979--on the slow
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diminution of the superexploited status of Mexican-Ameri- 
cans). At the same time, the presence of this variation 
suggests that not only is superexploitation a matter of 
degree, but so also is the distinction between the immigrant 
and the superexploited patterns. For example, Italian and 
Greek-Americans experienced a form of superexploited labor 
coercion at the hands of padrones. while the experiences of 
Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino-Americans contained elements 
of both the superexploited and the immigrant patterns 
(Archdeacon 1983, p. 158).
Much less apparent are the long term effects of super­
exploited status upon ethnic identity. The initial rigidity 
of intergroup boundaries (which serves as a vehicle for 
dominant group hegemony) functions to maintain the salience 
of group identity. Moreover, the segmentation inherent in 
superexploited status, permits only a limited degree of 
class differentiation within the group and precludes any 
assimilation by the minority middle class, thus maintaining 
the fusion of class and ethnicity. Over time, however, the 
continued capitalist development of the United States (e.g., 
industrialization, post-industrialization) and the ethnic 
mobilization of the most oppressed groups (e.g., the Civil 
Rights Movement resulted in the gradual disappearance of 
superexploited or coerced labor. Consequently, the contin­
ued persistence of ethnicity among previously superexploited 
groups can be attributed to two factors: the use of group
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identity as a basis for mobilization to challenge subor­
dinate status; and the perseverance of racial ideologies 
even after superexploitation has given way to ethnic compe­
tition. Future evolution of ethnicity among formerly super­
exploited groups will be contingent upon the relationship 
between ethnicity and class (increased differentiation vs. 
the emergence of a permanent Black, Hispanic, or Native 
American underclass), the degree of ethnic mobilization, 
and— especially through institutional racism--the continued 
survival of racist ideologies.
On a more general level, we can also reach some tenta­
tive conclusions regarding the nature of ethnic identities. 
While ethnic identities have their origin in historical 
separation and uneven development, they are maintained 
through interaroup contact, competition, and conflict; that 
is, through eth-class struggle. During the course of inter­
group material struggles, ethnic relations may take on an 
ideological life of their own and thereby set the stage for 
subsequent intergroup interaction.®3 In addition, the 
evolution of ethnic identities is more than a simple outcome 
of intergroup conflict: ethnicity is intersected by class
and the emergence of eth-class interests may result in the 
confounding of “ethnic" or "class" interests (which may 
explain, in the case of the United States, the relative 
absence of both class and ethnic consciousness). These eth- 
class interests are in turn are manifest in temporary
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alliances along either ethnic or class lines. Thus group 
identities assume a dynamic form--they neither disappear (a 
la Park) nor persist (a la the pluralist school)--but they 
are constantly renegotiated as groups struggle to gain (or 
protect) advantages or to establish niches within an ever- 
changing political economy. As we have seen in the American 
case, this can lead to a variety of outcomes.
At this juncture, our conclusions have been drawn from 
one case--that of the United States--which reflects but one 
of our postulated trajectories of intergroup relations 
(i.e., the "core" pattern). Moreover, the United States 
case, like that of any nation, undoubtedly contains idiosyn­
cratic characteristics (e.g., the lack of native, precapita­
list feudal elites as in Europe). In the next chapter, we 
will attempt to analyze a second case, South Africa, in 
order to test further the utility of our theoretical 
framework and to provide a broader base for analyzing the 
evolution of ethnic identities. Then, in the final chapter, 
we will draw more general conclusions regarding our model.
CHAPTER NOTES
CHAPTER V
See Zinn (1980, pp. 47-49) on the emergence of a 
settler merchant elite during the colonial era.
This contrast between North and South, while of immense 
historical significance, should not be overstated. As 
Archdeacon (1983, pp. 9-10) observes, the South did 
resemble the British Caribbean colonies (and the 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies) in the establishment 
of plantation slavery; however. the South differed from 
the Caribbean in that it contained both a larger 
European population and more small farmers and artisans 
(although less in comparison to the North). What is 
significant, however, is (1) that Southern society was 
not conducive to European immigration, and (2) that 
slavery served as the origin (or "roots") of Black- 
White relations in the United States.
Archdeacon (1983, pp. 23-24) estimates that in 1790 
Anglo-Americans constituted only 49.2% of the total 
population (excluding Native Americans) and 60.9% of 
the White population of the original thirteen states, 
Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
Our use of national may be somewhat problematic here 
inasmuch as we are applying it to a period which is at 
best the infancy of modern nationalism. It is employed 
here as the most descriptive term for a conflict 
between peoples, each of whom viewed themselves as 
autonomous and self-governing.
For a discussion of conflicting White class interests 
(e.g., merchants vs. settlers vs. English Crown) with 
respect to native Americans, see Fredrickson (1981, p. 
6 ) .
Interestingly, English colonial experience in Ireland 
served as a laboratory for the development of ideolo­
gies and policies later employed against Native 
Americans (Archdeacon 1983, p. 3; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 
14-16).
This open immigration policy can be attributed to the 
English desire for population growth in the colonies to 
provide labor power and for purposes of defense.
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8. As Fredrickson (1981, p. 87) observes, slavery tended 
to obscure class differences within groups, as the 
racial privileges of poor Whites served as counter­
weight to the disadvantages of class.
9. This is clearly an oversimplification. As Archdeacon 
(1983, pp. 22-23) asserts, the Revolutionary War 
involved a complex mixture of ethnic and class 
interests, with many groups opposing independence.
What is significant for our purposes was the success of 
this nationalist movement and its subsequent implica­
tions for intergroup relations.
10. According to Archdeacon (1983, p. 57), the continental 
congress initially considered including symbols of all 
major ethnic groups in the Great Seal of the United 
States; however, eventual American symbols instead 
reflected the new Anglo-dominated "American" identity.
11. Dinnerstein and Reimers (1982, p. 3) conceptualize 
American ethnic relations as containing a fundamental 
contradiction between the acceptance of newcomers 
(rooted in the need for labor) and the fear of 
"foreign" domination. To this, we would add a class- 
based contradiction between a national ideology rooted 
in equality and individual sovereignty and the elite 
fear of lower class rebellion (after the experiences of 
Bacon's Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Shay's 
Rebellion, etc.). Thus, the objective of the early 
American political leaders was creation of a social 
order which would preserve both ethnic and class 
hegemony,
12. The American case can be contrasted with the Canadian 
case, where the institutionalization of French customs 
facilitated the survival of French-Canadian ethnicity.
13. These issues are explored in detail in a series of 
essays by Genovese (1966).
14. According to Bonacich (1984, p. 86), only 2.7% of the 
Southern population in 1850 consisted of foreign born 
Whites, as opposed to 12%-15% in the Northeast, North 
Central, and Western regions of the United States.
15. In this analysis, the position of Ireland is somewhat 
ambiguous. Although it is probably best viewed as a 
colony rather than a core nation, the length of its 
colonization, its proximity to England and relative 
political absorption, and the economic distortion 
effected by British colonization gave Ireland charac­
teristics similar to those which facilitated emigration
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from peripheral areas within core societies.
16. Given the dominance of the North in trade, this is
another factor working against immigration to the
South--with the exception of New Orleans.
17. At the same time, the virtual removal of the indigenous 
peoples and the political absorption of the West into 
the United States made the outcome of conquest and 
settlement dramatically different from that of European 
overseas colonies.
18. It has been estimated that 12-15 million Native
Americans lived North of the Rio Grande in 1500 and
that their numbers fell to 600,000 by 1800 and 200,000 
by 1900 (Dinnerstein et al. 1979, p. 205; Schaefer 
1988, p. 177).
19. Bonacich (1984, p. 97) characterizes the Civil War as a 
conflict between Southern dependent (plantation) capi­
talism and the temporary alliance of Northern indus­
trial capital with independent small farmers. The 
foundation of this ultimately victorious coalition was 
a common interest in blocking any westward expansion of 
the plantation economy of the South. From the perspec­
tive of independent small farmers this was, as Aglietta 
(1978, p. 21, cited in Bonacich 1984, p. 97) observes, 
"an alliance with the devil himself"--for the expansion 
of industrial capitalism would ultimately envelop small 
agricultural production.
20. See Steinberg (1974) on initial vs. potential class 
position of Jewish immigrants.
21. English colonial domination of Ireland reduced most 
Irish to tenant farmers or laborers (as opposed to 
independent farmers or artisans); hence, their 
potential class position was different from that of 
other groups (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 40).
22. Another factor which may have contributed to intergroup 
divisions and, hence, assimilation was religious 
diversity--the existence of significant numbers of both 
Protestants and Catholics among German-Americans (cf. 
Archdeacon 1983, pp. 105-06).
23. Our notion of superexploited eth-classes is similar to 
what Blauner (1972) and Barrera (1979)--among others-- 
would refer to as "colonized" minorities. In order to 
avoid the conceptual confusion which we believe is 
inherent in the colonial analogy (see our critique of 
"internal colonialism" in Chapter III), we prefer to
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employ the term superexploited with its connotation of 
the extraction of additional surplus value by coercive, 
non-market measures. We would also maintain (as 
Blauner--1972--does for colonization) that super­
exploitation is a matter of degree; that is, that some 
groups (e.g., Blacks) experienced considerably harsher 
treatment than others (e.g., Mexican-Americans).
24. There were, however, some gaps in the Northern racial 
order which permitted a few Blacks to prosper (Quarles 
1969, p. 94), although they still experienced a caste­
like lower social position.
25. To the extent that Northern opposition to slavery was 
based on a belief in equality, it was more a matter of 
legal equality— the basis of the emerging bourgeois 
social order— than inherent equality (Fredrickson 1981, 
p. 153). As noted above, the popular Northern belief 
was that Blacks would be unable to compete under such 
circumstances (Archdeacon 1983, p. 66).
26. The re-establishment of the Southern rural elite was by 
no means inevitable, see Bloom 1987, p. 19) for a 
discussion of potential eth-class alliances.
27. As Bloom (1987, p. 51) points out, wages for Southern 
Whites remained low (as opposed to the effects of a 
labor aristocracy) and that the exclusion of Blacks was 
accomplished through local legislation.
28. For example, Northern business interests strongly 
opposed the Lodge voting rights bills of 1890 and 1891, 
claiming that the resulting social turmoil would be bad 
for business (Bloom 1987, pp. 43-44).
29. The Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism views such 
expansion as an attempt by capital to maintain or maxi­
mize profits in the face of the inherent contradictions 
of capitalism (e.g., underconsumption--the inability of 
the working class to consume the output of ever expan­
ding production--leading to stagnation; class struggle 
and the increasing demands of the working class) and 
the need for growth. Although, as Chirot (1977, pp. 
51-54) points out, this explanation is seemingly not 
supported by fact (e.g., colonies were not the primary 
source of trade and investment; core nations still 
possessed the potential for internal growth), what is 
important is that during the post-1870 era of imperi­
alism the core powers acted as though the Hobson-Lenin 
theory of imperialism was true. As Senator William 
Frye (quoted in Ehrenreich 1983, p. 21), Chairman of 








"We must have the market (of China), or we shall have a 
revolution."
For a brief but cogent analysis of U.S. imperialism, 
see Zinn (1980, pp. 290-313).
For detailed listings of "new immigrant" groups, see 
Archdeacon (1983, pp. 112--42) and Dinnerstein and 
Reimers (1982, pp. 32-48, 158). As Dinnerstein et al. 
observe, however, inaccurate record keeping by United 
States immigration officials makes an exact count 
impossible.
In contrast, previous immigrants left core nations 
(Germany, England) for the peripheral (or semiperi­
pheral) United States.
United States immigration in the post-1890 era was 
qualitatively different from that of the past. New 
immigrant groups contained a higher proportion of 
single men (sojourners, commuters) and, in many cases, 
a high rate of remigration (Archdeacon 1983, p. 139; 
Dinnerstein et al. 1979, pp. 134-35). Such a pattern 
was facilitated by the urban-industrial locus of immi­
grants and the prevalence of wage labor, as liquid 
assets (e.g., savings vs. farms) and fluctuations in 
labor demand made "commuter" migration feasible. This 
remigration rate also varied considerably from group to 
group, ranging from 4.3% for Jews to 87.4% for 
Bulgarians/Montenegrins/Serbs (cf. Archdeacon 1983, p. 
139 ) .
One historically interesting question is why the 
periphery-core pattern of labor migration did not 
include significant Black emigration from the South 
until the 1920s. According to Bonacich (1984, pp. 112- 
13), key factors were the indifference of Northern 
capital to the source of its labor and the insistence 
of the Southern elite upon retaining the post-bellum 
system of superexploited labor (e.g., sharecropping).
This illustrates the limitations of the core-periphery 
(colonial) metaphor within nation states. Despite its 
"peripheral" status in the American economy, the 
Western United States was, from a global standpoint, 
part of a core society— its "colonial" experience is 
hardly comparable to that of Latin America, Asia, or 
Africa. Likewise, its "core" status made the United 
States West at least somewhat attractive to immigrants 
from peripheral societies, hence, it did serve as a 
locus for immigration, although at a much lower level 
than that of the Northeast.
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36. For expositions of the nativist position, see Fairchild 
(1926) or Grant (1916). For analyses of American 
nativism, see Higham (1955) or Billington (1938).
37. The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 specified that 
annual quotas for each nation would initially be two 
percent of the foreign born persons from that nation 
according to the 1890 Census. This was changed in 1927 
to a ratio (of 150,000) proportionate to the national 
origin of all (White) residents of the United States in 
1920. In effect, this shift (actually implemented in 
1929) was merely the recloaking of the original formula 
in more politically palatable garb. This quota system 
was not applied to nations of the Western Hemisphere, 
thus Mexicans, Canadians, etc. were not affected.
38. This seemingly reflects a new phase of core-periphery 
relations. Core investment (vs. the previous pattern of 
colonization) brings about structural distortion and 
social change in the periphery, whose displaced 
population migrates to the core as a source of cheap 
labor.
39. As Barrera (1979, pp. 106-09) describes, Mexican immi­
gration functions as a reserve army of labor for South­
western agricultural interests. Periods of increased 
enforcement of immigration regulations coincided with 
downturns in the American economy, while the Border 
Patrol often avoided ranch checks and concentrated 
enforcement efforts upon non-agricultural workers.
40. For discussions of ethnic enterprise, see Light (1972) 
or Light and Bonacich (1988). For lists of ethnic 
occupational specialization, see Dinnerstein and 
Reimers (1982, pp. 109-25) or Hechter (1979).
41. Obviously the situation was more complex that a direct 
correspondence between class and attitude towards 
immigration. One confounding factor was ideology. 
Members of the elite, who presumably should favor 
immigration, were affected by the nativist/racist 
climate of the times (e.g., the "bluebloods" who formed 
the Immigration Restriction League in the 1890s-- 
Archdeacon 1983, pp. 162-63). Similarly, the American 
democratic ideology of inclusion and appeals to working 
class solidarity at times mitigated antagonism towards 
newcomers (e.g., attempts of the Knights of Labor to 
organize immigrants and Blacks— Bonacich 1984, p. 111). 
A second contradictory influence affecting attitudes 
towards new immigrants was the existence of diverse 
interests within dominant group eth-classes. Certainly 
owners and workers in different industrial sectors
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varied in terms of the benefit or threat posed by 
newcomers. Likewise, members of the independent class 
who prospered through commerce with immigrants were 
likely to be more tolerant than those in competition. 
The point is that while eth-class interests shaped the 
overall pattern of intergroup relations, other factors 
could and did influence interaction in specific cases.
42. For discussions of the role of schools in the 
"Americanization" of immigrants, see Carlson (1975), 
Weiss (1982), Higham (1955), and Hartmann (1948).
43. Interestingly, pressures during World War I are 
credited with effecting the final assimilation of 
German-Americans, as attempts to preserve German 
culture withered in the face of United States conflict 
with Germany (Archdeacon 1983, pp. 167-68; Hawgood 
1940) .
44. Use of the term ''lessened opposition" is important.
The bulk of the capitalist class did not support 
immigration restriction, but merely failed to oppose it 
with the same vigor as before.
45. Given the high remigration rate, many new immigrant 
group members were less likely to learn English or 
become American citizens. Following the cutoff of 
immigration and the decline of sojourners, this trend 
was reversed (Covello 1967).
46. This is not to suggest the disappearance of all domi­
nant group nativism. Continued competition was ex­
pressed in "WPX jobs" during the Depression, limiting 
quotas for Jews at Ivy League schools, and the perpetu­
ation of unfavorable stereotypes.
47. Integration into the class structure is not incom­
patible with status as a superexploited minority (cf. 
Barrera 1979). Southern Blacks constituted a (racial­
ly) separate and lower segment of the working class, 
subject to occupational stratification and a dual wage 
system in which they were paid less than White workers 
(Dinnerstein et a l . 1979, p. 152).
48. While the nature of the Southern racial order could 
seemingly lend itself to the split labor market inter­
pretation that it was imposed by the White working 
class (cf. Bonacich 1972; Wilson 1980), such a view is 
not compatible with the political economy of the early 
twentieth century South (Bloom 1987, p. 51). The White 
working class did not have the power to create such a 
system, nor were they the prime beneficiaries (e.g.
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while a dual wage system did exist, Southern wages 
remained below those of the rest of the nation). 
Although the specter of economic competition and the 
existence of racist ideology created a context in which 
the White working class was amenable to segregation, 
they are better viewed as a "junior partner" to White 
ethnic mobilization triggered by the rural elite.
49. Some observers (e.g., Dollard 1937; Myrdal 1944; 
Berreman 1960) have actually described the position of 
Black-Americans in caste terms.
50. According to Lieberson (1980, pp. 371-74), incoming 
Blacks from the South occupied a lower class position 
than Southern and Eastern Europeans. Moreover, given 
the lower standard of living of Southern Blacks 
(reflecting the caste-like racial order of the post- 
Reconstruction era), lower-paying jobs represented an 
improvement over their pre-migration status.
51. A more recent modification of the neoclassical position 
(Becker 1971) suggests that discrimination will persist 
if those discriminating are willing to accept the cost 
(i.e., inefficiency and competitive disadvantage) of 
their "taste for discrimination."
52. As is noted by several sources (e.g., Archdeacon 1983, 
p. 129; Barrera 1979, p. 67), there are no accurate 
data on the exact number of Mexican immigrants.
53. On the other hand, nativist pressure was sufficiently 
strong so as to effect some restriction of Mexican 
immigration (e.g., contract laborers, illiterates, 
potential public charges) in the 1930s (Archdeacon 
1983, p. 176). This was undoubtedly possible in the 
context of the Depression.
54. According to Schwartz (1945, p. 117, cited in Barrera 
1979, p. 106), persons with Spanish/Mexican surnames 
were laid off from WPA jobs in the Southwest in order 
to maintain a reserve labor force for agriculture 
(under the assumption that Mexican=agricultural labor).
55. Under the then-current interpretation of the Naturali­
zation Act of 1790, Japanese and Chinese were "non- 
Whites" and thus ineligible to become naturalized 
citizens (Archdeacon 1983, p. 164).
56. For a discussion of the role of racist ideology in the 
conflict between the United States and Japan during 
World War II, see Dower (1986).
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57. While this legislation did not succeed in proletariani- 
zing Native Americans, it did have the effect (often 
due to White fraud) of reducing Native American land 
holdings from 138 million acres to 90 million acres in 
1934 (Schaefer 1988, p. 181).
58. For our purposes, the most significant effects of TNCs 
are dependent development/underdevelopment in the 
periphery and (consequently) continued pressure for 
labor migration from periphery to core (e.g..gastar- 
beiter in Western Europe, Mexicans in the United 
States) .
59. For a description and analysis of the bracero program, 
see Craig (1971).
60. These acts do not reflect any significant softening of 
the discriminatory national origins system. The first 
displaced Persons Act was blatantly anti-Jewish, while 
the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952 continued 
the system of national quotas and only relaxed the 
Oriental Exclusion Act to allow each Asian nation a 
token annual quota of one hundred persons (Dinnerstein 
and Reimers 1982, pp. 72-73).
61. The limits established by the 1965 act were modified by 
subsequent legislation in 1976, 1978, and 1980 (cf. 
Dinnerstein and Reimers 1982, p. 168); however, the 
basic thrust of the act remained unchanged.
62. While the overall yearly quota during this period was 
290,000, the total number of immigrants was much larger 
due to the admission of substantial numbers of refugees.
63. In addition to residents, the number of undocumented 
immigrants present in the United States at any one time 
would be supplemented by temporary or commuter migrants 
(cf. Bennett 1986, p. 3).
64. For a cogent analysis of the "reserve army" role of 
undocumented labor, see Barrera (1979, pp. 113-26).
65. For a brief survey of the debate concerning the eco­
nomic impact of undocumented immigrants, see Beck, Ma, 
Weathers, Cooper and Pedersen (1984).
66. By the time of its expiration on May 4, 1988, the 
amnesty program attracted 1.5 million applicants. An 
emerging issue pertains to the treatment of family 
members of individuals who receive amnesty, which could 
potentially involve hundreds of thousands more indi­
viduals (Arocha 1988). At the same time, the United
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States has yet to resolve the status of those who did 
not qualify for amnesty (cf. Bartlett 1988).
67. Many "pull" factors--i.e ., the need for cheap labor, 
especially in the agricultural and service sectors—  
also remain a reality, a fact which is explicitly 
recognized by a provision of the 1986 act which permits 
entry of foreign agricultural workers.
68. This is not to suggest that the mass media cannot also 
be used as a vehicle for ethnic mobilization and cul­
tural maintenance (e.g., Spanish-language programming); 
however, this has been a relatively recent (and thus 
far limited) phenomenon.
69. This was reflected symbolically and culturally through 
slogans ("Black Power" and "Black is beautiful"), by 
alteration of group labels (from "Negro" to "Black"), 
by a rejection of White standards (the disappearance of 
the higher in-group status accorded lighter-skinned 
Blacks) and a promotion of Black culture (emphasis on 
"soul", demands for inclusion of Black Studies in 
college curricula).
70. Formation of this alliance was not necessarily a given. 
Much of the traditional (accommodationist) Black 
leadership either benefitted from White largess or was 
more vulnerable to White reaction and was often 
initially reluctant to challenge the established racial 
order (cf. Bloom 1987, pp. 127-37).
71. As Bloom (1987, p. 2) observes, one outcome of the 
social revolution wrought by the Civil Rights Movement 
was the completion of the modernization of the South 
and the integration of the South into the national 
political economy (or, as we might phrase it, termina­
tion of the "peripheral" status of the South).
72. In the words of one Southern Black (Chafe 1980, p. 213, 
cited in Bloom 1987, p. 184):
We could go anywhere in Greensboro that we wanted 
to go, but we were already raising the question, 
"what the hell, if people can't afford food on 
their table at home, it matters not that they can 
eat at the fancy little restaurants in 
Greensboro."
This point was also recognized by Martin Luther King, 
Jr. who in 1967 (quoted in Williams 1988, p. Dl) stated 
that "We must recognize that we can't solve our problem 
until there is a radical redistribution of economic and
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political power."
73. For example, recent public statements by sports figures 
(A1 Campanis, "Jimmy the Greek" Snyder) which were 
viewed as racist led to their dismissal from their 
respective organizations.
74. For a discussion of "White Ethnics" vs. "non-ethnics" 
see Banton's (1983, pp. 64-66) notion of "minus one" 
ethnicity. The idea that Anglo-Americans were non­
ethnics can be found in the work of Warner (Warner and 
Srole 1945, p. 295) and Hughes (Hughes and Hughes 1952, 
p. 137). For discussion of the notion of the "triple 
melting pot" see Kennedy (1952) and Herberg (1960). 
Interestingly, as Archdeacon (1983, p. 214) observes, 
the "triple melting pot" made no provision for "racial" 
minorities.
75. It is important to recognize that this mobility often 
occurred at different rates for different groups, due 
to the effects of actual or potential class position, 
as well as a myriad of historical and cultural factors. 
For example, the different rates of mobility experi­
enced by Jewish-Americans and Italian-Americans can be 
attributed to differences in potential class position 
(Steinberg 1974) and to differences in economic 
conditions (Covello 1967).
76. Alba and Chamlin (1983) found that despite increasing 
intermarriage (and, hence, multiple ethnicity) roost 
White Americans asserted an attachment to one ethnic 
group. The strength and salience of this attachment is 
entirely another matter.
77. In essence, one could say that White Ethnics felt 
"squeezed" between Anglo-Americans and Blacks--that 
Anglos expected them to make restitution for injustices 
for which they were not historically responsible, while 
Blacks were demanding that which White Ethnics felt 
that they had worked (and overcome Anglo prejudice and 
discrimination) to attain (cf. Vecoli 1978, pp. 142- 
43). Symbolically, this position is reflected in the 
belief that while anti-Black humor was defined as 
racist, anti-White Ethnic humor was respectable--and a 
means of asserting Anglo hegemony (Schaefer 1988, p.
155) .
78. By 1960, three interconnected labeling processes took 
place: (1) the acronym "WASP" was coined by competitive 
upwardly mobile Catholics and Jews to put "Old-Stock"
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Americans in their place, so to speak; (2) the word 
"minorities” was deflected from White Ethnics onto non- 
Whites and became a federal category for grants and 
entitlements; and (3) and "ghettoes" was ethnically 
clapped onto Black-American residential areas as an 
Americanization of an Eastern-European residential 
practice (Khleif 1978a).
79. This process is seemingly reflected in the 1988 Dukakis 
presidential candidacy. Dukakis, a Greek-American, 
drew upon ethnic ties for fund-raising and for a 
symbolic base for his candidacy; however, he also 
underwent criticism from some Greek-Americans for 
alleged movement away from traditional group heritage.
80. For an opposing viewpoint, see Vecoli (1978).
81. This process is also happening, albeit on a smaller 
scale, for Arab-Americans (Abraham and Abraham, 1983).
82. For a discussion of the negative impact of stereotypes 
upon ethnic groups, see Lieberson (1982).
83. We recognize that our choice here is somewhat arbi­
trary, that other groups (e.g., Filipinos, Koreans) 
were resident in the United States prior to 1965; 
however, the small numbers of these groups make any 
meaningful analysis difficult.
84. With respect to many social and economic indicators, 
the position of Japanese-Americans equals or surpasses 
that of White Americans (one notable exception is 
representation in the economic and political elite).
At the same time, this "success" may at least in part 
be attributable to small group size and concentration 
in high wage regions of the United States (Shaefer 
1988, p. 395).
85. Two exceptions to this would be the work of Baltzell 
(1964) and Anderson (1970).
86. This is not to assert that Anglo culture i_s American 
culture, but that it dominates American culture. Thus, 
we do not subscribe to either the American=Anglo model 
or to the "melting pot" analogy in which American 
culture is a composite of many ethnic cultures. Our 
preferred metaphor would be that of Khleif (1978a, p. 
57), who describes the United States as "a salad bowl 
with Anglo dressing" (see also Yinger 1981, p. 251 for 
a theoretical discussion of this issue).
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87. To the extent that ethnic merger has created a "White 
American" pan-ethnic identity, this term could be 
substituted for Anglo-American.
88. Interestingly, racial ideology has also been employed 
by Anglo-Americans to "explain" (i.e., denigrate as 
unfair competition rooted in undesirable group traits) 
the success of some groups (e.g., Jewish-Americans, 
Japanese-Americans) in intergroup competition.
89. For example, the WASP dominance described by Baltzell 
(1964) is not as apparent in more recent works (e.g..
Alba and Moore 1982).
90. In an excellent account, Barrera (1979, pp. 168-72) 
catalogues a number of state and federal government 
actions which served to perpetuate the superexploited 
status of Mexican labor for the benefit of large 
agricultural interests (e.g., forcing persons with 
Mexican surnames off the relief rolls prior to harvest 
time, consulting with agricultural interests before 
institutionalizing the bracero program, non-enforcement 
of school attendance lavs for Mexican-American children).
91. This is compatible with the class-dialectical model of 
state power discussed in Chapter IV.
92. To be sure, our framework can accommodate the role of 
ideology, cultural differences, or ethnocentrism in 
intergroup interaction; however, we contend that ideas, 
culture, or even ethnocentrism are not in themselves 
sufficient to explain the totality of intergroup 
relations— these processes derive their force from the 
exigencies of intergroup resource competition and eth- 
class struggle.
93. Our conception of material includes the political as 
well as the economic. As Bloom (1987, p. 3) observes:
the concerns of classes, while shaped by their 
material existence, are political as well as 
economic, because the political system is so 
important in setting the framework within which 
economic struggles are carried out.
94. C f . Marx's (1978, p. 595) famous quote:
Men make their own history, but they do not make 
it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given, and trans­
mitted from the past.
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95. Thus, one component of intergroup struggle is ideologi­
cal or cultural— ethnic beliefs and "markers" are 
important for mobilization and for setting boundaries, 
while restricting the options of others can be an 
effective strategy. This reminds us that while ideas 
such as ethnicity (or race) may have a material base, 
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CHAPTER VI
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY IN THE PERIPHERY: SOUTH AFRICA
In this chapter, we will continue the substantive 
application of our framework, this time directing analytical 
attention towards intergroup relations in South Africa. Our 
goals are the same as in the previous chapter: application
of our theoretical framework so as to enable us to under­
stand a specific historical case, and use of a case study as 
a vehicle for elaborating our framework. Likewise, our 
methodology will also be similar: interpretation as opposed
to description, and the secondary analysis of existing 
studies as "data" for analysis. Thus, what we will be 
presenting is not a detailed sociohistorical study of ethnic 
relations in South Africa, but rather an overview in which 
we employ our framework to highlight what in our view are 
major themes and issues in the evolution of ethnic iden­
tities .
Our analysis will emphasize the following assumptions, 
each of which was initially presented in Chapter IV. First. 
we will argue that the evolution of ethnic relations in 
South Africa was ultimately shaped by the process of South 
African capitalist development, which in turn is linked to 
global capitalist development— the ceaseless quest for 
markets, materials, cheap labor, and new outlets for invest­
ment. Secondly, we will assert that the major factor
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shaping the evolution of ethnic identities is resource 
competition between groups; that is, that specific inter­
actions (conflicts domination, alliance) between eth-classes 
(e.g., Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. White working class. 
African working class) with concrete material interests 
create a social order which embodies both a system of strat­
ification and a set of ideological understandings which 
circumscribe relations between groups. Moreover, this 
process is a dynamic one: tension between the forces of
social reproduction and social change creates a continually 
evolving context for the (strategic) assertion, evolution, 
or attenuation of ethnic ties. Throughout our analysis of 
the South African case, eth-class will serve as our main 
conceptual tool for the analysis of ethnic relations and 
group identities. Finally, we will again explore the role 
of aspects of the nation-state or "Intergroup arena" (e.g., 
relative size of groups, role of the state, impact of the 
physical and social environment) in shaping the evolution of 
ethnic identities.
In addition to these general analytical themes, a 
specific point of emphasis in this chapter will involve the 
impact of the uneven nature of global capitalist development 
and the peripheral status of South Africa upon the course of 
intergroup relations.3- Globally, in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, peripheral status entailed colo­
nization, which was manifest as direct political and eco-
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nomic domination of the periphery by the core and which 
resulted in social and cultural transformation (i.e., the 
destruction of traditional ways) and partial proletariani­
zation (i.e., a blending of wage labor and subsistence 
economy). For South Africa, a major historical force was 
Dutch/British colonization. Indeed, we will argue that the 
nature of the colonial relationship (e.g., economic develop­
ment shaped by the needs of the core, specific core colonial 
policies, and the structuring of post-colonial society) 
shaped the evolution of intergroup relations. At the same 
time, ve must also acknowledge unique aspects of the South 
African colonial experience. As a colony, South Africa was 
neither an ideal-typical colony (small-scale migration from 
the core for purposes of political administration and eco­
nomic exploitation) nor a classic settler society (one in 
which the indigenous population was virtually "replaced" by 
massive European settlement). Moreover, as we shall see 
below, the unique history of the Afrikaner descendants of 
the Dutch colonists (European settlers colonized by another 
European core power) was a key element in the evolution of 
South African ethnic relations. Thus, our analysis will 
consider both general aspects of colonialism and the histor­
ically specific nature of the South African case.
The organization of this chapter will be similar to 
that of Chapter V. Our sociohistorical analysis of the 
evolution of intergroup identities in South Africa will be
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presented in four chronological segments which correspond to 
the major divisions of the South African experience:
(1) Dutch settlement and initial intergroup contact 
(1652-1800)
(2) British colonization and territorial expansion 
(1800-1910)
(3) Union, economic development, and eth-class 
struggle (1910-1948)
(4) Afrikaner hegemony and African resistance
(1948-present).
For each historical era, ve will divide our analysis into 
two sub-sections. First. we will seek to link specific 
intergroup interactions to the dynamics of capitalist 
development (e.g., accumulation), with the objective of 
understanding the context in which intergroup relations 
occurred. Secondly, once ve have established this basic 
context, ve will direct our focus towards specific eth-class 
struggles, as ve seek to trace the evolution of group iden­
tities in the context of intergroup resource competition and 
ethnic stratification. Following our historical narrative, 
at the conclusion of the chapter, ve will review our find­
ings and present our conclusions.
Dutch Conquest and Settlement: 1652-1800
Capitalist Development and Dutch Colonization
The history of intergroup zelationB in South Africa, or 
any society for that matter, is intertwined with the expan­
sion of the European-based capitalist vorld-economy. For 
the purposes of this analysis, what is important is the 
impact of such changes as the migration of European peoples 
to other parts of the globe as conquerors, colonizers, and 
settlers (i.e., increased intergroup contact) and the trans­
formation (or, if one prefers, destruction) of societies as 
a result of this globalization of European capitalism upon 
the evolution of intergroup relations. In the case of South 
Africa, this process dates from 1652, when the Dutch East 
India Company established a small settlement on the Cape of 
Good Hope as a refreshment and refueling station for its 
profitable East Indies spice trade.3 . This development 
occurred at the height of Dutch core hegemony, an ascendancy 
grounded in financial strength and superior maritime tech­
nology (Wallerstein 1980, pp. 37-71). As ve will see in the 
course of this chapter, Dutch colonization would forever 
alter the course of South African history.
What was particularly most significant for the evolu­
tion of South African society was the fact that the initial 
colonizer was not a European state, but the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC).3 While statelike in the powers which had 
been granted to it (Katzen 1969, p. 185; Fredrickson 1981, 
p. 18), the VOC was a capitalist enterprise whose ultimate 
goal was profit maximization (as opposed to territorial 
expansion or empire building).4 From the perspective of 
the Company, South Africa offered little in terms of eco-
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noraic value; that is, there was no one staple commodity 
which could be profitably exploited and agriculture was not 
productive (de Kieviet 1957, p. 9).9 Consequently, the VOC 
had little interest in expanding beyond its Cape beachhead 
(Fredrickson 1981, p. 28).* In short, the exigencies of 
enterprise (i.e., profit) led to a different, "conservative" 
colonial policy (e.g., attempts to limit settlement and 
native contact; imposition of tight economic controls and 
company monopolies), one which reflected both the unwilling­
ness of the VOC to bear the costs of empire and the desire 
of the Company to maximize profits (de Kiewiet, 1957, p. 8).
What VOC presence meant for the Cape Colony was that 
the pace of European settlement and capitalist development 
was slow. Given that territorial expansion was not a pri­
ority of the VOC (especially in the context of declining 
Dutch hegemony after 1671), any additional settlement which 
did occur was undertaken by former Company employees who 
were permitted to establish themselves as independent 
farmers and pastoralists. Accordingly, settlement was not 
followed by extensive economic development (reflecting the 
limited interest of the VOC), thus leaving the interior of 
South Africa as a frontier existing in relative isolation 
from the world-economy. Indeed, Company actions (e.g., 
fixed prices and monopolies, unwillingness to invest capi­
tal, official corruption) have generally been viewed as an 
obstacle to the economic development of South Africa (cf.
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Katzen 1969, 202-03; de Kleviet 1957, pp. 5-7}. Over time, 
this "underdevelopment" fed upon itself, as low levels of 
development inhibited investment, immigration, and the 
emergence of a domestic market, all of which in turn limited 
further development. This slow pace of development would 
have a significant impact upon the evolution of intergroup 
relations in South African society.
Intergroup Struggles and Ethnic Identity
From our perspective, it appears that the South African 
case exhibits an historical pattern of development of inter­
group contact and relations which is significantly different 
from that of either other European settler societies (e.g., 
the United States) or other colonies. What appears crucial 
is the combined effect of slow capitalist development, 
limited immigration, and relative isolation from the world- 
economy, which created a South African society in which a 
relatively small proportion of Europeans existed in the 
midst of a larger native African population.7 This demo­
graphic imbalance between the dominant European colonizers 
and the native African population produced— in the context 
of South African capitalist development— a unique set of 
political and economic exigencies (i.e., the logistics of 
dominating and exploiting a numerically superior population) 
which in turn led to the emergence of a particular eth-class 
structure and specific cultural practices and ideologies. 
These processes played themselves out: over centuries. Our
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Immediate task in this section is to examine those aspects 
of intergroup relations during the pre-1800 era which ve 
believe had a significant effect upon the eth-class struc­
ture and the subsequent evolution of group identities. He 
will focus upon three phenomena: (1) resource competition
and conflict between natives and European settlers; (2) the 
emergence of the Boer independent class; and (3) slavery and 
intergroup boundaries.
i* Resource competition:__ Europeans va, Africans, as
was the case with the American colonies, a significant early 
intergroup conflict in South Africa was the "national" (in 
the context of groups viewing themselves as autonomous 
socio-political entities) struggle (or European war of con­
quest) between Dutch colonists and native African peoples 
for control of the land and its resources.* The initial 
pace of European settlement was slov--having barely moved 
beyond Cape Town by 1700— a reflection of both VOC policy 
and the limited number of immigrants. Nevertheless, despite 
continued attempts by the Company to limit settlement, by 
1803 Dutch colonists occupied much of the present-day Cape 
province (Fredrickson 1981, p. 32; Katzen 1969, p. 212).
This territorial expansion was brought about by several 
social and economic factors--population pressures, the need 
for large tracts of land for herding and farming to be 
economically viable (due to the limited fertility of the 
soil), and the desire of the settlers to move beyond the
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political and economic control o£ the VOC— and facilitated 
by the ease of access (temperate climate, no natural obsta­
cles) to the interior (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 2-15). Indeed, 
only the isolation of the interior and the strength of 
native resistance (particularly when eastward Dutch movement 
brought them into contact with the numerically larger Nguni- 
speaking peoples in the latter part of the eighteenth cen­
tury) inhibited further settlement (Katzen 1969, p. 212).*
One consequence of the expansion of Dutch settlement in 
the eighteenth century was increased contact and conflict, 
first with the Khoikhoin (who inhabited the Cape area) and 
later with the San (who lived inland and to the north).3-0 
While first contact between the Dutch and the Khoikhoin was 
relatively benign, due to the perceived utility of the Khoi­
khoin as suppliers of cattle to the Cape settlement, the 
unwillingness of the Khoikhoin (like many pastoralists) to 
part with a significant proportion of their herds and the 
expansionary desires of the independent Dutch settlers 
quickly led to cattle raids and warfare (i.e., the Khoi- 
khoin-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century) .ia- In these 
conflicts (or wars of conquest), the key dynamic was the 
ever-expanding European desire for land, a goal whose ful­
fillment required the widespread expropriation of native 
land and herds. What is perhaps most significant about this 
process was the use of negative stereotypes (e.g., "hea­
thens" or "savages") and ideologies of superiority in order
304
to legitimize the conquest and dispossession of the native 
peoples (cf. de Kieviet 1957, p. 20; M. Wilson 1969c, p.
242; Fredrickson 1981, p. 34). These ideologies vere then 
readily applied to subsequent relations between European 
colonists and other native Africans.
For the Khoikhoin, the consequences of this conflict 
vere disastrous. Khoikhoin society, never advanced to begin 
vith, literally disintegrated in the face of European colo­
nization (much in the same manner as east coast Native Amer­
icans) as loss of land and herds brought about the rapid 
erosion of the economic and social base of the Khoikhoin. 
When these changes vere accompanied by the ravages of 
disease, the Khoikhoin soon ceased to exist as an indepen­
dent people (M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 67-8).13 While some sur­
vivors moved northvestvard into vhat is nov Namibia and 
others (including Bastaards or Griquas) reestablished 
themselves on the northern frontier of the Cape Colony, 
those vho remained in the Cape area vere absorbed into 
European colonial society as casual labor (Katzen 1969, p. 
184; M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 68-70; Macmillan 1963, pp. 53- 
7 2 ) For this latter group, absorption over time led to 
acculturation (i.e., the adoption of European language, 
religion, and other cultural practices) and— vith inter­
marriage vith persons of slave and/or Dutch ancestry—  
eventual amalgamation (i.e., ethnic merger) into a nev 
"Coloured" ethnic group.1*
2. The rise of_the Boer independent class. The second 
significant development during the pre-1800 period was the 
emergence of the Boer independent class, an eth-class, 
which, as the predecessors of the present-day Afrikaners, 
would play a key role in the evolution of intergroup rela­
tions in South Africa. Our use of the term "independent 
class" reflects the contradictory position of the Dutch 
settlers between modes of production; that is, on the one 
hand they existed primarily at a precapitalist subsistence 
level, but on the other hand they were at least somewhat 
(and in varying degrees depending upon time and place) 
subject locally to the sway of market relations and able to 
operate as independent or petty-bourgeois producers (market 
production was primarily linked to the role of the Cape as a 
supply station on the route to the East Indies— cf. Fred­
rickson 1981, p. 5 2 ) . This class had its origins in those 
ex-Company employees who became independent herders and 
farmers and who spread away from Cape Town into the interior 
of South Africa.1" The ranks of the settlers were expanded 
by an influx of Huguenot immigrants in the late seventeenth 
century (who were quickly and deliberately assimilated into 
the Dutch population— Magubane 1979, p. 31; Katzen 1969, pp. 
196-99) and by the limited immigration permitted by the VOC 
during the period between 1700 and 1717 (Katzen 1969, pp. 
196-202; Fredrickson 1981, p. 66). Given the overall low 
level of immigration— particularly after 1717— the major
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means of Dutch settler population growth was by natural 
increase, thus leaving the size of the group relatively 
small.
In essence, what ve are describing is a process in 
which economic and social forces combined to create a new 
eth-class. The lack of immigration prevented South African 
settler society from developing the ethnic diversity which 
was so significant in the case of the United States. More­
over, the slow economic development of the Cape Colony 
inhibited the evolution of a differentiated class structure. 
Thus, the European settlers as a group had a structure 
marked by both ethnic and class homogeneity— indeed "Boer" 
is Dutch for "farmer"; thereby providing the group with a 
name which described it in terms of both ethnicity and class 
(cf. Katzen 1969, p. 231). In addition, a clear demarcation 
of interests vis-a-vis other eth-classes (i.e., natives, the 
VOC) and subsequent conflict encouraged the formation of a 
strong sense of group identity.xy
Prom the outset, the Boer independent class found its 
fortunes and interests both intertwined vith and in opposi­
tion to the colonial power (in the pre-1800 era, the VOC).
To the settlers, the profit-oriented economic policies of 
the Company (e.g., monopolies, trade restrictions, limits on 
contact vith the natives) constituted an economic burden. 
This conflict of interests, coupled vith the nature of the 
social and physical environment, encouraged settler migra­
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tion into the interior both to escape the control of the VOC 
and to exploit new economic opportunities.3-* For its part, 
vhile the VOC initially sought to forestall settler contact 
vith the natives, it eventually "tolerated" expanded settle­
ment and limited its role to providing support (e.g., arms) 
for the settlers when conflicts vith the natives became 
particularly intense (Katzen 1969, p. 224).x* From the 
perspective of the Company, this represented a "trade-off"—  
the increased cost of control (e.g., military intervention, 
administrative costs) vs. increased reliability of supply 
from European farmers and herders (Fredrickson 1981, pp. BO­
SS).30 Given the disinterest and institutional veakness of 
the VOC (e.g., its unwillingness to invest financial re­
sources to extend its influence into the "unprofitable" 
interior, its inability to collect taxes and rents and to 
enforce rules), the settlers or "trekboers" essentially 
existed beyond the control of the Company, thus giving rise 
to a Boer self-image as a free frontier society living on 
open land (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 10-15; Katzen 1969, p. 211).
At the same time, the economic interests of the Boer 
independent class brought them Into sharp conflict vith the 
native peoples. In the "national" conflict between Euro­
peans and Africans, the Boer independent class was the chief 
European antagonist, for it was the settler desire for 
expansion vhlch conflicted vith native land tenure. This 
vas a quintessential example of resource competition, lnas-
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much as the basis of the settler herder economy (a suffi­
ciently large tract of land so as to support— despite its 
low carrying capacity— an economically viable herd) vas also 
the economic base of native society. Despite their rela­
tively small numbers, the settlers vere able to vanquish 
the natives by virtue of their access to superior European 
military technology. Even in its early stages, this inter­
group conflict contained a class as veil as an ethnic or 
national dimension, for the basis of the economic veil being 
of the Boer independent class vas grounded in the disposses­
sion of native land and the exploitation of native labor 
(Magubane 1979, p. 10). This intertvining of class and 
ethnic interests vill remain a dominant theme in our inter­
pretation of South African history.
Another salient aspect of the settler independent class 
experience vas that it undervent a process of ethnic chanqe- 
-a transformation of identity from Dutch to Boer (White 
African). To quote de Kieviet (1957, p. 17):
In the long quietude of the eighteenth century the 
Boer race vas formed. In the vast, unmysterious, 
thirsty landscape of the interior lay the true 
center of South African settlement. When the 
Trekboers entered it vith their flocks and tented 
vagons, they left the current of European life and 
lost the economic habits of the nations from vhich 
they had sprung.
What made this rapid transformation possible vas the social
and economic isolation of the trekboers. Scattered farms, a
nomadic lifestyle, economic self-sufficiency, and a lack of
transportation netvorks all served to limit settler ties to
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Cape Tovn and European civilization (Magubane 1979, p. 31; 
Fredrickson 1981, p.34; de Kieviet 1957, pp. 11-15). More­
over, the limited nature of immigration meant that the 
settler population vas predominantly African-born and lacked 
the dynamic element introduced by constant immigration.
The emergence of Boer society vas manifest in changes 
in culture and language (e.g., the evolution from Dutch to 
taal. a local dialect vhich vas the forerunner of modern 
Afrikaans). Historically, the emerging Boer culture vas 
characterized— often as a result of isolation— as conserva­
tive, anti-intellectual, highly religious (the Dutch 
Reformed Church vas at the core of Boer culture), and 
stamped vith the individualism of the frontier (de Kieviet 
1957, pp. 15-18; Katzen 1969, pp. 228-31). More ominous, 
hovever, vas the fact that Boer society vas seemingly 
grounded in tvo fundamental tenets (vhich vere clearly 
linked to economic interests)— the principle of unlimited 
White access to land and the presumed— thought to be di­
vinely sanctioned— right of settlers to deal as they 
Pleased vith natives (Katzen 1969, p. 232). These princi­
ples vould provide the ideological basis for future 
intergroup conflict betveen Europeans and Africans.
3. Slavery and group boundaries. The other key aspect 
of intergroup relations in pre-1800 South Africa vas the 
emergence of slavery and the importation of slaves from 
East Africa and from Dutch holdings in the East Indies.
From an economic standpoint, the establishment of slavery 
vas a consequence of the need for cheap agricultural labor 
juxtaposed with the scarcity of local supply.22 Conse­
quently, slavery became widespread in the Cape settlement, 
particularly after the VOC made a conscious decision in 1717 
to favor slavery over European immigration (Fredrickson 
1981, pp. 66-67; de Kieviet 1957, p. 21).22 Economically, 
Cape slavery vas less salient in that it vas not the corner­
stone of a single-crop cash export economy (as in the Amer­
icas) and, consequently, not essential to the power of a 
ruling class (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 89-92). Instead, 
although the VOC did utilize slave labor, the bulk of slave- 
holding occurred on a widespread basis, vith a majority of 
settlers possessing slaves, yet most ovning a relatively 
small number (Katzen 1969, p. 205; Fredrickson 1981, p.
69).22 What slavery did do, however, was facilitate con­
tinued underdevelopment (by inhibiting productivity and 
market expansion— much as it did in the U.S. South) and 
encourage territorial expansion (by eliminating opportuni­
ties for White labor, thus forcing the "excess population" 
to migrate in search of farmland and, hence, to come into 
contact vith Bantu-speaking native peoples), both of vhich 
vere key processes in the evolution of South African society 
(de Kieviet 1957, p. 22). For these, if for no other rea­
sons, the institution of slavery in South Africa should be 
viewed as historically important.
For purposes of this analysis, South African slavery 
vas significant inasmuch as it established an institutional 
and cultural basis for White domination. Given the wide­
spread extent of slaveholding, slavery shaped production 
relations in that the domination and exploitation of non- 
White labor vas the mainstay of the economic well-being of 
the majority of the Boer independent class (unlike the U.S. 
South where slaveholding vas primarily concentrated within a 
small elite class). Not surprisingly, these economic inter­
ests vere ingrained in an ideological system vhich empha­
sized the religious and racial differences between natives 
and Europeans and the importance of "proper relations" 
between masters and servants— thereby maintaining White 
dominance (Macmillan 1963, p. 20). Furthermore, given the 
economic homogeneity of the Boer settlers and the general 
underdevelopment of the Cape Colony, the belief that manual 
labor vas the province of non-Whites (vhich created caste­
like distinctions) vas the basis of the supremacy of White 
settlers over native labor (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 21-22; 
Fredrickson 1981, pp. 92-92). This superimposition of 
ethnicity and class provided an ongoing basis for the 
supremacist ideologies vhich maintained the group position 
of the Boer independent class.
The other major Impact of Cape slavery vas its contri­
bution to the changing ethnic structure of the emerging 
South African society. Although some slaves were captured
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during commando raids beyond the borders of European settle­
ment, most slaves were not indigenous to South Africa, but 
came instead from East Africa or Dutch holdings in Asia 
(Katzen 1969, p. 204). The existence of widespread misce­
genation among Dutch settlers, imported slaves, and native 
Khoikhoin and San— a phenomenon which reflected, among other 
factors, the relatively relaxed Dutch attitude (displayed in 
Indonesia) towards the mixing of groups, the demographic 
imbalance in the male-female ratio among Dutch settlers, and 
the status of Cape Town as a "rest station" for passing 
ships (H. Wilson 1969a, p. 66; Katzen 1969, p. 184; Fred­
rickson 1981, pp. 94-135; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 17-19)-- 
produced a population of mixed ethnic background, which in 
turn continued miscegenation with the different ethnic 
groups.3* For South African society, the ultimate outcome 
of this process was the ethnic merger of slaves. Khoikhoin. 
San, and mixed-race persons into a new. "Coloured" ethnic 
group. This process was seemingly facilitated by external 
forces— the "deculturation" of slaves, Khoikhoin, and San 
and their rapid acculturation into Dutch culture (van den 
Berghe 1965, p. 19), as well as White insistence (despite 
attempts to retain subgroup identity) upon treating persons 
of mixed ancestry as a homogeneous entity. What emerged 
from this process was a unique social entity— the "Coloured" 
population; however, the small size of this group relative
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to the Europeans and Africans would relegate them to a 
marginal role in South African history.
While the distinctions between Whites and natives, free 
persons and slaves, were relatively clear, the social posi­
tion of this mixed group was more ambiguous. Initially, 
intergroup boundaries were somewhat fluid, particularly in 
light of the rapid acculturation of Coloureds, to the extent 
that third and sometimes even second generation offspring of 
mixed unions were generally able to "pass" into the Dutch 
group (van den Berghe 1965, p. 19; Fredrickson 1981, p.
118).30 In this process, a key variable was often social 
and economic position— i.e., wealth facilitating absorption 
into the Dutch group— reflecting the relationship between 
ethnicity and class and the need of the European settler 
community to expand its numbers. With the passage of time, 
however, boundaries began to harden, due to greater economic 
differentiation (which encouraged those of putatively "pure" 
European stock to use ethnic markers to enhance their 
status--cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 122) and expanded conflict 
with the Bantu-speaking population (which led to increased 
prejudice against non-Whites). Nevertheless, throughout 
South African history, the boundary between Whites and mixed 
(Coloured) persons has continued to be ambiguous and based 
on common knowledge as much as any other factor (van den 
Berghe 1965, p. 53; Fredrickson 1981, pp. 133-34).
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British Colonization and Territorial Expansion. 1800-1910 
Capitalist Development and British Colonial Rule
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Cape 
Colony was little more than a European beachhead on the tip 
of southern Africa. Despite nearly a century and one-half 
of occupation, the VOC had left "light footprints" in that 
the Cape exhibited a very low level of economic development, 
a paucity of political and cultural institutions, and a 
relatively small colonial population (de Kleviet 1957, p. 
30).*• Indeed, with the exception of Cape Town and its 
immediate environs, the remainder of vhat would become South 
Africa could be characterized as an "external area" beyond 
the economic and political sway of the European-based capi­
talist world economy. Nevertheless, the pre-1800 era left 
an enduring legacy in the form of an ethnically diverse 
society whose political economy was based upon domination 
and exploitation of the non-White majority by the White 
settler minority. Moreover, Cape society at the end of the 
eighteenth century was marked by an increasing divergence of 
Interests between the European settlers (the Boer indepen­
dent class) and the colonial power (the VOC).37 These 
dynamics constituted the foundation upon which South African 
society would be built.
The period encompassing the nineteenth century and the 
first decade of the twentieth century was a time of rapid 
change for South Africa. During this period, the forces of
global capitalist development facilitated the incorporation 
of South Africa into the capitalist vorld economy as a peri­
pheral area (cf. Martin 1987; Magubane 1979, p. 32). Key 
elements of this process of incorporation were: (1) the
absorption of South Africa into the British empire/sphere of 
influence; (2) settler/colonial territorial expansion and 
the conquest and absorption into settler/colonial society of 
the Bantu-speaking native peoples; and (3) the emergence of 
mining and the expansion of capitalist production and market 
relations. From our perspective, each of these events had 
an inarguable Impact upon the South African ethnic structure 
and upon the subsequent course of intergroup relations. In 
this initial discussion, our purpose is to examine these 
macro-level processes, with our ultimate objective being the 
development of an analytical context for the evolution of 
intergroup relations.
1. British colonization. One major transition occur­
red at the beginning of the nineteenth century (1795-1806), 
vhen the Dutch/VOC were supplanted by the British as the 
European colonial pover in South Africa.3* On a global 
scale, the acquisition of South Africa can be viewed in the 
context of British consolidation of hegemonic core status 
(replacing the Dutch) as the dominant political and economic 
power within the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 1989, 
p. 122). For the emerging South African society, this 
transformation was to have two main effects. First, it
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changed the political economy of the Cape Colony by substi­
tuting British colonial policy for that of the VOC and by 
linking the fortunes of South Africa to global British 
political and economic interests (South Africa vas, after, 
all, but one "jewel" in the imperial crown). Secondly, it 
added an ethnonational component to divergent class inter­
ests within the European colonial community; that is, eco­
nomic and political conflicts were no longer between Dutch 
settlers and the Dutch-based VOC, but instead between the 
Boer independent class and the British colonial administra­
tion .
The results wrought by the transfer of the Cape Colony 
to British control were neither immediate nor dramatic; 
however, they did produce several tangible alterations in 
the social fabric of South African society. Perhaps the 
most significant of these changes was an upsurge in economic 
activity--the removal of VOC monopolies and the opening up 
of trade, the introduction of Merino sheep and the develop­
ment of a wool export economy, and the general expansion and 
rationalization of market relations (Houghton 1969, pp. 4-5; 
de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 30-31; Martin 1987, p. 860). Other 
major effects of British rule included the establishment of 
an expanded (and indelibly British) social and political 
structure; the elimination of the slave trade (1807) and of 
slavery (1834/38); and a change in the ethnic structure of 
the settler community through the introduction of British
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immigrants (cf. de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 30-31; Davenport 1969, 
pp. 272-73; Thompson 1969a, pp. 378-79). For each of these 
processes, however, the overall impact was somewhat muted. 
The economy expanded, yet underdevelopment remained a signi­
ficant feature of South African society. Political and 
administrative structures emerged, but were slow to expand 
into the hinterlands. Slaves were freed, yet non-White 
labor experienced other formB of coercion (e.g., laws 
enforcing labor "contracts"). And while British immigration 
led to a diversification of the ethnic structure, it did not 
occur in sufficient quantity to overcome the numerical 
superiority (within the European settler community) of the 
Boers.a#
2. Settler expansion. The second major development 
during the nineteenth century vas the expansion of European 
settlement, a process which— after decades of conflict-- 
resulted in the subjugation of native African peoples and 
their eventual incorporation into South African society as 
the largest ethnic group.30 Intergroup contact between 
Europeans and Africans began on the Eastern Cape frontier In 
the eighteenth century, where the expansion of Dutch settle­
ment vas checked for some seventy years by encountering 
substantial settlements of Xhosa (Macmillan 1963, p. 40). 
What followed were decades of increased economic contact 
and slow European expansion along the eastern frontier, a 
process punctuated by mutual raids and outbreaks of open
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warfare (H. Wilson 1969c, pp. 237-53). This vas to be but 
the first act in an unfolding drama.
A second front of European territorial expansion began 
in 1830 with the movement of the Boer independent class 
across the Orange River into the interior highlands. This 
migration— often referred to as the "Great Trek"— was unique 
in that it did not consist of individuals moving in search 
of grazing land (trekboers) but instead vas comprised of 
loosely organized groups (voortrekkers) who consciously 
sought to move beyond the borders of the Cape Colony (Thomp­
son 1969c, pp. 4 0 5 - 0 6 ) . The roots of the Great Trek are 
complex— demographic, economic, and political (cf. Martin 
1987, p. 895). From the outset, European settler society 
possessed a strong expansionary dynamic— extensive agricul­
ture (and the impact of herding upon the fragile grasslands) 
and population growth— a force which for a century and a 
half had induced trekboers to ignore the frontier in search 
of better grazing areas. Given the Xhosa "barrier" along 
the eastern frontier, a barrier which vas also maintained by 
British policy (e.g., the British foreign Office order to 
the Cape Governor to restore African land seized after the 
1835 war— de Kiewiet 1957, p. 51), and the rapid population 
growth of the Cape Colony in the early nineteenth century, 
the Great Trek can in some respects be viewed as a natural 
outcome of bottled up expansionary pressures (cf. Macmillan 
1963, p. 199; Davenport 1969, p. 274).** Moreover, there
also existed strong economic incentives for migration, as 
the expansion of market relations and British attempts to 
rationalize agricultural production drove up land prices and 
encouraged Boers to move in search of cheap land (de Kieviet 
1957, p. 55; Martin 1987, p. 895) . What set the voortrek- 
kers apart from the trekboers. for whom the above dynamics 
also existed, vas the political and ideological— or, ve 
might add, ethnonatlonal— component of their migration; that 
is, Boer resentment of British rule, particularly the impo­
sition of a new racial order (e.g., the elimination of 
slavery and increased legal rights for natives— which also 
threatened the material interests of independent farmers) 
and the failure to maintain "proper relations" between 
masters (Europeans) and non-White servants (Davenport 1969, 
pp. 297-311; Macmillan 1963, pp. 7-20; Moodie 1975, p. 4).
Whatever its root causes, the Great Trek had three 
significant effects on the evolution of South African 
society: (1) the absorption of African peoples into settler
society; (2) the persistence of Boer identity; and (3) the 
widening of British involvement in South Africa. First, 
settler expansion brought the African peoples--first the 
Ndebele in the high veld and the Zulu in Natal, then others 
in the ensuing years— within the pale of European settle­
ment, thereby setting in motion a chain of events which 
would result in Europeans and Africans being inextricably 
bound together in a single society (cf. de Kieviet 1957, p.
56). Secondly, territorial expansion provided the Boers 
vlth the opportunity to preserve their group identity. As 
de Kieviet (1957, pp. 52-53) observed, the Great Trek came 
to occupy a symbolically important role in Boer/Afrikaner 
history, vith the voortrekkers portrayed as heroic peoples 
fleeing British colonial oppression.33 Zn addition, the 
establishment of the Boer Republics (the South African 
Republic and the Orange Free State) provided a political and 
territorial basis for group identity. Finally, the after- 
math of the Great Trek forced Great Britain to expand its 
sphere of influence in South Africa. While Britain vas 
generally reluctant to extend colonial control unless it 
could realize clear economic or strategic benefits, in­
creased frontier unrest (in part due to the disruption 
caused by Boer migration into Natal) and a perceived threat 
to the security of the Cape Colony (a Boer outlet to the sea 
could serve as a foothold for an unfriendly pover) moved the 
British to annex Natal in 1843 (de Kieviet 1957, p. 62).34 
Although Great Britain proceeded no further at this juncture 
(indeed, it recognized the autonomy of the Boer Republics), 
the imperial genie vas nevertheless out of the bottle.39 
Continued unrest and var on the Cape frontiers led to the 
annexation of British Kaffraria, Victoria East, and Basuto­
land— actions vhich vere but the first steps tovards 
British imperial domination of all of South Africa.
By the 1860s South Africa had evolved as follows. The 
Cape Colony and Natal, while still underdeveloped, had under 
British control steadily expanded both productive activities 
and external economic ties (Houghton 1969, pp. 1-6). At 
this stage, both could be viewed as peripheral areas of the 
world economy (Martin 1987, p. 860). In contrast, the 
Orange Free State and the South African Republic vere weak, 
frontier societies whose primarily subsistence economies 
vere only minimally integrated (via limited trade) into the 
capitalist world-economy (Thompson 1969c, pp. 425-27; Martin 
1987 pp. 860-61; Houghton 1969, pp. 6-7). Finally, South 
Africa in the 1860s contained innumerable African kingdoms 
and chiefdoms ringing the borders of the Orange Free State, 
Natal, and the South African Republic. Most of these socie­
ties had felt (in varying degrees) the impact of European 
territorial expansion; however, they remained, for the most 
part, on the fringes of or external to colonial society 
(cf. Arrighi— 1979, pp. 161-62— on "nominal incorporation";
i.e., external political domination and weak economic ties, 
but no wholesale Introduction of market relations or prole­
tarianization of independent producers). What none of these 
actors knew, however, vas that South Africa stood upon the 
threshold of an era of revolutionary social change.
3. Mining and capitalist development. The transforma­
tion of the social and economic landscape of South Africa 
began in 1867 with the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley
in Griqualand (an area on the northern frontier of the Cape 
Colony).3" By 1871, the Kimberley mines made South Africa 
the largest diamond producer in the world; total exports for 
1872 were valued at more than 1.6 million pounds (Innes 
1984, p. 21; Houghton 1969, p. 11). Scarcely fifteen years 
later, gold vas discovered on the Witvatersrand (in the 
South African Republic/Transvaal), giving birth to an indus­
try whose value and significance would eclipse even that of 
the diamond industry.37 By 1898, the South African Republic 
was the largest producer of gold in the world, producing 
27.55% of total global output— a proportion vhich rose to 
40% by 1913 (van Onselen 1979, p. 289).3" The emergence of 
these two industries irrevocably altered the course of South 
African capitalist development; they provided the basis for 
economic development and incorporation into the capitalist 
world-economy (Martin 1987). It is not an overstatement to 
say that the emergence of mining, more than anv other single 
development, transformed interaroup relations and shaped the 
economic, social, and political nature of modern South 
African society.3*
The impact of the mining revolution vas felt in all 
sectors of South African society."0 Moreover, as opposed to 
the gradual industrial development of the core, the pace of 
growth vas rapid— as was the social dislocation vhich re­
sulted from development. The influx of core capital and 
technology (facilitated by the colonial link between South
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Africa and Great Britain) and the revenues generated from 
mining fueled rapid economic growth— the expansion of com­
merce (vhich benefitted the ports of the Cape and Natal), 
Infrastructural development (the extension of roads and rail 
links from the ports to the interior mining areas), and the 
growth of a domestic market. This in turn provided a basis 
for secondary industry (e.g., coal, brickmaking, explosives) 
and an expanded market for agriculture, both of vhich fur­
ther contributed to economic expansion.*3- Another effect 
of the mining economy vas the creation of a basis for a 
significant vage-labor workforce, a recasting of the class 
structure vhich vas manifest in both the immigration of 
skilled mining labor and the proletarianization of indi­
genous (African and Boer) labor. Finally, South African 
economic expansion initiated those processes— urbanization, 
industrialization, and the expanded role of the state— vhich 
are the seemingly inevitable concomitants of capitalist 
development. Clearly, South Africa vould never be the same.
The nature of this economic expansion— and of the 
course of South African capitalist development— vas heavily 
influenced by the specific conditions of capitalist accumu­
lation in the mining industry. The marketing of diamonds 
(the quintessential luxury commodity) necessitated the 
forging of links between the South African mines, the world 
market, and core-based economic interests (cf. Innes 19B4, 
p. 22). Even more significant vas the nature of mining
itself: South African diamonds are located in diamond-
iferous "pipes'* running deep into the earth, vhich meant 
that once surface deposits had been exhausted, continued 
mining vould require modern technology— and a massive 
infusion of capital (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 92-93). At the 
same time, the scope of the diamond deposits vere suffi­
ciently extensive so as to serve as a basis for ongoing 
industry (rather than the brief "booms" vhich occurred in 
the vestern United States). Thus, vhlle the South African 
diamond industry vas initially marked by small holdings 
vorked by independent diggers, the forces of centralization 
resulted— after economic and political struggle (e.g., the 
"Black Flag Rebellion")— in the dispossession of small 
diggers and the consolidation of holdings (e.g., from 3588 
in 1871 to 71 in 1881— Innes 1984, pp. 29-31). This in turn 
enabled the mineovners to ensure market stability (by limit­
ing production) and to enhance profitability (by increasing 
their ability to control labor). The ultimate denouement of 
this process of centralization occurred in the mid-1880s 
vhen Cecil Rhodes— vith the backing of core finance capital 
in the form of the Rothschild group— bought out all 
competitors and consolidated the diamond fields under the 
aegis of De Beers Consolidated Mines (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 
94-95; Innes 1984, p. 36). In short, in less than tvo 
decades the South African diamond industry evolved from 
domination by independent small diggers to control by
3 2 5
monopoly capital intimately linked to core interests. 
Furthermore, South African monopoly capital vas to become a 
major force in other economic activities— agriculture, 
secondary Industry, and finance (Innes 1984, pp. 41-42).*■
A similar process occurred within the gold industry, 
accelerated by the capital and expertise accumulated in 
diamond mining. Indeed, prior to the announcement of the 
Witvatersrand gold fields, leading South African capitalists 
(e.g., Rhodes) actively bought up land in the area (Innes 
1984, p. 46). Given the initial participation of monopoly 
capital, centralization of the gold industry proceeded at a 
much faster pace and by the 1890s the industry vas dominated 
by a few large groups (de Kieviet 1957, p. 118; Innes 1984, 
p. 55; Houghton 1969, p. 13).49 As vas the case with dia­
monds, the process of centralization vas facilitated by the 
nature of South African gold mining— extensive veins of low 
grade ore vhich ran deep into the earth--vhich required 
extensive capital investment (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 116-19). 
Moreover, the unique role of gold as a global medium of 
exchange created an unlimited demand for gold, but at a 
fixed price set by Great Britain. This meant that the core 
concern of the mining industry vas not overproduction and 
market saturation, but the need to control costs in order to 
maintain profitability (Innes 1984, pp. 48-49). Given the 
relatively invariant nature of capital expenditures, cost 
control in the gold mining industry could best be obtained
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through ready access to cheap labor (Magubane 1979, pp. 115- 
116).44 Thus, cheap labor served as the basis tor the eco­
nomic development of South Africa (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 96). 
This vould have a significant effect upon the evolution of 
the South African eth-class system.
Interoroup Relations and the Eth-Class Structure
Until the beginning of the twentieth century South 
Africa vas not a unitary society in that it contained 
neither structured relations between groups nor a single 
political structure. With respect to intergroup rela­
tions, we maintain that the key process (and outcome) during 
the period between 1800-1910 vas the molding together of 
diverse groups into a single society (Union of South Africa) 
with a unique eth-class structure. At the same time, the 
evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa vas shaped 
by the changes wrought by the mining revolution and by the 
incorporation of South Africa into the capitalist vorld- 
economy as a peripheral society. In general, intergroup 
relations in South Africa during the nineteenth century vere 
characterized by continual tripartite conflict between 
Africans, British, and Boers. For our purposes, this 
conflict— and its resolution— is crucial, for it determined 
the nature of the eth-class structure in the emerging South 
African society. Our discussion of intergroup relations 
during this era will focus upon four significant develop­
ments: (1) the complete conquest of the African population
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and their absorption into European settler/colonial society; 
(2) the extension of British colonialism and subsequent 
bitter conflict with the Boer republics, the resolution of 
vhich established the political framework for modern South 
African society; (3) the processes of peasantization and 
proletarianization; and (4) the transformation of the South 
African eth-class structure. In each case, ve will explore 
the implications of developments for the evolution of ethnic 
identities.
1- Europeans vs. Africans:__ conflict and conquest.
The history of nineteenth century South Africa is the his­
tory of struggle over land— a "national” conflict (in the 
context of a struggle between autonomous peoples) between 
Europeans and Africans.*m By any yardstick, the outcome of 
this conflict vas dramatic: in 1800 European colonial rule
vas limited to Cape Town and the surrounding area; by 1900 
the entire area vhich constitutes modern South Africa had 
been conquered and absorbed into a society vhich vas domi­
nated by Europeans. From our perspective, European-Afrlean 
conflict can be viewed as a case of resource competition 
over land and cattle, a conflict grounded in confrontation 
between two societies vith similar expansionary dynamics—  
population growth and extensive agriculture.47 This resul­
ted in a cycle of conquest and dispossession of Africans 
from the best land, vhich increased the pressure on the 
remaining land, vhich in turn led to further conflict (raids
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and counter raids).4* Despite fierce African resistance, 
the technological superiority of European weaponry proved 
decisive and the process of conquest and dispossession con­
tinued such that by the end of the century, European colo­
nial rule had been extended over all of South Africa.4*
One key outcome of the conquest of African societies 
vas that the African population vas not annihilated (as vere 
natives in ideal-typical settler societies such as the U.S.) 
but instead vas absorbed into colonial society (cf. de 
Kieviet 1957, p. 79). As a result, a central problem for 
the European settlers became how, even given their techno­
logical superiority, could they maintain control over a 
significantly larger indigenous population.80 In general, 
European colonial policies involved measures for ensuring 
both security and a supply of cheap labor, such as restric­
ting African settlement to allotted "reserves", while at the 
same time limiting the number of Africans permitted to live 
as tenants on "European* land.*1 Within the reserves, loca­
tions, and nominal chiefdoms, African political structures 
vere allowed to persist; however, they vere ultimately sub­
ordinate to European authority (Thompson 1969a, p. 376).02 
According to colonial lav, Africans vere viewed as encroach- 
ers or foreigners— the Cape Colony Kaffir Employment Act 
used the convenient oxymoron "native foreigner" (Davenport 
1969, p. 310)— who vere required to have a pass to be in a 
White area (de Kieviet 1957, p. 74; Thompson 1969c, p. 436).
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In reality, these policies (like their more recent "Bantus- 
tan" successors) vere not workable inasmuch as they ignored 
the economic realities (e.g., the colonial need for labor; 
the fact that the land allotted for reserves vas insuffi­
cient to support the African population) vhich bound 
Africans and Europeans together. Consequently, many 
Africans vere forced to live in violation of colonial lavs—  
as tenants or squatters on "European" land. On the other 
hand, vhat these policies did do vas establish a framevork 
for European domination of the African majority within the 
confines of a single society.
In addition to military conquest, African societies 
vere transformed by economic and social forces stemming from 
European domination (Thompson 1969b, p. 251). Initially, 
when conquest entailed the extension of the colonial fron­
tier and the expulsion of native inhabitants, it resulted 
in little structural change in African society (i.e., if 
Europeans vere to leave, African society could continue 
relatively unchanged— cf. Arrighi 1979, p. 166). With 
increased contact and conquest, hovever, came cultural dif­
fusion and expanded economic ties (e.g., trade, employment), 
both of vhich began to erode the economic and political base 
of pre-colonial African society (Macmillan 1963, p. ix; 
Thompson 1969a, p. 335).03 In this context, ve might assert 
that the subjugation of the African peoples vas effected not 
only by military force, but also by missionaries who intro­
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duced new values, traders vho induced new wants, and farmers 
who appropriated the best lands (Thompson 1969b, p. 251; de 
Kieviet 1957, pp. 86-87). Dispossessed of the best land, 
Africans found themselves in an increasingly untenable 
economic position with respect to traditional activities and 
vere often reduced to serving Europeans as tenants or 
laborers. This process vas facilitated by nev colonial 
lavs— e.g., hut taxes, clothing regulations— vhich vere 
designed to force Africans into the colonial economy.84 In 
short, precapitalist African society withered avay and 
African peoples vere absorbed into colonial society.
The conflict between Europeans and Africans was also 
waged on an ideological and cultural level. Conquest, dis­
possession, and domination required rationalization— the 
debasement of subordinate peoples vhich vas endemic to 
Western colonialism. This vas manifest in racist ideologies 
which cast Africans as barbarians or even as members of a 
different species, thereby providing a moral basis for 
domination.** In the context of the transformation of 
traditional African culture, settler racism resulted in a 
process of psychological colonization or "deculturation"
(cf. Magubane 1979, p. 65); that is, the forced shedding of 
traditional culture and adoption of an externally imposed 
"colonial" culture.*" This involved some measure of accul­
turation (usually partial) to European culture, vhich in­
creased both the exploitability of African labor and their
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acquiescence to colonial rule (e.g., by socializing colo­
nized peoples to accept European domination). To the extent 
that elements of traditional culture persisted, they vere 
adapted to this new framework. Prom an ethnic standpoint, 
the outcome of this process vas to create a nev, subordinate 
"African” ethnic identity, largely imposed by Europeans, in 
the context of European-dominated colonial society. B'r Thus, 
European domination shaped the formation of African ethnic 
Identities.am
2. British vs. Boers: imperialism and nationalism.
The second major intergroup conflict in nineteenth century 
South Africa occurred within the European colonial commu­
nity— between British imperialism and Boer settlers. This 
conflict, vhich dominated the last two decades of the nine­
teenth century, vas significant for tvo reasons. First, 
the intensity of this conflict kindled the flames of Afri­
kaner nationalism, a dynamic vhich vould become a driving 
force in twentieth century South Africa. Secondly, the 
resolution of this conflict (given the European dominance of 
South African society) directly shaped the political economy 
of modern South Africa. At the same time, however, the 
British-Boer conflict must be viewed as secondary to the 
conflict between Europeans and Africans (e.g., intra-Euro­
pean conflict abated during periods of frontier unrest, 
neither side vould arm Africans or employ them as soldiers
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against the other— Fredrickson 1981, p. 194; Thompson 1969c, 
p. 250).
From our vantage point, the British-Boer conflict is 
best understood as an eth-class conflict, albeit vith 
national overtones. In essence, this vas a conflict between 
British imperial interests (and their local representatives) 
and the Boer independent class— the concerns of empire and 
core capital (e.g., security, profitability, limitation of 
colonial expenditures) vs. the interests of the independent 
settlers (land, cheap native labor, low taxes)— an economic 
conflict vith a cultural veneer.®* This conflict was 
grounded in a unique set of historical circumstances. The 
replacement of the VOC by the British meant that Boer sett­
lers vere ruled by a culturally different colonial power, 
the effects of vhich vere felt as the British moved to 
superimpose their language, institutions, and values on 
South African society.*0 Furthermore, British rule brought 
British settlers (although never in the same numbers as the 
Boers) into South African society, a group vhich vas not 
only able to resist assimilation (by dint of the institu­
tionalization of their culture) but also able to employ 
core-based educational and occupational skills to attain a 
superior economic position (Davenport 1969, p. 279).*1 At 
the same time, British settlers tended to side with the 
British colonial government (as its presence served as a 
guarantor of their status), often clamoring for increased
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imperial involvement to protect their interests (Thompson 
1969b/ p. 251; 1969d/ p. 318).
Prom the outset/ a key issue dividing the British and 
the Boers vas treatment of the natives. Again, the core of 
the conflict vas not ideological (e.g., settler racism vs. 
bourgeois liberalism) but economic. On one hand, the 
material interests of the Boer independent class vere 
closely tied to direct exploitation (e.g., slavery, coer­
cion) of native labor on individual farms and to the elimi­
nation of the African military threat (thereby enhancing 
their ability to appropriate land). As a consequence, the 
Boer republics employed more direct means of labor control 
and instituted political structures vhich expressly excluded 
non-Whites from citizenship (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 175-78; 
Thompson 1969c, p. 436). On the other hand, the interests 
of British colonialism (i.e., core capital) required less 
direct, less costly means of control— the more generalized 
exploitation obtainable through the labor market. Thus, 
slavery vas outlaved in the British colonies and natives 
vere accorded de lure equality.*a Our point here is not to 
deny the existence of British humanism (see Macmillan— 1963- 
-on the role of John Philip and the London Missionary 
Society in influencing British native policy), but instead 
to assert that such "liberalism” vas clearly tied to eco­
nomic interests (e.g., labor supply, market expansion, and 
the costs of administration— cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 62-
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64).■■ divert the divergence of economic interests between 
British and Boers— settler expansionism and petty bourgeois 
farming vs. British exigencies of empire— native policy 
served as an important political battleground.
Like many other aspects of South African society, the 
British-Boer conflict vas transformed by the post-1867 
mining revolution. The discovery of diamonds and gold 
heightened British interest in the interior of South Africa 
(vhich had previously been viewed as unprofitable), exempli­
fied by the British move in 1871 to annex the diamond fields 
(Thompson 1969b, pp. 255-56). Imperial goals vere seemingly 
clear: protect British strategic interests vhile maximizing
economic benefit and minimizing costs of control (de Kieviet 
1957, pp. 100-03). Over the long range, this meant the 
establishment of a self-sufficient, White settler dominated 
society operating within the British sphere of influence and 
under the tutelage of British capital— presumably for the 
benefit of British interests (cf. Thompson 1969d, p. 291; 
Magubane 1979, pp. 48-52). What remained problematic, 
however, vas the means by vhich this goal could be attained. 
The Afrikaner republics vere unlikely to join voluntarily 
into any union vith the British colonies (particularly after 
the ill-fated British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 
and subsequent relinquishment, after embarrassing military 
reverses at the hands of the Boers, in 1881), vhile the Cape 
Colony was too weak (and driven by its own interests) to
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serve as a proxy (Thompson 1969d, pp. 291-92; de Kieviet 
1957, pp. 1 2 2 - 2 5 ) . Thus, Great Britain sought to attain 
its goals via diplomacy and pressure— the politics of 
imperialism.
Occurring simultaneously vith increased intergroup con­
flict vas the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism; that is, 
the assertion of a White South African identity linked to 
the Boer experience, the Afrikaans language, conservative 
Calvinism, and a claimed role as a "chosen people" vith a 
divine covenant to rule South Africa (Moodie 1975, pp. 2-26; 
Fredrickson 1981, pp. 193-94; Thompson 1969d, pp. 301-02). 
While a basis for Afrikaner group assertion had been pro­
vided by prior events (e.g., the Great Trek), a full-fledged 
nationalism vas slov to coalesce before the 1870s due to the 
isolation of Boer communities, divisions vithin Afrikanerdom 
(e.g., cultural and linguistic differences betveen Boers in 
the Cape Colony and the republics), and conflicts betveen 
trek communities (Thompson 1969d, p. 301; Giliomee 1979a, p. 
96).** What gave rise to Afrikaner nationalism in the late 
nineteenth century vas conflict; the defense of petty bour­
geois agricultural interests in the face of modernization, 
(British) monopoly capitalism, and economic exploitation by 
the British colonies (de Kieviet 1957, pp. 67-68); the 
defense of territory (i.e., the Boer Republics) from the 
mounting threat of British imperialism; and the defense of 
identity in response to the influx of uitlanders (non-
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Afrikaner Europeans attracted by the mines) and feared 
assimilation into the British colonial community (de 
Villiers 1969, pp. 365-67; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 119-21; 
Giliomee 1979a, pp. 99-103). At the same time, Afrikaner 
resistance vas limited by their economic and military 
weakness vis-a-vis Great Britain, by the South African 
Republic-Orange Free State division, and by the lack of an 
outlet to the sea. Nevertheless, emboldened by revenues 
from the gold Industry and the nationalist leadership of 
Paul Kruger, the South African Republic increasingly 
adopted policies designed to remove it from the British 
sphere of influence.*17 While none of these measures vas 
completely successful, the Afrikaners vere playing a 
dangerous game by threatening the interests of both the 
British empire and the monopoly capital dominated gold 
industry.■■
By the mid-1890s, the situation evolved into a series 
of moves and countermoves, Machiavellian maneuverings vhich 
constitute a fascinating case study in imperial power poli­
tics. •• On a global level, the British-Boer conflict vas 
played out against the larger backdrop of the European race 
for Africa--the competition for colonies as other core 
powers (e.g., Germany, France) challenged British hegemony 
(cf. Stavrianos 1987, pp. 567-71; Magdoff 1978, pp. 54-62). 
This effectively raised the stakes for Great Britain in the 
interior of South Africa— particularly after the German
annexation of South West Africa (Namibia) in 1684— as it now 
faced the possibility of the loss of the Boer republics and 
adjoining areas to the "empires'1 of other core powers (de 
Kiewiet 1957, pp. 109-13). As a result, Great Britain 
rapidly escalated its involvement in southern Africa, 
annexing Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), most 
of the remaining African kingdoms (e.g., Zululand), and—  
through Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company— much of 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Tensions were heightened by the 
Jameson Raid of December 1895— a failed attempt by Rhodes 
and the British Foreign Office to stage a rebellion in the 
Transvaal which would serve as a pretext for military 
intervention. This episode only strengthened Afrikaner 
resolve, as it united the Orange Free State and the South 
African Republic in the face of British "treachery" (de 
Kiewiet 1957, p. 135).
In the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, Great Britain 
increased its pressure on the South African Republic, 
ultimately triggering the outbreak of war in October 1899. 
Despite the overwhelming military superiority of Great 
Britain, the South African War (Boer War to the British; 
Second War of Freedom to the Afrikaners— Thompson 1969e, p. 
325) lasted for two and one-half years— a crushing rebuff to 
British imperialism.70 Although the particulars of the war 
are beyond the scope of this inquiry, its conclusion— the 
Treaty of Vereeniging— saw the complete defeat of the Afri-
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kaners and the absorption of the South African Republic and 
the Orange Free State into the British empire.'73' From our 
perspective, the South African War is best vieved through 
the prism of both class and ethnicity: independent or petty
bourgeois settlers vs. monopoly capital; Afrikaner national­
ism vs. the British empire.173 Significantly, this dual 
nature of the conflict would shape the peace which was to 
follow.
While Great Britain von the war, the more crucial issue 
involved the structuring of post-war South African soc iety. 
On the surface. Great Britain had seemingly obtained its 
objective (i.e., the political consolidation of the British 
colonies and the Afrikaner republics); however, British 
policymakers quickly realized (given the minority status of 
British settlers) that they needed Afrikaner cooperation in 
order to achieve their goal of settler self-rule. In this 
vein, both the peace treaty and subsequent British colonial 
administration were narked by a tone of reconciliation, a 
reflection of the British Interest in restoring unity within 
the European settler community (and creating a stable 
climate for core investment).73 Moreover, British policy 
was shaped by the assumption that continued modernization 
and British immigration would in time result in the disap­
pearance of Afrikaner nationalism and their eventual absorp­
tion into a British-dominated settler society (Thompson
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1969c, p. 330). Time heals all wounds and erodes all 
unwanted identities— or so the British thought.
Achieving the political unification of the European 
settler community turned out to be a formidable task. 
Conflict between the different colonies threatened to create 
social and economic chaos instead of unity and stability (de 
Kiewiet 1957, pp.148-49). Afrikaner nationalism did not 
fade away, but instead was strengthened by the memories of 
the South African War (e.g.. Kitchener's "scorched earth" 
policy, the death of an estimated 25,000 Afrikaners in 
British concentration camps) and the emergence of new heroes 
(Villiers 1969, p. 369; cf. Moodie— 1975, pp. 2-13— on the 
"sacred history" of Afrikanerdora) .'7* At the same time, 
Britain no longer had the political will (or the domestic 
support) for continued imperial involvement in South Africa. 
Consequently, the British quickly restored self-rule to the 
colonies and consented in 1910 to the independence of the 
Union of South Africa as a member of the British Common­
wealth.
Historically, the formation of the Union of South 
Africa constituted a compromise between British capital and 
Afrikaner settlers— a resolution of an intra-White conflict 
which served to benefit both sides. Great Britain came away 
having achieved its goals of settler self-rule, political 
unity, and stable conditions for capital accumulation, while 
the Afrikaners gained political autonomy and ethnic survival
(via the institutionalization of "Dutch" on an equal footing 
with English). Perhaps what is clearest about the resolu­
tion of the British-Boer conflict and the creation of the 
Union of South Africa is that the Africans were the losers. 
Nov a conquered people, the Africans had been bystanders 
during both the war and the negotiations leading to union.7" 
Great Britain, despite its professed concern for native 
welfare, made no serious attempt to improve the status of 
the Africans.7,7 Indeed, the Treaty of Vereeniging postponed 
resolution of the issue of political rights of Africans 
until after independence, thus ensuring White settler hege­
mony within the new South African society.7* In essence, 
the British sold out the African peoples in exchange for 
White political unity and a stable climate for capitalist 
accumulation (much in the same manner that northern capital 
in the United States had little interest after the Recon­
struction period in pressing for improved conditions for 
Blacks— cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 197). As Magubane (1979, 
pp. 52-53) has observed, Britain exchanged "the right to 
rule for the right to make money." From the standpoint of 
the present, it is no exaggeration to state that the "peace" 
process created the context for South African intergroup 
relations in the twentieth century.7*
3. Peasantization and proletarianization. Thus far, 
we have discussed the military conquest and deculturation of 
the African peoples; that is, the destruction of traditional
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culture and the absorption of Africans Into European colo­
nial society. Equally far-reaching in its effects, however, 
was the economic incorporation of Africans into colonial 
society and, by extension, into the capitalist vorld- 
economy. As a result of this process, Africans became not 
only a subordinate ethnic group in a White-dominated South 
Africa, but also a lover class in a capitalist economy.00 
Thus, any consideration of South African intergroup rela­
tions from this point onward is inextricably interwoven 
with issues of class and ethnicity. In this context, we 
must first consider the nature of the incorporation of 
Africans into the colonial economy— the specific processes 
which shaped the eth-class structure of the new South 
African society.
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
traditional African relations of production were destroyed 
by European conquest, the dispossession of Africans from the 
best land, and— once absorbed into colonial society— by the 
effects of colonial domination (e.g., hut tax, induced 
consumption). This became particularly evident with the 
complete subjection of the African peoples in the years 
after 1870.01 Incorporation into the colonial economy 
Involved two complex and interrelated processes: peasanti-
zation and proletarianization. Peasantization can be 
described as the dissolution of kin-based subsistence 
economies and the emergence of relations grounded in land
rights, family labor, and a link (via external domination) 
to a broader market economy (cf. Saul 1979, pp. 303-05; 
Freund 1988, pp. 64-65).•* In the South African case, 
peasant production took such forms as tenant farming 
(including "farming on the half"— cf. F. Wilson 1969, p. 
128), squatting (under "semi-feudal" conditions— cf. de 
Kiewiet 1957, p. 84), and independent landholding (Thompson 
1969a, p. 385).** Proletarianization, perhaps the more 
familiar term, will be used here to describe the alienation 
of primary producers from land (Marx's "primitive accumula­
tion") and their necessary entrance into the labor market as 
wage labor (cf. Arrighi 1979, p. 185). In South Africa, 
this meant both casual labor on White farms and, after 1870, 
entrance into the mining work force.
To assert that the processes of peasantization and 
proletarianization are interwoven is to acknowledge that, in 
the South African case, they both occurred during the same 
period (as opposed to Europe, where proletarianization 
involved a well-established peasantry). In other words, 
what transpired in South Africa during the late nineteenth 
century was a slow and uneven process, one which involved 
varying levels (depending upon time and place) of tradi­
tional subsistence farming, peasant production, and wage 
labor. In this context, the African peasantry is a transi­
tional class. On the one hand, they represented a dramatic 
break from traditional soclety--"radicals" in the process of
343
social change (M. Wilson 1969e, pp. 53-54). On the other 
hand, virtually as soon as it was created, the African 
peasantry came under siege from the forces of capitalist 
development, forces vhich transformed the most successful 
peasants into capitalist farmers and the bulk of the 
remainder into a proletarianized working class (Saul 1979, 
p. 305).
Given the peripheral status (and ensuing underdevelop­
ment) of South Africa, the transformation of the African 
peasantry was a slow process. Due to environmental factors 
(e.g., soil quality, lack of rainfall) and the absence of a 
market. South Africa for most of the nineteenth century 
experienced no "agricultural revolution"— vhich elsewhere 
had the effect of displacing peasants who could not compete 
with capitalist agriculture (cf. Wallerstein 1974, pp. 110- 
20; M. Wilson 1969e, p. 69).■* What ultimately did trans­
form South African agriculture was the mining revolution, 
vhich, by expanding both the demand for agricultural produc­
tion and (by encouraging infrastructural development) the 
ease of access to markets, in turn greatly accelerated the 
peasantization of Africans (Southall, 1983, pp. 70-71; P. 
Wilson 1969, p. 114). In addition, this "boom" had, at 
least over the short run, the effect of retarding prole­
tarianization by reducing incentives to leave the land 
(Fredrickson 1981, p. 205). Furthermore, retaining peasant 
status could, for the African peoples, be viewed as a form
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of resistance to modernization and European domination--a 
means of retaining at least some ties to traditional culture 
(Znnes 1984, pp. 27-28).
At the same time, peasant production was being under­
mined by both capitalist development and the colonial poli­
tical economy. The railways vhich expanded the market also 
brought foreign (e.g., American) produce to compete with 
local goods (F. Wilson 1969, p. 114). Overcrowding, soil 
deterioration, and state policies vhich benefitted their 
White competitors (e.g., the location of railroads) further 
increased pressures on African peasants (Southall 1983, pp. 
74-75; H. Wilson 1969e, pp. 61-64).•• War, drought, and 
pestilence completed the process (cf. F. Wilson 1969, p. 
126). What emerged in many cases was partial proletariani­
zation linked to temporary migrant labor. This left many 
Africans with a foot In both worlds: labor migration
increased deculturation and the influence of White-dominated 
colonial culture; rural subsistence farming preserved many 
elements of traditional society."7
From the perspective of the colonial economy, the above 
processes, while increasing the impoverishment of Africans, 
moved too slowly to meet the labor needs of agriculture and 
the mining industry.•• The point is that African proletari­
anization began in the late nineteenth century--and worked 
itself out through much of the twentieth."* Consequently, 
Europeans often resorted to the importation and coercion of
labor— indentured Indian labor on the sugar cane plantations 
of Natal; forced apprenticeship of African children in the 
Afrikaner republics; labor agreements vith Portuguese colo­
nies; and imported Chinese miners after the South African 
War (cf. Freund 1988, p. 113; Magubane 1979, pp. 77-78; 
Thompson 1969a, pp. 387-90). In addition, colonial policy 
included the use of political and economic "levers" to 
hasten the decline of traditional/peasant societies and to 
accelerate the proletarianization of Africans.*0 For 
example, the Glen Grey Act (put into place by Rhodes in the 
Transkei during the 1890s) established a system of indi­
vidual land tenure on small, economically untenable plots; 
thereby effectively and deliberately forcing Africans off 
the land and into the labor market (Magubane 1979, p. 78; M. 
Wilson 1969e, p. 65; Southall 1983, p. 90).*x One outcome 
of this conflict— the struggle between Europeans and 
Africans over the control of African labor pover--vas the 
emergence of racially based ideologies asserting the right 
of European settlers to have access to African labor.*2 
Once again, the nature of intergroup relations was shaped by 
resource competition.
One key to understanding the nature of the South 
African proletarianization process is an appreciation of the 
role played by the mining industry, particularly gold.
Given that mining was the driving force behind South African 
economic development, it is not surprising that the process
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of proletarianization was strongly conditioned by the exi­
gencies of mining. This was particularly true if we con­
sider the relationship between cheap labor and the profita­
bility of gold mining.*3 Not surprisingly, African labor 
constituted the core of the emerging South African work­
force: by 1912, 325,000 African (including migrants from
Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Basutoland) workers— 88% of the 
total— were employed in mining (Houghton 1969, p. 19; Innes 
1984, p. 51). Partially proletarlanized migrant laborers 
(i.e., Africans) were particularly desirable from the 
standpoint of industry, because their rural base meant that 
their wages could be below the cost of reproduction of their 
labor power; that is, less than what was necessary to 
provide for the families of these workers.*4 In this 
context, one early class struggle was between capital, which 
was dependent upon cheap African labor, and African labor, 
which reacted to low wages by withholding their labor--as 
long as peasant farming provided a viable alternative (cf. 
Innes 1984, pp. 58-59). Thus, the partial proletarianiza­
tion of the African workers constituted a contradiction of 
late nineteenth century South African capitalism in that it 
was both necessary for profitability and at the same time a 
cause of continual labor shortages. As a consequence, 
monopoly capital (in the form of the Chamber of Mines and 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association— cf. Johnstone 
1987, p. 16) adopted a series of strategies (e.g., the
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compound system, pass lavs, contract labor lavs) to obtain a 
sufficient supply of cheap labor. None of these measures 
vas completely successful in the period prior to 1910 (due 
to a lack of effective state support and the existence of 
alternative means of subsistence for African labor) and the 
mining industry continued to be troubled by shortages of 
cheap labor (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 57-68).
Concurrent vith the above processes vas the emergence 
of a White vorking class, a phenomenon— hitherto absent from 
South African society (Fredrickson 1981, p. 205)— vhich 
increased the complexity of the eth-class structure. One 
component of this process vas the proletarianization of the 
predominantly Afrikaner independent/petty bourgeois farmers, 
vho fell victim to the same forces— population pressures, 
capitalist agriculture, disease, and var— vhich vere dis­
placing the African peasantry (de Kieviet 1957, p. 187; F. 
Wilson, 1969, p. 126).** The pace of proletarianization 
vas more rapid for Afrikaners than for Africans, to the 
extent that by 1911, sixty percent of the White population 
of the Transvaal lived in urban areas (Johnstone 1987, p.
53) . In addition to displaced settlers, the ranks of the 
White vorking class vere svelled by immigration, most 
notably an influx of skilled Enqlish-speakinq mining labor 
from Great Britain and other British colonies. This had the 
effect of creating eth-class fractions vithin the White
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working class, thereby providing a basis for the persistence 
of Afrikaner ethnonatlonalism.
4. Evolution of the eth-class structure. By the time 
the Union of South Africa emerged as an independent nation 
in 1910, the above processes— conquest, the mining revolu­
tion, peasantization and proletarianization, and the resolu­
tion of the British-Boer conflict-~had combined to create an 
entirely new eth-class structure. There were no frontier or 
imperial wars: those Issues had been settled. South Africa
had embarked upon a new stage of capitalist development, one 
in which intergroup conflict would be Played out against a 
backdrop of modernization (i.e.. urbanization, proletariani­
zation) and within the confines of a single society. Like­
wise, the class system was no longer comprised of African 
pastoralists, Afrikaner settlers, and British colonial func­
tionaries, but instead exhibited an ethnically segmented 
and increasingly differentiated character. Briefly, the top 
of the eth-class structure was occupied by British and 
Afrikaners, both of whom had their own internal class 
"pyramids"— the British providing the preponderance of 
capitalists and administrators, while the Afrikaners were 
predominantly petty bourgeois farmers and newly established 
laborers. In an intermediate and much lower position were 
the Cape Coloureds and Indians in Natal, both of whom played 
an increasingly marginal role due to their small numbers. 
Finally, at the bottom of the eth-class structure was the
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African majority, now £ully incorporated into settler 
society as peasant farmers or as fully or partially 
proletarianized labor.
A key dynamic in creating this system was the differen­
tial proletarianization of Africans and Europeans; that is, 
their disparate incorporation into the South African 
economy. At this point in time, the bulk of the African 
population remained at best partially proletarianized 
peasants, while Whites tended towards total proletarianiza­
tion and complete alienation from the land. In addition to 
this different general position in the class structure, 
Europeans and Africans were further differentiated occupa­
tionally in that the former were predominantly skilled or 
semi-skilled labor while the latter were limited to 
unskilled positions. These different structural positions 
gave rise to different material interests, which would then 
be articulated in ethnic/racial terms.
The focus of intergroup competition was no longer land 
and cattle, but labor market issues. An overriding fear for 
the White working class was that they would be displaced by 
Africans, whose "partial proletarian" status and lower 
levels of consumption enabled them to work for lower wages. 
This reflects what Johnstone (1987, pp. 57-58) has termed 
the "structural insecurity" of White workers. On the one 
hand, their complete proletarianization left them completely 
dependent upon wage labor as a means of survival. On the
other hand, they knev all too well that the interests of 
capital would be advanced by increasing the exploitation of 
cheap African labor in the place of more highly paid White 
labor (particularly in the context of gold mining and the 
need to limit production costs). Moreover, as Fredrickson 
(1981, p. 211) observes, Afrikaners were experlentially no 
more suited to industrial work than vere Africans. As a 
consequence, their interests would be served by erecting 
barriers to reduce labor market competition. What was 
crystallizing was a new tripartite eth-class conflict 
between White capital, a White vorking class (vhich also 
contained a British-Afrikaner division), and partially 
proletarianized African labor. This conflict would dominate 
twentieth century South African society.
Union. Economic Development* and Eth-class Struggle: 1910-48 
Capitalist Development and Economic Growth
As it emerged from British colonization, South Africa 
in 1910 had seen a century of dramatic social change. The 
nineteenth century had witnessed the expansion of European 
settlement and the conquest and transformation of African 
societies. It had also contained the mining revolution 
vhich had altered the pace and direction of economic 
development and facilitated the incorporation of South 
Africa into the capitalist vorld-economy. In its turn, the 
first decade of the twentieth century had brought the South 
African War and the resolution of the British-Boer conflict
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In the form of the Union of South Africa, thus binding all 
South Africans together in a single political and economic 
system. Nevertheless, South Africa in 1910 vas not a nation 
but a state, as it remained divided along lines of race and 
ethnicity and shoved little sign of developing a "South 
African" national identity.
For our purposes, the key development of the first half 
of the tventieth century vas the continued economic trans­
formation of South African society. On one hand, South 
Africa in 1910 vas an underdeveloped peripheral society, 
vith a modern, foreign-dominated mining sector counterpoised 
against an inefficient farming economy (vhich vas subsidized 
by coerced labor and mining revenues) and a backvards native 
peasant sector. On the other hand, the seeds of economic 
development had been planted. The processes of industrial­
ization, proletarianization, and urbanization vhich had 
taken root in the late nineteenth century operated more 
intensively in the decades after union. Indeed, during the 
period under consideration these dynamics functioned to such 
an extent that by the middle of the tventieth century South 
Africa possessed a relatively diversified industrial economy 
and stood poised to move into the semiperiphery of the 
vorld-economy.
What contributed to these changes vere tvo key factors. 
First, the mining sector served as an "engine" of develop­
ment. The consistency of the mineral resources of South
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Africa (i.e., the consistent quality of the ore— as opposed 
to surface deposits vhich in other milieus resulted in 
cycles of boom and bust) provided a steady source of 
national income— made possible, of course, bv the super- 
exploitation of cheap African labor.** This increased 
national wealth facilitated economic development in a 
variety of ways: it stimulated consumption, thereby
expanding markets for other sectors; it created capital 
{i.e., mining profits) vhich could be invested in expanding 
production of manufactured goods (Innes 1984, pp. 119-20); 
and it provided, through disproportionate taxes and tariffs, 
state revenues vhich vere used for infrastructural and 
industrial development (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 162).* T In 
short, the economic development of South Africa vas rooted 
in geological happenstance and made possible by a political 
economy vhich enabled settler society to maximize the 
exploitation of these fortunate circumstances.
In addition to mining-led economic grovth, the second 
key factor in the transformation of South Africa vas the 
restructuring of the vorld-economy vhich occurred during 
this period. The First World War accelerated the decline of 
British core hegemony and ushered in an era of heightened 
core conflict in concert with the contraction of the vorld- 
economy. As an independent, albeit peripheral, society veil 
removed from the economic mainstream, South Africa vas veil- 
positioned to benefit from the maneuvering room created by
the demise of the Pax Britannica and took advantage of this 
space to increase its resistance to core domination (Martin 
1986, pp. 108-09). World War I and the attendant disruption 
of commerce forced South Africa to substitute local products 
for core imports. Following the war, labor unrest reduced 
the competitive advantage of core manufactures in the South 
African market, while a general global increase in protec­
tionism (a reflection of the declining British ability to 
maintain free trade) enabled South Africa to institute 
protective tariffs (to shelter local industry and agricul­
ture) without incurring retaliation or provoking British 
intervention (Innes 1984, p. 120; Houghton 1969, pp. 28-30; 
de Kiewiet 1957, p. 2 6 1 ) . Finally, the period up to and 
including World War II saw increased foreign investment by 
core-based multinational corporations (a precursor to the 
wholesale global expansion of monopoly capital which 
occurred in the post-1945 era), a process vhich included an 
upsurge in foreign Investment in South African industrial 
production (Magubane 1979, p. 203; Innes 1984, p. 131).** 
Thus, South African economic expansion occurred at a propi­
tious moment with respect to processes of the capitalist 
world-system.
At the same time, the expansion of the South African 
economy vas not a smooth process. The period between 1919 
and 1932 contained considerable economic stagnation, a 
reflection of a general decline in world commodity prices
relative to manufactures vhich resulted in declining terms 
of trade (and higher prices) for South Africa (Houghton 
1969, p. 22). Given the poor quality of South African gold- 
bearing ore and the narrow profit margins of the mining 
industry, rising costs triggered a "profitability crisis" in 
the years after World War I, especially when Great Britain 
lowered the world gold price by removing the price premium 
(Johnstone 1987, pp. 93-104; Houghton 1969, p. 26; Innes 
1984, pp. 75-82).xo° Indeed, on more than one occasion, 
South Africa vas seemingly faced with the end of gold-based 
prosperity (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 172). These economic prob­
lems vere exacerbated by the decline of agriculture, as the 
Depression combined with problems stemming from inefficient 
production, ecological limitations, and capitalist develop­
ment to create widespread dislocation of farmers (cf. F. 
Wilson 1969, pp. 1 3 1 - 3 6 ) . These economic reversals were 
an integral component of the context for intergroup inter­
action during the 1920s and 1930s.
What completed the economic transformation of South 
Africa was a rise in gold prices triggered by the worldwide 
currency devaluations of the 1930s (Houghton 1969, p. 32; de 
Kiewiet 1957, pp. 174-76; Innes 1984, pp. 129-30). This in 
turn ushered in a new era of mining-led economic expansion—  
a long wave of prosperity in a world racked by Depression.
By this juncture, a sufficient industrial and infrastruc­
tural base had been established so as to provide the condi­
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tions for "take-off"— to borrow Rostov's (I960, p. 7) term—  
in industrial development. This expansion occurred with 
such rapidity that by the 1940s, industry surpassed mining 
in its proportional contribution to the South African Gross 
Domestic Product (Innes 1984, p. 167). Given the further 
impetus for economic development provided by World War II, 
the South African economy of the late 1940s exhibited a 
well-developed industrial base, a condition vhich bore scant 
resemblance to its position at the beginning of the century.
In sum, during the years between 1910 and 1948 South 
African society vas transformed from an underdeveloped 
colony/peripheral area to an industrialized semiperipheral 
state. Prom our perspective, this period constitutes a key 
era in the development of South African intergroup rela­
tions— a time of transition between the colonial and modern 
eras. The changing nature of the forces of production 
altered the dimensions of the "arena" in vhich intergroup 
relations occurred; that is, intergroup relations evolved 
from the "national" conflicts (between separate peoples) of 
the colonial era to ethnic conflicts between groups bound 
into a common economy and polity. Moreover, this process 
vas shaped by the specific forms of South African capitalist 
development (e.g., the mining-based economy) and by the eth- 
class structure vhich emerged from the colonial era. Our 
task in the remainder of this section is to explore the 
changing nature of intergroup relations during this era,
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with particular attention devoted to struggles between eth- 
classes and their impact upon group identities.
Eth-Class Struggles and Group Identities.
From the standpoint of intergroup relations, the period 
from 1910 to 1948 covered the transition from the colonial 
social structure to the system of apartheid characteristic 
of modern South Africa. On the one hand, the struggles of 
the early twentieth century were shaped by the eth-class 
structure vhich emerged from the colonial era and by racial 
ideologies and cultural practices which evolved from pre­
vious eth-class struggles (e.g., the use of notions of 
racial superiority to legitimate the dispossession and 
domination of Africans). Thus, intergroup relations were 
shaped by the material interests of various eth-classes and 
by socio-cultural understandings stemming from earlier 
conflicts.102 On the other hand, the eth-class struggles of 
early twentieth century South Africa took place in an inter­
group arena defined by the processes of South African capi­
talist development, which in the period between 1910 and 
1948 were the mining-led economic transformation and the 
emergence of a substantial industrial sector, both of which 
vere punctuated by periodic crises in mining and agricul­
ture. In addition, South African society experienced a 
continuation and intensification of the process of proletar­
ianization vhich had begun in the nineteenth century, as 
economic changes uprooted small farmers and peasants and
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forced increasing numbers of both Africans and Afrikaners 
into the vorking class. This changing economic context 
altered the material interests of the various eth-classes, 
who in turn responded by changing intergroup relations and 
group identities (i.e., altering past social structures and 
cultural understandings in an attempt to pursue strategic 
interests in a new set of circumstances.
Having outlined the setting for intergroup interaction, 
we will now examine the specific nature of eth-class 
struggles during the period between 1910 and 1948. Our 
discussion will be centered on the following issues: (1)
the initial eth-class struggles after the formation of the 
Union of South Africa; (2) the eth-class alliance between 
the White vorking class and the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie 
and the subsequent expanded use of the state as a vehicle 
for advancing group interests; (3) the rise in Afrikaner 
nationalism as a result of eth-class struggles; (4) the 
upsurge in African nationalism spawned by their subordinate 
status in the South African eth-class structure; and (5) the 
"crisis,f of the 1940s. Throughout our analysis, we will 
place particular emphasis upon the implications of these 
developments for the evolution of group identities.
1. Early struggles: 1910-1924. The South African
eth-class structure at the time of Union contained four 
major eth-class groupings: a largely agrarian Afrikaner
petit bourgeoisie; a British-dominated, mining-based capi­
talist class; a White working class; and a partially prole- 
tarianized African vorking class.103 Each of these eth- 
class groupings had clearly defined material interests; 
however/ there vas no one hegemonic class. Indeed, the 
rough "balance" existing among the White eth-classes, as 
well as the perceived common interest in maintaining domi­
nance over Africans, would be important factors in shaping 
group strategies. Given this state of affairs, our inter­
pretation of early twentieth century South African inter­
group relations will emphasize the role of strategic strug­
gles and alliances between these eth-classes (set, of 
course, in the context of South African capitalist develop­
ment) . As we will seek to demonstrate, it vas this process 
of pursuing group interests which led to the shaping and re­
shaping of the South African eth-class structure.
One issue vhich remained to be determined in the years 
following union vas the matter of who would wield power in 
this new Mstate-nation"--to use Rejai and Enloe's (1969) 
term. South Africa was not a nation— few, if any, of its 
inhabitants viewed themselves as "South African"— but rather 
a conglomerate of sharply defined eth-classes grounded in 
Afrikaner, British, and African ethnicity. Indeed, the 
relationship between the British and the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie could best be characterized as one of "antag­
onistic cooperation" (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 108). The 
only clear outcome at the time of Union was that Africans
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would be excluded from the political arena, that South 
Africa would continue to be controlled by European settler 
eth-classes.
Given the numerical domination of Afrikaners within the 
settler community, the agreement of Union ensured a signifi­
cant role in South African politics for the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie. 3-°* As an eth-class, the Afrikaner petit bour­
geoisie had evolved from the Boer independent class which 
had conquered much of South Africa; however, it vas now 
increasingly internally differentiated as a result of capi­
talist development and the mining revolution (Magubane 
1979, p. 121; Thompson 1969e, p. 339). Thus, the ranks of 
the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie ranged from a landed upper 
class to independent farmers (many of whom would be prole- 
tarianized in the coming decades). This in turn produced 
divisions within the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie with regard 
to relations with the British capitalist class, where the 
largest landowners (and the Transvaal interests most closely 
tied to mining) favored accommodation with Great Britain and 
mining capital, while smaller agricultural interests and 
hard-line Afrikaner nationalists feared continued British 
domination (de Villiers‘1969, p. 368; Buravoy 1974, p. 539). 
Indeed, this strategic division--accommodation vs. resis­
tance— would shape Afrikaner (and South African) politics 
throughout the early twentieth century. With these battle 
lines drawn, the first South African governments vere
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dominated by the accommodationist Botha-Smuts faction, a 
group committed to alliance with Great Britain and mining 
capital (Davies 1973, p. 43; Thompson 1969e, p. 341).109
A major early instance of eth-class struggle and alli­
ance involved the effort by mining capital and the Afrikaner 
petit bourgeoisie to secure a supply of cheap, superex­
ploited African labor.10* This vas essential to the 
material interests of both eth-classes: the nature of gold
mining (unlimited demand at a fixed price, cost constraints, 
and low grade ore) meant that industry profitability was 
based on the exploitation of African labor; while the 
"backwards" (i.e., inefficient, labor intensive) status of 
South African agriculture created a similar link between 
cheap labor and the well-being of the agricultural petit 
bourgeoisie. The guest for cheap African labor in the early 
twentieth century can be viewed as two problems: (1) the
ability to insure that a sufficient number of Africans 
needed to work (i.e., were forced to enter the workforce in 
order to survive); and (2) the ability to control the 
African workforce in order to maintain their status as 
superexploited labor. Paced with this situation, mining 
capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie joined forces 
and used the power of the state to establish what Magubane 
(1979, p. 71) has termed the "migrant labour system"--a 
series of measures designed to insure a steady flow of cheap 
African labor.
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The cornerstone of this effort was the Natives Land Act 
of 1913, a piece of legislation vhich vas originally pro­
posed by the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and subsequently 
supported by mining capital (Southall 1983, p. 24).107 For 
the purposes of this analysis, the Natives Land Act con­
tained two key elements (cf. F. Wilson 1969, pp. 127-31; de 
Kiewiet 1957, pp. 205-06; Magubane 1979, p. 81). First, it 
delineated as "African land" approximately 7.3% of the total 
territory of South Africa (mostly the existing "native re­
serves"), while holding out the promise of an additional 
5.7% to be released at a later date.xo* Africans were only 
permitted to purchase land within these areas, while Whites 
vere proscribed from buying land within these areas. 
Secondly, the act outlawed "farming on the half" and other 
sharecropping or tenancy arrangements vhich enabled Africans 
to pursue peasant farming on White-owned land, permitting 
Africans to reside on White-owned land only as wage laborers 
de Kiewiet 1957, p. 205; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 127-29).xa»
The effects of the Natives Land Act vere stark and 
immediate, dislocating thousands of Africans who were either 
forced to return to the already overcrowded Native Reserves 
or to migrate to urban areas in search of employment (Simons 
and Simons 1969, p. 132; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 129-30). On a 
societal level, this increased the proletarianization of 
Africans by restricting land occupancy and peasant agricul­
ture^— acja3^20matfLliL-asy£iitz_£££££nt_£lJtl]£_J2i2fiiilatLfiiL_aL£
South Africa vas now legally restricted to roughly seven 
percent of the land. The Natives Land Act served the class 
interests of both mining capital and the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie by increasing the numbers of Africans who were 
forced to seek wage employment in the settler economy 
(Southall 1983/ p. 24). In addition, the Act further bene- 
fitted the agricultural petit bourgeoisie by precluding any 
serious competition from African peasant farming (F. Wilson 
1969, pp. 127-31; Fredrickson 1981, p. 244). Thus, while 
many of its supporters couched their arguments in the 
rhetoric of segregation (separate development) and even 
protection of African land tenancy (cf. de Kieviet 1957, p. 
205; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 131-32), the ultimate purposes of 
the Natives Land Act were not ideological but material: the
provision of a steady supply of cheap African labor.110
In essence, the effect of the Natives Land Act was to 
codify and intensify the reserve-based migrant labor system 
which had begun to emerge at the end of the nineteenth 
century— an attempt to eliminate the then existing contra­
dictions (i.e., labor shortages) of the South African 
economy. There were specific advantages for capital in the 
migrant labor system in that it maintained the partially 
proletarianized status of African labor (i.e., wage labor 
retaining an agricultural toehold in the reserve economy), 
which in turn enabled wages to remain below subsistence 
level.111 At the same time, successful maintenance of this
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system required that mining capital and the agricultural 
petit bourgeoisie perform a "balancing act" with respect to 
the peasant economy of the reserves. On the one hand, if 
the agricultural economy of the reserves was to prosper, 
then there would be a shortfall in the number of Africans 
forced to enter the wage-labor workforce. On the other 
hand, if reserve agriculture were to become too weak, then 
the African working class would become fullv proletarian- 
ized, which in turn would increase both its wage require­
ments and its revolutionary potential (Wolpe 1972, pp. 437- 
38; Southall 1983, p. 26).ia-a This balancing act was suffi­
ciently successful so as to enable the reserve-based migrant 
labor system to serve as the foundation of the South African 
economy throughout the first part of the twentieth century.
In addition to insuring an adequate supply of cheap 
African labor, a second exigency for capital was to exert 
effective control over labor; that is, to maintain the 
conditions of superexploitation. This was accomplished both 
through the use of state power and through the practices of 
the mining companies. Shortly after the formation of the 
Union of South Africa, existing labor control legislation 
(e.g., Masters & Servants laws, which made breach of a work 
contract a criminal offense; pass laws, which required 
Africans to obtain an official pass in order to seek or 
change employment) was consolidated and extended to mining 
by the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 (Johnstone 1987,
pp. 35-37; Southall 1983, pp. 24-25).111 Equally important, 
the government acted to administer existing labor control 
laws more effectively (Innes 1984, p. 64). This legislation 
was supplemented by a range of practices of the mining 
industry: monopsonistic recruiting via the Native Recruit­
ing corporation; the maintenance of prison-like compounds 
for mine laborers; and a series of methods for minimizing 
wages— e.g., wage fixation, the minimum average system, and 
the loafer ticket system (Johnstone 1987, pp. 34-45;
Southall 1983, pp. 78-80). Considered in toto. state 
legislation and industry practices constituted a rational­
ized and institutionalized means of exploiting African 
labor, for the benefit of both mining capital and (via 
mining led growth) capitalist interests in general. Indeed, 
given the economic centrality of mining and the dependence 
of mining profitability upon cheap labor, it is no over­
statement to say that the exploitation of African labor was 
the basis of settler prosperity.
A second major area of eth--class struggle was the 
conflict between mining capital and the White working class, 
a conflict which encompassed two areas: (1) the "tradition­
al" (i.e., structurally inherent in capitalism) struggle 
over wages, benefits, and working conditions; and (2) the 
conflict over the role of African labor.X3-* Despite its 
peripheral status, South Africa by the end of the nineteenth 
century had begun to experience increased conflict between
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labor and capital, a phenomenon attributable to the nature 
of mining (i.e., its domination by monopoly capital) and to 
the influx of skilled British (core) mining laborers who 
brought with them a strong union tradition. Indeed, the 
first mining union was established in 1892, and by the end 
of the first decade of the twentieth century. South Africa 
has an increasingly militant labor movement, a labor-based 
political party, and even an active socialist movement 
(Simons and Simons 1969). In 1913, three years after the 
formation of the Union of South Africa, the mining industry 
was racked by major strikes which were settled only with 
direct government intervention (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 167-68; 
Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 156-58). At the same time, the 
White working class was itself an amalgamation of two eth- 
class fractions: skilled labor, which was comprised largely
of British immigrants, and unskilled labor, which increas­
ingly consisted of proletarianized Afrikaner bvwoners .1X9 
This division at times constituted a major obstacle to 
working class solidarity; however, it was of considerably 
lesser significance than the schism between White and 
African labor.
The "traditional" conflict between capital and the 
White working class was complicated by the existence of a 
third party, superexploited African labor, and the fact that 
the interests of capital (and the profitability of the gold 
mines) were linked to maximizing the use of superexploited
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African labor. In direct opposition to these interests vere 
those of the White vorking class, which had used its initial 
monopoly over skilled labor to secure high relative wages 
(averaging three to ten times that of Africans), and which 
feared replacement by cheaper African labor (de Kiewiet 
1957, pp. 210-13; Johnstone 1987, pp. 71-72).ia-« As a 
consequence, the White vorking class pushed for adoption of 
"colour bar" legislation which prohibited the employment of 
non-Whites in particular occupations (e.g., blasters, 
engineers, engine drivers, etc.) where they would be in 
competition with Whites.117 While the first colour bar 
legislation had emerged in the late nineteenth century (a 
colour bar had first been instituted in the Transvaal in 
1893 and was reinstated by the British in 1906), it was the 
Mines and Works Act of 1911 (and attendant regulations) 
which extended and consolidated the colour bar (also refer­
red to as the "White labour policy") in the new settler- 
dominated state (Johnstone 1987, pp. 66-70; Simons and 
Simons 1969, pp. 78-91; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 166). Thus, the 
material interests of the White vorking class vere grounded 
in both the low wages of Africans (which enabled capital to 
"afford" expensive White labor) and the ability of the White 
vorking class to exclude cheap African labor from competing 
for the same jobs.
How can we explain the colour bar with respect to eth- 
class interests? From the perspective of the White vorking
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class, colour bar legislation, as ve have noted, served as a 
means of protecting themselves from being replaced by super­
exploited African labor. Agitation for the colour bar 
reflected the structural insecurity of White workers: as
fully proletarianized, "free" labor they could not compete 
with partially proletarianized and coerced African labor; 
moreover, they recognized that capital had a clear interest 
in replacing them with cheap labor. At the same time, their 
political rights— which Africans did not have and which were 
particularly important given the split between mining capi­
tal and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie— and their monopoly 
on skills Increased the power of the White working class and 
enabled them to protect their "privileged" position.11*
Given that Africans could not be excluded from the mining 
labor force— indeed, both mining profitability and the 
status of the White vorking class rested on the exploitation 
of African labor (Johnstone 1987, pp. 86-87)— job discrimi­
nation served as an effective means for maximizing the 
material interests of the White working class. The only 
other strategic alternative for the White vorking class, a 
cross-ethnic class alliance with African labor, held only a 
promise of long-term gains (i.e., the fruits of class 
struggle waged by a united vorking class). From the vantage 
point of the White worker, this outcome paled by comparison 
to the short term gains (e.g., higher wages, job security) 
realized through job segregation.
A point needs to be made here regarding the relation­
ship between material interests and racist ideologies. We 
maintain that eth-class interest, not racism, was the force 
underlying White working class support for the colour bar.
In other words, job discrimination was not merely a product 
of the racism of the White working class, but instead was a 
reflection of their ethnic and class interests. As members 
of the dominant ethnic group, the White working class had an 
interest in maintaining the privileged position created by 
colonialism; as an upper "fraction" of the working class, it 
had an interest in defending its position from both capital 
and African labor. Indeed, White miners had previously 
attempted to exclude competition from both unskilled Euro­
pean immigrants and Chinese contract labor (Simons and 
Simons 1969, pp. 53, 80-82). Thus, while the racial ideolo­
gies which pervaded both the British Empire and South 
African society undoubtedly channeled and inflamed White 
vorking class antagonism towards African labor, we do not 
believe that they were the determining factor in group 
action.11* Racism was used as an instrument for protecting 
material interests.
At this juncture, the South African situation seemingly 
fits the split labor market thesis of restrictions imposed 
upon capital (which would prefer a free labor market and 
wage competition) by a dominant group vorking class bent 
upon eliminating competition from cheap labor— with ethnic
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antagonism resulting from the "coincidental” relationship 
between ethnicity and labor market status (cf. Bonacich 
1972). While this gives us some useful insights regarding 
the interests of the South African White working class, the 
split labor market model does not, in our opinion, provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the South African case. On one 
hand, the colour bar undoubtedly hurt capital by limiting 
its ability to exploit cheap African labor (e.g., the use of 
African labor in semi-skilled and skilled occupations). On 
the other hand, capital was a clear beneficiary of the 
"split labor market” inasmuch as the migrant labor system 
and the colour bar maintained the "superexploitability" of 
African labor and, hence, the profitability of the mining 
industry (which in turn enabled it to tolerate more expen­
sive White labor). Furthermore, the existence of the colour 
bar effectively divided the vorking class along ethnic 
lines, where a unified vorking class would in all likelihood 
have been able to wage an effective struggle for higher 
wages (thereby reducing profitability). Our conclusion, 
therefore, is that the existence of the colour bar benefit- 
ted both capital and the White working class; the issue 
which divided them was the location of the colour bar--labor 
favoring an extensive colour bar, capital a more limited 
system of segregation (Johnstone 1987, p. 81).X2° Thus, the 
location of the colour bar was the field upon which the 
battle between the mine owners and the White vorking class
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would be fought. The outcome of these struggles would be 
determined by the strength of the respective eth-class 
alliances.
In the first years after the formation of the Union of 
South Africa, the balance of power between eth-classes would 
fluctuate rapidly. Although raining capital and their allies 
were successful in crushing the 1913 strikes, the White 
working class almost immediately gained an advantage in its 
struggles with the mine owners. Shortages of workers during 
both World War I and the brief postwar boom enabled the 
White vorking class to use its economic and political power 
to extract significant concessions from capital with respect 
to wages, benefits, and working conditions (Johnstone 1987, 
pp. 98-99).1=1 In addition, the White working class was 
able in 1918 to coerce mining companies into signing the 
"Status Quo Agreement", a pact which extended the colour bar 
and proscribed any replacement of White workers by Africans 
(Simons and Simons 1969, p. 278; Johnstone 1987, pp. 109- 
11).122
The context for eth-class struggle was changed drama­
tically by the onset in 1921 of the post war profitability 
crisis in gold mining. The mining industry sought to 
address this crisis by attacking the colour bar through the 
increased use of African labor. While mine owner rhetoric 
stressed the rights of African workers, the overriding 
motivating interest was economic. Only by substituting
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cheap African labor (often in conjunction with mechaniza­
tion) for more highly paid White labor could the mining 
industry achieve the lower costs and higher productivity 
(i.e., output per shift) necessary to restore profita­
bility. When the Chamber of Mines unilaterally abrogated
the Status Quo Agreement, White workers struck in January of 
1922— triggering the bloody confrontation known as the Rand 
Revolt (Johnstone 1987, pp. 125-45; Simons and Simons 1969, 
pp. 279-97). Stripped to its barest essentials, the Rand 
Revolt was an all-out struggle between capital and labor 
over the location of the colour bar: the White working
class was fighting to preserve its position; mining capital 
was attempting to crush the unions and restore profitability 
by limiting the colour bar. The ethnic and class nature of 
this confrontation was reflected in the slogan "Workers of 
the world unite and fight for a White South Africa" (Burawoy 
1974, p. 540; Davies 1973, p. 43)— a rare example of "eth- 
class consciousness." Ultimately, the intransigence of the 
mining industry and the military forces of the government 
(Smuts' South African Party having combined with the mining- 
backed Unionist Party in 1920— Simons and Simons 1969, p. 
249) combined to crush the rebellion and enable mining 
capital to restore profitability by reorganizing labor and 
restricting the colour bar (Johnstone 1987, pp. 136-37; 
Simons and Simons 1969, p. 3 0 0 ) . This apparently consti­
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tuted a complete victory for mining capital; however, as we 
shall see below, it was to prove a short-lived triumph.
2. Eth-class alliance: the Pact Government. A turn­
ing point in South African politics was the emergence of an 
eth-class alliance between the White working class and the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, and the subsequent success of 
this alliance in capturing state power. Shortly after 
mining capital and the Smuts government had combined to 
crush the Rand Revolt, the Labour Party (representing 
British-dominated craft unions) and the Nationalist Party 
(established in 1914 by a faction of the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie which rejected the accommodationist policies of 
Prime Ministers Botha and Smuts— cf. de Villiers 1969, pp. 
369-70; Moodie 1975, pp. 73-82) agreed to electoral cooper­
ation in opposition to the Smuts government. In the 1924 
elections, this alliance was successful in defeating Smuts 
and creating a Nationalist-Labour coalition government (the 
"Pact Government” ), dominated by the Nationalist Party under 
Prime Minister Hertzog.laB Prom our perspective, the sur­
passing significance of this development was that the White 
working class/Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie eth-class alliance 
embarked upon the use of state power to advance group 
interests on a scale which would transform the structure of 
South African intergroup relations (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 
164; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 224). Indeed, as Davies (1973, p.
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44) asserts, "it is this class alliance which remains the 
key to understanding the South African system."
The eth-class alliance between the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie and the White working class was grounded in 
common economic and political interests vis-a-vis other eth- 
class groupings. First, both groups shared an interest in 
industrial segregation (i.e., the colour bar): the White
vorking class for reasons of protection and privilege; the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie for the purpose of maintaining 
its supply of cheap agricultural labor (inasmuch as the 
colour bar would restrict the flow of African labor towards 
mining and industry). Secondly, both groups had an interest 
in constraining the power of mining (core) capital and its 
local allies. The Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie feared that 
the growing economic power of British-dominated mining 
capital (which they often referred to collectively and 
pejoratively as "Hoggenheimer"— an epithet derived from the 
surname of the Oppenheimer family which controlled the 
Anglo-American Mining Corporation--cf. Moodie 1975, p. 90) 
would channel South African economic development in a 
direction inimical to agricultural interests, while the 
White vorking class had just experienced the effects of 
unbridled capitalist power in the crushing of the Rand 
Revolt (cf. Johnstone 1987, pp. 152-54). Indeed, these two 
eth-classes had been taking tentative steps towards each 
other (e.g., petit bourgeoisie support for the Mines and
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Works Act of 1911); however, any dynamics facilitating 
coalition had hitherto been offset by mutual mistrust (e.g., 
Afrikaner resentment of British support for the British 
empire; British fear of Afrikaner nationalism; the Afrikaner 
fear of union socialism) before any eth-class alliance could 
emerge (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 303).
In addition to common interests, there vere compelling 
strategic and ideological reasons for the post-1924 eth- 
class alliance, reasons rooted in the unique eth-class 
configuration of the South African political arena. Given 
the exclusion of Africans and the sixtv-fortv Afrikaner- 
British split within the White population, the Afrikaner 
agricultural petit bourgeoisie needed White vorking class 
support in order to overcome the political dominance of 
mining capital, British South Africans, and their allies 
(e.g., Coloureds, accommodationist Afrikaners). If the eth- 
class alliance which led to the Pact Government was grounded 
in common interests and considerations of political strat­
egy, the final bonds vere ideological. Afrikaner national­
ism helped fuse together the petit bourgeoisie and the 
expanding Afrikaner segment of the White vorking class; many 
Afrikaners feared British domination, harbored smoldering 
resentments from the South African War, and viewed Smuts as 
a collaborator ("the Handyman of the Empire"— Moodie 1975, 
p. 88). In the same vein, racist doctrines provided a 
common ideological base for the policies of segregation,
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domination/ and exploitation which benefitted both the petit 
bourgeoisie and the White working c l a s s . T h u s ,  the ideo­
logical/ while emerging from material circumstances, was in 
turn able to shape the direction of eth-class relations.
Once in power, the Pact Government and its Nationalist- 
dominated successors made effective use of the state to 
advance the interests of their eth-class coalition. Not 
surprisingly, the government expanded state involvement in 
the agricultural sector--the agrarian petit bourgeoisie 
being the power base of the Nationalist Party. During the 
years after 1924, the government increased the number of 
programs designed to stimulate production or otherwise 
improve the economic position of farmers (de Kiewiet 1957, 
pp. 257-61; F. Wilson 1969, pp. 137-40). Even more critical 
vere measures designed to improve the status of the White 
vorking class, for the persistence of the ruling eth-class 
alliance was contingent upon the ability of Afrikaner petty 
bourgeois politicians to deliver benefits to the White 
vorking class. Almost immediately, the Pact government was 
able to reinstate and extend the mining colour bar (which 
had been limited by mining capital and invalidated by a 1923 
judicial decision) in the Mine and Works Amendment Act of 
1926 (Johnstone 1987, p. 162; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 228;
Davies 1973, p. 45; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 340-41).
This action was, however, but the first in a series of
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policies designed to protect the White vorking class and 
solidify the eth-class alliance.
A major concern for White South Africa during the 1920s 
and 19 30s vas vhat was described as the "poor White" prob­
lem— as though "poor White" vas a social oxymoron.137 This 
referred to the increasing proportion of the population 
(one-tenth to one-sixth of the population— de Kiewiet 1957, 
p. 181; Magubane 1979, p. 183), largely proletarianized and 
displaced Afrikaners, who had no industrial skills and who 
could not compete in the unskilled labor market against 
superexploited African labor (whom, of course, employers 
vere only too willing to exploit).128 From the perspective 
of the government and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, the 
poor White phenomenon vas threatening for two reasons: (1)
the potential for cross-ethnic class alliances between poor 
Whites and Africans; and (2) the potential for intermarriage 
and the weakening of ethnic boundaries, which in turn would 
threaten White political and economic hegemony (Simons and 
Simons 1969, pp. 516-17; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 221-22). 
Furthermore, it quickly became evident that the poor White 
problem could not be solved by increasing the utilization of 
Whites as unskilled mining labor (i.e., by extending the 
colour bar even further). Given the nature of South African 
gold mining, the profitability of the mines--and, by 
extension, the health of the South African economy and the 
revenue base of the government— was dependent upon the
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exploitation of African labor (via the coercive migrant 
labor system) at wage levels at which Whites were unwilling 
to work.
In response to this dilemma, the government established 
a "civilized labour" policy; that is, a series of measures 
to protect the White working class and discriminate against 
the use of cheap labor (Davies 1973, p. 45; de Kiewiet 1957, 
p. 224). Foremost among these was the Wage Act (1925), 
which maintained the White-African wage gap by asserting 
different subsistence needs for the two groups and then 
setting "civilized" (i.e., European) wage levels for certain 
occupations— assuming that given equal wages, employers 
would prefer White labor (Johnstone 1987, p. 156; de Kiewiet 
1957, pp. 273-75). This wage policy was buttressed by 
making the awarding of government contracts and the exten­
sion of tariff protection contingent upon industries follow­
ing the government wage guidelines (Davies 1973, p. 45; 
Burawoy 1974, p. 541). In addition, the government itself 
served as an employer of poor Whites at "civilized" wages 
through expanded public works programs and the development 
of state owned industries (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 229). De­
spite these measures, resolution of the poor White problem 
was a slow process, as the government was unwilling to risk 
economic disruption for the benefit of the White working 
class (e.g., limiting application of the Wage Act when 
business profitability was threatened— Simons and Simons
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1969, p. 338). Eventually, however, these policies, along 
with the economic and industrial boom of the mid-1930s, 
produced the remarkably low White unemployment rate which 
became a characteristic of the South African economy 
(Davies 1973, pp. 46-48).
On a general level, ve would maintain that the civi­
lized labour policy did not turn the White working class 
into an elite (as Simons and Simons--1969, p. 325--suggest), 
but instead gave the White working class a vested interest 
in the status quo and in a continued alliance with the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie.12* The system of job discrimi­
nation (e.g., colour bars, the civilized labour policy) 
enabled the White working class to enjoy artificially high 
wages, employment levels, and mobility (a position which was 
only possible due to the small relative size of the White 
vorking class). This in turn had two important consequences 
for South African society. First, it solidified the eth- 
class alliance between the White working class and the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, as the White working class gave 
its allegiance to the state and in return enjoyed continued 
protection of its material interests. Secondly, the civi­
lized labour policy solidified the connection between the 
interests of the White vorking class and the petit bour­
geoisie and the subjection of the African population, a 
linkage which would lead to further measures to maintain 
White supremacy.
As ve consider the actions of the eth-class alliance 
between the White vorking class and the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie, a question arises regarding the role of mining 
capital and British interests, now cast in the role of 
opposition. Although the petit bourgeoisie/White working 
class coalition pursued different policies, and the Afri­
kaners sought to increase their political and economic 
power, the interests of mining capital were not clearly 
contravened by any actions of the new government. Indeed, 
the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie had a clear interest in 
maintaining the health of the mining industry, for mining 
remained the basis of economic prosperity and government 
revenues— which the petit bourgeoisie needed in order to 
advance its own interests (Magubane 1979, p. 174; Burawoy 
1974, p. 537). Thus, government policies tended to preserve 
the migrant labor system and the flow of cheap labor into 
the mines. At the same time, mining capital found the 
colour bar and the civilized labour policy to be an accept­
able price to pay for peace with the White working class- 
petit bourgeoisie alliance (Fredrickson 1981, p. 234). In 
short, there was no overriding conflict of interest between 
mining capital and the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie.3-30 
Indeed, all White eth-classes had an interest in maintaining 
a political economy which assured White supremacy and con­
tinued capitalist accumulation; the differences which did
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exist were more a matter of disputing the appropriate means 
for achieving this goal.1*1
3. Eth-class alliance; Afrikaner nationalism. A 
third major intergroup phenomenon in South African society 
during the first half of the twentieth century was the emer­
gence of Afrikaner nationalism as a significant political 
force.132 Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to assert 
that Afrikaner nationalism vas a dominating factor in South 
African during this era. The unique Boer/Afrikaner identity 
was molded by the events of the nineteenth century-~isola- 
tion, the wars of conquest versus the Africans, and the 
conflict with British imperialism.1 ** From an "ethnic 
studies" standpoint, Afrikaner ethnicity had a firm basis: 
cultural differences (e.g., language and religion) from 
other groups; a strong feeling of peoplehood and a claimed 
"territory"; and a sense of common experience and historical 
injury (what Hoodie— 1975— has termed the "sacred history" 
of Afrikanerdom). Yet all of these factors existed prior to 
1910. What is analytically interesting is the upsurge in 
Afrikaner nationalism during the first half of the twentieth 
century, a phenomenon which requires new explanations.
At the time of Union, the position of Afrikanerdom had 
both strengths and weaknesses with respect to the potential 
for group mobilization. Although the Union of South Africa 
was formed under the auspices of British imperialism, the 
creation of a unitary South African society brought all
381
Afrikaners into one intergroup arena— as opposed to pre- 
Union days, when group activity had been linked to the 
British colonies and the Boer Republics. Other strengths 
included the numerical domination of Afrikaners within the 
White community (which provided a potential electoral base 
for political power and a strong incentive for group mobili­
zation) and the British acceptance of linguistic equality 
(which provided an institutional footing for Afrikaner 
culture).13* At the same time, the Afrikaner community 
contained major internal divisions--most notably the con­
flict between the accommodationists (i.e., the Botha-Smuts 
governments) and the resolute nationalists— which were 
reflected in Hertzog's withdrawal from the South African 
Party and the formation of the Nationalist Party in 1914. 
Thus, Afrikaner nationalism was still in its formative 
stages in the early twentieth century; however, it now had a 
vehicle for political mobilization--the Nationalist Party.
While some aspects of nationalist assertion took place 
on an ideological level (e.g., Afrikaner resistance and 
revolt against South African participation in World War I —  
de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 168-69; continued agitation for status 
as a republic outside of the British Commonwealth— de 
Villiers 1969, pp. 391-93), twentieth century Afrikaner 
nationalism vas not the persistence of primordial tribalism. 
Afrikaner nationalism flourished because it served the class 
interests of the Afrikaner petit .bourgeoisie and intelli-
qentsia. Appreciation of this point must be linked to an 
understanding of the eth-class interests of these two 
groups. The Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and intellectual 
eth-classes occupied an intermediate position in the overall 
South African eth-class structure, one which was clearly 
inferior in comparison to British mining and finance capi­
tal. Moreover, the agricultural power base of the petit 
bourgeoisie left them vulnerable to the effects of capital­
ist development and British economic power (Burawoy 1974, p. 
539). Given these circumstances, acquisition of state power 
became the best and perhaps only means of advancing the 
material interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. The 
problem, however, was that the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie 
was neither large enough nor sufficiently united to pursue 
this strategy. Ethnic mobilization (i.e., obtaining the 
support of the Afrikaner working class bv couching eth-class 
interests in ethnic terms and by stressing symbolic issues—  
e.g.. lanquaqe--to promote unitv) would provide the 
solution.
During the same period (1910-1924), a second dynamic 
was occurring which would further strengthen the basis of 
Afrikaner nationalism. Forces of social change— proletari­
anization and urbanization--transformed Afrikaner society by 
turning farmers and bywoners into an urban vorking class.13S 
The newly urbanized and proletarianized Afrikaners found 
themselves in unfamiliar surroundings (the cities were
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centers of British culture) and often at a disadvantage in 
labor market competition with the British (who dominated 
the ranks of skilled labor) and Africans (preferred by 
employers due to their "superexploited” status). These 
circumstances left the Afrikaner vorking class receptive to 
nationalist appeals which both appealed to their psychologi­
cal needs and provided a basis for advancing their material 
interests (Giliomee 1979a, p. 107). Thus, in addition to a 
common interest in the colour bar, Afrikaner nationalism—  
initially promoted by the petit bourgeoisie as a means of 
advancing their interests vis-a-vis British capital— became 
the cement for a cross-class ethnic alliance between the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and vorking classes.
The accession to power of the Pact Government did not 
represent a complete triumph for Afrikaner nationalism, for 
the eth-class alliance which led to the Pact Government also 
included the British-dominated Labour party (British influ­
ence within the labor movement reflected the nevly-proletar- 
ianized status of the Afrikaner vorking class). As a conse­
quence, the Nationalist Party was forced to soft-pedal Afri­
kaner nationalism in order to avoid alienating its coalition 
partners (Moodie 1975, p. 91). Furthermore, the narrowness 
of the electoral mandate of the Pact Government and the 
continuing political strength of Smuts and the South African 
Party constituted additional constraints upon the National­
ist agenda (de Villiers 1969, p. 379; van den Berghe 1965,
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p. 294). In this context, the Nationalists found appeals to 
White unity to be strategically more effective in establish­
ing a political common ground.X3a This in turn further 
imbued Afrikaner nationalism with an anti-African tone which 
vas at least as powerful as pro-Afrikaner sentiment, a 
development which would only further heighten conflict 
between Africans and Whites.
Once in possession of state power, the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie used the state as a vehicle for furthering its 
eth-class interests. The political interests of this class 
were advanced by protecting White labor via the colour bar 
and the civilized labour policy, thereby maintaining the 
eth-class alliance with the White working class (which, 
while by no means an equal partner, provided crucial elec­
toral support).13,7 In addition, the Afrikaner petit bour­
geoisie vas able to advance its own material interests 
through both agricultural programs and, more importantly, 
through the use of the power of the state to facilitate 
Afrikaner entrance into the modern sector of the economy. 
This latter goal vas accomplished through development of the 
state capitalist sector and Afrikaner monopolization of 
government employment, both of which provided an urban power 
base for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (cf. Davies 1973, 
pp. 48-49; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 60-61). What is signi­
ficant about this development is that the interests of the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie vere increasingly wedded to the
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exercise of state power as a means of maintaining and en­
hancing economic power (Magubane 1979, p. 188; Davies 1973, 
p. 56). Consequently, the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie made 
increasing use of the "nationalist card"--the twin specters 
of British imperialism and the African threat--as an 
ideological prop for their political position.
Another manifestation of increasing Afrikaner national­
ism vas the proliferation of ethnic activity outside of the 
realm of politics. In addition to Afrikaner schools, social 
organizations and newspapers, this included the Broederbond 
(a secret society which played a key role in organizing the 
Afrikaner elite and coordinating nationalist activity), the 
FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniainas— a cultural 
organization), and trade unions (Moodie 1975, pp. 96-115; de 
Villiers 1969, pp. 395-401; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 517- 
25). Also significant was Afrikaner economic nationalism-- 
exhortations to patronize ons eie mense ("our own people"), 
the amassing of funds for Afrikaner entrepreneurs, and the 
organization of Afrikaner investment companies (Magubane 
1979, pp. 175-76; Moodie 1975, pp. 202-07; Simons and Simons 
1969, p. 612).a-** From our perspective, these developments 
can be interpreted in the context of urbanization and in­
creasing intergroup competition; that is, as a response to 
the perceived threats posed by Africans and the British. On 
a practical level, the effect of the emergence of these
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organizations vas to expand the ideological and material 
bases of Afrikaner nationalism.
Despite the increase in nationalist sentiment and 
activity, the realization of Afrikaner hegemony vas a long, 
dravn-out process. A major obstacle to unity vas the exis­
tence of divisions vithin Afrikanerdom, particularly vith 
regard to such issues as the definition of "Afrikaner"
(i.e., vhether the ethnic boundary extended to all White 
South Africans or vould be restricted to Afrikaans speakers) 
and relations vith the British (de Villiers 1969, p. 380; 
Giliomee 1969a, p. 101). Matters came to a head in 1933, 
vhen Hertzog joined vith Smuts to form a government (the 
"Fusion" government) and subsequently merged the Nationalist 
and South African Parties into the United South African 
Nationalist Party--later the United Party (Simons and Simons 
1969, p. 4 6 9 ) . This vas anathema to hardline national­
ists, vho in turn formed a nev opposition party, the Puri­
fied Nationalist Party, under the leadership of D.F. Malan 
(Moodie 1975, pp. 126-45).1*° Moreover, by returning 
British capital (affiliated vith Smuts and the South African 
Party) to a position of pover, "fusion" posed a threat to 
the material interests of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, 
all of vhom depended upon access to state pover to compete 
vith British-South Africans (Giliomee 1979b, pp. 152-53).
The effect of these developments--internecine struggle, the 
return to opposition, the return of Smuts as Prime Minister
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(Hertzog resigned in 1939 when the Cabinet voted to enter 
World War II)— was to increase Afrikaner militancy.1*1 
Indeed, it was during the late 1930s— particularly the Great 
Trek centennial celebration of 1938--that Afrikaner nation­
alism became a mass movement (Moodie 1975, pp. 177-93).
This ethnic resurgence would play a significant role in the 
postwar restoration of Afrikaner political power.
4. African nationalism; conflict and ethnic asser­
tion . Thus far, our discussion has treated Africans more as 
objects (or victims) of eth-class struggle than as active 
participants. While they were clearly involved in the 
abovementioned struggles (e.g., Africans were the "third 
party" in the struggle between mining capital and the White 
working class over the colour bar), the fragmentation and 
political powerlessness of Africans served to limit their 
ability to act. At the same time, there were also strong 
forces which favored the development of an African national 
consciousness. Incorporation into a settler-dominated 
society increased intergroup contact and awareness of the 
differences between Africans and Europeans. Entrance into 
the mining workforce (which began in the late nineteenth 
century) brought Africans from different ethnic groups 
together under common conditions of exploitation (Magubane 
1979, p. 272). Perhaps the most important dynamic of all. 
however, was the fact that natives were subject to White 
domination as Africans (i.e.. lumped together as "Kaffirs"
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or "Bantu ”) rather than as members of a particular ethnic 
group (e.g.. as Zulus. Xhosa^etc.). Thus, the national 
(racial) nature of exploitation and oppression gave rise to 
a national consciousness.142
Despite the strength of these unifying forces, the 
development of a broad-based African nationalism was a slow 
process. In our view, this can be attributed to the exis­
tence of two factors. First, the partial proletarianization 
of African labor (a result of the migrant labor system which 
maintained ties to the rural reserves) slowed the formation 
of a permanent urban working class and encouraged the per­
sistence of traditional group identities, both of which in 
turn inhibited national mobilization. Secondly, harsh state 
repression and rigid social and political controls (e.g., 
the compound system) further dampened African attempts to 
resist tfhite domination. As a consequence, the period from 
1910 to 1948 saw the painfully slow emergence of African 
nationalism, as the propelling dynamics were often out­
weighed by countervailing forces. Nevertheless, the events 
of this period were crucial to the development of African 
nationalism, as they created the basis for a common national 
consciousness which would dominate intergroup relations in 
the years following World War II.
The emergence of African nationalism involved a process 
of ethnic merger: that is, the fusion of regional ethnic 
Identities (e.g., Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho)— which were in
themselves still emerging from precapitalist Mtribaln ties—  
into an "African” group identity.143 First steps towards 
this group mobilization were taken in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries— as intellectuals established 
autonomous "Ethiopian" churches, and as Africans responded 
to their political exclusion by founding the African 
National Congress (ANC) in 1912 (Kuper 1969b, p. 435; Simons 
and Simons 1969, pp. 132-34). One characteristic of the 
early stages of this ethnic merger was its petty bourgeois 
base, as the ANC was dominated by professionals and intel­
lectuals {Simons and Simons 1969, p. 116). The fact that an 
"African" national consciousness first emerged among the 
petit bourgeoisie reflected their awareness of the disjun­
ction between their class and ethnic status.144 What was 
significant about this development was that initial nation­
alist strategies reflected the experiences and interests of 
the African petit bourgeoisie (e.g., the use of "constitu­
tional methods" such as resolutions or petitions to Great 
Britain), not the economic interests of the working class. 
During the period prior to World War II, this "petty bour­
geois nationalism", as well as the slower evolution of 
nationalism among the working class {due to their partially 
proletarianized status), served to hinder the alliance of 
African eth-class segments.143
For this analysis, a significant question pertains to 
whether African resistance would be expressed in class or
national terms. Given the overtly racial nature of South 
African society and the relative absence of class differen­
tiation within the African group, one might expect that 
Africans would mobilize along national lines. At the same 
time, the "racial" oppression of Africans also reflected the 
class interests (e.g., profit, cheap labor, occupational 
privilege) of various White eth-classes. Moreover, the lack 
of significant economic differentiation within African 
groups (i.e., most Africans were wage laborers or peasant 
farmers) and the fact that African national identity (as 
opposed to ethnic or "tribal" ties) was still in the early 
stages of emergence made class-based group action a seem­
ingly viable alternative. This potential became reality in 
labor actions by African workers (strikes as early as 1875, 
with major strikes in 1918 and 1920— Magubane 1979, pp. 280- 
85; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 211-12, 230-32) and in the 
formation and growth of the African-based Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union (ICU).
Despite this initial surge of eth-class action articu­
lated in class terms, the African working class was unable 
to maintain effective mobilization during the first half of 
the twentieth century (indeed, the early 1920s were the high 
water mark for such activities). We believe that this can 
be attributed to three factors. First, the partially prole- 
tarianized status of African labor inhibited the emergence 
of class consciousness inasmuch as the migrant labor system
maintained the temporary status of wage workers. Moreover, 
continued ties to the reserves maintained ethnic divisions, 
which in turn undermined class solidarity (African labor 
movements were, after all, alliances of eth-class segments—  
e.g., Zulu workers, Xhosa workers, etc.). A second key 
factor limiting class-based action was the lack of coopera­
tion and even outright hostility from the White working 
class (the optimal class action, of course, being an eth- 
class alliance of African and White workers), who sought 
instead to maintain their relative privileges at the expense 
of African labor. 1'#s This precluded any broad based eth- 
class alliance and weakened the position of the African 
working class. The third obstacle confronting African 
workers' organizations was state repression: strikes
brought immediate and harsh response, while the ability of 
Africans to form labor unions was restricted by the Indus­
trial Conciliation Act of 1924.3-'*’7 As a result of these and 
other factors, the ICU withered away in the late 1920s, 
taking with it any prospects for class-based mobilization 
during this era.5-'**
Thus far, we have asserted that the major force in the 
weakening of both national and class based African resis­
tance was repression. The political control of Africans—  
that is, the ability of Whites to use state power to re­
strict African group action— was a core aspect of South 
African eth-class struggle. Indeed, political domination of
the African population was essential to the interests of all 
White eth-classes: both the migrant labor system (and
profits of the mine owners and the agrarian petit bour­
geoisie) and the colour bar (and the privileged position of 
the White working class) were maintained by state action.
But political control went far beyond economically-oriented 
measures. Particularly critical were measures which repro­
duced the political powerlessness of the African population, 
for this was the cornerstone of White domination. Given the 
overwhelming numerical superiority of the African popula­
tion, anything remotely resembling political equality would 
bring an end to White political and economic hegemony (thus 
the immediacy of White opposition to any measures which 
would increase African political power). As a consequence, 
political control of Africans was undertaken by all White 
governments— differences, such as those between Smuts and 
the Nationalist Party— were merely a matter of degree.
While the African majority had been effectively disen­
franchised from the beginning, political control meant more 
than maintaining the status quo. The system of White domi­
nation was subject to destabilizing forces in the form of 
the increasing proletarianization and urbanization of the 
African population. A fully proletarianized African urban 
working class would be a potentially formidable political 
force in eth-class struggle, as opposed to a fragmented and 
partially proletarianized work force. Accordingly, the
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South African state sought to forestall this threat and 
maintain political control by increasing the segregation of 
Africans (thus, segregation vas a product of increased 
intergroup contact). A major step in this direction was the 
Urban Areas Act of 1923, which restricted the right of 
Africans to remain in urban locations and extended the 
provisions of the colonial pass laws (Welsh 1969, pp. 197- 
98; de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 229-31).1-** As much as any single 
state action, the Urban Areas Act maintained the partial 
proletarianization of the African population and, hence, 
extended White political control.
A second area of political control vas the political 
sphere itself. While Africans were effectively disenfran­
chised, Whites feared that urbanization would in time lead 
to acculturation and demands for political representation 
(and, ultimately, the loss of White hegemony). Accordingly, 
South African governments enacted a series of measures 
(e.g., the Native Affairs Act of 1920, the Native Adminis­
tration Act of 1927, and the Representation of Natives Act 
of 1936) designed to remove Africans from political life by 
establishing separate political, legal, and social institu­
tions in the context of the reserves (Magubane 1979, pp. 84- 
88; de Kiewiet 1957, p. 235). By 1936, Africans had lost 
even their limited franchise in the Cape, and political 
representation was restricted to three White representatives 
to Parliament (out of 150) and an "advisory" Natives Repre-
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sentative Council (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 495; Kuper 
1969b, p. 452).180 Equally significant was the ideological 
rationale for this legislation--the assertion that segrega­
tion reflected the natural order of things and that Whites 
and Africans should each develop in their own manner (de 
Kiewiet 1957, p. 235; Magubane 1979, pp. 84-85)--a precursor 
of the system of apartheid which was to come.
In addition to political exclusion, the 1927 Native 
Administration Act furthered the goal of segregation by 
attempting to revive traditional culture and by restoring 
the power of chiefs (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 345; Magu­
bane 1979, p. 84). The purpose of this legislation was to 
use traditional African "tribal" identities as a means of 
separation and control--by fostering traditional practices 
to inhibit acculturation and by installing traditional 
authority figures (chiefs) as a petty bureaucrats (de 
Kiewiet 1957, pp. 236-37; Magubane 1979, p. 84). In 
essence, the White South African state was employing eth­
nicity as a weapon; that is, it was attempting to revive 
aspects of traditional culture to create new subordinate 
African ethnic identities. There is considerable historical 
irony attached to this strategy, for it was nineteenth cen­
tury European conquest and deliberate policies of decultura- 
tion which had resulted in the disintegration of traditional 
African societies. While it was probably impossible to 
reverse the ethnic fusion which was creating an "African"
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Identity, the White South African "ethnic weapon" was 
nonetheless effective in retarding African mobilization by 
maintaining reserve-based ethnic identities (e.g., Zulu, 
Pedi, etc.) and by creating a comprador class (chiefs and 
headmen) whose interests were tied to political separation.
The eth-class struggles described above had specific 
outcomes— segregation, political control, migrant labor, and 
partial proletarianization— which produced a social system 
with a high level of reproduction; that is, one which main­
tained the correlation between ethnic affiliation (African) 
and class position (partially proletarianized labor).
Indeed, the material circumstances of Africans seemingly 
worsened over the period, given the continued decline of 
real wages under conditions of superexploitation (Southall 
1983, p. 80; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 569-71). Such 
practices as the colour bar and the migrant labor system 
retarded both economic mobility and the emergence of a 
stable, self-conscious urban proletariat. Nevertheless, 
White South Africa vas only postponing the inevitable.1®1
5. The "crisis" of the 1940s. The first half of the 
twentieth century was a time of rapid economic and social 
change for South African society. With respect to inter­
group relations, this period was dominated by eth-class 
struggles between British mining capital, the Afrikaner 
petit bourgeoisie, the White working class, and the African 
working class, as well as the emergence of an eth-class
alliance between the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and the 
White working class). Our analysis emphasized three major 
outcomes: (1) the evolution of the system of segregation—
the migrant labor system, the colour bar, and the native 
reserves— as a reflection of the political power and eco­
nomic interests of the White eth-classes vis-a-vis the 
African majority; (2) the Afrikaner-British conflict and 
the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism as a potent political 
force; and (3) the slow development of African resistance to 
White domination, a process inhibited by partial proletari­
anization and by White political control. Thus, in the 
three decades following independence. South Africa gave rise 
to a unique system of social relations, a system shaped by 
the exigencies of capitalist development (e.g., gold mining) 
and by the material interests of specific eth-classes.
If there is any constant in intergroup relations, how­
ever, it is that they are in a continuous state of change. 
South Africa in the first half of the twentieth century was 
no exception, for during this period dynamics were in force 
which would alter the nature of relations between groups.
By the 1940s, the contradictions of the reserve-based 
migrant labor system— the bulwark of the South African 
political economy— had reached the crisis stage (Saul and 
Gelb 1986, p. 67). The "balancing act" upon which the 
system depended (i.e., the ability of the reserve economy to 
subsidize superexploited African migrant labor) vas eroded
by the decline of African agriculture (manifest in increas­
ing poverty and landlessness and declining productivity) as 
a consequence of underdevelopment and population pressures 
(Wolpe 1972/ pp. 440-42; Southall 1983, pp. 73-88). At the 
same time, the post-1933 economic expansion generated an 
increased demand for cheap African labor, particularly as 
unskilled and semi-skilled factory workers (where the "civi­
lized labour policy" made them less expensive than White 
workers) in the rapidly growing industrial sector (Freund 
1988, pp. 121-23; Southall 1983, p. 30). This combination 
of push and pull factors resulted in a dramatic influx of 
Africans into urban areas and into the industrial workforce- 
-the percentage of Africans residing in urban areas rose 
from 18.4% in 1936 to 23.7% in 1946, the number employed in 
industry increased during the same period from 270,000 to
457,000 (Kuper 1969b, p. 451). Moreover, a significant 
proportion of this population was becoming permanently 
urbanized (Welsh 1969, pp. 209-10). In the words of the 
Fagan Commission (cited by Magubane 1979, p. 130): "The
natives have come to town and they have come to stay."
For the African population, one major outcome of urban­
ization was a more complete proletarianization of the work­
ing class. This was manifest in the emergence of a "cul­
turally new working class" with new "urban" concerns (e.g., 
transportation, housing) and supported by an array of new 
institutions and associations (Freund 1988, p. 124; Welsh
1969, pp. 214-19). The material interests of this urban 
proletariat were asserted in a variety of ways: bus boy­
cotts in response to fare increases; squatter camps in the 
face of overcrowding in slums; and strikes in reaction to 
low wages (Magubane 1979, pp. 127-28; Simons and Simons 
1969, pp. 554-55). In terms of destabilization of the 
existing order, the upsurge in strike activity— strikes 
absorbed 1,684,915 African man hours in the 1940s, as 
opposed to 171,088 in the 1930s (Wolpe 1972, p. 445)— was 
particularly significant.1*2 This resistance reached its 
zenith with the 1946 Mine Workers' Strike, when 75,000 to
100,000 African miners paralyzed the mining industry with a 
week long strike which was brutally crushed by the police 
(O'Meara 1975; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 571-77; Magubane 
1979, pp. 293-94). Clearly, the_ further proletarianization 
of the African working class was creating the basis for a 
challenge to the underpinnings of the entire social system.
The crisis of the 1940s and the African "challenge from 
below" had varying implications for the material interests 
of the different White eth-classes. Industrial capital 
(still primarily British) stood to benefit the most from a 
stable African work force— which would enable capital to 
take advantage of labor which was both cheaper and more 
permanent (i.e., better trained and more productive). As a 
consequence, industrial capital was more willing to consider 
the relaxation of restrictions on the urban migration of
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Africans, so long as the hegemony of capital remained un­
challenged (cf. Welsh— 1969, pp. 200-01— on the recommenda­
tions by the Smits Committee that the pass lavs be abol­
ished).103 In contrast, other fractions of capital— e.g., 
mining, vith its need for fixed costs; agriculture, predomi­
nantly Afrikaner, vhose survival depended upon cheap African 
labor— believed that profitability would be jeopardized (due 
to either higher wages or loss of workers to other sectors) 
by the decline of the migrant labor system (Freund 1988, p. 
120; Magubane 1979, p. 132). Most threatened of all, how­
ever, was the White working class, which once again faced 
replacement by cheaper African labor. Within this group, 
Afrikaner workers, who constituted the least-skilled segment 
of the White working class, were particularly vulnerable to 
any change in the existing system— thereby creating a coin­
cidence of ethnic and class interests which would prove 
crucial in group mobilization (cf. Southall 1983, p. SI).1*'* 
As South Africa approached the second half of the twentieth 
century, resolution of these conflicting interests would 
result in the emergence of a new set of social relations.
Apartheid and African Resistance: 1948-Present
Capitalist Development:__ The Post-1948 Era
As we noted in Chapter V, the period following World 
War II constituted a new stage in global capitalist develop­
ment. From the standpoint of the world-economy, this vas 
the era of the Pax Americana— U.S. core hegemony— which was
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marked by decolonization, the Cold War, and the emergence of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) as the major vehicle for 
global capitalist accumulation. For South Africa, this vas 
a new era as well, as the years after 1945 brought continued 
economic and industrial expansion and the consolidation of 
its semiperipheral status in the global economy. From our 
perspective, these events, while interesting in themselves, 
are significant inasmuch as they established the larger 
context for South African intergroup relations— the conflict 
between White hegemony and African resistance which has come 
to dominate modern South African society. Consequently, we 
will briefly discuss these macro-trends in order to set the 
stage for our discussion of intergroup relations.
Geopolitically, the world in which South Africa found 
itself after World War II was shaped by decolonization in 
the periphery and the superpower rivalry between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. (cf. Beaud 1983, 186-88). The wave 
of decolonization and Third World nationalism which began 
immediately after 1945 reached Africa with the independence 
of Ghana in 1957 and would sweep across the continent in the 
following two decades (Stavrianos 1987, pp. 694-706). 
Decolonization came to Southern Africa (e.g., Botswana, 
Malawi, Zambia) in the mid-1960s and continued with the col­
lapse of Portuguese colonial rule (and the independence of 
Angola and Mozambique) in the mid-1970s and the liberation 
of Zimbabwe from settler rule in 1979. For South Africa,
decolonization would have several major effects. First. 
continued White domination and racial capitalism (as well as 
South African colonial rule in Namibia) became increasingly 
anomalous in the emerging new international order. As a 
consequence, South Africa was subject to strong interna­
tional criticism (which was led by the newly independent 
nations) and, especially after 1960, increasing political 
isolation (Spence 1969, pp. 507-24).199 Secondly, decoloni­
zation changed the nature of African nationalism within 
South Africa by expanding the ideological basis for group 
assertion and by increasing external support for African 
1iberation. This served to provide further impetus for 
group mobilization. Finally, decolonization restructured 
the political environment of Southern Africa: where
previously South Africa had been bordered by British and 
Portuguese colonies, it was now surrounded by potentially or 
actively hostile African states.3-9® At the same time, 
however, the economic and military weakness of these new 
states would provide South Africa with new opportunities to 
act as a regional power.
Although at first glance decolonization appeared to 
increase pressure on the White-dominated state, its overall 
effect was reduced by countervailing forces. For example, 
while decolonization transformed the interstate system and 
produced an array of newly independent states, it also 
altered the regional balance of power in Southern Africa by
402
eliminating direct core rule. Consequently, given the weak­
ness o£ the newly independent states, South Africa was able 
to employ its military and economic power to mute opposition 
towards apartheid on the part of its neighbors. Further­
more, decolonization did not occur in a vacuum, but in con­
cert with the global political struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. One product of this "Cold War" 
was the freedom of maneuver it provided for nations in the 
periphery and semiperiphery.XBT For the South African set­
tler state, this meant that Western criticism of apartheid 
would be restrained by "strategic" interests; that is, the 
perceived utility of a stridently anti-communist state 
located adjacent to sea lanes and atop vital minerals.
From an economic standpoint, the key feature of the 
post-1945 capitalist world-economy was the globalization of 
production relations; that is, the worldwide activities of 
core-based transnational corporations (Martin 1986, p. Ill; 
Magdoff 1978, pp. 171-76; Beaud 1983, pp. 216-24). For 
South Africa, this meant an upsurge in core investment, as 
transnational corporations were attracted by cheap labor, 
the availability of local capital, a relatively developed 
infrastructure, and the seeming stability of the settler 
regime. What vas particularly significant for South Africa 
was the changing nature of foreign investment— from holding 
shares in mining companies to direct investment and active 
involvement in productive facilities (Saul and Gelb 1986, p.
74). This trend became increasingly evident in the 1960s, 
as direct foreign investment more that doubled, particularly 
in the manufacturing sector (Magubane 1979, pp. 205-211).
The impact of this foreign investment vas mixed. On one 
hand, the expansion of foreign investment increased the 
economic dependence of South African upon imported capital 
and technology--South Africa imported mostly capital goods 
and relied upon mineral exports to balance payments (Saul 
and Gelb 1986, p. 75; Magubane 1984, pp. 204-06). Thus, 
South Africa vas even more closely linked to and affected by 
processes of the capitalist vorld-economy. On the other 
hand, the grovth of foreign investment increased the eco­
nomic stake of the core in South Africa above and beyond 
any "strategic11 interests. This had the effect of undermin­
ing Western opposition to apartheid and support for African 
liberation (Magubane 1979, pp. 213-15).
In terms of the capitalist vorld-economy, vhat ve have 
been describing is the seminer ioheral status of South Africa 
(i.e., its mixture of core and peripheral processes), a 
position vhich crystallized during the decades folloving 
World War II (Martin 1986, p. 111).3-®* As had been the case 
throughout its history, South Africa clearly assumed a peri­
pheral role in its relationships vith the core. At the 
same time, South Africa emerged as a regional pover vith 
respect to its nevly independent neighbors; that is, it 
assumed a "core" position vithin Southern Africa. This vas
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manifest in the flow of labor and other commodities into 
South Africa, in South African dominance of the regional 
infrastructure (the British-built transportation network 
extended north from South Africa), and in increased South 
African investment in neighboring states (Magubane 1984, p. 
205; Innes 1984, pp. 248-49; Martin 1986, pp. 110-11).
Thus, South Africa was increasingly able to shape political 
and economic processes beyond its borders, a capacity vhich 
would become a significant force in Southern Africa during 
the 1970s and 1980s.
While our discussion thus far has concentrated upon the 
implications of world-system processes for South African 
capitalist development, it is also essential for us to con­
sider the evolution of the domestic economy, for it is at 
this level that productive processes most directly interact 
with intergroup relations. In the years following the 
Second World War, South Africa found itself in the midst of 
a long (1933-1973) period of economic expansion, which in 
turn resulted in continued industrialization, urbanization, 
and proletarianization (Houghton 1969, pp. 32-36; Freund 
1988, p. 121; Southall 1983, pp. 208-13; Welsh 1969, p.
173). Initially, South African economic development adhered 
to the prewar pattern of reliance on mining (which was but­
tressed in the post-war period by the discovery of new gold 
fields in the Orange Free State) and mining-led industrial 
development (Innes 1984, 175-84). As a consequence, despite
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economic growth, the industrial sector of the South African 
economy remained small, labor intensive, and backwards (cf. 
Freund 1988, p. Ill; Innes 1984, pp. 169-71). This pattern 
would change during the economic boom of the 1960s, when an 
influx of foreign capital, the expansion of state-owned 
industry, and the accelerated movement of mining capital 
into industry (cf. Innes— 1984, pp. 191-222--on the expan­
sion of the Anglo-American Corporation into industrial pro­
duction) resulted in rapid industrial development and the 
increased concentration of South African capital in fewer 
hands (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 73; Magubane 1984, pp. 205-06; 
Innes 1984, pp. 188-89). In the post-1948 era, this trans­
formation would provide the backdrop for the further altera­
tion of both the context for intergroup Interaction and the 
South African eth-class structure itself.
Eth-Clas3 Struggles and Interaroup Relations
In our analysis thus far, we have described the evolu­
tion of South African intergroup relations as shaped by the 
dynamics of capitalist development and the outcomes of 
intergroup conflict. Moreover, we have demonstrated how 
eth-class interaction during each era reflects the legacy of 
previous periods; that is, the existence of specific eth- 
classes, ideologies, and relations of productions. South 
Africa after 1948 is no exception to this pattern. The main 
elements of its eth-class structure had emerged during the 
first half of the twentieth century. Likewise, key pro­
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cesses which affected the eth-class structure— industrial­
ization, urbanization, and proletarianization— were evident 
during the years between 1910 and 1948.
At the same time, intergroup relations in the post-1948 
era were more than an intensification of previous patterns. 
By 1948, the evolution of South African capitalist develop­
ment, the changing dynamics of the world-system, and the 
outcomes of previous eth-class struggles combined to create 
an Intergroup arena which was aual1tativelv different from 
conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century. Fur­
thermore, the course of intergroup relations is continually 
shaped and re-shaped by the actors themselves— their inter­
ests (and perceptions thereof), their ability to mobilize, 
and their success (in relation to other groups) in attaining 
group objectives. Social groups in South Africa in 1948 
faced a new array of opportunities and constraints in the 
form of the crisis of the 1940s--the challenge to existing 
relations posed by the internal contradictions of the social 
system.
From our perspective, intergroup relations in post-1948 
South Africa can be most fruitfully analyzed in terms of 
three core issues. The first of these is the 1948 estab­
lishment of Afrikaner political hegemony and the creation of 
the apartheid system, a development which defined the con­
text for subsequent interaction. This in turn engendered 
the second dynamic, the upsurge in African resistance in
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response to the apartheid state. Finally, the dialectical 
relationship between these two forces, as well as the 
changing nature of South African capitalist development, 
gave rise to the third event: the "crisis" of the mid-1970s
and 1980s and the restructuring of interoroup relations. 
Throughout our analysis, we will attempt to highlight eth- 
class interests and the implications of developments for 
both group identities and relations between groups.
1. Afrikaner hegemony and apartheid. The election of 
1948 marked a watershed in South African intergroup rela­
tions, as it resulted in the return to power of the Nation­
alist Party {albeit a "recreated” party) and the establish­
ment of an Afrikaner political hegemony which has persisted 
to the present. Historically, these events reflected the 
interaction of two dynamics: the rising tide of Afrikaner
nationalism and the South African "crisis" of the 1940s. 
While Nationalist Party campaign slogans stressed White 
supremacy and Afrikaner unity, the issue was not White 
dominance— neither party considered changing that aspect of 
South African society— but rather one of tactics and the 
interests of specific eth-classes; that is, how best to 
maintain White supremacy in the face of increasing African 
urbanization and resistance. Here the parties differed: 
the United Party was prepared to tolerate some African urban 
presence (the interests of its capitalist constituency would 
be served by a more stable work force— cf. Saul and Gelb
1986, pp. 68-70), while the Nationalist Party advocated a 
hard line policy of total segregation.1*0 The outcome of 
the election was a narrow victory for the Nationalist Party 
and the installation of D.F. Malan as Prime Minister.1*1 
As was the case with the 1924 Pact Government, the National­
ist Party was in essence an eth-class alliance between the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (still largely rural) and the 
White working class (without the Labour Party), with Afri­
kaner nationalism and White supremacy serving to cement the 
alliance. What was different, however, was that the Nation­
alist Party was controlled by a more conservative--!.e .. 
militant Afrikaner nationalist, hard line attitude towards 
non-Whites— political leadership as a result of the schisms 
of the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, this new government 
would be even more adamant in pursuing eth-class interests.
Once in power, the Nationalist Party embarked upon its 
program of apartheid, the state-based system of racial 
oppression which has become the defining feature of South 
African society in the post World War II era.1*2 In con­
trast to the "race relations" approach, which views apar­
theid as an expression of Afrikaner racism (e.g., van den 
Berghe 1965, p. 267), we will assert that apartheid is best 
understood as a reflection of the material interests of the 
eth-class coalition which came to power in 1948. Thus, 
apartheid is not an irrational ideology divorced from eco­
nomic life, but an eth-class strategy which can be analyzed
in terms of intergroup relations and South African capital­
ist development--!.e.. interaction between the Afrikaner 
petit bourgeoisie, British capital, the White working class, 
and the African working class in the context of the crisis 
of the 1940s (cf. Stone 1985, pp. 62-82). At the same time, 
we recognize that apartheid was not a narrow economic pro­
ject, but that it was shaped by the outcomes of previous 
eth-class struggles, including the institutions and ideolo­
gies which emerged from them (cf. Burawoy--1974, p. 528--on 
the interaction between economic base and superstructure). 
Indeed, ideologies played a significant role, both as a 
means for group mobilization and in attempts to legitimize 
the existing system of domination. Nevertheless, in keeping 
with our theoretical framework, we will give analytical 
primacy to eth-class interests, for therein lies the key to 
the specific nature of apartheid.
Having staked out this theoretical ground, we will now 
focus upon the specific eth-class interests of the Afrikaner 
petit bourgeoisie (and the small Afrikaner capitalist class) 
which dominated the 1948 Nationalist government. On the 
surface, these interests were similar to those of the eth- 
class alliance which formed the Pact Government of 1924: (1) 
promote the economic interests of the Afrikaner petit bour­
geoisie; (2) maintain political power within the White com­
munity (i.e., control of state power) : and (3) maintain 
White hegemony over the African population.1*3 What was
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different, however, was the context. South Africa in 1948 
was more urban and industrial; the African population was 
increasingly proletarianized (given the decline of reserve 
agriculture) and more likely to engage in militant resis­
tance. Thus, the policies of the South African state after 
1948 reflect the interests of the dominant eth-class as 
shaped by the changing nature of the intergroup arena.
What gave South African state policies their seemingly 
unique cast was the quantity and quality of actions which 
directly advanced one or more of the interests of the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie .18 * Briefly, South African 
state "ethnic" policies after 1948 can be divided into three 
main categories: economic, segregative, and dominative.189
Economic policies either directly advanced the economic 
interests and power of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and 
capitalist class or aided in the consolidation of political 
power by benefitting the White population in general. Exam­
ples of the former include the growing Afrikaner domination 
of the state bureaucracy, the further expansion of state 
corporations, and increased state support for the Afrikaner 
private sector (Giliomee 1979b, pp. 162-69; Saul and Gelb 
1986, p. 65; van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; Magubane 1979, pp. 
178-79). On a more general level, new "colour bar" legis­
lation (e.g., the Native Building Workers Act; Section 77 of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act— cf. Davies 1973, pp. 45-46) 
maintained the protected position of the White working
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class. Furthermore, it is probably no exaggeration to 
assert that the overall effect of government spending—  
whether on agriculture, education, infrastructure, housing, 
or jobs— has been to increase further the economic differ­
ences between Whites and non-Whites (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989, p. 196).1-8 Thus, the Nationalist Party (and the 
Afrikaner elite) has been able to solidify its hold on power 
by maintaining the allegiance (and dependence) of broad 
segments of the White population. *-m 17
Segregative policies, perhaps the most notorious aspect 
of the apartheid system, are those state actions designed to 
separate Whites and non-Whites. These included the Group 
Areas Act (which expanded and rigidified urban segregation), 
the Bantu Authorities Act (which extended political segrega­
tion via separate "tribal" institutions), the Bantu Educa­
tion Act (which formalized a system of educational segrega­
tion), the Population Registration Act (which effectively 
codified ethnic divisions), and the system of "petty apar­
theid" (including the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 
the Immorality Act, and the Separate Amenities Act).1**
This body of legislation promoted dominant eth-class inter­
ests in that it sought to halt the urbanization, proletari­
anization, and acculturation of Africans, thereby reducing 
their ability to make demands in the context of South 
African s o c i e t y . F r o m  the standpoint of the White popu­
lation, segregation provided reinforcement for ideologies of
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group separation and White supremacy, thus maintaining the 
rigid intergroup boundaries necessary for domination.170
Finally, dominative policies refer to the use of the 
South African state to maintain White political and economic 
hegemony. These policies served two crucial interests of 
the dominant eth-classes. First, they enabled the continued 
superexploitation of migratory African labor, a dynamic 
which served as the cornerstone of White economic pros­
perity. Particularly effective in this regard were the "pass 
laws" (officially called— in an excellent example of Orwel- 
lian "doublespeak"— the Abolition of Passes and Coordination 
of Documents Act of 1952), which operated in conjunction 
with the Group Areas Act and other legislation to restrict 
African urban migration to those persons employed under 
labor contracts and the few who had "legal" urban rights.171 
In addition to "influx control", the migrant labor system 
was supported by state labor bureaus and by the continued 
proscription of African labor unions. The second function 
of these dominative policies was to crush African resistance 
and mobilization through both direct and indirect means. 
Direct measures of domination included both an array of 
repressive legislation and the increased use of police and 
military power, the combination of which effectively 
created a police state with regard to the African popula­
tion.17* Indirect measures, on the other hand, were 
designed to control Africans via ideology (e.g., Bantu
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education) and through African intermediaries in the 
reserves and townships (e.g., the Bantu Authorities Act, the 
creation of Urban Bantu councils).17S From the perspective 
of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie and capitalist classes, 
the maintenance of political domination over the Africans 
constituted the crux of intergroup relations. As Magubane 
(1979, p. 188) has observed, "if the Nationalist Party loses 
state power, it loses all else as well." Without the domi- 
native powers of the state, White advantages would quickly 
wither away.
Viewed in a broader historical perspective, the apar­
theid system can be seen to have clear roots in the South 
African past (e.g., earlier pass laws, the Natives Land Act 
of 1913, the Urban Areas Act of 1923). Indeed, given that 
they were both means of political and economic domination, 
it is tempting to view apartheid merely as a rationalized, 
rigidified outgrowth of earlier South African segregation. 
Yet while it evolved from the past (i.e., earlier capitalist 
development and eth-class struggle), apartheid was also 
qualitatively different in that it reflected changing condi­
tions of accumulation (i.e., the crisis of the 1940s) and 
the unique eth-class interests of the Afrikaner petit bour­
geoisie. Given the declining yield of peasant agriculture, 
the problem for White South Africa was no longer inducing 
peasants to seek wage employment but was now to maintain 
superexploitation and political control in the face of
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increasing African urbanization (Wolpe 1972). Moreover, the 
Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie (and its White working class 
allies) were, unlike British capital, more vulnerable to any 
social restructuring and were therefore more likely to favor 
a Mhard line” reactionary solution as opposed to the reforms 
considered by the United Party (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 69).
In the wake of our several references to British capi­
tal and the suggestion that its eth-class interests differed 
from the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, it is useful for us to 
examine briefly the role and interests of British South 
African capital in the years after 1948. As had become evi­
dent during the crisis of the 1940s, British capital (mining 
and manufacturing) was seemingly willing to accept (and, 
indeed, would seemingly benefit from) a limited program of 
reform and a permanent African urban presence. In addition, 
it was not unlikely that apartheid would contain “costs'* for 
capital as a result of its limitations on productivity and 
markets. Nevertheless, British capital did not strenuously 
object to the apartheid program because it had no intention 
of dismantling White domination (which had, after all, 
served as the basis for profitability) and found its eth- 
class interests threatened by African resistance. In this 
context, Afrikaner hardliners were viewed as playing a 
useful role in maintaining White supremacy (Magubane 1979, 
p. 190; Adam, 1979b, pp. 177-86). Furthermore, the
British capitalist class stood to profit from the super-
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exploitation of cheap labor which was perpetuated by the 
apartheid system. At the same time, the Nationalist Party 
was unlikely to adopt extreme policies which would endanger 
capitalist accumulation, for, as was true in the 1920s, 
state power (and the Afrikaner political program) depended 
upon continued economic prosperity. Thus, while the British 
South African capitalist class was not part of the dominant 
eth-class alliance, it was able to exist in a symbiotic 
relationship with the Afrikaner-dominated apartheid state.
In our analysis of post-1948 South Africa, we have 
emphasized the material base of apartheid; that is, its 
relationship to the interests of the dominant eth-classes. 
Our point is that apartheid is not only a rigid system of 
social relations (as might be suggested by an ideological 
interpretation), but also a means for maintaining White 
(especially Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie/capitalist) economic 
and political domination (supported, of course, by ideolog­
ical systems). One benefit of this approach is its ability 
to address changes in intergroup relations by linking them 
to the evolution of the intergroup arena (and, hence, the 
need to alter group strategies). This is a significant 
point, for South African society did change, a process 
spurred by both eth-class struggle and the dynamics of 
capitalist development.
An excellent illustration of this point is provided by 
the emergence of the "Bantustan" or homelands policy— the
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attempt by the South African state to transform the African 
reserves into self-governing territories and, ultimately, 
"independent11 nations. At the outset, even autonomous (let 
alone independent) African homelands were not the objective 
of post-1948 Nationalist governments (van den Berghe 1965, 
pp. 117-18; Wolpe 1972, pp. 448-49; Southall 1983, pp. 45- 
46).178 In this context, the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act is
probably best interpreted as a vehicle for achieving poli­
tical segregation and the indirect control of the African 
population (via so-called "tribal" authorities), as opposed 
to the first step in a greater plan.3--78 At the same time, 
however, the emerging apartheid system was beset during the 
1950s by contradictory pressures: the intensification of
African resistance; the decolonization of Africa and the
increase in international criticism of South Africa; and the
growing realization that total segregation was economically 
unfeasible--that Whites and Africans were economically 
intertwined (Magubane 1979, pp. 237-41). In response, the 
apartheid state evolved its "Bantustan" policy, a process 
which began with the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self Government 
Act— legislation which "established" eight (later ten) 
"nationalities" among the African population and proclaimed 
an explicit goal of gradual African "self-rule" compatible 
with their own traditions--but which in reality meant 
pseudo-self rule under White domination (Southall 1983, p. 
46; van den Berghe 1965, p. 145).177 This process was
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accelerated by the government (partially in response to 
international pressures for change) during the 1960s and 
1970s and culminated with the nominal "independence" of four 
Bantustans (beginning with the Transkei in 1976). 3-"rm
In terms of the eth-class interests outlined above, the 
Bantustan policy was an attempt by the dominant eth-classes 
to respond to changing circumstances. Stripped to its 
barest essentials, the Bantustan system was a strategy for 
maintaining the migrant labor system and the economic bene­
fits of superexploited laborr while sustaining White poli­
tical hegemony.17* While the economic benefits are rela­
tively self-evident, the political objectives of the Bantu­
stan policy were equally significant. First, creation of 
African homelands was an attempt to provide legitimation 
for the existing system of social relations. The South 
African government could now claim to the African population 
and to the outside world (in an attempt to deflect interna­
tional criticism) that the political and civil rights of 
Africans would be attained with the "decolonization" (an 
interesting mutation of the anticolonialist rhetoric of the 
era) of the homelands— thereby excusing the denial of these 
rights in "White" South Africa (Spence 1969, pp. 510-11).100 
Indeed, carried to its extreme, the Bantustan policy envi­
sioned that every African would become a citizen of a home­
land— thereby eliminating the Black-White problem within 
South Africa (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 1 0 1 ) . Secondly, the
Bantustan policy was— to borrow Southall's (1983, p. 34) 
expression— a strategy of "divide and rule". The South 
African state was again employing ethnicity as a weapon; it 
essentially created officially recognized identities (which 
were loosely based upon traditional African society) in 
order to divide the African population and forestall the 
emergence of a more Inclusive African Identity (cf. van den 
Berghe 1965, p. 76).1S2 In addition, the South African 
government was also playing the "class card"; that is, it 
further attempted to divide the African population by 
creating a comprador class of bureaucrats and small entre­
preneurs whose interests would be tied to "separate develop­
ment11— and who would serve as agents of control for White 
South Africa (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 101-02).
While the South African government sought to portray 
its Bantustan policy as a concession which would lead to 
independence and African political empowerment, the reality 
was that very little power was changing hands. First, the 
homelands were (to quote Pienar and Simpson— 1960, p. 25, 
cited by Magubane 1979, p. 237) "economic nonsense" in that 
they cannot begin to support their populations.1®3 Thus, 
the homelands remain underdeveloped and economically depen­
dent upon South Africa, serving as reservoirs of cheap labor 
for South African industry.1®® Moreover, the Bantustans 
remained politically subservient to South Africa: the
"autonomous" homelands found that certain key functions had
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been reserved for South Africa, while the power of the 
"independent” Bantustans was severely limited by their 
economic and military weakness (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 
145-48; Southall 1983, pp. 247-80). Ultimately, South 
Africa hoped to create a network of small, dependent African 
states, thereby enabling it to retain political control and 
access to cheap labor while transferring the costs of gov­
ernment services to the inhabitants of the Bantustans.
This, then, was the grand strategy. We will follow its 
progress when we consider more recent developments in the 
1970s and 1980s.
A final Issue for consideration in this section is the 
impact of Afrikaner political hegemony on Afrikaner nation­
alism; that is, how access to state power shaped group iden­
tity. During the first half of the twentieth century, Afri­
kaner ethnic mobilization had increased dramatically, trig­
gered by intergroup competition in the context of South 
African capitalist development. With a growing array of 
ethnic institutions and the Nationalist Party as a political 
vanguard, Afrikaner nationalism emerged as a potent poli­
tical f o r c e . I t  was this flood of national ism--inter­
twined with eth-class Interests— which brought the National­
ist Party to power in 1948. *-my Thus, Afrikaner nationalism 
was important to the dominant eth-class— the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie and the emerging capitalist class— for it was 
the cement which bound together the eth-class alliance with
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the working class and enabled them to maintain their grasp 
on political power (van Zyl Slabbert 1975).
Given this central role of group identity, the Nation­
alist Party quickly moved to consolidate its ideological 
base. One step towards this end was advancement of the 
Afrikaner cultural/symbolic agenda— elimination of English 
influences from currency, the flag, and the national anthem 
(van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; de Villiers 1969, pp. 393-94). 
This process culminated with the achievement in 1960-61 of 
two long sought goals of Afrikaner nationalism: the estab­
lishment of South Africa as a republic and its subsequent 
withdrawal from the British Commonwealth--the shedding of 
the two most prominent remnants of British colonial domina­
tion (Spence 1969, pp. 486-88; de Villiers 1969, pp. 390- 
94). Of more substantive significance were government steps 
to expand the role of the Afrikaans language (including 
separate education for Afrikaner and English South Africans) 
and to establish a system of "Christian-National" education 
steeped in Afrikaner nationalist ideology and propaganda 
(Moodie 1975, pp. 239-45; van den Berghe 1965, p. 105; de 
Villiers 1969, p. 3 9 9 ) . It was through this and other 
measures that the Nationalist Party further entrenched Afri­
kaner identity in South African society, thereby securing 
its political position.
Once the Nationalist Party was firmly installed in 
power (it increased its parliamentary majority in each
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election), it appears to us that Afrikaner ethnic assertion 
underwent a transformation of sorts. Where previously the 
major focus of group mobilization had been to resist British 
political and economic power, it was increasingly clear by 
the end of the 1950s that the fight against the forces of 
assimilation and domination had been won--at least as far as 
the British were concerned. Consequently, Afrikaner nation­
alist leaders began to reach out towards British South 
Africans by emphasizing the commonality of interests within 
the White community (Giliomee 1979a, p. 116; Adam 1979a, p. 
131; Moodie 1975, pp. 277-86; Spence 1969, p. 495). This is 
not to imply that any ethnic merger was occurring; indeed, 
the Afrikaner/British boundary remained distinct, as it was 
reinforced by British economic superiority (although the gap 
was narrowing) and an Afrikaner sense of injury (van den 
Berghe 1965, pp. 107-08). What we are suggesting instead is 
that the improvement of Afrikaner status within South Africa 
has allowed Afrikaners to cooperate with the British--this 
time as the dominant ethnic group within the White community 
(de Villiers 1969, pp. 375-76).
At the same time, however, Afrikaners became increas­
ingly insecure with regard to African nationalism and its 
claim to political rights. Accordingly, Afrikaner national­
ism is more frequently expressed as a negation of African 
status within South African society. Ideologically, this 
took a variety of forms: the claim to be a unique people—
White Africans— with a right to self-determination apart 
from others (thereby legitimizing the "separate development" 
of the Bantustan policy); the incredible assertion that 
Europeans and Africans arrived in South Africa at the same 
time (thus negating any prior African claim to South 
Africa); and self-characterization as the defenders of 
Western civilization in the face of African "barbarism" (van 
den Berghe 1965, p. 116; Spence 1969, p. 491; Saunders 1988, 
p. 149; Magubane 1979, p. 254; Moodie 1975, p. 264).3-’0 On 
a broader level, Afrikaners sought to mobilize themselves 
(and any British South Africans willing to adopt a "proper" 
position) to defend the "fatherland" from the threat of 
communism (which included, by legal definition, any attempt 
to abolish apartheid), "British-American" liberalism, and 
general global condemnation (de Villiers 1969, p. 374;
Spence 1969, pp. 489-92, 517-24). This linkage between 
Afrikaner mobilization and continued White domination was a 
key force in intergroup relations, for it solidified the 
political and ideological base of the apartheid system.
2. Apartheid and African resistance. The leitmotif 
of South African history in the post-1948 era is the dialec­
tical confrontation between White domination (as manifest in 
apartheid) and African resistance to their subordinate 
status. Our use of the word dialectical is important, for 
it captures both the oppositional nature of the forces 
(e.g., White material well-being is grounded in the subju­
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gation of the African population) and their interrelation­
ship. This interrelationship is as important as the under­
lying contradiction, for just as the nature of apartheid was 
shaped by African resistance, the direction of African 
resistance was shaped by the actions of the apartheid state. 
Inasmuch as we have just examined the dynamics of White 
domination, our purpose here is to assess briefly the nature 
of African resistance to apartheid.
From our perspective, African nationalism in the 1950s 
represented a significant departure from the previous era. 
This transformation was due to a variety of factors: the
crisis of the 1940s (the contradictions of the existing 
system of social relations fell most heavily upon the 
African population); Afrikaner nationalism and the emergence 
of the apartheid state; and the changing nature of the 
intergroup arena, especially the impact of global decoloni­
zation. At the same time, African group mobilization could 
also be viewed as having evolved from the struggles of the 
early twentieth century. The African National Congress 
(ANC) continued to be dominated by the petit bourgeoisie and 
the intelligentsia; however, it also experienced a dramatic 
upsurge in its membership. While this is at least partially 
attributable to continued proletarianization and urbaniza­
tion, it also reflected the realization by the African petit 
bourgeoisie that it could not advance as a class, but 
instead must pursue an "ethnic" strategy in alliance with
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the African working classes.1*1 In addition, both the ANC 
and African resistance in general were energized by a never, 
more radical leadership (e.g., Mandela, Tambo, Mbeki, Sisulu 
and the ANC Youth League--the generation which came of age 
in the 1930s and 1940s— cf. Simons and Simons 1969, p. 546). 
Accordingly, the ANC was now better situated to form the 
alliance with the African working classes which would become 
the basis of the mass movements of the 1950s.
Two major strategic issues for the expanding African 
resistance were the form which mobilization would take and 
the particular tactics to be used to advance group claims. 
The question of form pertains to whether claims would be 
asserted in class or national terms (a debate reminiscent of 
the ANC-ICU division in the early 1920s), a question which 
was especially pertinent following the central role played 
by the working class in the resistance of the 1940s. Given 
the then existent stage of development of the working class 
(partially proletarianized, limited availability of unions), 
the domination of the nationalist movement by the petit 
bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, and the fact that eth-class 
subordination was overtly expressed in ethnic/racial terms, 
group action took the form of an eth-class "nationalist” 
alliance rather than a working class movement.1*2 Conse­
quently, the explicit focus of group protest and demands was 
upon conditions which oppressed all Africans (e.g., pass 
laws, political exclusion) rather than the material inter­
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ests of a particular eth-class, an inclusiveness which 
reinforced the emerging cross-class nationalist alliance.193
Closely related to the form of the struggle was the 
question of tactics? that is, the specific strategies selec­
ted to pursue group goals. This was not an easy matter.
The strategic options of the African population were con­
strained by their total exclusion from the political arena 
and by their economic and military powerlessness relative to 
the apartheid state. Moreover, unlike other nationalist 
movements, African South Africans were not confronting a 
colonial power (which could be induced to leave by increas­
ing the cost of domination through either non-violent pro­
test or guerilla warfare), but instead were challenging an 
entrenched settler community which was determined to hold 
on to power. What emerged in this context was a process of 
national mobilization— national by virtue of its grounding 
in an pan-ethnic African identity— which was marked by 
extraparliamentary mass action (Magubane 1979, pp. 298-99; 
Wolpe 1984, p. 236). The widespread nature of this movement 
constituted a break with the past on the part of the petty- 
bourgeois/intellectual leadership, a reflection of both the 
evolution of eth-class struggle and the realization that 
small-scale protests and petitions to the government were 
futile (especially given the actions of the apartheid 
state). As a result, movement tactics included varying 
types of mass action: mass demonstrations; strikes (e.g.,
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the June 26, 1950 "Freedom Day" strike); the 1952 Defiance 
Campaign (mass disobedience of the pass lavs); and economic 
boycotts (Kuper 1969b, pp. 461-63; Magubane 1979, pp. 299- 
307) .
The transformation of African resistance can also be 
seen in the evolution of group ideology. Where the first 
protests of the ANC (1909-25) had essentially "requested" 
reforms from Whites, the 1949 ANC Programme of Action 
explicitly rejected White domination and asserted the right 
of national self-determination for Africans (cf. Magubane 
1979, p. 298). Even more influential was the 1955 Freedom 
Charter, which called for liberation from apartheid and an 
inclusive democratic state (Kuper 1969b, 463-64; van den 
Berghe 1965, p. 180). These developments can be interpreted 
in the context of decolonization and, more importantly, as a 
response to increased White domination. While expanded 
African nationalism was already emerging in post-World War 
II South Africa, its growth was undoubtedly enhanced by the 
total oppression embodied in the apartheid state. Once 
again, ve see that ethnonational ideologies arise in 
response to the exigencies of intergroup conflict.
One related issue of interest involves the role of the 
other non-White groups in resistance to apartheid.1** The 
post-1948 era brought rapid deterioration in the social and 
political circumstances of Coloureds and Indians (e.g., loss 
of franchise of representation; increased segregation).
thereby increasing their commonality of interest with the 
African population (Fredrickson 1981, pp. 272-76; van den 
Berghe 1965, pp. 1 5 1 - 5 2 ) . On the one hand, this led to 
increased intergroup cooperation in opposition to government 
policies. Both the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the 1955 
Congress of the People (which produced the Freedom Charter) 
contained Coloured, Indian, and African components (Kuper 
1969b, p. 463; Magubane 1979, p. 301). On the other hand, 
there remained elements which separated the three groups. 
Segregation (e.g., the Group Areas Act, separate educational 
facilities) limited intergroup contact and inhibited the 
potential for joint action. Furthermore, ethnic barriers 
remained: the Indian fear of Africans (particularly after
the 1949 attack on Indians by Africans in Durban); the 
African resentment of Indians as a "middleman minority"; 
Coloured insulation and sense of superiority; and the some­
times exclusionary nature of African nationalism (van den 
Berghe 1965, 168-69; Kuper 1969b, pp. 462-69; Simons and 
Simons 1969, p. 599). Finally, the sheer numerical weight 
of the African population seemingly preordained that they 
would assume a dominant role in any resistance movement. 
Accordingly, while the 1950s brought increased intergroup 
cooperation, a full-fledged ethnic alliance failed to 
materialize.
Despite the significant upsurge in African nationalism 
and the emergence of mass resistance to apartheid, African
opposition was not successful in bringing about any changes 
in the South African social structure. One explanation for 
this lies in the persistence of divisions within the African 
population, which in turn inhibited the formation of an eth- 
class alliance and limited African ability for group action. 
The continued slow development of an urban working class 
(the result of the persistence of the migrant labor system 
and the Bantustan policy) reduced contact between different 
ethnic and class fractions of the African population. Like­
wise, government policies such as the system of Bantu educa­
tion (which was designed to maintain linguistic divisions 
among the African population) and the Bantu Authorities Act 
(which strengthened the reserve-based comprador class) also 
contributed to the fragmentation of the African peoples.
Even within the resistance movement itself, ideological 
schisms— between the multiracialism of the ANC and the 
exclusionary nationalism of the breakaway Pan-African Con­
gress (PAC); between socialists and nationalists; between 
radicals and moderates— stood as an obstacle to national 
mobilization (Magubane 1979, pp. 307-10; Kuper 1969b, p.
468; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 177-78).
The paramount reason for the lack of success on the 
part of the national liberation movement was the repressive 
reaction by the apartheid state. Kuper (1969b, p. 459) 
aptly describes the Nationalist Party apartheid program as a 
counter-revolution aimed at crushing African resistance.
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Each and every mass action against White domination vas met 
by increasingly harsh police responses and a growing body of 
restrictive legislation. Even the drafting of the Freedom 
Charter resulted in the arrest of 156 leaders of the Con­
gress Alliance on treason charges (Magubane 1979, p. 305). 
The early 1960s saw a further escalation of dominative 
action by the state: the 1960 Sharpeville massacre; the
outlawing (banning) of the ANC and the PAC; the emergence of 
a police state (mass arrests, state of emergency, expanded 
security apparatus); and the "decapitation" of the ANC via 
the Rivonia "treason" trials (Wolpe 1984, pp. 237-38; van 
den Berghe 1965, pp. 136-40; Magubane 1979, pp. 312-19; Saul 
and Gelb 1986, pp. 190-91). This repressive counter-revolu­
tion achieved its goals— at least for the short term— as 
overt African resistance declined dramatically during the 
middle and late 1960s.
In the context of the escalation of repression and the 
absence of change, it is reasonable to enquire exactly what 
was achieved by the African nationalist movement during the 
1950s and 1960s. Perhaps the major accomplishment of this 
political struggle was to heighten group consciousness among 
Africans, thereby providing an organizational and ideologi­
cal base for subsequent action. In addition, the general 
rejection by Africans of the basic mechanisms of dominance-- 
e.g., the Bantustan policy, Bantu education— increased the 
contradictions of the apartheid system and intensified the
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pressure on the South African state by foiling attempts to 
achieve legitimacy for its policies. Furthermore, just as 
African mobilization resulted in increased reaction, so did 
state repression further radicalize the nature of resis­
tance— as evidenced by the Pondo revolt, violent protest, 
and the formation of a military wing (Unkhonto We Sizwe—  
"Spear of the Nation") of the ANC (Magubane 1979, pp. 306- 
19; Kuper 1969b, pp. 464-65). Thus, while resistance may 
have been temporarily silenced, the seeds of group mobili­
zation which were planted in the 1950s and 1960s would bear 
fruit in the decades to follow.
The other major achievement of the post-1948 African 
nationalist movement was the internationalization of the 
South African struggle. In the post-1945 era of global 
decolonization, apartheid became increasingly anomalous with 
respect to the international order. Within this context, 
the cycle of mass action and state repression evoked wide­
spread condemnation of apartheid and increased the political 
isolation of the settler regime. Moreover, external support 
for African liberation enabled the resistance movement to 
persist during periods of inactivity (e.g., the ability of 
the ANC to survive in exile during the 1960s). The link 
between the conflict in South Africa and the capitalist 
world-economy was particularly evident immediately after the 
Sharpeville massacre, when international concern with the 
"instability" of the situation led to a flight of foreign
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capital, which in turn triggered a (temporary) financial 
crisis (Southall 1983, p. 48). This vulnerability of the 
South African economy to international reaction to ethnic 
conflict would become a significant aspect of the intergroup 
arena in the 1970s and 1980s.
3. Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. The late 1960s and 
the early 1970s could appropriately be described as the 
"golden age" of apartheid. At this juncture, the general 
course of events appeared to favor the dominant Afrikaner 
petit bourgeois and capitalist eth-classes: South Africa
was in the midst of an economic boom spurred by the rapid 
growth of industry; the Nationalist Party had established 
unchallenged political hegemony; and the African resistance 
of the 1950s and early 1960s seemed to have been crushed.
In this environment, the South African state continued with 
its task of limiting African urbanization. The border 
industries policy sought to move industry near the home­
lands; forced removals increased segregation and reduced the 
number of Africans in urban areas; the cessation of African 
housing construction seemingly insured that the number of 
urban Africans would not grow; and the Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act removed even the limited South African 
citizenship of the African population (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989, pp. 216-25; Freund 1988, p. 125; Southall 1983, p.
50). If Third World condemnation persisted, or industrial­
ists objected to plans to reduce the African urban presence
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(cf. Magubane 1979, p. 136), or the ANC engaged in isolated 
acts of sabotage— these were minor problems which could be 
solved. The South African state had apparently succeeded in 
creating a stable society held together by coercion and 
exploitation (cf. van den Berghe 1965, p. 218).
Within a few short years, however, the situation had 
changed dramatically. The four decade (1933-1973) cycle of 
economic prosperity which had supported the evolution of 
South African social relations came to an abrupt halt in the 
early 1970s,. Decolonization in Angola and Mozambique and 
the liberation of Zimbabwe left South Africa surrounded by 
African-dominated states hostile to apartheid. Moreover, 
the virtually complete decolonization of Africa added to 
global sentiment against apartheid and led to the further 
political isolation of South Africa. Most significantly of 
all, African resistance, which had been thought to have been 
broken, emerged with renewed strength in a series of strikes 
(e.g., the 1973 Durban strike), increased ANC activity, and 
the 1976 student-led Soweto uprising (Magubane 1979, pp. 
321-26; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 159-67; Wolpe 1984, p. 239). 
From this point onwards, it was clear that African resis­
tance, although it might vary in intensity, would be a per­
manent feature of South African society.
These developments had their genesis in both processes 
of the world-system and the dynamics of South African capi­
talist development. The post-1971 downturn of the capital­
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ist world-economy was felt in South Africa as slow growth, 
rapid inflation, increasing unemployment (experienced by all 
groups, but particularly the African working class), and 
rising balance of payments problems (Innes 1984, pp. 190-91; 
Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 77).1** At the same time, the 
internal contradictions of "apartheid capitalism"— hitherto 
masked by the superexploitation of African labor and heavy 
foreign investment— emerged as obstacles to continued capi­
talist accumulation. Economically, while apartheid ensured 
White (especially Afrikaner) prosperity and supplied capital 
with a supply of cheap labor, it also restricted the growth 
of an internal market (by limiting African purchasing power) 
and (by preserving the migrant labor system) inhibited the 
development of a skilled work force (Freund 1988, pp. 125- 
26; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 70-73). This in turn placed a 
ceiling on industrial growth, as the stunted domestic market 
and the inability to develop a meaningful export sector (due 
in part to low productivity stemming from the shortage of 
skilled labor) left limited room for expansion.1*7
Equally if not more important were the political con­
tradictions of South African capitalist development. White 
well-being has been grounded in the impoverishment of the 
African population— White income per capita is roughly five 
times that of urban Africans and fifteen times that of rural 
Africans; the South African Gini coefficient of income 
inequality is the highest in the world among countries for
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which data are available; and an estimated sixty percent of 
the African population is living in poverty (Wilson and 
Ramphele 1989, pp. 17-19).3-*a Moreover, conditions for 
Africans have seemingly worsened as a result of recent 
(post-1960) capitalist development: mechanization of agri­
culture and the growth of capital intensive industry has 
resulted in a growing unemployment problem; Africans are 
disproportionately affected by inflation (Saul and Gelb 
1986, pp. 71, 160; Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 84-93; 
Magubane 1979, p. 322; Southall 1983, p. 39).1** While 
inequality exists in every nation, what is politically 
explosive in the South African case is the direct correspon­
dence between the high level of economic inequality and 
ethnicity, coupled with the fact that this relationship is 
maintained by an explicitly ethnically-based system of 
control and exploitation. This is the fundamental contra­
diction of apartheid: the specific form of eth-class domi­
nation gives rise to an implacable oppositional force, for 
only bv drastically restructuring social relations can the 
material interests of the African majority be advanced.
For our purposes, the most salient aspect of the crisis 
of the 1970s and 1980s was the transformation of the inter­
group arena which we have just outlined. At the same time, 
the impact of this transformation was magnified by a more 
gradual evolution of the South African eth-class structure 
during the post-1948 era. The joint effect of these two
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dynamics was to alter both eth-class interests and the 
strategies available for pursuing group goals. New situa­
tions contain new opportunities and threats; evolving groups 
have new interests and new capacities for pursuing these 
interests. In the remainder of this subsection, we will 
explore the interests and strategies of the most significant 
eth-classes in the context of this changing intergroup 
arena.
One noteworthy phenomenon was the changing nature of 
the South African capitalist class, manifest in the 
increasing concentration and centralization of economic 
power; the creation of expanded links between South African 
and international capital; and the emergence of an increas­
ingly powerful Afrikaner capitalist class (Innes 1984, pp. 
220, 326-33; Adam 1979b, pp. 177-78). The rapid growth of 
Afrikaner economic power after 1948 was fostered by Afri­
kaner political power (e.g., the awarding of government 
contracts to Afrikaner firms; the flow of personnel between 
government and Afrikaner industry— Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 
72-73; Magubane 1979, pp. 178-79) and by Afrikaner economic 
nationalism (cf. Magubane— 1979, pp. 175-77~-on the role of 
Afrikaner organizations in mobilizing Afrikaner capital). 
This development was significant for two reasons. First, 
the melding of political with economic power resulted in a 
redefinition of the interests of the dominant eth-class 
(i.e., the interests of the Afrikaner elite were now more
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closely identified with those of capital because the Afri­
kaner elite now contained a larger capitalist as opposed to 
petit bourgeois, component).200 Secondly, the growth of 
Afrikaner capital led to increasing differentiation and 
divergence of interests within Afrikanerdom (Adam 1979b, pp. 
187-88). This reshaping of the eth-class structure would in 
turn alter both group strategies and state policies.
The effects of this evolution of the South African 
capitalist class can be seen in the conflicting interests 
of various White eth-classes with respect to the crisis of 
the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, Afrikaner/British 
capital was seemingly willing to accept some change in 
existing social relations— e.g., higher wages, urban rights 
for Africans— in order to preserve South African capitalism 
(i.e., to avoid the "socialization” of production by the 
African majority). Moreover, South African capital needs to 
avoid continued political instability, which would undermine 
the confidence of international capital and jeopardize 
access to capital, credit, and technology. Given the 
increasing centralization of capital, these dominant classes 
would be able to retain economic power even in the face of 
significant concessions; indeed, they could potentially 
benefit from expansion of the domestic market and a greater 
supply of skilled labor. On the other hand, the Afrikaner 
petit bourgeoisie, bureaucracy, and working classes tend to 
be adamantly opposed to change, inasmuch as they have the
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most to lose— e.g., small businesses would be less able to 
pass on higher wage costs; without protection, the White 
working class and the Afrikaner bureaucracy would be vulner­
able to African competition (cf. Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 79- 
91; Adam 1979b, pp. 187-90).201
Politically, these conflicting interests emerged as 
divisions within the Nationalist Party, which, in the wake 
of the disappearance of the United Party and the political 
irrelevance of its successors (e.g., the Progressive Federal 
Party), was the center of White politics in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.202 Initially (until the mid-1980s), this 
involved the split over African policy between the verliate 
("enlightened” or progressive conservatives) and verkrampte 
("cramped" or reactionary) factions of the Nationalist 
Party, the former advocating reform, the latter espousing a 
"hard line" defense of apartheid (de Villiers 1969, p. 390). 
As was the case with previous divisions among White South 
Africans, the issue was not White supremacy per se. but 
rather how best to maintain it.203 What is different, 
however, is that this conflict no longer so neatly corre­
sponds to the Afrikaner-British division; instead, the 
distinction is articulated more along class lines (e.g., 
capital vs. the petit bourgeoisie and working classes).184 
For verliutes. this means preservation of "free enterprise"; 
for verkramptes r maintenance of White supremacy (reflecting 
both the threat of African competition and the fact that
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many of their verliate opponents are also Afrikaner). Thus, 
both Afrikaner solidarity and ethnic divisions within the 
White community have been weakened by class differences, 
thereby reducing the material basis for Afrikaner mobiliza­
tion (Giliomee 1979c).
Of greater significance are the effects of the changing 
eth-class structure on actual group strategies and actions; 
that is, upon how the South African state and key White eth- 
classes responded to the crisis threatening apartheid. 
Initially (i.e., the mid-1970s), the response of the Vorster 
government was to expand state repression (e.g., banning of 
organizations, mass arrests, state terrorism) and to step up 
the pace of the Bantustan policy (the cornerstone of apar­
theid) by granting windependence" to the Transkei and to 
Bophuthatswana (Southall 1983, pp. 50-53). This was, after 
all, the "final solution" to the "Black problem": there
would ultimately be no Black South Africans (all Africans 
would be citizens of independent homelands); Africans would 
only enter "White" South Africa as "guestworkers".ao*
Despite these developments (and the subsequent independence 
of Venda and the Ciskei in 1979-81), it became increasingly 
clear that the Bantustan policy would not resolve the South 
African crisis. The Bantustans were economically, geograph­
ically, and demographically irrational; they were not recog­
nized by any nation other than South Africa; and they were 
rejected by the overwhelming majority of the African
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people.30* Thus, the Bantustan policy has essentially been 
in a state of limbo throughout the 1980s; it is retained by 
the South African government as a useful tool for dividing 
African resistance and for muddying the waters for future 
political negotiations.
Given this state of affairs, South African state policy 
underwent a transformation of sorts with the accession to 
power in 1978 of the Nationalist Party verliote faction led 
by P.W. Botha. What followed was a new attempt to preserve 
White supremacy and to protect the interests of South 
African capital, one which adopted the rhetoric of reform 
(e.g., Botha's oft-quoted "adapt or die" statement— cf. 
Marger 1985, p. 217). These reforms were part of what was 
presented as a "total strategy" for dealing with the South 
African crisis, a plan which included the regional assertion 
of South African power (e.g., destabilization of Angola and 
Mozambique, attacks on ANC bases, economic and political 
pressure directed towards neighboring states) and a propa­
ganda campaign aimed at breaking the international isolation 
of South Africa (O'Meara 1986), With respect to quelling 
African resistance, the "total strategy" has entailed a 
series of minor (yet unprecedented for the Nationalist 
Party) concessions: a limited right to form unions; some
recognition of urban rights; a curtailing of petty apar­
theid; and a relaxation of restrictions on African managers 
and entrepreneurs (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 117-37; Freund
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1988, pp. 127-30; Magubane 1984, p. 213; Wolpe 1984, pp. 
240-42). From a strategic standpoint, these "reforms" can 
be interpreted as attempts to divide and co-opt segments of 
the African population— e.g., union vs. non-union workers; 
urban vs. rural dwellers; middle vs. working class.207 
While the South African state did experience some success 
with the regional aspect of its strategy, by the mid-1980s 
it was evident that little headway had been made towards 
deflecting domestic opposition to apartheid. Indeed, 
throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s the ultimate 
foundation of White dominance remained the power of the 
state security apparatus, a force which the government found 
it necessary to employ with increasing frequency.
What becomes increasingly visible is the dilemma which 
reform presents for a South African capitalist economy which 
is so Intimately linked to racial domination. From the 
perspective of the dominant eth-class (Afrikaner-British 
capital), some measure of reform is necessary to resolve the 
crisis and to preserve the core of group hegemony. Repres­
sion without reform (i.e., the verkrampte position) would 
seemingly only lead to a hardening of African resistance and 
the further international isolation of South Africa. At the 
same time, however, any softening of apartheid undermines 
the political power of capital by increasing the hostility 
of the White petit bourgeoisie and working classes— a group 
which is essential to Nationalist Party rule, but which
441
perceives any improvement in the status of Africans as 
threatening to its own eth-class interests (Magubane 1984, 
pp. 213-16). Furthermore, the situation is even more com­
plex. As Saul and Gelb (1986, pp. 94-96) observe, change 
is a perilous path for those who dominate South Africa. Co­
optation requires real concessions; however, reforms may 
increase expectations and assume a dynamic of their own 
(e.g., the emergence of "legal” African unions such as the 
National Union of Miners and the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions as a major force in the African struggle 
against apartheid). South African capital is as concerned 
at the prospect of rapid change as are the White petit bour­
geois and working classes. Consequently, given these con­
tradictory pressures, it is not surprising that the South 
African state has repeatedly drawn back from any meaningful 
reform of the apartheid system.
Thus far, our analysis in this subsection has focused 
upon changes in the eth-class structure of White South 
Africans and the evolution of group strategies. This is but 
half the equation. The actions of White eth-classes in 
South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s can only be under­
stood as a response to the assertion of African interests 
(and vice-versa). Eth-class struggle takes place in a 
constantly changing intergroup arena. Through this strug­
gle, groups transform both themselves and their social 
environment, thereby creating a new context for subsequent
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interaction. To complete our analysis, therefore, we must 
examine the evolution of the African eth-class structure and 
assess the implications of any changes for the interests and 
strategies of the various eth-classes.
In general, the shape of the current African eth-class 
structure reflects both the influence of previous patterns 
and the changes in the intergroup arena. Proletarianization 
proceeded hand in hand with the continuing decline of re­
serve agriculture; that is, an ever-increasing proportion 
of the African population became totally dependent upon wage 
labor, while significantly fewer were able to survive as 
peasant farmers without relying extensively on wages (cf. 
Southall 1983, pp. 219-21; Wilson and Ramphele 1989, pp. 69- 
71). Although this suggests a rapid expansion of the urban 
working class, the persistence of the migrant labor system 
and the increasing enforcement of restrictions on urban 
settlement meant that an important portion of the working 
class remained partially oroletarianized.ao* In addition, 
the combination of dramatic population increases in the 
reserves and rising levels of urban and rural unemployment 
(both post-1960 phenomena) have led to the emergence of a 
significant African underclass.ao» Considered in toto. the 
major effect of these processes has been to expand the 
proletarian base of the African eth-class structure (espe­
cially if we make the assumption that the underclass has at 
least some commonality of interest with the working class).
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An equally important phenomenon involved alterations in 
both the size and the character of the African petit bour­
geois and middle classes.210 Particularly striking in this 
regard was the expansion of the power and influence on the 
bantustan-based petit bourgeoisie— chiefs, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs— a class which was, for the 
most part, a deliberate creation of the Bantustan policy of 
the South African state (Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 101-02; 
Southall 1983, pp. 173-94).211 Moreover, the interests of 
this class were tied directly to the apartheid-fostered 
notion of separate development: the power of the politi­
cians was linked to territorial segregation and support from 
the South African government; African entrepreneurs bene- 
fitted from government aid and from protection from White 
competition (Wolpe 1984, pp. 246-47). Yet the bantustan 
elites are but part of the picture. Also expanding in 
numbers are other fractions of the emerging petit bourgeois 
and middle classes: an urban commercial class, managers,
professionals, and intellectuals— each with different 
interests with respect to existing social relations. A 
final addition to the African eth-class matrix was the 
rapidly growing number of students, whose declasse position 
(given the closed opportunity structure) has transformed 
them into a potent political force (Bigras 1986; Saul and 
Gelb 1986, p. 185). In sum, the last four decades have seen
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the evolution of an increasingly complex and differentiated 
class structure within the African population.
One important consequence of this proliferation of eth- 
class "fractions" is a multiplicity of group interests. As 
we have already noted, the Bantustan policy has resulted in 
the establishment of a comprador class whose economic inter­
ests are seemingly tied to apartheid— and stand in opposi­
tion to other African eth-classes.212 Furthermore, even 
though the remaining African eth-classes are united by 
opposition to apartheid, they also contain a diverse array 
of potentially divisive interests. For example, the African 
middle class (e.g., professionals, intellectuals) has served 
as the vanguard of resistance to White domination. Never­
theless, the common interests which unite them with the 
working classes stem more from the political (i.e., lack of 
political and civil rights) as opposed to the economic 
aspects of their oppression. As a consequence, the African 
middle class could potentially be pried away from the resis­
tance movement by reforms which remove the barriers to their 
advancement.213 Indeed, this separation of African eth- 
classes could be viewed as the underlying goal of the 
government in its recent decisions to scrap aspects of petty 
apartheid and to extend limited urban rights; however, 
reforms to date have been too limited to achieve this goal 
(cf. Adam 1979a, p. 136). In contrast to the middle clas­
ses, the African working classes would seemingly have a
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broader economic agenda (e.g., higher wages, an end to the 
migrant labor system, land redistribution) which would 
require more drastic social changes. The point to be
emphasized here is that there is no monolithic "African” 
resistance to apartheid, but rather an alliance between eth- 
classes with interests which are overlapping yet discrete 
(and contain potential contradictions).
Politically, African mobilization reflects changes in 
both the eth-class structure and the intergroup arena. 
Continued mass action over four decades and the centrality 
of the Black-White divide as maintained by the apartheid 
state has resulted in an ever-broadening adherence to an 
African national identity--an ongoing process of ethnic 
merger despite government attempts to maintain ethnic divi­
sions. Prom an organizational standpoint, while the ANC 
remains the core of African resistance, the political ter­
rain has become infinitely more varied. Eth-class differen­
tiation and the exigencies of struggle have led to a prolif­
eration of organizations. Increased proletarianization and 
the legalization of unions has produced an enlarged working 
class presence (e.g., NUM, COSATU). The expansion of educa­
tion and the oppressive nature of the Bantu Educational 
system gave rise to student resistance organizations (e.g., 
Congress of South African Students). African mobilization 
includes cultural nationalist groups (e.g., Azanian People's 
Organization) and organizations reflecting the interests of
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the reserve leadership (e.g., Inkatha). Even the broad- 
based United Democratic Front is an umbrella for an array of 
organizations. What provides the basis for cooperation 
among most of -these organizations (i.e., an eth-class alli­
ance) is the totality of White domination— which creates a 
commonality of interests— and the "cement" of African 
nationalism.
If strategy (e.g., reform vs. repression) constitutes a 
dilemma for the White eth-classes, it is also a problematic 
issue for the African resistance movement. A military vic­
tory is unthinkable for the foreseeable future, yet Whites 
are unlikely to make meaningful changes voluntarily. Given 
the continuing total absence of African political rights 
(the emergence of an unrestricted franchise would constitute 
an effective transfer of power to the African majority), 
change cannot be sought through existing political institu­
tions. What remains is mass action (perhaps accompanied by 
underground warfare)— the use of economic power (i.e., the 
fact that the South African economy cannot exist without 
African labor) and large scale protests to make existing 
social relations untenable. Yet even this strategy has its 
difficulties: the willingness of the state to use repres­
sive measures has kept the cost of resistance high; the 
continuing banning of organizations and silencing of the 
African leadership inhibits group mobilization. Neverthe­
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less, the ongoing trend in the 1970s and 1980s has been the 
expansion of the kind of mass action described above.
From our perspective, the above analysis contains 
significant implications for the evolution of African eth- 
classes. Mass action requires mass ideologies and a program 
vhich is sufficiently general so as to appeal to a broad 
range of interests (e.g., one person, one vote; legalization 
of organizations). Consequently, ve would expect a contin­
uing upsurge in African nationalism as a unifying force for 
group mobilization. At the same time, to the extent that 
proletarianization and exploitation of the working classes 
continue, we would also expect the further development of 
working class consciousness. As ve have asserted before, 
identities emerge, persist, change, and disappear in the 
course of eth-class struggle.
Current scene. The post-1984 era has brought an inten­
sification of previous trends. A dramatic increase in 
African resistance has intensified the level of intergroup 
conflict. In response, the South African state has imposed 
a draconian state of emergency, engaged in mass arrests and 
detentions, banned organizations and leaders, and imposed 
severe restrictions upon media coverage of African protests. 
Given the willingness of the government to use violence in 
an attempt to control African protests, South African soci­
ety has been enmeshed in a low level civil war, with an 
annual death toll of several hundred. Nevertheless, while
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the imposition of the state of emergency over several years 
has resulted in a temporary lull in the level of intergroup 
conflict, African resistance has not disappeared (e.g., an 
estimated two million Africans participated in a three-day 
strike in June of 1988, the 1989 election campaign has 
sparked organized action by the Mass Democratic Movement). 
Clearly, the next cycle of resistance and reaction could be 
even more cataclysmic.
Closely linked to these events has been a deepening of 
the economic and political crisis. During the past few 
years South Africa has been rocked by one blow after 
another: the flight of foreign capital in response to
unrest; a decline in the value of the rand and increasing 
balance of payments problems; fiscal and political pressures 
upon the government as a result of the increasing cost of 
security and of the unsuccessful military involvements in 
Namibia and Angola; and the refusal of foreign banks to make 
additional loans to South Africa. In addition, the intensi­
fication of intergroup conflict has led to expanded inter­
national pressure upon the apartheid state, including the 
imposition of sanctions by the United States, vhich had 
hitherto at least tacitly supported the current government. 
Once again, the South African government was forced to talk 
of reform and negotiations with the African majority.
With respect to the White eth-classes, the second half 
of the 1980s has been marked by the persistence of the
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intragroup conflicts vhich had emerged during the previous 
decade. The Botha government maintained the pattern of 
rhetoric suggesting significant change followed by minor 
reforms (a reduction of "petty1* apartheid; a pro forma 
scrapping of the "pass laws", the creation of a tricameral—  
White, Coloured, and Indian--parliament). Similarly, capi­
tal (ever aware of the changing business climate and the 
reaction of international capital) has continued to push for 
change, even going so far as to make contact with the ANC in 
defiance of the government. Nevertheless, neither capital 
nor the government has demonstrated a willingness to contem­
plate significant power sharing, let alone meet the demands 
of the African majority. Caught in the contradictions of 
reform, the dominant eth-classes have also come under mount­
ing pressure from the White petit bourgeois and working 
classes, both of which feel increasingly threatened by the 
course of events. Moreover, following the failure of "sepa­
rate development," White politics suffer from the absence of 
a unifying ideology (cf. Adam--1979a--on "survival poli­
tics"). The result has been a dramatic growth in the poli­
tical strength of the right (e.g., the Conservative Party, 
the Afrikaner Resistance Movement) and a lesser but still 
significant growth in the left opposition, to the extent 
that the Nationalist Party was faced with the loss or reduc­
tion of its parliamentary majority in the September 1989 
elections. While the new de Klerk government appears to be
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adopting a more conciliatory approach towards the African 
population (e.g., increased toleration of protest, release 
of political prisoners, tacit acceptance of the ANC), the 
outcome of the still-unresolved political struggle within 
the White community will influence the course of the larger 
Black-White conflict.
Likewise, the African eth-classes continue to grapple 
with the same issues as before. Mass resistance has per­
sisted; however, mobilization has been limited by ongoing 
repression and the banning of organizations. Accordingly, 
the search for effective strategies of resistance continues. 
In addition, ongoing conflicts between eth-class fractions 
(e.g., between "comrades" and "fathers" in the townships) 
and increased intragroup violence threatens to divide the 
African liberation movement. Finally, any political nego­
tiations with the apartheid state will pose a new set of 
strategic and organizational dilemmas, as well as the poten­
tial for new intragroup eth-class conflict. Thus, a major 
challenge for the anti-apartheid forces will be to maintain 
their eth-class alliance in the face of mounting fissiparous 
tendencies.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have applied our theoretical frame­
work for the study of ethnic relations to the South African 
case. As we stated at the outset, our purposes in doing so 
were twofold. Firstf by employing our model for the analy-
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sis of a particular historical case, we intended to demon­
strate its utility. Secondly, through this application, we 
hoped to be able to refine our framework. In this summary, 
we will focus upon the first issue; that is, the degree to 
which our framework is useful for understanding the evolu­
tion of intergroup relations in South Africa. The second 
issue, modification of the framework in light of our case 
studies, will be addressed in the final chapter.
Throughout our analysis, we stressed two basic themes. 
On a general level, ve emphasized the role of capitalist 
development in shaping initial intergroup contact and in 
setting the context for intergroup interaction. Thus, the 
changing nature of economic life (i.e., forces and relations 
of production) gives a dynamic aspect to ethnic relations.
On a more specific level (i.e., within the environment 
created by capitalist development), we focused upon inter- 
group resource competition (i.e., eth-class struggle) as the 
primary factor in the evolution of group identities. Social 
groups constantly redefine themselves and their relations 
with other groups as they pursue material interests. As we 
conducted our exploration of the South African case, we did 
so over a long period of time (1652-present) in order to 
capture the historical evolution of intergroup relations.
The following is a reprise of the major themes raised by the 
application of our theoretical framework.
452
In examining the impact of capitalist development upon 
intergroup relations, ve asserted that events in a partic­
ular society cannot be understood apart from global capi­
talist development. South Africa, like most of the non- 
European world, was shaped by the wave of European expansion 
vhich resulted in unprecedented levels of intergroup contact 
and social change. The fact that South Africa vas initially 
colonized by the Dutch East India Company vas reflected in 
both the emergence of a Dutch settler population and in the 
limited degree of settlement prior to 1800. Even more 
significant for the course of intergroup relations vas the 
"second colonization" of South Africa by Great Britain in 
the early nineteenth century. This left South Africa vith 
tvo settler populations (the British vere not immigrants but 
rather a dominant colonial group) and meant that its eco­
nomic and political development vould be shaped by British 
imperial interests (e.g., protection of British interests 
vis-a-vis other core povers in the "race for Africa"). As 
ve saw in our historical narrative, this led to the British- 
Boer conflict vhich dominated nineteenth-century South 
Africa and culminated in the South African War.
The impact of these "external" forces did not end vith 
the independence of South Africa in 1910. For example, the 
nature of post-colonial society vas shaped by British poli­
cies (e.g., deferment of the question of African franchise 
rights until after independence; the British decision not to
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integrate Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland into the Union of 
South Africa). Structural changes in the world-econoray— the 
decline of British hegemony, the emergence of transnational 
corporations as a vehicle for core investment— had important 
implications for South African society. Throughout the 
twentieth century wars and global economic cycles affected 
intergroup relations in South Africa (e.g., the post-World 
War I profitability crisis which subsequently led to the 
Rand Rebellion and the Pact Government). At times, external 
actors even exerted a direct influence upon South African 
intergroup relations (e.g., support for the ANC; interna­
tional condemnation of apartheid; economic sanctions). The 
point is: not only did the dynamics of global capitalist
development bring specific groups into contact with one 
another in South Africa, but they also continuously (even 
after the colonial era) shaped the environment in which 
these groups interacted. Consequently, we believe that any 
analysis of interoroup relations should take the dvnamics_of 
the capitalist world-economv as a point of departure.
At the macro level of analysis (societal as opposed to 
global) we asserted that South African capitalist develop­
ment itself played a major role in shaping the course of 
ethnic relations. In other words, economic relations within 
a society determine the context in which groups interact. 
During the colonial period, a key factor affecting inter­
group relations was the underdevelopment of South Africa;
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that is, the limited development of the forces of produc­
tion, the economic infrastructure, and the domestic mar­
ket.21* From the standpoint of intergroup interaction, 
slow economic development vas linked to limited immigration, 
the isolation of the interior, and the emergence of a 
specific set of production relations (e.g., the "feudal- 
like" relations of extensive agriculture). These processes 
in turn gave rise to a particular eth-class structure (e.g., 
a homogeneous Boer independent class, an African peasantry, 
the absence of other European immigrant groups) in which 
each group had specific material interests.
Even more significant vas the impact of capitalist 
development over time; that is, the effect of changes in the 
forces and relations of production. For example, the mining 
revolution (i.e., the development of large-scale diamond and 
gold mining) effected the transformation of production rela­
tions (e.g., the emergence of a wage-dependent working 
class, the evolution of monopoly capital) which in turn 
altered ethnic relations (e.g., intensification of the 
British-Boer conflict, proletarianization of Africans and 
Afrikaners). Moreover, the specific nature of mining (i.e., 
the profit/cost structure and the need for cheap labor) had 
a major influence upon subsequent eth-class relations in the 
twentieth century (e.g., the migrant labor system, the 
colour bar, etc.). Over the long run, mining triggered a 
change in the forces of production (i.e., industrialization)
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which resulted in a further restructuring of intergroup 
interaction— a pattern which continued with subsequent 
events (e.g., the crisis of the 1940s, the industrial boom
of the 1960s, the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s). The key
issue here is change: the progressive development of the
forces of production and the contradictions inherent in any 
social formation mean that ethnic relations take place in a 
continuously evolving intergroup arena. Both the eth-class 
structure and the interests of individual groups are altered
by the nature of capitalist development.
At our third level of analysis, that of intergroup 
interaction, we examined the role of eth-class struggle in 
shaping group identities. This required an emphasis upon 
particular eth-classes (e.g., the Afrikaner petit bour­
geoisie) and the strategies which they employ in order to 
pursue their material interests. Initially, the focus of 
eth-class struggle in South Africa was resource competition 
for land, a process whose denouement included the conquest 
of South Africa by European settlers, the transformation of 
traditional African societies, and the establishment of 
relations of domination and subordination between Europeans 
and Africans. This gave rise to a new set of social rela­
tionships vhich, like any social system, contained elements 
of both reproduction (e.g., control mechanisms, ideologies, 
and economic practices) and change (e.g., struggle by sub­
ordinate groups). Our central point here is that interaroup
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relations are never static: they change not only (as dis­
cussed above) as a result of external forces and the evolv­
ing nature of production, but also as a consequence of the 
actions of social groups pursuing material interests. While 
later eth-class struggles in South African may have had 
different foci (e.g, labor market competition in the early 
twentieth century, the political struggles of the post-1948 
era) and different strategies, the underlying dynamic— the 
pursuit of material Interests— remains the same.
With respect to our core issue— the evolution of ethnic 
identities--this chapter traced the impact of intergroup 
interaction upon the various South African groups. From the 
outset, one major process entailed the deculturation of 
natives and the transformation of identities— a dynamic 
vhich was manifest most spectacularly in the disappearance 
of the Khoikhoin and the emergence of the "Coloured" group. 
For the African majority, a slower process of deculturation 
resulted in the creation of a "colonized" identity shaped by 
European settler society (indeed, the ability of settlers to 
affect African identities— e.g., via the mission schools, 
the "ethnic weapon", and the system of "Bantu Education"-- 
has been an important factor in the persistence of European 
domination). During the same epoch, a second key develop­
ment was the emergence of Boer/Afrikaner identity, a phenom­
enon linked both to resistance to British hegemony and their 
own assertion of domination over the African peoples. In
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each of the above cases, oroup identities evolved through 
interaction vith other groups.
This process was no less evident in the twentieth 
century, as new conditions generated new struggles and the 
further change of group identities. Indeed, eth-class 
struggle and ethnic change seemingly gained momentum as a 
result of the increased intergroup interaction which accom­
panied industrialization, proletarianization, and urbaniza­
tion. In the Afrikaner case, we saw ethnic assertion (i.e., 
an alliance between eth-classes) in response to the economic 
superiority of British South Africans and the desire to 
maintain advantages with respect to the African population. 
This led to ethnic mobilization and the capture of state 
power (due to their weak economic position, Afrikaners 
needed state power in order to attain group interests), 
which in turn produced further changes in identity (e.g., an 
increasing emphasis on the need to maintain White domi­
nance) . Also occurring at the same time was the emergence 
of African nationalism, a process which involved the merger 
of subgroups into a pan-ethnic African identity (a process 
which to a lesser degree involved the forging of cross-class 
alliances). As ve asserted in the chapter, this mobiliza­
tion was a reaction to the overtly racial (i.e.. ethnic) 
nature of Afrikaner petty bourgeois domination and the use 
of state power to maintain this state of affairs. In both 
the African and the Afrikaner cases, group identities have
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evolved as a result of the exigencies of intergroup conflict 
and competition.
Throughout this analysis, eth-class has served as an 
essential organizing concept inasmuch as it has enabled us 
to account for intragroup (and intraclass) divisions vhich 
give rise to different interests. At first, the South 
African eth-class structure vas marked by limited intragroup 
differentiation; that is, the correspondence between ethni­
city and class vas virtually total (e.g., the homogeneity of 
the Afrikaner independent class). From our vantage point, 
this had the effect of solidifying group identities and 
boundaries so that ethnic assertion vas in effect also class 
assertion (e.g., Boer farmers vs. African labor or British 
colonial administration). These interrelationships were 
transformed by the mining revolution and its aftermath, as 
increased differentiation produced a more complex eth-class 
structure. As a consequence, ve found it necessary to 
examine the interests and actions of a constantly evolving 
array of eth-classes— the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie, 
British capital, the White working class, partially prole- 
tarianized African labor, the African petit bourgeoisie, and 
the reserve-based comprador class. The central finding of 
this analysis vas that there were no Afrikaner or African 
(or Black or White) interests as such, only those of eth- 
classes or eth-class alliances. Ethnic identities (and 
racial ideologies) served to cement eth-class alliances
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(e.g., the role of Afrikaner nationalism in uniting the 
petit bourgeoisie and working classes); they remained an 
effective basis for group mobilization due to the compati­
bility of interests between the different eth-class "frac­
tions" of each group (e.g., the African petit bourgeoisie 
and working classes have a common interest in overturning a 
set of social relations which restricts Africans as 
Afr icans).
The final analytical concept which we employed was the 
notion of intergroup arena; that is, the general environment 
in which groups come Into contact. In our examination of the 
South African case, we noted the impact of a myriad of vari- 
ables--e.g., geographical location, ecology, mineral wealth, 
economic cycles— upon eth-class struggle. Each of these 
"background variables" shaped intergroup relations by 
changing interests, guiding strategies, and affecting the 
power of groups to achieve their goals. For example, we 
found that demography (i.e., the relative size of groups) 
played a particularly salient role in determining group 
strategies. Factors such as the overwhelming African 
majority, the sixty-forty split of the settler community 
between Afrikaners and British, and the small size of the 
Coloured and Indian groups all contributed to the historical 
evolution of South African ethnic relations (e.g., the 
strategies involved in establishing settler control over the 
African majority). Accordingly, one might wonder how the
course of events could have been altered if British settlers 
had achieved a majority within the White community as had 
been envisioned by Lord Milner at the turn of the century. 
Would a politically dominant British capitalist class have 
erected a less rigid system of domination than apartheid? 
Would an Afrikaner minority have adopted a secessionist 
strategy (perhaps in the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State)? Would a less rigid but still onerous system of 
exploitation have led to the more rapid assertion of African 
mobilization? How would the various eth-classes have 
responded to these changed circumstances? While these 
questions are hypothetical, they underscore our larger 
point: different intergroup arenas produce different eth-
class interests and, hence, a different evolutionary course 
for group identities.
As is evident even in this brief summary, our analysis 
of the evolution of intergroup relations in South Africa 
drew upon many different threads in order to explain the 
unfolding of events. If there is one overarching conclusion 
which emerges from our consideration of South African ethnic 
relations, it is that they are not the product of primordial 
ties or racist ideologies, but instead reflect the material 
interests of groups (which can, as we have noted on several 
occasions, be affected by ideologies stemming from previous 
interaction). Thus, apartheid is best studied not as an 
ideological system or a feudal relic, but as a changing
system of social relations which (although conditioned by 
past events) reflects both the interests and the constraints 
of particular eth-classes in a specific context. As eth- 
class struggle continues in South Africa, we may anticipate 




1. As we indicated in Chapter I, South Africa is currently 
viewed as semiperipheral: that is, as containing a 
mixture of core and peripheral activities (Arrighi and 
Drangel 1986). Nevertheless, given what we believe to 
be the relativity of the semiperiphery-periphery dis­
tinction as well as the clearly peripheral nature of 
South Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
it is our opinion that the South African case is best 
analyzed in the context of the periphery.
At this point, we might ask: Why choose South Africa
as a peripheral case study. We believe that there are 
distinct advantages to the selection of South Africa. 
The stark nature of its ethnic structure has attracted 
considerable scholarly attention, thereby providing a 
rich store of material for secondary analysis. More­
over, the length of the South African experience (both 
colonial and post-colonial) incorporates a broader 
range of intergroup interaction, thus providing more 
"data” for analysis. Finally, South Africa constitutes 
an excellent laboratory for application of those pre- 
cepts--the influence of capitalist development, inter­
group material conflict, and eth-class struggle— which 
comprise the core of our theoretical framework.
2. As a refueling station for ships, Cape Town offered the 
advantages (vs. other African ports) of a temperate 
climate, local water, and a small native population (de 
Kiewiet 1957, p. 2).
3. VOC is a popular historical acronym for the Dutch East 
India Company (Vereeniode Nederlandsche Ge-Octroveerde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie = United Netherlands Chartered 
East India Company--cf. Katzen 1969, p. 183). 
Henceforth, we will refer to the Dutch East India 
Company as either the VOC or the Company.
4. For a discussion of the issues involved in the choice 
of the Dutch East India Company between trade and 
colonization, see Wallerstein (1980, pp. 47-51).
5. Indeed, for much of its tenure the VOC viewed the Cape 




6. Indeed, VOC instructions for Jan van Riebeeck, the 
first governor of the settlement, emphasized that 
settlement should be limited (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 2; 
Katzen 1969, p. 189).
7. Indeed, the survival of a significant proportion of the 
native population (we are referring here to the Bantu­
speaking groups as opposed to the Khoikhoin and the 
San) is an historical fact which in itself sets the 
South African experience apart from that of other 
European settler societies.
8. For an interesting comparison of European-native
relations in South Africa and the United States, see
Fredrickson (1981, pp. 3-53).
9. Although contact and conflict between the Dutch
settlers and the Nguni-speaking peoples began in the 
late eighteenth century, consideration of this subject 
will be deferred to our discussion of the next 
historical era (1800-1910), which is when the bulk of 
the struggle occurred.
10. The Khoikhoin (pejoratively called "Hottentots" by the 
Dutch) and the San (called "Bushmen" by the Dutch) were 
"click" language speaking pastoralists and hunters who 
were physically and linguistically distinct from the 
other native peoples of South Africa. For a discussion 
of the Khoikhoin and San peoples and their societies, 
see M. Wilson (1969a).
11. For a discussion of the uniqueness of the "colonial" 
policy of the VOC— that is, how the desire to maintain 
trade relations provided an incentive for accommodation 
with native peoples— see Wallerstein (1980, p. 48) and 
Fredrickson (1981, pp. 19-20). On the other hand, if 
circumstances seemed to favor the acquisition of 
wealth instead of trade, the VOC could be particularly 
ruthless (Fredrickson 1981, p. 19; Magubane 1979, pp. 
26-30) .
12. According to M. Wilson (1969a, pp. 67-8), the Khoikhoin 
population of the Cape Colony dwindled from an esti­
mated 200,000 in 1652 to approximately 20,000 in 1805.
13. The Bastaards or Griquas were a persons of mixed 
ancestry (Khoikhoin, Dutch, slave) who fled the Cape 
area and settled to the north of the colony. Described 
as "Europeanized" (e.g., religion, language, use of 
European clothes and arms), the Bastaards/Griquas 
established themselves as a new group. During the 
nineteenth century, however, they were absorbed by the
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expansion of European colonial society and disappeared 
as a separate group (Macmillan 1963, p. 57; M. Wilson 
1969a, p. 70).
14. The impact of this acculturation and assimilation was
not lost upon the neighboring Nguni-speaking peoples,
who referred to the early nineteenth century Khoikhoin 
as "the people without customs" (M. Wilson 1969b, p. 
105). In comparison to the Khoikhoin, the fate of the 
San was even more stark (cf. M. Wilson 1969a, pp. 70- 
1). As the combined population of the Cape area 
increased the supply of game (upon which the San 
hunters were dependent) decreased, thus forcing the 
San to turn to cattle rustling for survival. As a 
consequence, they were hunted and exterminated in a 
genocidal manner. Those who did survive were absorbed 
into the Coloured group.
15. For further discussion of the notion of contradictory
class location, see Wright et al. (1982, p. 710).
16. The initial plan of the VOC called for farming to be
carried out by company soldier/farmers; however, the 
low productivity of this workforce forced the Company 
to encourage the establishment of free landholders in 
the hope that economic self-interest would inspire 
greater productivity--to the ultimate benefit of the 
VOC (de Kiewiet 1957, p.5).
17. For a comment on how these conflicts were magnified in 
later South African history (to serve as an ideological 
cornerstone of modern Afrikaner identity), see de 
Kiewiet (1957, p. 8).
18. Environmental/economic factors which promoted migration 
into the interior included: abundant land (and the 
weakness of Khoikhoin resistance); low agricultural 
productivity (which required large landholdings and 
expansion to accommodate population growth); and the 
lack of markets, labor, and capital (which precluded 
alternatives to herding). For further discussion of 
these issues, see Katzen (1969, pp. 208-12) and de 
Kiewiet (1957, pp. 11-15).
19. Indeed, during the early years of European settlement, 
the Company went so far as to consider building a canal 
and/or a hedge to separate the settlers and the 
Khoikhoin (de Kiewiet, 1957, p. 20).
20. In essence, this created a self-fulfilling cycle. 
European settlement was tolerated due to the perceived 
unreliability of the Khoikhoin as trading partners. As
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European expansion disrupted the native way of life, 
the Company became increasingly dependent upon White 
farmers and herders and, hence, more tolerant of 
further settlement (Fredrickson 1981, p. 33).
21. The small number of European immigrants, the existence 
of alternatives to unskilled labor (e.g., the availa­
bility of land for agriculture or herding), and the 
perceived social instability inherent in sizable White 
working class, meant that other sources of labor would 
have to be sought (Katzen 1969, pp. 200-02; Fredrickson 
1981, p. 67). Similarly, while cattleless Khoikhoin 
could often be induced to labor for Europeans, the 
proximity of their own society made it difficult for 
Europeans to find a sufficient supply of stable, long­
term labor. These circumstances were remarkably to 
those in the Southern United States as described in 
Chapter V.
22. For a more detailed discussion of the VOC debate on the 
relative merits of slavery and free labor, see Katzen 
(1969, pp. 200-04).
23. For an in-depth discussion of South African slavery, 
including interesting comparisons to the Southern 
United States, see Fredrickson (1981, pp. 54-93).
24. This process of miscegenation was not random with 
respect to choice of partners, at least from the 
perspective of the European population. Fredrickson 
(1981, pp. 110-117) describes a preference system in 
which persons of mixed or Asian background were favored 
over East Africans or Khoikhoin. Indeed, Dutch- 
Khoikhoin unions faced greater social disapproval and 
only tended to occur along the frontier. It was the 
socially outcast offspring of these latter unions who 
formed the bulk of the Bastaard (later Grigua) 
population mentioned earlier (cf. Fredrickson 1981, pp. 
123-24).
25. Indeed, several studies cited by Fredrickson (1981, pp. 
114-15) suggest that a considerable portion of the 
current South African Afrikaner population could be 
said to have mixed ancestry. Utilizing genealogical 
data, Fredrickson (1981, p. 115) calculates that 
approximately "twenty-four percent of the founding 
marriages taking place between 1688 and 1807 involved 
one spouse, usually female, who had some known degree 
of nonWhite ancestry."
26. According to de Kiewiet (1957, p. 30), the total 
population of the Cape in 1795 consisted of 13,500
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persons in Cape Town and the western districts and an 
estimated 7000-8000 persons in the rest of the colony.
27. For discussion of conflicts between the Boer indepen­
dent class and the VOC, see Katzen {1969, pp. 227-28), 
Macmillan (1963, pp. 43-47), and Davenport (1969, pp. 
311-12) .
28. This changing of the colonial guard was not marked by 
armed conflict; however, control of the Cape Colony 
oscillated over a period of eleven years at the 
beginning of the century. The British first occupied 
the Cape in 1795, then returned control to the Dutch 
(Batavian Republic) in 1803, and then assumed final 
control of the area in 1806 (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. BO- 
33; Davenport 1969, p. 273).
29. According to de Kiewiet (1957, p. 70) net European 
immigration to South Africa during the period between 
1820 and 1860 averaged roughly 750 persons per year.
30. By African we refer to the native peoples of South 
Africa other than the Khoikhoin and the San, those who 
are often loosely characterized as Bantu-speaking 
peoples. The major division within this group is 
between the Nguni-speaking peoples of southeastern 
South Africa (of whom the Xhosa and the Zulus were the 
most significant, but whose ranks also included the 
Ndebele and the Swazi) and the peoples of the northern 
interior (of whom the Sotho— subdivided into the 
Southern Sotho, the Northern Sotho, and the Tswana—  
were the largest group, but also including the Venda 
and the Tsonga. For an extensive discussion of these 
peoples, see M. Wilson (1969b; 1969d).
31. According to Thompson (1969c, p. 400), approximately
5000 Afrikaner voortrekkers had crossed the Orange by 
1837, a number which roughly tripled in the next eight 
years. Physically, the Great Trek consisted of two 
separate movements: one northward along the high veld,
where Boer migration was ultimately constrained by the 
Kalahari desert to the vest and by environments condu­
cive to malaria to the north and east (e.g., near the 
Limpopo River and towards the coastal lowlands); the 
other (initially more popular) northeast, then south 
through passes in the Drakensburg Mountains into 
southern Natal (Macmillan 1963, pp. 200-07; Thompson 
1969c, p. 409; 1969b, p. 358).
32. According to Davenport (1969, p. 274), the White
settler population expanded from 8554 in 1773 to 42,217
in 1819 to 187,439 in 1865.
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33. As Macmillan (1963, pp. 195-99) indicates, this image 
is overstated inasmuch as the Great Trek was much less 
sudden than is often portrayed in history.
34. The initial British reaction to the Great Trek was 
weak: the colonial administration opposed Boer
emigration yet made no decisive response (de Kiewiet 
1957, p. 61; Thompson 1969c, p. 410). For cogent 
analyses of British imperial imperatives during this 
period, see de Kiewiet (1957, p. 65); Thompson 1969a, 
p. 368). For an enlightening discussion of British 
colonial "models" (e.g., settler societies such as 
Canada and Australia vs. colonies such as India--with 
South Africa located somewhere in between), see 
Thompson (1969b, p. 248).
35. During the following three decades (1836-67), British- 
Boer relations exhibited varying levels of conflict and 
cooperation. In general, Great Britain was willing to 
countenance Boer autonomy (which, after all, relieved 
Britain of the cost of governing--Macmillan 1963, pp. 
324-25) as long as the Boer republics posed no threat 
to British imperial interests (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 65; 
Thompson, 1969a, p. 368). For their part, the Boers 
were too divided and too occupied with subduing the 
Africans to mount a significant challenge to British 
hegemony (Thompson 1969c, pp. 425-35). This uneasy 
relationship between British and Boers was manifest in 
the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions (1852/54) 
in which Britain recognized the independence of the 
South African Republic and the Orange Free State--a 
tacit alliance between European groups where Britain 
agreed to supply arms to the Boers so as to enable the 
extension of White rule (Thompson 1969c, pp. 420-24; 
Fredrickson 1981, p. 187).
36. News of the discovery of the diamond fields was 
presented by the Colonial Secretary to the Cape House 
of Assembly with the now-famous (and prescient) words 
(quoted in Houghton 1969, p. 11): "Gentlemen, this is
the rock on which the future success of South Africa 
will be built."
37. The Witwatersrand mines did not constitute the first 
discovery of gold in South Africa (small findings had 
been reported in the South African Republic as early as 
1868--Innes 1984, p. 45); however, the scope of the 
Witwatersrand mines— described as the greatest in 
history (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 115-17)--makes 1886 the 
baseline for discussion of the influence of gold upon 
South African society.
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38. For detailed data on South African gold output, see 
Innes (1984, pp. 246-47).
39. Indeed, without the gold and diamond industries, the 
subsequent evolution of South Africa would probably 
have been more similar to that of Southern Rhodesia 
Zimbabwe (cf. Arrighi 1979, pp. 184-90).
40. For more detailed discussion of the social and economic
effects of the South African mining revolution, see de 
Kiewiet (1957); van Onselen (1979); Martin (1987); 
Magubane (1979); and Houghton (1969).
41. For example, Southall (1983, pp. 70-71) describes a
measurable impact of mining upon native agriculture as 
far away as Pondoland on the border between the Cape 
Colony and Natal.
42. The emergence of South African monopoly capital also
had important political ramifications. Rhodes' British
South Africa company was a major force in extending 
British control into the interior of Africa (e.g., 
Bechuanaland and the Rhodesias), while Rhodes himself 
served as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in the 
1890s.
43. The group system, as developed in the South African
gold industry, entailed combining finance houses into 
groups which in turn controlled (as the dominant 
minority partner) several mining companies. This 
system enabled the industry to amass large amounts of 
capital while distributing (and thereby minimizing) 
risk, with the added advantage of maintaining liquidity 
for future investment--and even greater control of the 
industry (cf. Innes 1984, pp. 54-56).
44. Indeed, a major objective of the Chamber of Mines (an
organization of monopoly capital in the gold industry)
was the procurement of a stable supply of cheap labor 
(cf. Innes 1984, pp. 57-69).
45. For example, in his discussion of South Africa in 1870,
Thompson (1969b, p. 245) describes five types of
societies: independent African chiefdoms, protec­
torates (e.g., the Southern Sotho), small autonomous 
communities (e.g., the Griqua), the Afrikaner repub­
lics, and the British colonies.
46. Note the resemblance of this conflict to the conflict 
between Europeans and Native Americans— which we 
described as a "national" conflict in Chapter V.
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47. The nineteenth century African societies which faced 
this European invasion ranged from small chiefdoms to 
large kingdoms (cf. M. Wilson 1969b; 1969c; 1969d).
From a military standpoint, African societies had been 
weakened by rivalries between groups and by internal 
tendencies towards division, a situation often exploi­
ted by Europeans (Thompson 1969c, p. 438). These weak­
nesses were exacerbated by the Pifaaane and Mfecane-- 
"forced migration" and "crushing of peoples" (Martin 
1987, p. 864)--a domino-like series of wars and dislo­
cations triggered by the Zulu conquests of the 1820s 
(Thompson 1969c).
48. For an illustration of the relationship between 
resources and intergroup conflict, see de Kiewiet 
(1957, p. 75) on the link between drought and border 
conflict.
49. Examples of African resistance abound. The Northern 
Sotho drove the Boers out of the northern Transvaal in 
the 1860s and 1870s; the Southern Sotho defeated an 
invasion by the Orange Free State in the 1850s; and the 
Zulu annihilated a force of 1600 British soldiers at 
Isandlwana in 1879 (Thompson 1969b, 1969c). On the 
other hand, the superior firepower of the Europeans 
often resulted in unequal outcomes (e.g., a small force 
of voortrekkers defeated and killed a much larger 
number of Zulus at Blood River in 1838— Thompson 1969a, 
p. 362).
50. For example, the estimated population of Natal in 1870
included 250,000 Africans, as opposed to only 18,000
Europeans (Thompson 1969a, p. 387).
51. For a detailed description of such policies in the
South African Republic and in Natal, see Thompson
(1969c, p. 436; 1969a, p. 367).
52. Clearly, we are simplifying the complex process of 
incorporation of Africans into colonial society. The 
degree of autonomy/control varied in conjunction with 
such factors as location, degree of economic inter­
dependence, etc.
53. For example, cultural diffusion (via trade) created new 
wants which in turn induced Africans to enter the colo­
nial economy (e.g., either via cash crop production or 
wage labor). These external economic links weakened 
traditional African polity by eliminating economic 
basis of the power of African chiefs (cf. Thompson 
1969a, p. 335). We should note, however, that this 
process occurred in varying degrees for different
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African peoples.
54. Note, for example, the following recommendation of the 
Natal "Kaffir Commission" of the early 1850s (cited in 
Magubane, 1979, p.61):
All Kaffirs should be ordered to go decently 
clothed. This measure would at once tend to 
increase the number of laborers, because many 
would be obliged to work to produce the means of 
buying clothing; it would also add to the general 
revenue of the colony through Customs duties.
55. According to Thompson (1969a, p. 366), the voortrekkers 
described Africans as skepsels. or creatures of a 
different sub-species. In Natal, a commission 
empaneled to make policy recommendations regarding 
Africans described them as follows (cited in Thompson 
1969a, p. 384):
When not effectually restrained and directed by 
the strong arm of power, the true and universal 
character of the Kafirs, as framed by their 
education, habits, and associations, is at once 
superstitious and warlike. Their estimate of the 
value of human life is very low; plunder and 
bloodshed are engagements with which their 
circumstances have rendered them familiar since 
their childhood; they are crafty and cunning; at 
once indolent and excitable; averse to labour; but 
bloodthirsty and cruel when their passions are 
inflamed.
56. On this point, see also Fanon (1968, pp. 236-48).
57. Given the role of Europeans— who were more race 
conscious (i.e., in terms of emphasizing the Black- 
White division and in terms of asserting White 
superiority) and who tended to view all Africans as a 
unitary bloc (more so than the Africans themselves)— in 
creating this new African ethnic identity, one might 
refer to this identity as a "Kaffir" identity (using 
the derogatory European term for Africans to reflect 
the ability of dominant groups to impose--and to 
debase--ethnic identities).
58. As a footnote to our discussion of conflict between 
Europeans and Africans, we should note its impact upon 
the Coloured population who figured so prominently in 
the first one hundred and fifty years of colonial his­
tory. With the expansion of South African society and 
the wholesale incorporation of African (i.e., Bantu­
speaking) peoples, the influence of the Coloured group 







Colony--due to their small numbers relative to 
Africans. While some Coloured groups persisted along 
the frontiers until the 1870s— e.g, the Griqua states 
(cf. Thompson 1969b)— a more common process was the 
continued deculturation and amalgamation of Khoikhoi, 
San, and others (e.g., ex-slaves, persons with a 
"mixed”— including partially European background) into 
a mostly europeanized "Coloured" ethnic group (Fredric­
kson 1981, pp. 131-35; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 38-42; 
M. Wilson 1969c, p. 248). In both cases, Coloureds 
were absorbed into South African colonial society as an 
intermediate and marginal group.
As mentioned in our discussion of the pre-1800 era, the 
interests of settlers were different from that of the 
colonial power, even when this involved Dutch settlers 
and the Dutch-controlled VOC. Thus, we would suggest 
that while ethnonational divisions may have amplified 
or even added a new dimension to this colonial power- 
settler conflict, they did not cause it. Consequently, 
we reject the idealist interpretation (such as that of 
Davenport--1969, p. 277) of this conflict as one 
between pre-Enlightenment Calvinism and nineteenth 
century liberalism.
There did exist early Boer ethnonational resistance to 
British rule, particularly in the areas of language and 
education. On the other hand, the improvement in the 
economic position of the settlers (i.e., the effects of 
British liberalism vs. VOC monopoly control) had a 
dampening effect upon this conflict.
British settlers were more likely to be urban dwellers, 
merchants, and capitalist farmers (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 
39; Davenport 1969, p. 274).
For natives in the British colonies, equality under 
the law did not mean social equality. Property quali­
fications for the franchise limited the native vote, 
while pass systems and "masters and servants" laws 
maintained a supply of cheap native labor. In addi­
tion, planned programs for native education and devel­
opment were never carried out as Britain was unwilling 
to absorb the costs (Thompson 1969a, p. 375; de Kiewiet 
1957, pp. 35-51). For an enlightening discussion of 
the whole phenomenon of "Cape liberalism", see 
Fredrickson (1981, pp. 182-86).
Moreover, the ideological difference between British 
and Boers was less than would appear on the surface. 
When objective material circumstances were similar— as
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was the case with British settlers in Natal (Thompson 
1969a, p. 383)--there was a convergence of attitudes 
towards natives.
64. For a description of the annexation of the Transvaal
and subsequent events, see Thompson (1969d, pp. 295-
300) and de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 103-08). The British 
annexation of the Transvaal was made possible by a 
state of anarchy which existed in the Transvaal in the 
mid 1870s; however, Britain was unwilling to invest 
sufficient resources for effective rule. Afrikaner 
rebellion in 1880 resulted in the military defeat and 
withdrawal of Great Britain and the restoration of 
Afrikaner self government via the Pretoria Convention 
of 1881.
65. One key aspect of this identity should be noted;
namely, the fusion of Afrikaner identity with the 
"rightful" domination of "inferior" Africans— the 
notion of baaskap (cf. Fredrickson 1981, p. 193).
66. From an ideological standpoint, see Thompson's (1969d, 
pp. 301-05) interesting discussion of the role of the 
Cape-based Afrikaner Bond in providing a cultural base 
for Afrikaner nationalism.
67. Afrikaner strategies included: attempts at expansion 
(e.g., the annexation of Stellaland and Goshen to the 
west and Swaziland to the east); the search for an 
outlet to the sea beyond British control (i.e., the 
rail link to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese Mozambique and 
the use of tariffs to favor this route over ports in 
the Cape Colony and Natal); political flirtation with 
Germany; and restriction of the political rights of 
non-Afrikaner Europeans in the Transvaal (de Kiewiet 
1957, pp. 110-11, 122-26; Thompson 1969d, pp. 311-12).
68. From the vantage point of the gold industry, the 
policies of the South African Republic (e.g., tariffs, 
monopolies) and the political division of South Africa 
constituted a drag on profits (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 
134-35).
69. For a more detailed discussion, see Thompson (1969d,
pp. 313-24; de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 126-40).
70. For an outline of the military strengths and weaknesses
of each side, see Thompson (1969e, pp. 325-26).
71. For example, see Marais (1961) and Le May (1965). See
also the references cited by Thompson (1969e, p. 325).
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72. On one hand, the South African War bears interesting 
similarities to the U.S. Civil War, which we inter­
preted in Chapter V as primarily a class conflict 
between the industrial North and the Southern planta­
tion class (albeit with ideological rallying points-- 
e.g., states' rights, antislavery). On the other hand, 
Afrikaner nationalism gives a unique tenor to the South 
African conflict, inasmuch as "Southerner" never fully 
emerged as an ethnonational identity in the United 
States.
73. Symbolically, Vereeniging, the site of the Anglo- 
Afrikaner treaty ending the South African War, means 
"union" in Afrikaans (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 143). From 
an African standpoint, Magubane (1979, p.48) describes 
the Anglo-Boer War as "a classic case of a ‘thieves' 
falling out" and the Treaty of Vereeniging as a 
"reconciliation between the intruders." British 
generosity in victory towards the Afrikaners stands in 
sharp contrast to their treatment of the Zulus two 
decades previously (cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 48-49).
74. Some interesting historical similarities exist between 
the Afrikaners and French-Canadians in Quebec. Both 
were conquered peoples forcibly absorbed into British- 
ruled settler societies. Both groups nurtured 
identities in isolation during the nineteenth century.
In both cases it was assumed that modernization would 
bring assimi lation--and in both cases modernization 
instead contributed to the persistence of group identities.
75. For a discussion of forces promoting union, see 
Thompson (1969e). One issue of historical significance 
for the future of South Africa was the fact that the 
South Africa Act separated the High Commission terri­
tories of Southern Rhodesia, Basutoland, Swaziland, and 
Bechuanaland from the Union of South Africa (cf.
Thompson 1969e, pp. 362-63).
76. During the war, neither the British nor the Boers 
employed Africans as troops (Thompson 1969e, p.326). 
Furthermore, Africans were not allowed to participate 
in the drafting of the South African Constitution and 
were rendered politically non-existent by provisions 
which retained the existing colonial franchise laws.
This meant that Africans were proscribed from voting in 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, while fran­
chise qualifications in Natal and the Cape effectively 
excluded Africans. For example, in 1910 Whites com­
prised 85% of the electorate in the Cape (with 
Coloureds constituting much of the remainder) and 99%
of the electorate of Natal (Thompson 1969e, pp. 337-39).
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77. According to Fredrickson (1981, pp. 195-96), British 
racism played a key role in the British willingness to 
sacrifice African interests. He quotes Lord Milner, 
British High Commissioner for South Africa during the 
post-war period, as follows:
A political equality of White and Black is 
impossible. The White man must rule, because he 
is elevated by many, many steps above the Black 
man; steps which it will take the latter centuries 
to climb, and which it is possible that the vast 
bulk of the White population may never be able to 
climb at all.
78. The importance of continued settler dominance was not 
lost upon the Afrikaners who, due to their lower class 
position, had the most to lose from any improvement in 
the status of Africans. In the words of Afrikaner 
leader Jan Smuts (cited in Magubane--1979, p.52):
two peoples [Black and White] cannot indefinitely 
go on living side by side without some major 
future explosion. For this day of reckoning we 
Whites must prepare. We must see that we have in 
our power all those things which can insure 
tactical and military superiority. . . . Manufac­
turing, industry, wealth, and education must be 
kept in White hands.
79. The decisions made in the writing of the South African 
Constitution (British South Africa Act of 1909) played 
a vital role in shaping the future of South African 
society. Key elements of this process included: (1) 
the adoption of existing voting systems (which assured 
the disenfranchisement of the African population); (2) 
the establishment of the Dutch language on equal status 
with English (thereby institutionalizing Afrikaner cul­
ture); (3) the establishment of a system of political 
representation which gave disproportionate influence to 
rural areas (thus increasing Afrikaner political 
power); and (4) the retention by Great Britain of its 
other colonies in Southern Africa— Bechuanaland, Swazi­
land, Basutoland, and the Rhodesias--which meant that 
they would not be included in the settler-dominated 
South African state. For a more extensive discussion 
of these issues, see Thompson (1969e, pp. 337-39).
80. This is not to assert that the African peoples were in 
themselves a class, but instead to recognize that they 
were universally incorporated into the working classes 
of the colonial economy.
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81. As Freund (1988, p. 112) observes, prior to complete 
subjection Africans were often able to retreat beyond 
the frontiers of European settlement and thereby 
preserve the core of traditional economic structures.
82. In his definition of peasantization, Saul (1979, p.
304) emphasizes the "structural subordination" of 
peasants; that is, their incorporation into a larger 
system of stratification.
83. As part of the economic incorporation of Africans, 
colonial administrators and missionaries sought to 
encourage individual land ownership rather than the 
traditional communal tenure. For a discussion of this 
point, see M. Wilson (1969e, p. 60).
84. Land restriction imposed on Africans and unequal access 
to markets had the effect of limiting the emergence of 
capitalist agriculture, with the exception of those 
chiefs and their allies who were able to use extra- 
economic methods to amass land and cattle (Southall 
1983, pp. 85-87). Thus, the African comprador class 
was able to use its position to become a rural "elite" 
(within the confines of the African community).
85. One exception to this agricultural underdevelopment was 
the introduction of Merino sheep, which, according to 
Houghton (1969, pp. 4-5), "carried the impact of the 
world market into the interior" of South Africa. 
Otherwise, farming remained mostly at the subsistence 
level.
86. This resulted in dramatic declines in productivity, to 
the extent that traditional grain exporters (e.g.,
Sotho in Basutoland; Mpondo in the Transkei) lost their 
ability to produce a surplus (Southall 1983, p. 72; M. 
Wilson 1969e, p. 69).
87. The status of migrant workers has been the subject of a 
debate as to whether they constitute a peasantry or a 
rural proletariat. On one hand, Arrighi (1979, p. 163) 
described peasants as increasing consumption by 
"raiding" the industrial economy. Monica Wilson
(1969e, p. 68) and Saul (1979, p. 305) would define 
migrant workers with land rights as peasants. On the 
other hand, Innes (1984, pp. 60-61) described migrant 
workers as a proletariat located in rural areas. We 
would suggest that these peasants are at least 
partially proletarianized— to the extent that wage 
labor is necessary for survival--while recognizing that 
the migratory process limits the emergence of a 









the latter decades of the nineteenth century.
Thus, South Africa experienced the contradictory 
condition of having both a labor shortage and under­
employment (de Kiewiet 1957, pp. 83-84).
According to Welsh (1969, p. 173), urban Africans in 
1911 constituted only 12.6% of the total African 
population (although the migratory labor pattern 
undoubtedly meant that a greater proportion of the 
African population came into contact with urban 
society).
Interestingly, one lever which was not employed was 
raising wages. As F. Wilson (1969) notes, one tenet of 
colonial society was the belief that increased wages 
would only result in fewer hours worked by Africans 
(i.e., that less labor would be required in order to 
be able to purchase desired consumer goods). This was 
at variance with reality: African labor displayed
considerable sensitivity to wage fluctuations (Innes 
1984, pp. 62-67).
There is an interesting similarity between the Glen 
Grey Act and the Dawes Act (discussed in Chapter V) 
imposed by Whites upon Native Americans.
According to M. Wilson (1969e, p. 65), most Europeans 
viewed peasant status as a state of "idleness". More 
telling, perhaps, are the words of a Lieutenant 
Governor of Natal (quoted by Welsh--1969, p. 176):
It seems impossible for a body of White men to 
live in proximity to the coloured races, without a 
conviction that as the dominant people, they have 
a right to command the services of the less 
civilized.
As we noted earlier, the key to profitability in gold 
mining— given that prices were set on the world market 
(virtually unlimited demand at a fixed price)— was cost 
control. Since the nature of gold mining in South 
Africa required a heavy investment in fixed capital 
(e.g., machinery), the major area for achieving economy 
(and, hence, insuring profitability) was wages (i.e., 
variable capital).
In other words, the existing wage level assumed that 
part of the subsistence needs of African workers and 
their families were being met by a source other than 
wages paid by the mining industry.
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95. Many displaced farmers passed through intermediate 
steps before entering the wage labor workforce. Some 
became bvwoners (i.e., tenant farmers), while others 
prospered as petty bourgeois entrepreneurs (e.g., 
brickmaking, transportation). Ultimately, however, 
these occupations fell victim to the expansion of 
market relations (e.g., large industry displaced the 
independent brickmakers; completion of the rail link to 
Johannesburg eliminated wagon hauling). For further 
discussion of this point, see van Onselen (1979); 
Thompson (1969e, p. 329); and de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 
191-96) .
96. The importance of cheap African labor was abundantly 
clear to White South Africans. For example, the 
Landsdown Commission of 1944 (cited in Magubane--1979, 
p. 97) commented that:
The gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand has 
indeed been fortunate in having secured, for its 
unskilled labour, native peasants who have been 
prepared to come to the Witwatersrand for periods 
of labour at comparatively low rates of pay. . . .
. . That the results accruing from this cheap
native labour supply have had a profoundly 
beneficial influence on the general economic 
development of the Union is a matter that needs no 
demonstration. Not only has the earth yielded up 
a great body of wealth which would have remained 
unexploited, but vast amounts of money have been 
paid away in wages and put into circulation for 
the acquiring of equipment and stores necessary 
for the working of the mines and this, in turn, 
has had the beneficial effect upon the development 
of secondary industries.
97. Indeed, as we will see below, the South African state 
played a unique and central role in industrial 
development. Beginning with the formation of the state 
iron and steel corporation (ISCOR) in 1928, government 
established korporasies came to play an increasingly 
important role in the South African economy (cf. Davies 
1973, pp. 48-49; Southall 1983, p. 27).
98. As Innes (1984, pp. 123-24) observes, South African 
protectionism and local development may not have run 
counter to British interests. Through the Ottawa 
Agreement of 1932, Great Britain gained preferential 
market status for its capital goods, thereby insuring 
that it benefitted from industrialization within the 
British Commonwealth (cf. Beaud 1983, pp. 165-66)
478
99. South Africa was an attractive locus of investment for 
core capital for a variety of reasons: cheap African 
labor; low taxes and tariffs; an infrastructure 
sufficiently developed to support industry; and the 
distance of South Africa from the gathering storm 
clouds of European conflict (Magubane 1979, p. 203).
For a list of core-based multinationals which estab­
lished an early presence in South Africa, see Innes 
(1984, p. 131).
100. For a discussion of the problems of "low grade mines" 
(i.e., mines with smaller amounts of profitable ore 
given rising costs), see Johnstone (1987, pp. 102-04). 
According to the Chamber of Mines, two-thirds of South 
African gold mines in 1921 were only profitable as a 
result of the gold premium (Johnstone 1987, p. 130).
101. The dimension of the problems facing South African 
agriculture is reflected in the scope of government 
legislation during this period. For an extended 
discussion of this point, see de Kiewiet (1957, pp. 
250-59) and F. Wilson (1969, pp. 136-42).
102. For a similar argument, see Burawoy (1974, pp. 527-28) 
on the interaction between base and superstructure in 
South African society.
103. Our point here is not that these were the only eth- 
class groupings in early twentieth century South 
Africa, but merely that they were the most significant 
political and economic actors. Other eth-classes 
clearly existed (e.g., Indian and Coloured working 
classes); however, they played a relatively minor 
historical role.
104. Our review of the literature found a rather disconcert­
ing array of terms used to describe this eth-class, 
including "rural bourgeoisie" (Southall 1983, p. 32); 
"landed upper classes" or "landed aristocracy" (Burawoy 
1974, p. 537); "Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" (Magubane 
1979, p. 106); and "farmers" (F. Wilson 1969). While 
this undoubtedly reflects the increasing differentia­
tion among rural Afrikaners, it also indicates a need 
for further research into the nature of this class. At 
this juncture, we believe that the term "Afrikaner 
petty bourgeoisie" best captures the intermediate 
position of this eth-class (i.e., their ability to 
dominate African labor, their relative weakness vis-a- 
vis mining capital); however, we recognize that this 
represents an attempt to capture a continuum which 
ranges from a "landed aristocracy" comparable to that 
of the southern United States to small-scale indepen­
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dent farmers. In any event, ve believe that the 
exclusive use of such terms as "rural bourgeoisie" or 
"landed aristocracy" describes an entire class on the 
basis of a "fraction" of that class.
105. See Thompson (1969e, p. 341) on how British concessions 
following the South African War encouraged the accommo- 
dationist policies of Botha and Smuts. At the same 
time, this stance caused Botha and Smuts to be viewed 
as "traitors" by Afrikaner nationalists (Moodie 1975, 
pp. 82-88). For a discussion of the "internationalism" 
of Smuts and his role in the British Commonwealth, see 
Spence (1969, pp. 481-85).
106. This discussion will focus upon the actions and 
interests of mining capital and the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie; issues of African working class resistance 
will be discussed separately below.
107. The 1913 Natives Land Act did not emerge de novo, but
had its genesis in the recommendations of a 1905 Native
Affairs Commission Report (cf. Magubane 1979, pp. 80- 
81; F. Wilson 1969, p. 129).
108. Due to opposition from Afrikaner agricultural inter­
ests, this additional land was not released until after 
1936 when the limited African franchise in the Cape was 
terminated (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 131; Magubane 
1979, p. 81).
109. For a description of "farming on the half", "Kaffir 
farming", and other South African systems of agricul­
tural tenancy, see F. Wilson (1969, pp. 127-29). This 
provision was not completely successful, as many 
Africans were able to enter into illegal "squatter" 
tenency arrangements with Afrikaner farmers (de Kiewiet 
1957, pp. 202-03; F. Wilson 1969, p. 130).
110. During the debate on the Natives Land Act, some members 
of the Labour Party characterized the legislation as a 
device designed to create "an abundance of cheap Kafir 
Labour" (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 130). The focus of 
the Act is stated even more clearly in the words of a 
prominent Afrikaner politician of the 1930s (Jan 
Hofmeyr, cited in Fredrickson 1981, p. 244):
it is inconceivable that the White man should be 
able to completely dispense with the Black man's 
labor on his farms, in his mines, in his fac­
tories; it is just as inconceivable that there 
should be set aside for the Black man's occupation 
land sufficient to provide for all his needs
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independent of the White man's wages.
111. For elaboration of this point/ see Magubane (1979, pp. 
93-97).
112. Indeed, Wolpe (1972, p. 437) maintains that the other 
provision of the Natives Land Act--the proscription 
against Whites purchasing land within the reserves— had 
the consequence of preserving the land base of the 
reserve economy. This protection of African land, in 
conjunction with limits on the size of landholdings and 
the seemingly deliberate underdevelopment of African 
agriculture, effectively maintained the reserve base of 
the migrant labor system (Southall 1983, pp. 76-79; 
Wolpe 1972, p. 438).
113. One effect of the. pass system of the early twentieth 
century was to make it difficult if not impossible to 
bargain in the labor market. Africans were required to 
secure a pass within twenty-four hours of arrival in an 
area; if they had not secured employment within six 
day, they were subject to arrest and expulsion. In
the same vein, passes were also required for Africans 
to leave mining compounds or to change jobs. For 
further discussion of this point, see Johnstone (1987, 
pp. 37-39 ) .
114. Our purpose here in emphasizing the eth-class struggles 
between mining capital and the Afrikaner petit 
bourgeoisie and between mining capital and the White 
working class is not to ignore two other significant 
eth-class issues, African resistance and Afrikaner 
ethnic assertion. These phenomena will be treated 
separately below.
115. According to Davies (1973, p.43) and Simons and Simons 
(1969, p. 271), Afrikaners constituted 75% of the 
mining labor force by the mid 1920s. Johnstone (1987, 
p. 105) asserts that this milestone was reached by the 
end of World War I . In either event, the key issue for 
our purposes is the increasing entry of Afrikaners into 
the working class.
116. An important aspect of the wage structure was, as de 
Kiewiet (1957, p. 210) observed, the absence of a 
graded wage scale and the existence instead of an 
abrupt gap between White and African wages. This 
increased the stake of the White working class in 
maintaining ethnically-based job distinctions. In the 
same vein, Simons and Simons (1969, p. 277) suggest 
that some White miners were both petty-bourgeois 
contractors and wage laborers to the extent that the
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wages of supervisors were linked to the output of 
African labor under their supervision. This would 
further divide the interests of White and African 
labor.
117. As Fredrickson (1981, p. 228) observes, Africans could 
not be excluded in the same manner that Chinese and 
Eastern Europeans were in the United States. Conse­
quently, the role of colour bar legislation was to 
enable the continued exploitation of unskilled African 
labor while protecting White workers from competition.
118. This reflects the "contradictory class position" of the 
White working class; that is, their membership in both 
the dominant ethnic group and a subordinate class (cf. 
Simons and Simons 1969, p. 89).
119. The industrial colour bar had strong ideological and 
material roots which can be traced back to the 
beginning of European settlement. Underdevelopment, 
limited immigration, and slavery had combined to create 
an agricultural caste system— one in which only non- 
Whites performed manual labor (F. Wilson 1969, p. 110; 
Fredrickson 1981, p. 206). Moreover, the prosperity of 
European settlers derived from their ability to command 
non-White labor. When these economic interests were 
compounded with racial and religious ideologies which 
served to rationalize the dispossession and domination 
of Africans, what emerged were cultural and institu­
tional practices (e.g., increasingly rigid group 
boundaries, ideologies of White superiority) which 
could easily be transplanted to new circumstances.
More recently (i.e., 1870), this relationship between 
competition and discrimination had been evident when 
White petty bourgeois diamond diggers created a colour 
bar to eliminate their native competitors (Welsh 1969, 
p. 181). Thus, the industrial colour bar reflected the 
adaptation of earlier practices to new material 
interests in a changing intergroup arena.
120. As evidence of the interest of capital in retaining 
some form of colour bar, it is significant that after a 
1923 judicial ruling (the Hildrick-Smith case) which 
held that the colour bar regulations exceeded the 
wording of the 1911 Mines and Works Act and therefore 
had no legal basis, the mining industry made no attempt 
to eliminate colour bars (cf. Johnstone 1987, pp. 145- 
50) .
121. During this period, the wages of White miners increased 
by roughly 50%, while the wages of African workers
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increased by only 9% (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 235).
122. Acquiescence to the Status Quo Agreement reflected the 
relatively weak position of mining capital in 1918--a 
situation which was recognized by the Chamber of Mines. 
For a discussion of this point, see Johnstone (1987, 
pp. 111-14) .
123. For example, colour bar regulations requiring certain 
tasks to be performed under White supervision often 
reduced effective labor time for Africans to 5-6 hours 
per shift. By increasing the autonomy of African labor 
and using Africans as de facto supervisors (i.e., 
raising the colour bar), mine owners were able to 
increase output per shift (Johnstone 1987, pp. 128-39).
124. According to data presented by Johnstone (1987, p.
145), mine output and dividends rose following the 
strike, while cost per ton, total wages, and the number 
of White employees all declined.
125. In the 1924 parliamentary elections, the Nationalist 
Party won 63 seats, Smuts' South African Party won 54 
seats, and the Labour Party won 17 seats (cf. van den 
Berghe 1965, p. 293). Given that 68 seats were 
necessary in order to establish a clear parliamentary 
majority, the coalition between Labour and the 
Nationalist Party was necessary in order to form a 
government. While this stood as the high water market 
for the Labour Party in electoral politics (it was 
never thereafter a necessary component of a government 
and it eventually withered away), the eth-class 
alliance with the White working class remained an 
essential aspect of the Nationalist Party power base.
126. For example, Nationalist Party propaganda accused the 
mine owners and Smuts of "Blackening'1 the industrial 
sector while the party platform called for "saving 
Whites" (Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 321-22; de Kiewiet 
1957, p. 224).
127. One indicator of the depth of concern of White South 
African society with this problem was the number of 
commissions which emerged to deal with the "poor White" 
issue (cf. Magubane 1979, p. 170),
128. With respect to the industrial labor market, Afrikaners 
were disadvantaged by the underdevelopment of South 
African agriculture (in essence, they were migrating 
from the periphery of the South African economy to the 
core) and were no more suited for industrial labor than 
were the Africans (de Kiewiet 1957, p. 217; Simons and
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Simons 1969, p. 612). As a consequence, Afrikaner 
labor found it necessary to use its political power to 
secure a privileged position.
129. Application of terms such as "elite" or "labor 
aristocracy" to the South African White working class 
may be useful to describe the relatively privileged 
position of this eth-class; however, we believe that 
use of these terms has dangerous analytical implica­
tions. The South African White working class was not 
an elite; it was merely able to use its limited 
political power to realize material gains at the 
expense of other eth-classes.
130. As evidenced by the ability of Hertzog and Smuts to 
join together in the "Fusion" government of 1933 (cf. 
Magubane 1979, p. 185; de Villiers 1969, p. 379).
131. For example, Smuts' opposition to the Mines and Works 
Amendment Act was not that it promoted White supremacy 
(which he favored), but rather that its overt discrimi­
nation would increase African resistance and "make 
impossible any policy of appeasement and settlement 
between White and Black in this country" (Johnstone 
1987, p. 165).
132. To some degree, it might be more appropriate to 
characterize Afrikaner mobilization as ethnic asser­
tion: that is, the strategic use of group identity to 
pursue material interests within a society. On the 
other hand, given that the ultimate goal of Afrikaner 
mobilization was the acquisition of state power, it 
took on the characteristics of a nationalist movement. 
Accordingly, we will employ the term "nationalism" to 
describe Afrikaner group mobilization.
133. According to de Villiers (1969, p. 365), absorption 
with the threat posed by an external enemy became an 
integral component of Afrikaner group identity.
134. The British South Africa Act actually placed Dutch on 
an equal footing with English as official languages.
One of the actions of the Nationalist-dominated Pact 
Government was to substitute Afrikaans for Dutch, an 
act which reflected both the increasing power of 
Afrikaner nationalism and the importance of language as 
a symbolic issue for group mobilization (van den Berghe 
1965, p. 102; Giliomee 1979a, p. 106).
135. The urban proportion of the White population increased 
from 35.8% in 1891 to 51.6% in 1911 to 65.2% in 1936 
(Welsh 1969, p. 173). Displaced Afrikaner farmers and
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bvvoners were a major factor in this increase.
136. This is not to imply either that no appeals were made 
to Afrikaner unity or that the Nationalist Party met 
with no success in promoting the nationalist agenda.
For example, the Nationalist Party was able to 
substitute Afrikaans for Dutch as an official language; 
it also succeeded in securing a 1926 British Common­
wealth agreement which asserted the autonomy of members 
(van den Berghe 1965, p. 102; de Villiers 1969, p.
391) .
137. Nationalist rhetoric throughout this period attempted 
to downplay class divisions within Afrikanerdom and 
emphasize owner-worker solidarity (Simons and Simons 
1969, p. 563; Magubane 1979, pp. 186-87; Moodie 1975, 
pp. 169-72).
138. As Giliomee (1979b, pp. 156-57) has observed, while the 
rhetoric of Afrikaner economic nationalism focused upon 
the "poor White" problem, the reality is that this 
movement was designed to aid the fledgling Afrikaner 
capitalist class.
139. Explanations for this development vary, including a 
desire by Hertzog to remain in power during an economic 
downturn, an attempt to achieve British-Afrikaner unity 
(Hertzog subscribed to the more inclusive definition of 
Afrikaner), and a need to achieve a two-thirds majority 
to pass the "Hertzog Bills" which eliminated the 
African franchise in the Cape (cf. Simons and Simons 
1969, pp. 463-69; de Villiers 1969, pp. 379-81;
Magubane 1979, p. 185).
140. The Purified Nationalist Party later became the 
Reunited Nationalist Party (following a 1940 reunifica­
tion agreement between Hertzog and Malan) and even­
tually (in 1951) returned to calling itself the 
Nationalist Party.
141. There was also considerable Afrikaner sympathy for Nazi 
Germany. Nazi-like (i.e., authoritarian, extremely 
nationalistic) movements in South Africa included the 
Ossewabrandwaa and the New Order. The influence of 
these movements waned with the downfall of Nazi Germany 
and the rise of the Nationalist Party (Moodie 1975, pp. 
208-33; Simons and Simons 1969, pp. 527-28; de Villiers 
1969, pp. 385-87).
142. This was clearly articulated by P. Ka I . Seme (cited in 
Simons and Simons 1969, p. 133) during a 1911 appeal 
for African unity: "We are one people. Let us forget
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the differences between Xhosa-Fingo, Zulus and Tongas, 
Basutos, and other natives."
143. For a brief discussion of regional differences in the 
situation of Africans in early twentieth century South 
Africa, see Kuper (1969b, pp. 426-31).
144. This "petty bourgeois" base of early African national­
ism has a parallel in the early stages of the ethnic 
mobilization of Black Americans (cf. Bloom 1987, p.
219 ) .
145. In a particularly cogent analysis, Magubane (1979, pp. 
274-78) criticizes the tendency to dismiss the early 
efforts of the ANC as "reformist" or "naive" and 
interprets early nationalist ideologies and strategies 
in the context of their times (i.e., as the "moral" 
struggle of an educated minority elite which is 
simultaneously aware of both its oppressed status and 
its powerlessness to change its situation). The 
historical contribution of this movement was its 
ability to increase African national consciousness.
146. For a detailed examination of relations between the 
African and White working classes in early twentieth 
century South Africa, the work of Simons and Simons 
(1969) should be read in its entirety. Their discus­
sion of the evolving position of the South African 
Communist Party is particularly insightful.
147. The Industrial Conciliation Act institutionalized 
unions and collective bargaining and established a 
system of arbitration to reduce industrial conflict. 
Africans, however, were excluded from the definition of
"employee"; therefore, it was illegal for them to form
unions (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 320).
148. For discussions of the dissolution of the ICU, see
Simons and Simons (1969, pp. 353-76) and Magubane 
(1979, pp. 282-86).
149. The underlying philosophy of the Urban Areas Act was 
expressed by the Stallard Commission of 1921 (cited by 
Southall--1983, p. 25), which stated that Africans:
should only be allowed to enter the urban 
areas, which are essentially the White man's 
creation, when he is willing to enter and to 
minister to the needs of the White man and 
should depart therefore when he ceases so to 
minister.
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After 1923, the Urban Areas Act was extended on several 
occasions— e.g., 1930 restrictions on African women, 
1937 expanded police powers to remove "surplus"
Africans (Welsh 1969, p. 198).
150. The elimination of the African franchise in the Cape 
particularly served the interests of the Nationalist 
Party as it (1) increased the Afrikaner proportion of 
the electorate, and (2) improved Nationalist electoral 
chances in the Cape where African voters (who were not 
likely to vote Nationalist), despite their small 
numbers, occasionally provided the winning margin in 
close elections.
151. One question not addressed thus far in this section was 
the status of the other South African ethnic groups-- 
the Coloureds, Indians, and British. How did their 
identities evolve amidst the events described above?
For the first two of these groups, Coloureds and 
Indians, group identities persisted in response to eth- 
class differentiation, unequal treatment, and rigid 
ethnic boundaries. Both groups occupied an intermediate 
position in the eth-class structure (i.e., one which 
was slightly above the position of Africans but signi­
ficantly below that of Whites) and both were systemati­
cally excluded from economic and political power. In 
response to this state of affairs, both the Coloureds 
and the Indians engaged in ethnic mobilization (e.g., 
the African People's Organization and the South African 
Indian Congress; however, neither of thee movements 
emerged as a significant political force. One major 
obstacle to effective group action was the existence of 
internal divisions, both sub-ethnic (e.g., Hindu vs. 
Moslem within the Indian community, "light" vs. "dark" 
Coloureds) and class (e.g., the dominance of the petit 
bourgeoisie within these ethnic organizations).
Equally limiting was the smallness of each group 
(Coloureds comprised 9% of the South African popula­
tion, Indians approximately 3%) and the lack of a 
significant economic or political niche. Thus, while 
material forces (e.g., their subordinate position) were 
strong enough to trigger ethnic mobilization and the 
persistence of identities, both Coloured and Indian 
ethnicity were for the most part salient only on the 
regional or local level.
Given their small numbers and economic and political 
marginality, an alternative course of action for 
Coloureds and Indians could have been an eth-class 
alliance or even an ethnic merger with other ethnic 
groups (e.g.. Coloured merger with either Africans or 
Afrikaners). In this context, one possibility would
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have been a cross-ethnic class alliance with the White 
working class or, in the case of the Coloured petit 
bourgeoisie (who had acculturated to Afrikaner society 
and who tended to pursue an accommodationist strategy), 
the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. This was precluded, 
however, by the exclusionary strategies of the White 
working class (which was interested in restricting 
group boundaries, particularly in light of the "poor 
White" problem) and by the emergence of a narrowly 
defined and race conscious Afrikaner nationalism (cf. 
Fredrickson 1981, p. 272). The second course of 
action, eth-class alliance or ethnic merger with the 
African majority, was rejected by the Coloureds and 
Indians themselves, as both groups were reluctant to 
jeopardize the few privileges which they did possess in 
order to enter into an alliance with a lower status 
group (Simons and Simons 1969, p. 120). Thus, while 
increasing discrimination by Whites against both 
Coloureds and Indians narrowed intergroup differences 
and created a broader basis for common action with 
Africans, intergroup cooperation remained at best at a 
moderate level.
An entirely different case from the Coloured and Indian 
experience was that of British South Africans. The 
British occupied a somewhat paradoxical position in 
that they overwhelmingly dominated the economy, but 
were less able (given Afrikaner numerical superiority) 
to exert political power. This meant (1) that they had 
no economic grievances to generate ethnic mobilization 
and (2) that their material position was best main­
tained by muting their ethnicity— as assertion would 
only inflame Afrikaner nationalism. In addition, 
British South Africans were probably not unhappy with 
the general direction of government policy, for 
(despite British "liberalism") they too had a strong 
stake in continued White supremacy. Finally, the 
British ethnic assertion which did exist had an alter­
native outlet in support for Great Britain and the 
British Commonwealth (e.g., strong British South 
African support for Great Britain in World War I and 
World War II). Thus, while British South Africans were 
a self-conscious ethnic entity, their was no real 
material or ideological basis for ethnically-based 
group action.
Circumstances also militated against the emergence of 
an inclusive South African national identity. Non- 
Whites were excluded from the beginning, while the 
bifurcation of the White community limited any pros­
pects of a White South African identity. Indeed, the 
existing eth-class configuration--the smaller, econom-
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ically powerful British vs. the numerically dominant 
Afrikaners— was an ideal prescription for ethnic 
mobilization on the part of the latter group. While 
there were South Africans who envisioned a British- 
Afrikaner merger (albeit with varying emphases), their 
numbers were never sufficiently large to enable them to 
achieve this objective.
152. White South Africans were well aware of the threat 
posed by a stable urban proletariat. According to a 
1945 Board of Trade and Industry Report (Cited by 
Southall— 1983, p.30):
Racial and Class differences will make a homogene­
ous Native proletariat which will eventually lose 
all contact with its former communal rural rela­
tions which had previously given their lives a 
content and meaning. The detribalisation of large 
numbers of Natives congregated in amorphous masses 
in large industrial centres is a matter which no 
government can view with equanimity.
153. From the perspective of industrial capital, the 
existing relations of production (i.e., the coerced 
migrant labor system) constituted an obstacle to the 
development of the forces of production (i.e., 
industrial mass production) and to continued capitalist 
accumulation. Industrial committees and reports spoke 
of the waste of African labor and the retardation of 
industrial development (cf. sources cited by Magubane 
1979, p. 129). Even if a fully proletarianized African 
workforce required higher wages, increased productivity 
and higher prices would mean that the manufacturing 
sector could accommodate such demands (Southall 1983,
p . 30 ) .
154. This fact was not lost upon Nationalist Party politi­
cians, who by the late 1930s had begun to speak of the 
need to "save White civilization" (Simons and Simons 
1969, p. 525). In a 1938 speech, future Prime Minister 
D.F. Malan (cited in Magubane 1979, p. 126) observed 
that:
the Afrikaner of the new Great Trek meets the non- 
White at his Blood River, half-armed or even 
completely unarmed, without barricade, without a 
river between, defenseless in the open plains of 
economic competition.
155. Third World condemnation of South African apartheid 
reflected the anti-colonial (anti-core) component of 
peripheral nationalist ideologies. Given the central
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role of European racism in colonial domination, it is 
not surprising that Third World leaders have found 
apartheid to be particularly offensive (see, for 
example, the quotations found in Beaud— 1983, p. 188—  
and Spence--1969, p. 311). While this assault on South 
Africa was grounded in ideology, peripheral anti­
colonialism and nationalism can in turn be linked to 
core domination and global capitalist development. As 
ve observed earlier, nationalism is one of the 
contradictions of capitalism.
156. Although the British South Africa Act of 1909 had left 
open the possibility of transferring the High Commis­
sion Territories (e.g., Basutoland/Lesotho, Swaziland, 
and Bechuanaland/Botswana) to South Africa), this was 
clearly impossible in the context of post-1945 decolo­
nization and anticolonialism. Consequently, all three 
colonies became independent nations in the late 1960s. 
For an extended discussion of this issue, see Spence 
(1969, pp. 496-503).
157. Indeed, South Africa capitalized upon the U.S. fear of 
"communist expansionism" to gain support for its recent 
intervention in Angola.
158. For a brief discussion of characteristics of semi­
peripheral states, see Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987, 
pp. 773-774). For a theoretical and empirical analysis 
of semiperipheral areas, see Arrighi and Drangel 
(1986).
159. In separate analyses, both Arrighi (1979, pp. 186-87) 
and Martin (1986, p. Ill) discuss how the economic 
development of other areas (e.g., Southern Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe) was undercut by South African capitalist 
development.
160. The different party policies were reflected in the 
reports of two commissions: the Fagan Commission 
(United Party) and the Sauer Commission (Nationalist 
Party). For discussions of these respective reports, 
see Magubane (1979, pp. 129-31) and de Villiers (1969, 
p p . 406-09).
161. The Nationalist Party received 120,000 fewer votes that 
the United Party; however, due to the disproportionate 
electoral influence of rural areas, it won 70 parlia­
mentary seats to 65 for the United Party. Neverthe­
less, the Nationalist Party was forced to enter into a 
coalition with the tiny Afrikaner Party in order to 
attain the seats necessary for a working parliamentary 
majority (van den Berghe 1965, pp. 293-95).
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162. Apartheid was defined by future Prime Minister Verwoerd 
(cited in van den Berghe— 1965, p. 119) as "a process 
of continually increasing separation in all spheres of 
living, and this takes place even when there is no 
territorial segregation."
163. While we present these interests separately, they are 
clearly interrelated. For example, maintaining White 
domination over Africans had clear economic benefits 
for the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie inasmuch as it was 
able to maintain a pool of cheap labor.
164. It is not our intention to present an overly instrumen­
tal picture of the South African state as a mere tool 
of the Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie. Dominant eth-class 
interests were constrained by the interests and power 
of other groups (the British-dominated capitalist 
class, the White working class, international capital, 
and even the African working class). The seemingly 
instrumental nature of the apartheid state reflects the 
increasing political hegemony of the Nationalist Party 
juxtaposed against relative economic weakness--in other
words, state power was the most ready (if not the only)
means for attaining group objectives.
165. Our purpose here is not to provide a detailed discus­
sion of the array of apartheid legislation, but instead 
to illustrate the connection between state policies and 
eth-class interests.
166. This point is captured in a quote by W. M. Macmillan 
(cited in Southall--1983, p. 75): "to locate the
native reserves it is no bad rule ... to look for the
areas circumvented or entirely missed by even branch
railway lines."
167. While all South African political parties protected the 
economic interests of the White population, the success 
of the Nationalist Party since 1948 has been tied to 
its ability to project itself as the best defender of 
White interests. This was particularly important for 
the White working class (especially the less-skilled 
segments) which would seemingly have the most to lose 
from the elimination of segregation (cf. Davies 1973, 
pp. 51-55).
168. For more detailed discussion of these laws, see de
Villiers (1969, pp. 409-14); Magubane (1979, pp. 132-
38); and Southall (1983, pp. 33-44).
169. As an example of Afrikaner concerns in this area, the 
1955 Tomlinson Commission (cited by Magubane— 1979, p.
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137) decried African urbanization as leading to "the 
westernization of the Bantu" and the eventual certainty 
"that the control of political power will pass into the 
hands of the Bantu."
170. Also falling into this category would be the 1956 
elimination (after a five-year struggle) of the 
coloured franchise (de villiers 1969, pp. 405-06).
While this was generally interpreted ideologically 
(I.e., as the Afrikaner drive for total segregation), 
it was also perceived by the Nationalist Party--which 
believed that the coloured vote could be decisive in a 
close election--as a key step in maintaining control of 
the government (Fredrickson 1981, p. 279).
171. The pass laws, which required all Africans to carry 
"reference books", were the centerpiece of the system 
of "influx control" which sought to maintain the 
migrant labor system by restricting African urban 
residence. Under Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act of 1945, it was illegal for Africans 
to be in urban areas for more than seventy-two hours 
unless they (1) had resided there since birth; (2) had 
worked for the same employed for ten years; (3) were 
dependents of persons qualified under the first two 
categories; or (4) had been given permission by a labor 
bureau (established to funnel African labor to 
industry) to work as contract labor (Saul and Gelb 
1986, p. 118). Since few Africans could prove that 
they qualified under the first three categories, the 
bulk of legal urban residents were employed as contract 
laborers (and were not allowed to have their dependents 
reside with them in urban areas). Residential segrega­
tion (the Group Areas Act) and the pass lavs facili­
tated enforcement of these policies. If apprehended, 
unemployed Africans could be declared "redundant Bantu" 
and would be "endorsed out" to the reserves or sen­
tenced to serve as convict labor on White farms 
(Magubane 1979, p. 143). These lavs were vigorously 
enforced: during the period 1950-1975, hundreds of
thousands of Africans were arrested each year for pass 
law violations (see the figures provided in Wilson and 
Ramphele--1989, p. 209). By retarding African urbani­
zation, these lavs propped up the migrant labor system 
despite ever-increasing economic pressures for Africans 
to leave the reserves.
172. Direct control measures, which included the Suppression 
of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal Lav Amendment 
Act of 1953, and the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, 
gave the South African state virtually unlimited power 
to suppress persons and organizations (Southall 1983,
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p. 40; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 130-32).
173. We will consider the full implications of this indirect 
control in our discussion of the "Bantustan" policy.
For a discussion of the control aspects of "Bantu 
Education", see van den Berghe (1965, pp. 129-30).
174. Moreover, change (i.e., greater African urbanization 
and proletarianization) would also potentially involve 
costs to capital— higher wages, further political 
demands, increased conflict with the White working 
class, and increased conflict with agricultural capital 
over access to African labor (cf. Wolpe 1972, 445-46).
175. See the statements of various Nationalist Party leaders 
cited by van den Berghe (1965, p. 118) and Southall 
(1983, pp. 45-46).
176. Moreover, as Southall (1983, p. 45) observes, there was 
little immediate response to the Bantu Authorities Act. 
Reserve Councils were slow to disband in favor of the 
new "tribal author ities"--the first homeland to accept 
this new arrangement was the Transkei in 1955.
177. Particularly interesting was the ideological shift 
which accompanied the evolution of the Bantustan 
policy. The Nationalist Party began to downplay racial 
dogmas (i.e., those stressing the inferiority of 
Africans) and instead began to emphasize "ethnic"
(i.e., cultural) differences and the need for separate 
development (Wolpe 1972, pp. 450-51; Saul and Gelb 
1986, p. 100; Magubane 1979, pp. 234-36). Too much 
should not be read into this transition, for the 
doctrine of separate development was infused with a 
sense of paternalism and an implicit assumption of 
inferiority (e.g., Africans as different and less 
developed). For illustrative quotations, see van den 
Berghe (1965, pp. 121-24). For a discussion of the 
link between separate development and Afrikaner 
nationalism, see Moodie (1975, pp. 260-76).
178. For a discussion of the process leading to the 
"independence" of the Transkei, see Southall (1983, pp. 
103-45).
179. Given the decline of reserve agriculture, superexploi­
tation was no longer grounded in the contribution of 
peasant farming to the subsistence of migratory wage 
labor (which had previously allowed African wages to be 
below the subsistence level). Instead, superexploita­
tion was now achieved through coercion: that is, via 
direct and indirect control measures instituted by
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post-1948 governments which essentially forced Africans 
to accept low wages and to remain migratory labor. For
elaboration of this point, see Wolpe (1972, pp. 444-
50). For an insightful comparison of the Bantustan 
policy with Israeli policies towards Palestinians in 
the occupied territories, see Locke and Stewart (1985).
180. Thus, apartheid was presented as "positive” in that it 
would eliminate White domination and allow Africans to 
develop along their own lines (albeit by being confined
to 13% of the land area of South Africa).
181. A first step towards this end was taken with the Bantu 
Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 (cf. Southall--1983, 
p. 292).
182. Towards this end, government spokespersons sought to 
promote the perception of African ethnic attachment to 
the homelands (see H. M, Verwoerd, quoted in Magubane 
1979, pp. 241-42). For example one bureaucrat (cited 
by Wilson and Ramphele— 1989, p. 213), in explaining 
the "voluntary" movement of Africans into the 
KwaNdebele homeland, observed:
What motivated the Israelis to go to Israel after 
the Balfour Declaration? Idealism gripped them 
and see what happened to Israel. It is the same 
thing in KwaNdebele. It is all about the magne­
tism, the pulling power of a spiritual fatherland. 
They are streaming in and we just can't keep up 
with the services there. They prefer to live 
there, in their own community.
In this context, it is not surprising that apartheid 
proponents opposed "denationalized Africans" (i.e., 
urbanized and educated Africans who espoused an 
"African" ethnic identity) and favored "civilized 
Bantu" (i.e., those retaining traditional group ties in 
the context of the homelands). For a discussion of 
this point, see Magubane (1979, pp. 242-43).
183. This was quickly evident to the South African govern­
ment. The Nationalist Party's Tomlinson Commission 
(1955) estimated that even with heavy investment, the 
reserves could only support one-half of the African 
population (Southall 1983, pp. 3G-37; de Villiers 1969, 
p. 409). While the Commission's financial recommenda­
tions were insufficient and its estimates of the carry­
ing capacity of the land were gross overstatements, the 
point is that the Bantustans did not have a viable 
economic base. Moreover, the South African state was 
unwilling to expend funds at even the level recommended
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by the Tomlinson Commission. What it did do was 
establish a few "development corporations" and promote 
the creation of "border industries"— White industries 
located adjacent to the reserves to take advantage of 
cheap labor (Wolpe 1972, p. 452; Southall 1983, pp. 36- 
39 ) .
184. According to Southall (1983, pp. 210-12), a high 
proportion of the labor for of the Transkei must 
migrate to South Africa. The important point is that 
this economic dependence will perpetuate the under­
development of the homelands.
185. When it was clear that Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
were to become independent nations and not part of 
South Africa, Prime Minister Verwoerd observed that 
South Africa would enjoy political and economic 
domination over these areas without having to assume 
responsibility for social welfare expenses (Wilson and 
Ramphele 1989, p. 205). This thinking carried over to 
South Africa's relations with the Bantustans, for 
although it continued to provide them with economic 
support. South Africa forced the Bantustans to become 
increasingly responsible for raising revenue through 
the taxation of their inhabitants (cf. Wolpe 1972, p. 
451). The ultimate Nationalist Party vision for 
Southern Africa was a commonwealth type arrangement 
with South Africa as the regional core exercising 
economic and political suzerainty over "independent" 
African states (cf. Southall 1983, pp. 49-50).
186. The relationship between the Nationalist Party and 
Afrikaner nationalism is reflected in the slogan: "die 
party is die volk en die volk is die Dartv"--"the party 
is the nation and the nation is the party" (de Villiers 
1969, p. 370).
187. The Nationalist Party victory in 1948 was attributed to 
Malan's ability to unify Afrikanerdom. An estimated 
two-thirds of Afrikaners voted for the Nationalist 
Party on 1948 (de Villiers 1969, p. 387).
188. For a discussion of the origins of "Christian-National- 
ism," see Moodie (1975, p. 110). For a graphic 
illustration of the effects of this education, see 
Coles (1986, pp. 184-96).
189. Thus, Afrikaner have assumed some of the characteris­
tics of a dominant ethnic identity (e.g., a decreased 
need for assertion as compared to a minority identity). 
Some British South Africans, on the other hand, began 
to fear for their position in an Afrikaner-dominated
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South Africa and moved towards assuming characteristics 
of a minority group (cf. Spence 1969, p. 486).
190. This ideological front was supported by such institu­
tions as the Nationalist Party-backed South African 
bureau of Racial Affairs (de Villiers 1969, p. 401).
For "academic” works in this tradition, see the 
references cited by van den Berghe (1965, p. 116).
191. Indeed, the position of the African petit bourgeoisie 
was seemingly worsening as a consequence of the 
segregative policies of the apartheid, of policies 
designed to protect White economic interests (e.g., 
restrictions upon African entrepreneurs— cf. Southall 
1983, pp. 186-87), and of the decline of their already 
limited political power (e.g., the effects of the 
"Hertzog bills” of the 1930s).
192. This was, however, not a zero-sum proposition inasmuch 
as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
played an active role in the resistance movement and 
the ANC itself contained a socialist wing.
193. At the same time, it could be argued that the course 
followed by the resistance was predominantly a petty- 
bourgeois program inasmuch as the specific targets were 
the most significant obstacles to the interests of this 
class, as opposed to the more economic interests of the 
working class. This bears an interesting similarity to 
the U.S. civil rights movement, whose program for 
change (e.g., desegregation, voting rights) removed 
obstacles to the mobility of the Black middle class 
more than they improved conditions for the Black 
working class.
194. We should also make parenthetical mention of the 
existence of a White opposition to apartheid--e.g., the 
Liberal and Progressive political parties, the Congress 
of Democrats, and the Black Sash Movement (de Villiers 
1969, pp. 419-21; van den Berghe 1965, pp. 171-74, 243- 
44; Magubane 1979, pp. 314-15). While often courageous 
in face of government persecution, White liberals made 
at best a limited contribution to anti-apartheid 
resistance, a fact which can be attributed to both the 
smallness of their numbers and the general unwilling­
ness of liberals to consider the total restructuring 
(e.g., one person, one vote) of South African society.
195. This was particularly true for Indians, who were 
characterized by Nationalist Party propaganda as 
"unassimilable aliens” and who were subject to an 
unsuccessful government campaign to effect their return
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to India (van den Berghe 1965, p. 152),
196. This occurred in spite of the increase in gold prices 
engendered by the decline of the Bretton Woods Agree­
ment. The important point here is that while gold 
prices could exacerbate or mitigate economic problems, 
mineral exports were no longer sufficient to insure 
economic prosperity. Moreover, to the extent that gold 
continued to play a key role, South Africa was vulner­
able to sudden changes in international gold prices 
(Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 76-79; Innes 1984, pp. 190-91).
197. Innes (1984, pp. 189-90) links the South African eco­
nomic crisis to the peripheral relationship of South 
Africa to the core. Investment during the 1960s was 
extremely capital Intensive, which required the impor­
tation of advanced technology from core nations. Given 
the limited ability of South Africa to export manufac­
tures (due to low productivity and the high cost of 
White labor--both consequences of the apartheid sys­
tem), this eventually led to balance of payments 
difficulties.
198. The impact of this inequality is such that although 
South Africa as a whole has a moderately high per 
capita gross domestic product, the African population, 
particularly the two-thirds who live in the reserves, 
ranks below many Third World nations on such key 
variables as income and life expectancy (cf. Wilson and 
Ramphele 1989, pp. 22-28).
199. While the economic position of some segments of the 
African working class may have improved since 1970 
(i.e., through wage increases for the urban working 
class), there is also evidence that the number of very 
poor has increased and that conditions for this group 
have worsened (cf. Wilson and Ramphele 1989, p. 21).
200. Although the advancement of the Afrikaner capitalist 
class placed in on an increasingly equal footing with 
British capital and resulted in the further diminution 
of British political power, this process was not objec­
tionable to British capital inasmuch as it gave 
Afrikaners a greater stake in maintaining optimal con­
ditions for capitalist accumulation. Indeed, some 
elements of British capital deliberately fostered the 
expansion of Afrikaner capital— cf. Innes (1984, pp. 
158-59) on the role of the Oppenheimer family and the 
Anglo-American Corporation in facilitating Afrikaner 
penetration of the mining industry.
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201. This point has not been lost upon the petit bour­
geoisie, the White working class, and their political 
leaders. As Andries Treurnicht (currently leader of 
the Conservative Party) noted in a 1980 speech (quoted 
by Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 106), "free markets would 
jeopardize the whole edifice of apartheid."
202. By "political irrelevance" we are referring to the 
inability of parties to the "left" of the Nationalist 
Party to provide any meaningful electoral opposition or 
to stymie government policies. White "liberal" politi­
cal parties probably did increase the overall level of 
opposition to apartheid and created additional 
maneuvering room for resistance movements; however, 
their unwillingness to accept broad social change 
precluded any meaningful alliance with African 
resistance movements. Some White radicals (e.g., the 
South African Communist Party) have exhibited total 
opposition to White supremacy (an interesting example 
of the ability of ideology to transcend material 
interests); however, their numbers are currently too 
small to enable them to play a significant role. For 
further discussion of these issues, see Simons and 
Simons (1969); Charney (1986); and de Villiers (1969, 
pp. 417-22).
203. The central theme of this conflict was evident in the 
difference between British and Boer colonial policy and 
in the many clashes between the South African/United 
Parties and the Nationalist Party.
204. Our point here is that the conflict is the same 
(capital vs. the petit bourgeoisie and working 
classes), but that it is no longer expressed in ethnic 
terms because the capitalist-petit bourgeoisie division 
no longer corresponds to the British-Afrikaner 
division. We should also note that while the
verliqte-verkrampte division reflects class interests, 
this does not imply a mechanistic division along the 
lines of Verligte=capital. verkrampte=petit bourgeois 
or working class. Ideologies may emerge from material 
interests; however, they can take on an independent 
existence.
205. This was explicitly stated in 1978 by Nationalist Party 
official Connie Mulder (quoted in Saul and Gelb 1986,
p. 101):
If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion 
as far as the Black people are concerned, there 
will not be one Black man with South African 
cit izenship.
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206. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see 
Southall (1983, pp. 202-308).
207. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see (Saul 
and Gelb 1986, pp. 117-37).
208. As a result of increasing enforcement of the pass laws 
(approximately one-half million arrests per year) and 
forced removals (3.5 million people were resettled 
between 1960 and 1985), the proportion of Africans 
living in urban areas (33% according to official
statistics--which probably underestimate the actual 
figure) remained the same between 1960 and 1980 (Wilson 
and Ramphele 1989, pp. 26; 209-19). For a conceptual 
discussion of issues of partial proletarianization, see 
Saul and Gelb (1986, pp. 147-51).
209. According to data presented by Wilson and Ramphele 
(1989, pp. 38-39, 84-88), the reserve population more 
than doubled between 1960 and 1980, while estimates of 
the proportion of Africans who are unemployed (data are 
limited; however, all sources agree that it is rising 
rapidly) begin at 20%-25%.
210. A key element in the African eth-class structure is the 
absence of a bourgeoisie (the title of Kuper's— 1965—  
book notwithstanding), due to a myriad of restrictions 
on African commercial activity (cf. Southall 1983, p. 
172; van den Berghe 1965, p. 71; Saul and Gelb 1986,
pp . 13 2-33).
211. As we have noted earlier, the creation of such a 
reserve-based comprador class was part of the "divide 
and rule" strategy for inhibiting African national 
mobilization. The South African government has also 
employed this strategy in urban areas via municipal 
councils and assistance to entrepreneurs (Southall 
1983, pp. 192-94; Saul and Gelb 1986, pp. 108-16).
212. To some degree, the emergence of the bantustan elite 
has undoubtedly weakened African resistance to apar­
theid. While commanding little popular support, ban­
tustan governments have been ruthless in suppressing 
opposition and pursuing class interests (Saul and Gelb 
1986, pp. 178-81). This in turn has led to violent 
clashes between bantustan elites and the national 
liberation movement (e.g., between Zulu-based Inkatha 
and the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front).
At the same time, this point should not be overstated. 
The interests of a comprador class may be in many ways 
linked to those of dominant classes (e.g., the dominant
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White groups); however, they are not identical. For 
example, a dispute over territory and South African 
resettlement policies led the Transkei to break off 
diplomatic relations with South Africa from 1978 until 
1980 (Southall 1983, pp. 268-75). For a discussion of 
the potential long-term role of the bantustans, see 
Southall (1983, pp. 281-308).
213. This would probably be more true of the urban petit
bourgeois entrepreneurs, who, while adamantly opposing
apartheid, are already inclined to adopt a more 
"moderate" line with respect to change (Wolpe 1984, 
pp. 246-47; Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 183).
214. See, for example, the statement by Jay Naidoo, General 
Secretary of COSATU (quoted in Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 
236:
I told the ANC and SACTU delegations we did not 
want superficial changes, or Black bosses to 
replace White bosses, while the repressive 
machinery of state and capital remained intact. I
expressed very clearly to them our commitment to
see a society which was not only free of apar­
theid, but also free of the exploitative, 
degrading, and brutalizing system under which 
Black workers suffered. This meant a restructur­
ing of society so that the wealth of the country 
would be shared among the people.
At the same time, the African working class could also 
be vulnerable to the divisive tactics of the South 
African state. Legislation permitting African unions 
and discussion of urban rights could be viewed as an 
attempt to split urban and rural segments of the 
working class by granting concessions to the former.
215. We recognize, of course, that the underdevelopment of 
South Africa was a reflection of its peripheral status 
(i.e., political and economic domination by the core) 
within the capitalist world-economy. Our interest 
here, however, is the nature of South African capital­




At the beginning of this work, we stated that our pur­
pose was to develop a theoretical model useful for explain­
ing the evolution of ethnic and national identities. We 
summarized this endeavor in the question: What causes
ethnic and national identities to emerge, peraist. change, 
or disappear? In our effort to address this goal, we under­
took an intellectual "long march" which included a concep­
tual discussion, a critical review of existing theories of 
the evolution of ethnicity and nationality, presentation of 
our own "class-based" theoretical framework, and two case 
studies in which we employed our model to interpret the 
historical development of intergroup relations in the United 
States and South Africa. Now that we have arrived at our 
destination, we will attempt to draw together the various 
segments of our endeavor.
We shall begin with a summary of the central arguments 
of each chapter in order to provide a succinct statement of 
the core of our work. In addition to this short summary, we 
also intend to consider briefly two global issues. First. 
we will assess the general implications of this work for the 
study of ethnic relations; that is, what we envision to be 
the most fruitful aspects of our model. Secondly, we will 
review our framework in light of our experiences with the
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two case studies, our goal being the development of issues 
for future research.
Summary
From design to execution, we viewed this undertaking as 
an integrated series of tasks, with each part making a sig­
nificant contribution to the larger whole. Following our 
introductory chapter, we began with a conceptual discussion 
(Chapter XI) in which we sought to clarify basic issues of 
ethnicity and nationality (and, to a lesser degree, of 
class), a step which we felt was mandated by the defini­
tional confusion which we believe characterizes the field of 
ethnic studies. In general, we described ethnicity and 
nationality as social attachments, as group affiliations 
grounded in presumed common origin and shared history. 
Moreover, these identities only become meaningful when 
actively contrasted with other such groupings (i.e., an "in­
group" vs. "out-group"). We also proposed a fundamental 
distinction between ethnicity and nationality (one which we 
hope addresses the common tendency to confuse these two 
terms): that ethnic ties are asserted within a society,
while national identities are more inclusive and linked to 
citizenship in a nation-state which is asserted on a global 
level. Yet our discussion did not end with these rather 
static definitions, for we then asserted that ethnic and 
national identities, while putatively communal, assume 
social significance in the course of interoroup resource
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competition and ethnic stratification--conflict stemming 
from differences of power and in relation to the means of 
production. This then led us to the position that ethnic 
and national identities are variables (or, if one prefers, 
strategies), that they emerge, persist, change, or disappear 
as a result of interoroup interaction. In addition, this 
allowed us to posit the existence of intragroup variations 
in identity, differences which can be explained in terms of 
material interests.
Armed with this conceptual arsenal, we then turned to a 
critical review (Chapter III) of existing theories of the 
evolution of ethnic and national identities. We began with 
two basic assertions derived from our conceptual discussion: 
(1) that given their material base, a complete theory of 
ethnicity and nationality must consider them in relation to 
class; and (2) that given their variable (or evolutionary) 
nature, anv theory of ethnicity and nationality must contain 
a theory of social change. In our review of existing theo­
ries, we noted the failure of classical (especially pre- 
1960) social theories--both mainstream and Marxian--to 
account for the persistence of ethnicity in modern societies 
other than as a precapitalist relic or an individual attri­
bute (i.e., the attempt by mainstream U.S. sociologists to 
theorize ethnicity and class out of existence). Our cri­
tique notwithstanding, these initial theories of ethnicity 
experienced a paradigmatic "crisis" (to use Kuhn*s--1970--
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term) in the wake of worldwide ethnic persistence and mobil­
ization in the post-1945 era. As a response to this state 
of affairs, the past three decades have seen the emergence 
of "new” theories of ethnicity and nationality which purport 
to explain the persistence of these bonds in modern socie­
ties, theories which we organized and criticized on the 
basis of the following typology: (1) primordialism; (2)
plural society theories; (3) competition theories; (4) 
reactive ethnicity; and (5) class theories. In general, 
while we felt that all of these approaches contained some 
useful elements, each theory failed to address one or more 
of our core problems (e.g., intragroup variation, change 
over time, and the relationship between ethnicity and 
class).
Following these necessary preliminaries, we then pre­
sented (in Chapter IV) our theoretical framework for under­
standing ethnicity and nationality in the post-1800 era. 
While our model is best taken in toto. its central elements 
can be summarized as follows. We started with the assertion 
that, in the most general sense, the evolution of ethnic and 
national identities can only be understood in the context of 
global capitalist development. In other words, the study of 
social change at the societal level must embody some consid­
eration of external (i.e., world-system) dynamics (cf. 
Wallerstein 1972, p. 222; Shannon 1989, p. 171). We further 
suggested that a central global dynamic is the uneven devel­
opment of the world-system/ and that the evolution of group 
identities can be understood (as we attempted to do in a set 
of working hypotheses— see p p . 136-44) in the context of the 
core-peripherv distinction. Moving to a "lower” level of 
analysis {that of an individual society or nation-state) we 
then outlined several key factors--the course of economic 
development, the ethnic and class composition of a society, 
political structure, and a series of contextual variables 
which we subsumed under the aegis of "intergroup arena"—  
which we believe play a key role in determining the course 
of group identities. Finally, with respect to intergroup 
interaction and ethnic change, we introduced our basic 
analytical concept for the explanation of group action; 
eth-class (i.e., social location in terms of both ethnicity 
and class). From our perspective, this concept could then 
be employed to explain ethnic, national, and class-based 
action in terms of eth-class "alliances" (of which we 
offered a typology--see pp. 120-22) where the bonds of 
ethnicity, nationality, or class were used to mobilize 
groups in order to pursue material interests.
In the last two chapters, we presented case studies 
(the United States and South Africa) in which we applied our 
model to the study of intergroup relations in historically 
specific circumstances. The underlying rationale in selec­
ting these two cases was to allow us to explore the differ­
ential impact of core vs. peripheral capitalist development
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upon the evolution of ethnic relations. In the case of the 
United States, we saw how economic expansion and movement 
into the core produced a complex ethnic pattern character­
ized by immigration and both persistence and change of group 
identities. For South Africa, on the other hand, prolonged 
colonization and peripheral status resulted in expanded 
external (i.e., British) influence and a slower development 
of "modern" ethnic identities. In both cases, processes 
such as industrialization, proletarianization, and urbaniza­
tion— and the specific forms which they assumed in the 
course of national capitalist development--left an indelible 
imprint upon the nature of intergroup relations.
While we gleaned much from our case studies, what 
stands out is the utility of eth-class in explaining group 
mobilization and the evolution of identities. We found 
intergroup interaction to be an infinitely complicated 
process: identities and ideologies emerged from material
(and non-material) practice, and in turn altered the course 
of subsequent resource competition. Nevertheless, by view­
ing group identities as linked to eth-class strategies, we 
were able to interpret such diverse phenomena as Black- 
American mobilization, European immigrant ethnic merger and 
assimilation, and the exclusionary actions of Anglo-Ameri­
cans in United States; or Afrikaner mobilization, apartheid, 
and African resistance in South Africa. In addition, our 
eth-class/resource competition model enabled us to explain
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differences between groups (e.g., why British South Africans 
downplayed group identity while Afrikaners engaged in ethnic 
assertion) and even differences within groups (e.g., why 
upper and middle class White Ethnics happened to assimilate 
more quickly than the enclave-based working class). Thus, 
as the culmination of our endeavor, the two case studies 
provided us with a diverse array of data with which to test 
our model. We will provide our evaluation of the results in 
the following sections.
The Study of Interoroup Relations
What conclusions can we reach about the study of ethni­
city and nationality? At the outset, we posited that these 
group identities are not immutable, but that they evolve as 
a result of intergroup interaction. Throughout our analysis 
of the two case studies, we attempted to demonstrate that 
the explanation of this process of change must be grounded 
in global, historical, and material processes. Modern eth­
nic identities, whether Asian-American or Afrikaner, are 
forged during intergroup resource competition and shaped by 
the dynamics of global and national capitalist development 
and by the evolution of the arena in which groups interact. 
Having thus far completed our research, we would like to add 
that we are convinced of the essential validity of this 
statement.
By placing analytical emphasis upon global dynamics, 
we are asserting that the analysis of intergroup relations
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within a particular society must take into consideration 
the impact of forces external to that society. Indeed, 
ethnic relations have their genesis in contact between 
peoples who were previously separate, most notably the 
processes of conquest, colonization, and immigration which 
characterized the centuries of European expansion. More­
over, we saw that the impact of global forces does not end 
once groups have been brought into contact. Specific pro­
cesses of the worId-system, such as core-periphery rela­
tions, continue to shape the context in which groups inter­
act {e.g., the impact of the rise and fall of British impe­
rialism upon relations between settlers and natives in South 
Africa).
Of equal importance to our approach to the study of 
intergroup relations is the emphasis which we have placed 
upon adopting a historical perspective. Simply stated, we 
believe that ethnic and national identities can only be 
analyzed as ongoing processes; that is, that the nature of 
group identification (and intergroup interaction) during any 
time period is conditioned by events which occurred during 
previous epochs. Ethnic change cannot be studied when it 
is isolated from history. This point was repeatedly illus­
trated during the course of our case studies. One cannot, 
for example, understand the current social significance of 
African-American ethnicity without linking it to such past
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phenomena as the Civil Rights Movement, the Jim Crow era, 
and the institution of slavery.
The third component of our analytical trinity is a 
recognition of the overriding importance of mater ial 
interests in the study of group identities and intergroup 
relations. Throughout our analysis, we explored the funda­
mental link between ethnic identity and resource competition 
between groups. From our vantage point, the assertion, 
masking, or alteration of group ties can be interpreted as 
strategies employed to pursue specific material, as well as 
meta-material, interests in a particular intergroup arena 
(e.g., twentieth century Afrikaner ethnic mobilization as a 
means for enhancing their economic and political position 
vis-a-vis other South African ethnic groups). As we have 
noted previously, this is not to reduce ethnicity to an 
epiphenomenon of economic life (indeed, we have repeatedly 
observed that while ethnic ideologies may emerge from 
material life, they are capable of assuming an independent 
social existence— and may in turn influence economic life), 
but to underscore the general primacy of material forces in 
the study of ethnic relations.
While we have linked the evolution of ethnic identities 
to strategies employed in intergroup resource competition, 
we also found that social reality is much more complex than 
attributing a single strategy (and, hence, identity) to an 
entire group. With few exceptions, ethnic groups are inter­
nally differentiated with respect to class (i.e., relations 
of production), thus giving rise to subgroups with poten­
tially diverse interests and strategies. Throughout our 
examination of the United States and South African case 
studies, we repeatedly demonstrated the efficacy of the eth- 
class (i.e., objective social location in terms of both 
ethnicity and class) as a useful analytical tool for under­
standing the complexity of intergroup relations. As 
employed herein, the notion of eth-class captures the 
reality that ethnic groups contain class divisions (and 
vice-versa) and therefore cannot be studied as monolithic 
entities (as is too often done in the field of ethnic rela­
tions) but rather as separate "fractions" with unique group 
interests and which may employ different "strategies" with 
respect to ethnic identities. Consequently, when ethnic 
mobilization does occur, it represents a temporary alliance 
(due to a real or perceived compatibility of interests) 
among the eth-classes of a particular group (e.g., the use 
of "ethnic" strategies such as occupational networks and 
political machines in immigrant enclaves in the nineteenth 
century United States). At the same time, divergent inter­
ests among eth-classes may lead to strategies which are 
quite different (e.g., the different rates of assimilation 
for elite, middle class, and working class "White Ethnics" 
in the twentieth century United States). Only by employing
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the concept of eth-class can we begin to unravel the complex 
web of intergroup relations.
In general, we believe that the approach presented in 
our model is useful in the analysis of a diverse array of 
ethnic phenomena. We have not provided a theoretical for­
mula, but rather a set of interrelated concepts, proposi­
tions, and methodological directives. During the course of 
our case studies, we were able to employ our model to gen­
erate explanations for both the diversity of outcomes which 
mark the ethnic history of the United States and the more 
stable cleavages which divide South African society. We 
believe that a particular strength of our framework lies in 
its ability to account for change— historically a problem­
atic issue for the study of ethnic relations. In the con­
text of our framework, intergroup interaction assumes a 
dynamic nature; that is, it is continually shaped and re­
shaped by external factors, by the evolution of global as 
well as national forces and relations of production, and by 
the process of eth-class struggle. As a result, we see a 
constant reworking of group interests, strategies, and 
ability to achieve objectives. Consequently, we believe 
that we have achieved our goal of developing a model useful 
for explaining the evolution of ethnic identities.
Directions for Further Research 
During our case studies, we asserted that one objective 
was to use the findings to suggest future refinements for
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our theoretical model. Admittedly, as we developed and 
applied our framework, we painted with broad analytical 
strokes. Moreover, both case studies were concerned with 
intergroup relations in large arenas over periods of more 
than three centuries. As a result, we believe that our 
framework requires more detailed elaboration of the pro­
cesses through which group identities evolve. For example, 
the emergence of African group identity, which we addressed 
in a few pages as part of a broad analysis, could be the 
focus of an in-depth examination which would undoubtedly 
yield further insights into the nature of both ethnicity and 
nationality. Likewise, other dynamics--e.g ., the impact of 
industrialization and the spread of market relations, the 
demographic balance between groups--could and should be 
explored in more detail.
After completing the case studies, we are left with a 
lingering sense of uneasiness that our explanation of ethnic 
change is at times too idiosyncratic. In other words, 
although our model provides what we believe to be an ade­
quate basis for the study of the evolution of group identi­
ties, it does so by linking this process to a unique config­
uration of elements and to the actions of specific groups in 
a particular intergroup arena. If we are serious about 
developing a class-based theory of ethnicity, then we need 
more nomothetic explanations--for example, more general 
statements of the conditions which give rise to such out­
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comes as assimilation, ethnic merger, and group mobiliza­
tion. Towards this end, we believe that our model would 
benefit from comparative application to the broadest pos­
sible range of cases— including what is happening nowadays 
in the way of ethnic assertiveness in the U.S.S.R. and other 
non-capitalist states. Only then can we develop a suffi­
cient data base to enable us to make the general statements 
necessary for refinement of our model.
Another matter which demands further elaboration is the 
issues of level of analysis. As we observed in Chapter I, 
human social behavior takes place across a range of inter­
related levels from the world-system to the dyad, with 
interactions at any level closely linked to events occurring 
on other levels. Accordingly, a theory of ethnicity should 
be able to articulate interrelationships between levels if 
it is truly to account for the evolution of group identi­
ties. While we believe that our framework adequately con­
nects intergroup interaction within states to world-system 
processes, it became increasingly clear to us during the 
case studies that this is but part of the picture, that our 
model needs to be extended to incorporate ethnic relations 
at the regional and local levels, as well as the bureau­
cratic or institutional level. Where we did undertake such 
analysis--e.g., the examination of different trajectories of 
intergroup relations in the Northern, Southern, and Western 
United States--our ability to explain ethnic change was
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greatly enhanced. At the same time, we recognize that other 
such phenomena remain unexplored; for example, regional 
variations in South Africa {e.g., intergroup relations in 
the Transvaal as compared to the Cape Province); the role of 
Hispanic ethnicity in the United States Southwest as opposed 
to Florida; Indian vs. African conflict in Durban, South 
Africa; urban vs. rural differences (e.g., among African- 
Americans); and the reported greater development of African 
ethnicity among Xhosa in the Eastern Cape than among Zulus 
in Natal. Clearly, such "lower-level" studies would consti­
tute an important direction for future research.
Thirdly, we believe that our theoretical framework 
requires additional specification of the mechanisms through 
which groups form strategies and mobilize for action. As it 
stands, in application of our model, we could be accused of 
being teleoloqical: that is, we have explained group actions 
in terms of material interests without directly linking the 
interests to the action, but merely by establishing an ex 
post facto correlation between actions and presumed inter­
ests. We need to address more thoroughly such questions as: 
What propels groups (and the individuals who comprise them) 
to mobilize for action and what determines the specific form 
and nature of this mobilization? On a theoretical level, 
this would involve linking our framework to theories of 
social movements, as well as specifying the role of ideology 
and culture (in relation to material interests) in group
mobilization (cf. Touraine 1988). This would then enable us 
to explain the timing and form of ethnic assertion (e.g., 
why the United States Civil Rights Movement emerged in the 
1950s and 1960s, why it took the form of demands for inclu­
sion, and why it gave rise to the development of a more 
radical Black nationalism among some group members). In our 
case studies, ve would have to construct a more detailed 
exposition of the evolution of group strategies and action, 
perhaps through the use of primary sources (e.g., statements 
of leaders, intellectuals, and other key actors) which would 
enable us to explore the perceptions of actors and the for­
mation of strategies. Where we did include quotes or ex­
tracts from official reports (e.g., in the debate over the 
homelands policy in our South African case study), they 
immeasurably added to the strength of our analysis. While 
this would entail exhaustive research, it would provide for 
the fullest possible explanation of group action and ethnic 
change.
Finally, we recognize that the preliminary nature of 
our framework has resulted in a number of issues being over­
looked or incompletely addressed. We believe that these 
issues are significant and would provide fruitful ground for 
further research and subsequent refining of our approach. 
While we do not claim to address all possibilities, we would 
particularly like to emphasize the following issues:
1. The evolution of ethnic identities in non-capital­
ist societies. This question is particularly interest­
ing following recent developments in the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Rumania, and Tibet. While we believe that 
our framework— time-bound, as are all frameworks— could 
be applied directly to these societies during their 
periods of capitalist development, we also recognize 
that post-revolutionary societies would have their own 
lavs of motion and class structures, which will in turn 
require new working hypotheses with regard to the evo­
lution of ethnic and national Identities.1
2. The role of the non-materlal in influencing the 
shape and evolution of ethnic and national identities. 
Although we have acknowledged that ideas, ideologies, 
and the social-psychological aspects of ethnicity may 
in turn influence economic life— and, hence, our asser­
ted material basis of ethnic identity— it is clear that 
our framework must be expanded in order to account for 
these processes inasmuch as they particularly sustain 
the ethnic component of the eth-class.
3. Further specification of the impact of relations of 
power and the role of the state upon intergroup inter­
action. While we made a first attempt at assessing the 
role of the state in intergroup relations and eth-class 
struggle, we recognize that additional elaboration is 
necessary (cf. Carnoy 1984; Nash 1989) if we are to
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develop a more complete framework for understanding 
ethnic change.
4. The evolution of ethnic and national identities in 
other peripheral societies. Although we have chosen 
South Africa as our peripheral case study (its rela­
tively long— for the periphery— period of incorporation 
into the capitalist world-economy constitutes a greater 
data base for analysis), we admit that its movement 
into the semiperiphery and its post-1974 emergence as
a regional power disqualify it as an "ideal-typical" 
peripheral society. Consequently, application of our 
framework to more "traditional" peripheral societies 
(e.g., Chad or Senegal) would enhance our understanding 
of the impact of uneven capitalist development upon 
group identities.
5. Exploration of possible linkages between ethnicity, 
eth-class, and other bases for understanding group 
action--e.g., status-groups or "estates" (cf. Khleif 
1984b). This could potentially involve reconsideration 
of race beyond our casting of it as a subcategory of 
ethnicity— particularly in light of our analytic empha­
sis upon the Black-White and White-non White divisions 
in our case studies of South Africa and the United 
States— and greater specification of the role of 
"racial" ideologies in intergroup relations.
517
Conclusion
As we stated at the outset, the goal of this work was 
not to present a finished theory of ethnicity and nation­
ality, but rather to provide a point of departure for fur­
ther inquiry. This undertaking emerged as a result of our 
dissatisfaction with existing approaches to the study of 
ethnicity, a judgement which we applied both to works within 
the field of ethnic relations and to more general approaches 
to the study of social behavior. In response, we sought to 
lay the groundwork for a class-based theory of ethnicity 
which incorporated insights from the study of both of these 
forms of group affiliation. At the risk of seeming presump­
tuous, we believe we can state that we have achieved this 
objective, that the concepts presented and demonstrated in 
this work provide a fruitful basis for understanding ethnic 
relations. What remains to be done is to continue to pursue 
this process on both the theoretical and the substantive 
levels— to see what calls for conceptual refinement. In 
other words, we must continue to seek to answer the ques­
tion: What causes ethnic and national identities to emerge,
persist, change._or disappear?
The potential rewards for this endeavor are great. The 
human propensity for using the communal bonds of ethnicity 
and nationality for group mobilization remains as strong as 
ever. As we write these words, ethnic conflict flares in 
the streets of New York City; in the seeming fragmentation
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of the Soviet Union; in the cleavages which continue to 
divide Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Palestine/Israel; and in the 
renewed struggle to restructure South African society. Only 
if we explore issues of ethnicity and class ^nd their inter­
relationship can we hope to understand intergroup relations 
in all their complexity. And only through such understand­
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